{
  "id": 8526096,
  "name": "WILLIE MAE JOYNER, Widow of JESSE JOYNER, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiff v. J. P. STEVENS AND COMPANY, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Joyner v. J. P. Stevens & Co.",
  "decision_date": "1984-12-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 8410IC343",
  "first_page": "625",
  "last_page": "628",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "year": 1979,
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          "page": "204-05"
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      "category": "reporters:state",
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      "year": 1979,
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:06.115640+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Webb and Hill concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "WILLIE MAE JOYNER, Widow of JESSE JOYNER, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiff v. J. P. STEVENS AND COMPANY, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThis appeal raises the single question of whether plaintiff is entitled to benefits pursuant to G.S. 97-38, which in pertinent part provides: \u201cIf death results proximately from the accident and within two years thereafter, or while total disability still continues and within six years after the accident, the employer shall pay . . . compensation. . . .\u201d Resolution of this question depends upon when the \u201caccident\u201d occurred that ultimately caused the deceased employee\u2019s death.\nBecause occupational diseases usually develop over a prolonged period of exposure to hazardous conditions rather than from a single event, G.S. 97-52 defines \u201caccident\u201d as \u201c[disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease. . . .\u201d See Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 482-83, 256 S.E. 2d 189, 204-05 (1979). G.S. 97-54 provides that \u201cdisablement\u201d is equivalent to \u201cdisability\u201d as defined in G.S. 97-2(9), which is \u201cincapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.\u201d Thus an \u201caccident\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 97-38 occurred when the deceased employee\u2019s disability due to chronic obstructive lung disease began.\nPlaintiff contends that her husband\u2019s decline from partial disability to total disability status on 10 October 1980 constituted an \u201caccident\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 97-38, as the Commission concluded. His 19 March 1982 death therefore would have occurred within two years of the accident, entitling her to G.S. 97-38 benefits. Plaintiff notes that the policy of liberally construing workers\u2019 compensation statutes to allow coverage supports her contention.\nWe nonetheless believe the deceased employee\u2019s \u201caccident\u201d occurred on 23 December 1975. That is the date he officially lost wage earning capacity due to his occupational disease and became disabled. Clearly, he suffered an \u201caccident\u201d on that date. G.S. 97-38 contemplates only one accident leading to death when it states \u201cthe accident.\u201d Death benefits accrue only if death occurs within the maximum statutorily set time after \u201cthe accident.\u201d It would defy legislative intent to hold that subsequent changes in disability status arising from the same occupational disease created new \u201caccidents,\u201d thereby renewing the time limit for claiming G.S. 97-38 benefits.\nAs defendants contend, the rule limiting occupational disease victims to a single claim for purposes of the statute of limitations in G.S. 97-58(c) applies by analogy to allow occupational disease victims to claim only one \u201caccident\u201d under G.S. 97-38. In rejecting a claimant\u2019s argument that the limitations period began to run from the time when his disability status changed from partial to total, the Supreme Court stated,\nWe did not in any way indicate in Taylor [v. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E. 2d 144 (1980)] that only total and permanent disability would trigger the running of the two year period or that a separate, independent and additional two year period would commence under the statute if the employee\u2019s disability from the occupational disease evolved from permanent partial disability into permanent total disability.\nDowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, 308 N.C. 701, 714, 304 S.E. 2d 215, 223 (1983). Thus the onset of plaintiffs husband\u2019s disability on 23 December 1975 was the only \u201caccident\u201d from which the G.S. 97-38 time limits for benefits ran. Because plaintiffs husband died in 1982, over six years after his \u201caccident\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 97-38, plaintiffs claim for benefits under G.S. 97-38 is barred.\nOur holding is a harsh but necessary result of the statutory scheme. Booker, supra, 297 N.C. at 483-84, 256 S.E. 2d at 205. The legislature has amended G.S. 97-38 to cover occupational disease deaths where the employee had total disability and died within two years of the final determination of his total disability. This amendment became effective on 15 July 1983 and is of no avail to plaintiff since her claim is controlled by the version of G.S. 97-38 in force at the time of her husband\u2019s death. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 772, s. 2.\nWe recognize that application of G.S. 97-38 may sometimes have the effect of barring an otherwise valid and provable claim simply because the employee did not die within the requisite period of time. . . . The remedy for any inequities arising from the statute, however, lies not with the courts but with the legislature.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges Webb and Hill concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for plaintiff, appellee.",
      "Maupin, Taylor & Ellis, P.A., by David V. Brooks, for defendants, appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WILLIE MAE JOYNER, Widow of JESSE JOYNER, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiff v. J. P. STEVENS AND COMPANY, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. 8410IC343\n(Filed 4 December 1984)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 55.1\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 death from occupational disease-time of \u201caccident\u201d\nAn employee\u2019s \u201caccident\u201d leading to his death from chronic obstructive lung disease occurred, for the purposes of compensation under G.S. 97-38, when the employee\u2019s permanent partial disability due to chronic obstructive lung disease began rather than on the date he became totally disabled, and plaintiffs claim for death benefits under G.S. 97-38 was barred where the employee died over six years after his \u201caccident.\u201d\nAppeal by defendants from an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission filed 3 November 1983. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 1984.\nThe evidence and findings establish the following uncon-troverted facts: On 4 June 1980 the Industrial Commission found that deceased employee Jesse Joyner had contracted chronic obstructive lung disease due to his occupational exposure to cotton dust while employed by defendant J. P. Stevens (hereinafter defendant). The Commission made an award of compensation for permanent partial disability pursuant to G.S. 97-30 for a period beginning 23 December 1975 and not to exceed 300 weeks. Joyner became totally disabled on 10 October 1980, and died as a result of his occupational disease on 19 March 1982. Plaintiff, who is the deceased employee\u2019s widow, applied for death benefits under G.S. 97-38.\nThe Commission found and concluded that the date of the \u201caccident\u201d leading to death was, for purposes of compensation under G.S. 97-38, 10 October 1980, the date when the deceased employee\u2019s total disability began. On the basis of the foregoing conclusion, the Commission awarded plaintiff benefits in accordance with G.S. 97-38. Defendants appealed.\nCharles R. Hassell, Jr., for plaintiff, appellee.\nMaupin, Taylor & Ellis, P.A., by David V. Brooks, for defendants, appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0625-01",
  "first_page_order": 659,
  "last_page_order": 662
}