{ "id": 8526308, "name": "UNIGARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of North Carolina", "name_abbreviation": "Unigard Mutual Insurance v. Ingram", "decision_date": "1984-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 8410SC177", "first_page": "725", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 N.C. App. 725" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "267 S.E. 2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575936, 8575907, 8575876, 8575890, 8575922 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0735-05", "/nc/299/0735-03", "/nc/299/0735-01", "/nc/299/0735-02", "/nc/299/0735-04" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554358 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562647 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551119 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0619-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 600, "char_count": 12647, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20556854859105686 }, "sha256": "8c24ae9c462d00c8ae43cd39fd0063f18688aeb59c844a20f2a64e89fd9a3621", "simhash": "1:c721d58946ba03c7", "word_count": 1979 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:06.115640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Webb and Hill concur." ], "parties": [ "UNIGARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of North Carolina" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe record reveals the following undisputed facts:\nUnder North Carolina law an insurance company doing business in this State is required to insure all applicants for motor vehicle liability insurance. When a particular applicant is judged by the insurance company to present an unacceptable risk, the company is permitted by statute to \u201ccede\u201d the risk of loss on that insured to the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Reinsurance Facility. When a policy is ceded to the Facility, premiums are paid to the Facility, less an \u201cexpense allowance\u201d provided to the insurance company as reimbursement for costs incurred in establishing, maintaining, and servicing the policies ceded to the Facility. When a loss arises on a ceded policy, the company issuing the policy pays the claim and is reimbursed by the Facility. Under G.S. 58-248.33(1) the Facility is, as a general rule having one exception, to set rates on ceded policies \u201cinsofar as is possible, to produce neither a profit nor a loss.\u201d All insurance companies writing automobile liability insurance in this State are required to be members of the Facility. When Facility rates are insufficient to offset losses arising out of ceded policies, such losses are to be \u201cequitably share[d]\u201d by member companies.\nUnder North Carolina law, automobile insurance rates applicable to the \u201cvoluntary\u201d market (i.e., policies issued to insureds deemed \u201cacceptable risks\u201d by a company and thus not ceded to the Facility) are set by the North Carolina Rate Bureau. G.S. 58-124.23 permits companies that desire to do so to deviate from the rates established by the Rate Bureau upon filing a request for such deviation with the Commissioner. The statute provides that the Commissioner \u201cshall approve proposed deviations if the same do not render the rates excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.\u201d\nOn 1 June 1982 Unigard filed a request for deviation from basic rates with the Commissioner pursuant to G.S. 58-124.23. On 10 June 1982 respondent ruled on petitioner\u2019s request in a letter, included in the record on appeal, and quoted below in pertinent part:\nApproval is given to your request of June 1, 1982 for a deviation from the rates of the N.C. Rate Bureau as follows:\n10% on non-fleet private passenger auto bodily injury and property damage liability and medical pay voluntary and \u201cclean\u201d ceded risks;\nOn 7 July 1982 petitioner submitted to respondent a written request that the Commissioner \u201camend certain portions of its approval letter . . . which relates to extending the insurance rate deviation requested by Unigard to private passenger automobile insurance risks ceded to the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility.\u201d On 12 July 1982 Unigard filed a complaint in Superior Court, Wake County, seeking review of respondent\u2019s decision pursuant to G.S. 58-9.3 and G.S. 150A-43, a declaratory judgment under G.S. 1-253, and issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and stay pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65, N.C. Rules Civ. Pro., G.S. 58-9.3, and G.S. 150A-48. A temporary restraining order and stay issued that same day, and on 19 July a preliminary injunction and stay issued. On 9 January 1984 following several extensions of time stipulated to by all parties, respondent filed an \u201canswer and counterclaim for declaratory relief.\u201d On 12 January 1984 the matter came on for hearing, the trial court considering \u201cthe pleadings, the Stipulation of Facts, other matters of record and oral and written arguments of counsel.\u201d After making \u201cFindings of Fact\u201d virtually identical to those contained in the \u201cStipulation of Facts,\u201d signed by the parties and filed 12 January, Judge Beaty made conclusions of law and entered an order, quoted in pertinent part below:\nConclusions of Law\n2. Respondent John Randolph Ingram, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of North Carolina, exceeded his statutory authority in modifying and extending the deviation in requiring the deviation to cover \u201cclean risks\u201d ceded to the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility . . . and the purported modification and addition is invalid.\n3. Neither G.S. Sec. 58-248.33(1), G.S. Sec. 58-124.23 nor any other provision of the General Statutes of North Carolina permit the extension of deviations applicable to voluntary market insureds to any other insureds, whether \u201cclean risk\u201d or otherwise, which are ceded to the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility.\nNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED and Declared, that:\n1. The deviation approval approving petitioner\u2019s deviation filing relating to deviation from rates for premiums from the types of insurance in its insurance package program, including \u201cvoluntary\u201d private passenger non-fleet automobile insurance, is proper, valid and effective.\n2. The added portion of this deviation approval which relates to petitioner\u2019s ceded \u201cclean\u201d risks on its \u201cnon-voluntary\u201d automobile insurance business ... is contrary to law, invalid, and respondent, his agents, principal, employees and persons action [sic] on his behalf, directly or indirectly, are hereby enjoined from implementing, enforcing or otherwise acting upon said additions.\nIn determining the scope of our review in the instant case, we first turn to G.S. 58-9.3, which permits in certain cases a \u201cperson aggrieved\u201d by an order or decision of the Commissioner of Insurance to petition for review of that decision in Superior Court. G.S. 58-9.3(b) provides that \u201c[t]he order or decision of the Commissioner if supported by substantial evidence shall be presumed to be correct and proper. . . . The cause shall be heard by the trial judge as a civil case upon transcript of the record for review of findings of fact and errors of law only.\u201d This scope of review has been characterized by this Court as \u201csomewhat limited\u201d in comparison with the \u201csubstantially broader review . . . provided by G.S. Ch. 150A.\u201d Insurance Co. v. Ingram, Comr. of Insurance, 34 N.C. App. 619, 635, 240 S.E. 2d 460, 469 (1977). G.S. 150A-43 provides that a person aggrieved by a final agency decision \u201cis entitled to judicial review of such decision\u201d under the Administrative Procedure Act \u201cunless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by some other statute, in which case the review shall be under such other statute.\u201d This Court has said that \u201cadequate procedure for judicial review\u201d under another statute exists only if the scope of review is equal to that set out in G.S. Ch. 150A, Art. 4. Insur. Co. at 635-36, 240 S.E. 2d at 470. Accordingly, our scope of review in the instant case is dictated by G.S. 150A-51. Id,.; see also Comr. of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 394-96, 269 5.E. 2d 547, 558-59 (1980).\nRespondent assigns error to the court\u2019s conclusion that Commissioner Ingram \u201cexceeded his statutory authority in modifying and extending the deviation in requiring the deviation to cover \u2018clean risks\u2019 ceded to the . . . Facility.\u201d The Commissioner\u2019s authority to act on deviation requests is set out in G.S. 58-124.23, which states: \u201cThe Commissioner shall approve proposed deviations if the same do not render the rates excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.\u201d We agree with appellees that Comr. of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 43 N.C. App. 715, 259 S.E. 2d 922 (1979), disc. rev. denied, 299 N.C. 735, 267 S.E. 2d 670 (1980), is persuasive authority on this issue. In that case the Court was confronted with an attempt by the Commissioner to modify a classification plan, submitted to the Commissioner by the Rate Bureau pursuant to G.S. 58-124.19 and 58-124.21. In holding the Commissioner\u2019s actions in excess of his statutory authority, this Court said:\nThe legislative intent is clear. The Rate Bureau is vested with sole authority to determine rates and classifications for motor vehicle insurance, subject to review by the Commissioner. Upon his review, if the Commissioner disapproves the Bureau plan, he must specify \u201cwherein and to what extent\u201d he disapproves it, and he may set a date after which the filing will no longer be effective. He may not, however, submit his own proposals, whether they be deemed \u201cmodifications\u201d or \u201csubstitutions.\u201d Nor may he order his scheme into effect. . . . The Commissioner is a creature of statute and, as such, he may act only to the extent and in the manner legislatively prescribed. . . .\nId. at 720-21, 259 S.E. 2d at 925-26. The Commissioner attempts to escape the application of this rule and bring his actions within the scope of his statutory authority by contending that \u201cthe filing did not specifically exclude \u2018clean risks\u2019 ceded to the Facility, and inasmuch as it was well known (to insurance companies, at least) that a lot of clean risks were in the Facility . . . the Commissioner was justified in concluding that the deviation proposal included \u2018proven safe drivers\u2019 in the Facility.\u201d We find this argument specious. Any misunderstanding under which respondent may have initially labored in regard to the precise parameters of Unigard\u2019s proposed deviation was clearly eliminated by petitioner\u2019s formal written request for amendment, quoted in part supra. However \u201cjustified\u201d the Commissioner\u2019s initial conclusion, his ruling clearly amounts to a modification of the deviation request filed by petitioners and, as such, exceeds his statutory authority.\nThe Commissioner also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cextension of deviations applicable to voluntary market insureds to any other insureds, whether \u2018clean risk\u2019 or otherwise, which are ceded to the . . . Facility\u201d is unauthorized by any statutory provision. We agree with the trial court\u2019s statement of the law. The statute permitting deviations from rates established by the Rate Bureau clearly applies only to the so-called \u201cvoluntary market.\u201d Indeed, under G.S. 58-248.33(1), rates on policies ceded to the Facility are not set by the Rate Bureau, but rather by the Facility. G.S. Chap. 58, Article 25A, which sets forth the statutory scheme establishing and regulating the Facility, contains no reference to deviations, and our reading of that Article as a whole persuades us that the Legislature never contemplated that the deviation statute might be extended to rates set under Article 25A.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court is in all respects affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Webb and Hill concur.\n. Rates set by the Rate Bureau may effectively establish rates for ceded policies in the case of \u201cclean risk\u201d insureds because of the following provision of G.S. 58-248.33(1): \u201c[T]he rates made by or on behalf of the Facility with respect to \u2018clean risks\u2019 . . . shall not exceed the rates charged \u2018clean risks\u2019 who are not rein-sured in the Facility.\u201d This provision, heavily relied on by respondent, in no way authorizes the extension of deviations to \u201cclean risk\u201d insureds within the Facility.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, by Henry A. Mitchell, Jr., and Julian D. Bobbitt, Jr., for petitioner, appellee.", "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for respondent, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "UNIGARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of North Carolina\nNo. 8410SC177\n(Filed 18 December 1984)\n1. Insurance 8 79.1\u2014 insurance rate case \u2014 scope of review\nThe scope of review of an automobile liability insurance rate case is that provided by G.S. 150A-51.\n2. Insurance 8 79.1\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 requests for deviation from rates \u2014 clean risks ceded to Reinsurance Facility\nIn ruling upon an insurance company\u2019s request pursuant to G.S. 58-124.23 for deviation from automobile liability rates established by the Rate Bureau, the Commissioner of Insurance exceeded his statutory authority in extending the requested rate deviation to \u201cclean risks\u201d ceded to the N.C. Reinsurance Facility. G.S. 58-248.33(1).\nAppeal by respondent from Beaty, Judge. Judgment entered 12 January 1984 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 1984.\nThis is a civil action wherein petitioner, Unigard Mutual Insurance Company, seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the validity and effect of certain actions taken by respondent, Commissioner of Insurance, in connection with petitioner\u2019s request pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 58-124.23 for deviation from basic rates. On 12 January 1984 Judge Beaty entered an order declaring that the Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority in taking the action challenged by petitioner; the court also declared that the approval of petitioner\u2019s deviation request was otherwise proper, valid, and effective. Respondent Commissioner of Insurance appealed.\nSmith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, by Henry A. Mitchell, Jr., and Julian D. Bobbitt, Jr., for petitioner, appellee.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for respondent, appellant." }, "file_name": "0725-01", "first_page_order": 759, "last_page_order": 765 }