{ "id": 8526215, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY EUGENE WALLACE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wallace", "decision_date": "1984-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 8426SC105", "first_page": "681", "last_page": "691", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 N.C. App. 681" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "175 S.E. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561810 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524901 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571013 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E. 2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524109 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E. 2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564026 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E. 2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621547 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571955 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" }, { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565531 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" }, { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563440 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560709 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571760 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0169-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 24431, "ocr_confidence": 0.819, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2132294748680833e-07, "percentile": 0.7767711553839626 }, "sha256": "916892ae723f083f552846b482c0ea7771ea2f30f5029ba57058406d0cba3212", "simhash": "1:99675dbb723fc456", "word_count": 4048 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:06.115640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY EUGENE WALLACE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\n1. The Suppression of Identification Evidence .\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence of a pretrial out-of-court photographic identification and the in-court identification of defendant by the witness Marianne Best. Defendant argues that the out-of-court photographic display was so suggestive and that Ms. Best\u2019s in-court identification was so unreliable that there was a substantial chance that she mistakenly identified defendant, thus causing a denial of his right to a fair trial. We disagree.\nIdentification evidence must be excluded as violative of the due process clause \u201cwhere the facts of the case reveal a pretrial identification procedure so impermissibly suggestive that there is a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.\u201d State v. Thompson, 303 N.C. 169, 171, 277 S.E. 2d 431, 433 (1981). In determining whether the out-of-court photographic identification is suggestive, the factors to be considered include whether the accused is somehow distinguished from others in the line-up or in a set of photographs, see id.; State v. Smith, 278 N.C. 476, 180 S.E. 2d 7 (1971), and whether the witness is given some extraneous information by the police which leads her to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the offense. Id.\nIn the case at bar, the witness was first given a photograph of a line-up of which the defendant was a member. All persons in the line-up were dressed the same, in khaki shirts and dark pants. All were approximately the same height and weight. All but one (not the defendant) had facial hair. Four had close-cropped head hair while the other two had somewhat longer hair. All wore a number tag. As compared to the others, defendant had no markedly different physical characteristics. The witness chose defendant out of this line-up. She said she was positive about this identification. She testified that the police officer conducting the photographic display told her to ignore letters, numbers, or scratches on the photograph. We find nothing suggestive in this method of identification.\nThe witness was given another similar line-up photograph, which did not contain defendant. She refused to identify anyone in that photograph as the person who committed the robbery.\nFinally, the witness was shown individual photographs, one of which pictured the defendant. All persons in this set of photographs wore glasses, had facial hair, and had head hair approximately the same length as the defendant\u2019s. In each photo, there were number tags. Yet, in defendant\u2019s photo, the number tag was a police identification sign with a cas\u00e9 number on it. In certain circumstances, such a sign might have impermissibly influenced the witness to identify the defendant as the robber. Clearly, the better practice for such photographic identification would have been to use a handwritten tag in defendant\u2019s photograph, as was used with the other persons. We do not find, however, that in this case the police number sign was so suggestive that it would make a misidentification substantially likely. Each photograph had some sort of numbered sign or tag, located on or to one side of the subject. Indeed, one of the subjects (not the defendant) was pictured next to a height chart. Each photo was taken of the subject\u2019s upper torso so that attention was directed towards the face and away from any sign or tag. The police told the witness to disregard any sign or marks. In light of these circumstances, the police number tag did not so taint the photo identification that it should have been excluded.\nFinally, we deal with the issue of repetition. Defendant was the only subject pictured in both the photo line-up and the individual photographs. Our study of the photographs convinces us that this also was not unduly suggestive, especially in light of the fact that the witness was shown the individual photographs ten days after seeing the line-up, and did not have both of them before her at the same time for comparison.\nDefendant contends that the in-court identification was tainted by the victim\u2019s out-of-court identification of defendant in the police photographs. Even if the photographic identification was impermissibly suggestive (and we find it was not), the central question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, \u201cthe identification of defendant at trial was reliable and of independent origin.\u201d State v. Headen, 295 N.C. 437, 441, 245 S.E. 2d 706, 710 (1978). In assessing the reliability and independent origin of the identification, we must consider: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness\u2019s degree of attention, the accuracy of her prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Headen, 295 N.C. at 442, 245 S.E. 2d at 710.\nOpportunity to view: Ms. Best had ample opportunity to view the defendant. The crime occurred at around 9:30 in the morning. All the lights were on in the laundry. Nothing obstructed Ms. Best\u2019s view of defendant. He came within eighteen inches of her, and she got a close look at his face. She was not wearing her prescribed eyeglasses that day, but she was farsighted, so that whether she wore them or not made no difference as to her capacity to identify the robber.\nDegree of attention: We are convinced that Ms. Best intentionally focused her eyes on the defendant in order to remember his features. Unlike Ms. Andrews, the other shop assistant, who became upset, Ms. Best had considerable control of herself during the crime.\nAccuracy of the description: Ms. Best gave police officers a detailed description of defendant. It was accurate, as to height, weight, and facial pockmarks. Ms. Best described no particular features defendant did not possess. Nor did he have any outstanding feature she failed to mention.\nWitness\u2019s level of certainty: Ms. Best said she was absolutely positive in her identification of defendant in the first line-up photo. In court as well, she appeared to have no problem in identifying him.\nTime between the crime and the confrontation: The crime occurred on 18 May 1983. Within a week after the crime, Ms. Best was shown the photo of the line-up that did not contain defendant. She was shown the photo of the line-up that contained defendant on 4 June 1983 and positively identified him. She was shown the individual photographs on 14 June 1983. Trial occurred in early September, 1983. The time between the crime and Ms. Best\u2019s photo identification was relatively short. The time between the crime and her in-court identification was not so long as to make the identification doubtful.\nWeighing the factors in this case we do not find reason to doubt the reliability and independent origin of Ms. Best\u2019s in-court identification, even had the photographic identification been im-permissibly suggestive.\n2. Admissibility of \u201cOpinion\u201d Testimony\nThe defendant contends further that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Marianne Best to the effect that she believed that the gun used in the robbery would kill her if she did not do what the robber said. The defendant argues that such testimony was an unsupported statement of opinion that invaded the province of the jury to decide whether the robber used a dangerous weapon and so threatened Ms. Best\u2019s or Ms. Andrews\u2019s life.\nOpinion evidence is generally inadmissible if the witness can relate the facts \u201cso that the jury will have an adequate understanding of them and the jury is as well-qualified as the witness to draw inferences and conclusions from the facts.\u201d 1 Stansbury\u2019s North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 124 (Brandis rev. 1973), quoted in State v. Lucas, 302 N.C. 342, 348, 275 S.E. 2d 433, 437 (1981). The \u201copinion rule\u201d forces the witness to give as detailed a recital of his or her perception of the facts as is reasonably possible. The rule appears to have two purposes: to test the witness\u2019s perception of the facts, and to prevent the witness from unfairly influencing the jury\u2019s conclusions. 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 123 (2d rev. ed. 1982). The rule has been much-criticized, and is subject to a number of exceptions, see id. at \u00a7 125. One of these, which we feel applies in this case, is that a witness may testify as to \u201cinstantaneous conclusions . . . derived from observation of a variety of facts presented to the senses at one and the same time.\u201d State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 23, 269 S.E. 2d 125, 129 (1980).\nIn this case, the prosecution seeks to prove that defendant is guilty of armed robbery as defined in G.S. 14-87(a). Two elements of that crime are (1) that the accused had in possession, used or threatened to use a firearm or other dangerous weapon and (2) that he used it to endanger or threaten the life of another person. The defendant alleges that the witness, Ms. Best, should not have been allowed to testify directly that the gun in the robber\u2019s hand was one that would kill her if she did not do what he said. Defendant argues that she was testifying directly as to the ultimate fact that the weapon was dangerous and threatened her life. This, the defendant says, the jury should have decided without her testimony.\nMs. Best positively identified the object in the defendant\u2019s hand as a \u201crevolver,\u201d and as \u201ca gun.\u201d The prosecuting attorney then asked her what type it was:\nQ. At the time that the gun was being pointed at you across the counter, did you know what kind of gun it was?\nMr. Bragg: Objection\nThe Court: Overruled.\nA. No, only that it was a revolver.\nQ. Do you know to this date what kind of gun it was?\nA. No I do not.\nQ. What kind of gun did you believe it to bel\nMr. Bragg: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nA. One that would kill me if I didn\u2019t do what he said.\n(Emphasis added.)\nMs. Best was thus being asked, since she did not know the make or type of gun the robber pointed at her, what was her belief or impression at the time as to the type of gun the robber held. Her belief at the time of the crime was an \u201cinstantaneous conclusion,\u201d drawn from observation of a variety of facts at once. See Joyner, 301 N.C. at 23, 269 S.E. 2d at 129. It was an \u201copinion\u201d which in a legal sense was a \u201cfact,\u201d helpful to the jury in comprehending what happened the morning of 18 May. The jury\u2019s province was not invaded by allowing it to consider and weigh this evidence along with Ms. Best\u2019s \u201copinion\u201d that the gunshot sounded like that from a starter\u2019s pistol, and her failure to remember whether the gun had a hole in the barrel.\n3. Variance between the indictment and the proof\nThe defendant contends next that there was a fatal variance between the allegations in the indictment and the evidence at trial as to the location of the alleged robbery and the person or entity from whom personal property was taken. The indictment read that defendant stole seventy-eight dollars from \u201cAmerican Cleaners Corporation, a corporation doing business as Holiday Cleaners when Marianne Elmore Best was present and in attendance.\u201d Ms. Best testified on direct examination that she worked for American Cleaning Corporation, Holiday Cleaners Division. On cross-examination, she said she worked for Americana Cleaning Corporation.\n\u201c[A] fatal variance results in larceny cases where title to the property is laid in one person by the indictment and proof shows it in another.\u201d State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 345, 185 S.E. 2d 881, 884 (1972); see also State v. Law, 227 N.C. 103, 104, 40 S.E. 2d 699, 700 (1946). In the case at bar, the testimony at trial did not show that the money stolen was taken from a business other than the Holiday Cleaners where Ms. Best was employed, or that there were two corporations, one called the American Cleaners Corporation and the other called the Americana Cleaning Corporation, both operating businesses called Holiday Cleaners. It only showed a slight discrepancy between the corporate name given in the indictment and that given by Ms. Best. We are not convinced that there was a fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial, such that crimes at two different places of business were described.\n4. Denial of defendant\u2019s motion for judgment as of nonsuit and for dismissal\nDefendant contends also that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment as of nonsuit and for dismissal when there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law of the commission of a robbery with a firearm or dangerous weapon as provided in G.S. 14-87(a). In ruling on the defendant\u2019s motions, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence on every element of the offense charged, interpreting the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E. 2d 699, 703 (1981); State v. Quick, 60 N.C. App. 771, 772-73, 299 S.E. 2d 815, 816 (1983). The defendant argues that the State failed to provide \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d that a dangerous weapon or firearm was used in the commission of the robbery at Holiday Cleaners.\nThe State provided testimony by Ms. Best that the robber held a \u201crevolver,\u201d and a \u201cgun.\u201d She testified further that she could not remember whether it had a hole in its barrel, but that it was the type of gun that could kill her, ie., that it was a real gun. She also testified that when the gun was fired inside the cleaning establishment, it sounded like a blank gun. The State elicited from Ms. Best that the building was made of cinder block, and that the ceiling was partially cinder block and partially, as we understand, ceiling tiles on runners. Ms. Best and Ms. Andrews were standing at the rear of the building when the shot was fired, where there were four racks of clothes, each thirty feet long, and various pieces of dry-cleaning and ironing equipment. Drawing all inferences in favor of the State, we conclude that the jury had substantial evidence to conclude that the gun was a real and dangerous weapon, and that the sound of the shot was affected by the accoustical properties of the building.\n5. Lawfulness of the warrantless arrest\nDefendant contends finally that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that he was under lawful arrest at the time he was photographed. The issues we face are whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and whether \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d excused their obtaining an arrest warrant.\nOn the morning of 26 May 1983, the Charlotte police arrested Charles Alexander. Mr. Alexander had been staying at the New Imperial Motel in Charlotte, and was suspected of being involved in armed robberies in the Charlotte area. At 9:45 a.m., Alexander signed a statement implicating the defendant and several other persons in two of nine armed robberies Alexander had committed. Alexander gave a description of defendant which matched that given in offense reports the police had for robberies in Charlotte. The information given by Alexander, together with the fact that his description of defendant matched that given by witnesses in the offense reports, gave the police a reasonable ground to believe that defendant had participated in armed robberies in Charlotte. They therefore had probable cause to arrest him. See State v. Alexander, 279 N.C. 527, 532, 184 S.E. 2d 274, 278 (1971).\nAlexander told the police that defendant was also staying at the New Imperial Motel, in the same room Alexander had occupied. At 10:00 a.m., the police called the motel clerk, who informed them that defendant had recently left the motel with another person. The police asked the clerk to call them when defendant returned. The police were in the process of making out warrants when the clerk called and informed the police that defendant had returned and was taking articles out of the motel room as if in preparation to leave. This occurred fifteen to twenty minutes after the police called the motel. On hearing that defendant was leaving, the police immediately went to the motel. They arrested defendant in his room without a warrant at 10:25 a.m.\nApplying the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d test adopted in State v. Yananokwiak, 65 N.C. App. 513, 517, 309 S.E. 2d 560, 563 (1983), we hold that the fact that the defendant appeared to be about to check out of the motel and leave the area, and that he was suspected of having participated in more than one violent offense, constituted \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d which excused the warrantless entry into defendant\u2019s motel room and arrest. Thus, the testimony as to identification of defendant, resulting from the use of a photograph of defendant taken after his arrest but before warrants were secured, should not be suppressed under the rule of State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 84, 175 S.E. 2d 583, 595 (1970), as the product of an illegal arrest.\nNo error.\nJudges Wells and Hill concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Jane P. Gray, for the State.", "Ellis M. Bragg for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY EUGENE WALLACE\nNo. 8426SC105\n(Filed 18 December 1984)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.9\u2014 identification from photograph of lineup \u2014 no impermissible suggestiveness\nA pretrial identification procedure in which a robbery victim identified the defendant as the robber from a photograph of a lineup was not imper-missibly suggestive where all persons in the lineup were dressed the same; all were approximately the same height and weight; all but one (not the defendant) had facial hair; all wore a number tag; defendant had no markedly different physical characteristics from other persons in the lineup; and the officer conducting the photographic display told the victim to ignore letters, numbers or scratches on the photograph.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.9\u2014 photographic identification procedure \u2014 number tag on defendant\u2019s photograph different from others \u2014 no impermissible suggestiveness\nA photographic identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive because the number tag shown in the photograph of defendant was a police identification sign with a case number on it while handwritten number tags were used in the other photographs where each photograph showed the subject\u2019s upper torso so that attention was directed toward the face and away from any sign or tag, and where officers told the witness to disregard any signs or marks on the photographs.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.9\u2014 pretrial photographic identifications \u2014 defendant\u2019s photograph only one in two procedures \u2014 no impermissible suggestiveness\nPretrial photographic procedures were not impermissibly suggestive because defendant was the only person who appeared both in a photograph of a lineup and in individual photographs shown to a robbery victim, especially since the victim was shown the individual photographs ten days after seeing the lineup photograph and did not have both of them before her at the same time for comparison.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.16\u2014 in-court identification \u2014 independent origin from photographic procedures\nA robbery victim\u2019s in-court identification of defendant was of independent origin and not tainted by pretrial photographic identification procedures where the victim had ample opportunity to view defendant in that the robbery occurred at 9:30 a.m., the lights were on in the laundry in which the robbery occurred, defendant came within eighteen inches of the victim and the victim got a close look at his face; the victim intentionally focused her eyes on defendant in order to remember his features; the victim gave the police an accurate detailed description of defendant; the victim was positive in her first photographic identification of defendant; and only seventeen days passed between the robbery and the victim\u2019s first photographic identification of defendant.\n5. Criminal Law 8 50.1; Robbery 8 3\u2014 ability oi gun to kill \u2014 competency oi testimony\nA robbery victim's testimony that the gun used by the defendant in the robbery was \u201cone that would kill me if I didn\u2019t do what he said\u201d was admissible as an instantaneous conclusion of the mind and did not invade the province of the jury.\n6. Robbery 8 6.2\u2014 robbery indictment \u2014 ownership of property taken\nThere was no fatal variance between an armed robbery indictment charging that the defendant stole seventy-eight dollars from \u201cAmerican Cleaners Corporation, a corporation doing business as Holiday Cleaners when Marianne Elmore Best was present and in attendance\" and testimony by the victim that she worked for American Cleaning Corporation, Holiday Cleaners Division.\n7. Robbery 8 4.3\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 sufficient evidence of dangerous weapon or firearm\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that a dangerous weapon or firearm was used in a robbery so as to support defendant\u2019s conviction of armed robbery where the victim identified the object in defendant\u2019s hand as a \u201crevolver\u201d and as a \u201cgun\u201d and testified that the gun was one that would kill her if she didn\u2019t do what the robber said, notwithstanding the victim also testified that she could not remember whether the gun had a hole in its barrel and that the gun \u201csounded\u201d like a blank gun when it was fired inside the cleaning establishment in which the robbery occurred.\n8. Arrest and Bail 8 3.6\u2014 warrantless arrest \u2014 probable cause \u2014 exigent circumstances\nOfficers had probable cause to arrest defendant for certain armed robberies based on an accomplice\u2019s confession implicating defendant and his description of defendant which matched that given by witnesses in the offense reports, and the fact that the defendant appeared to be about to check out of a motel and leave the area constituted \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d which excused a warrantless entry by officers into defendant\u2019s motel room and their war-rantless arrest of defendant. Therefore, a photographic identification of defendant by use of a photograph taken after his arrest should not be suppressed as a product of an illegal arrest.\nAppeal by defendant from Morgan, Judge. Judgment entered 9 September 1983 in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 September 1984.\nOn 18 May 1983, the American Cleaning Corporation, Holiday Cleaners Division, in Charlotte was robbed of approximately seventy-eight dollars. The robbery occurred at about 9:30 in the morning. Marianne Best was in the store at that time, training a new employee, Leslie Andrews. Ms. Best observed the perpetrator come into the store, pull out a gun, and say that this was a stick-up. He ordered Ms. Best to open the cash register, which she did. The robber then took the cash on hand, and told Ms. Best and Ms. Andrews to go to the back of the store. They did this. The robber fired a shot, and left.\nOn the morning of 26 May 1983, Charlotte police officers arrested Charles Alexander in connection with robberies in the Charlotte area. In confessions made that morning, Alexander implicated defendant and several others in these robberies. Alexander told the police that defendant was staying at a Charlotte motel. A call to the motel indicated that the defendant had left the motel and police requested the motel clerk to call them when the defendant returned. Within fifteen or twenty minutes, the police were notified that the defendant had returned and was removing articles from his room as if in preparation to leave. They went to the motel and arrested defendant without a warrant.\nOn the day he was arrested, defendant was photographed individually by police. Later in the day, the police obtained warrants for defendant\u2019s arrest in connection with robberies not involved in this case. On 1 June 1983, the defendant was photographed as part of a line-up. On 29 June 1983, a warrant was issued for defendant\u2019s arrest for the robbery in the present case.\nA Charlotte police officer, Officer Alsbrook, showed two lineup photographs to Ms. Best on 4 June 1983, one containing defendant. Ms. Best identified defendant in the photograph containing him, and failed to identify anyone in the photograph not containing him. Ten days later, Officer Alsbrook showed Ms. Best a stack of five individual photographs, one of which depicted defendant. Again, Ms. Best identified the defendant as perpetrator of the robbery. Ms. Best identified defendant at trial.\nDefendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. From this judgment, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Jane P. Gray, for the State.\nEllis M. Bragg for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0681-01", "first_page_order": 715, "last_page_order": 725 }