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  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pippin",
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    "judges": [
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    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFRED ALLAN PIPPIN, IV"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nThe State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing charges with prejudice against defendant because (1) it made findings of fact totally unsubstantiated by any evidence in the record as no evidence was presented at the hearing, and (2) it erred in concluding that defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe fundamental law of this state provides every individual charged with a crime has the right to a speedy trial, e.g., State v. Webb, 155 N.C. 426, 70 S.E. 1064 (1911). This right is also protected by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). This right, perhaps the most amorphous of constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, protects an accused from undue and oppressive pretrial incarceration, prolonged anxiety attendant to criminal accusation, and the potential that undue delays will impair an accused\u2019s defense. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). Recognizing the obvious interests that society has in the prompt punishment of criminal activity and given the reality that undue delay may hinder the prosecution of an accused, as well as prejudice a defendant, the right to a speedy trial also protects a \u201csocietal interest . . . which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.\u201d Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The balancing of these interests has been aptly described as not affording the defendant a \u201csword for defendant\u2019s escape, but rather ... a shield for his protection.\u201d Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1957).\nThe determination of whether the right to a speedy trial has been abridged requires a case by case balancing of four interrelated factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant\u2019s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. Yet, \u201cnone of the four factors . . . [are] either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. ... In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.\u201d Barker v. Wingo, supra; see also e.g., State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E. 2d 383 (1978); State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E. 2d 274 (1969). Defendant has the initial burden of showing, prima facie, that the delay was caused by the wilful acts or neglect of the prosecuting authority, and, if this burden is met, the State must \u201coffer evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay and sufficient to rebut the prima facie showing or risk dismissal.\u201d State v. McKoy, supra (emphasis in original); see also State v. Marlow, 310 N.C. 507, 313 S.E. 2d 532 (1984); State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 314 S.E. 2d 529 (1984); State v. Wright, 290 N.C. 45, 224 S.E. 2d 624 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).\nWe first address the length of the delay in this case of some fourteen months (437 days) from arrest until defendant\u2019s speedy trial motion was granted. It is well established that a defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial attaches upon being formally accused of criminal activity, by arrest or indictment. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per curiam); State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 277 S.E. 2d 515 (1981). This factor:\n[I]s to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.\nBarker v. Wingo, supra; see also State v. McKoy, supra; State v. Wright, supra (Exum, J., dissenting). We recognize that some delay is inherent and must be tolerated in any criminal trial, State v. McKoy, supra; for example, the state is entitled to an adequate period in which to prepare its case for trial, Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); see also e.g., State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Norman, 8 N.C. App. 239, 174 S.E. 2d 41 (1970). What length of time is appropriate in each case is initially within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 145 S.E. 2d 309 (1965); State v. Lowry and State v. Mallory, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E. 2d 870, cert. denied (1965); State v. Watson, 13 N.C. App. 54, 185 S.E. 2d 252 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972).\nThe offense for which defendant was indicted occurred on 12 July 1982. Defendant voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on the same day, admitting his act. Under these facts, and allowing for a reasonable period in which the district attorney needed to prepare for trial, we agree with the implicit finding of the trial court that a delay of fourteen months in bringing defendant to trial was prima facie unreasonable and required the district attorney to fully justify the delay. Compare State v. McKoy, supra (defendant indicted for first degree murder, found guilty of voluntary manslaughter; approximately twenty-two month delay \u201cunusual\u201d); State v. Eugene Brown, 282 N.C. 117, 191 S.E. 2d 659 (1972) (defendant charged with first degree murder, found guilty of manslaughter; seventeen month delay \u201ccould contravene the right to a speedy trial under some circumstances, and such delay should be avoided if possible\u201d); with State v. McCoy, supra (\u201cWe doubt that for a murder case such as this one this delay [eleven months] ... is enough to be \u2018presumptively prejudicial,\u2019 so as to require us to inquire \u2018into the other factors that go into the balance.\u2019 \u201d); State v. Sidney Brown, 287 N.C. 523, 215 S.E. 2d 150 (1975) (three and one-half month delay held not showing any denial of right to speedy trial). The period of delay \u201cin absolute terms is never per se determinative,\u201d see also State v. Eugene Brown, supra; State v. Wright, supra, and as a \u201ctriggering\u201d mechanism, \u201cits significance in the balance is not great.\u201d State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 207, 214 S.E. 2d 67 (1975).\nWe next review the reasons for the delay. This factor is closely associated with length of delay as the right to a speedy trial protects wilful, oppressive, or neglectful delays by the State. E.g., United States v. Ewell, supra; Barker v. Wingo, supra; State v. Hill, supra; State v. Crowe, 25 N.C. App. 420, 213 S.E. 2d 360, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 665, 216 S.E. 2d 908 (1975). In balancing the reasons for delay in bringing an accused to trial:\n[Different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.\nBarker v. Wingo, supra. It is axiomatic that the state will not, under most circumstances, be held responsible for delays requested or caused by defendant. E.g.. State v. McKoy, supra.\nBetween defendant\u2019s arrest on 12 July 1982 and the first unsuccessful attempt at indictment for first degree murder on 25 March 1983 and the initial indictment for second degree murder on 11 April 1983, there was a lapse of some 273 days. The assistant district attorney, at the motion hearing before the trial court, represented that he had not sought an indictment prior to March 1983 because defendant\u2019s counsel had requested that no indictment be brought against defendant while plea negotiations were held with the assistant district attorney. The assistant district attorney stated that plea bargaining involved extensive discussions with defense counsel and some correspondence between the parties. Defendant\u2019s attorney agreed that he had requested the district attorney not to indict defendant for first degree murder. In its order, the trial court found as facts:\n5. ... no indictment was issued, although there were negotiations between the State and counsel for the defendant. . . .\n6. . . . this Court has heard the argument of counsel for the State as to the cause of the delay and cannot find that this lengthy delay [437 days] was justified by any reasonable necessity. . . .\nThe State, in its brief, appears to argue that by entering into plea bargaining with the assistant district attorney defendant acquiesced in the full 273 days delay between arrest and indictment thereby waiving his right to assert a denial of a speedy trial. We disagree with the state\u2019s argument that the entire period is ex-cludable.\nWe hold that any time periods actually attributable to defense counsel\u2019s requested plea negotiations is a waiver by defendant of predicating a speedy trial claim on that period. Plea bargaining is a universal and necessary practice in the courts of this state. The practice is mutually beneficial to the State and defendants. Permitting defendants to avail themselves of this beneficial process and then to subsequently base speedy trial claims on delays expended in plea negotiations would be grossly prejudicial to the state. The trial court\u2019s order failed to determine this period of time, and we have been unable to determine this period from the motion transcript. The burden of proof for establishing any periods relating to plea bargaining was on the State. State v. McKoy, supra. The state, having failed to adequately present the trial court with evidence as to the period expended in plea negotiations, cannot now complain as to the trial court\u2019s failure to exclude that time.\nFrom 11 April 1983 until 29 August 1983, some 140 days, defendant requested one seven day continuance, from 6 June 1983 to 13 June 1983, in order that he might complete high school examinations. The balance of this period, some 133 days, was spent by the district attorney in repeated attempts to secure an indictment under which the state could proceed to trial. The district attorney attempted to supersede the indictment of 11 April 1983 with an indictment on 6 June 1983 because it improperly named the defendant and victim. The superseding indictment was quashed on 13 June 1983 because of the district attorney\u2019s failure to properly allege \u201cmalice,\u201d a necessary element of the charge against defendant. Defendant was indicted for a third time on 10 June 1983 and a trial date was set for 18 July 1983. A continuance was granted until 22 August 1983 because the assistant district attorney in charge of the case was ill. The indictment was dismissed without prejudice on 18 August 1983, the trial court finding a violation of the North Carolina Speedy Trial Act. Each of these indictments arose from the same act by defendant and the intervals between indictments must be considered in evaluating defendant\u2019s speedy trial claim. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).\nThe state argues that the delay in prosecuting defendant was not intentionally designed to prejudice the defendant, oppressive or arbitrary. While the delay may not have been intentionally pursued in order to prejudice defendant\u2019s defense, defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial encompasses neglectful or negligent delays even though such delays are weighed more neutrally in the Barker balancing process than purposeful delays. Unquestionably, the delay between 11 April 1983 and 18 August 1983, except for the seven day continuance granted on defendant\u2019s motion, is attributable, for the most part, to the district attorney\u2019s negligent failure to secure a proper indictment and prosecute the case prior to a violation of the North Carolina Speedy Trial Act, and, to a much lesser extent, the result of illness of the assistant district attorney.\nThe district attorney had the defendant indicted a fourth time on 29 August 1983, the next session of the Grand Jury. Defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari to this court on 1 September 1983, defendant\u2019s petition was denied on 15 September 1983 and this court\u2019s order was filed on 19 September 1983. On 22 September 1983, the trial court dismissed the charge against defendant which is the subject of this appeal. Any delay occasioned by defendant\u2019s motion would not be attributable to the state, but based on the record before us, this delay, if any, was minimal.\nThe next factor to be considered is defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Defendant is not required to demand that the state prosecute him. Our supreme court has held that after beginning a prosecution the state has the duty to see that defendants are speedily brought to trial. State v. Johnson, supra. The\n[R]ule is that the defendant\u2019s assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right.\nWe emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.\nBarker v. Wingo, supra; see also State v. Jones, supra; State v. Hill, supra.\nDefendant contends that his speedy trial motion under the North Carolina Speedy Trial Act was an assertion of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We disagree. In State v. Jones, supra, the court held that the defendant had not asserted his right to a speedy trial even though he had filed a motion to dismiss under the North Carolina Speedy Trial Act. See also State v. Moore, 51 N.C. App. 26, 275 S.E. 2d 257 (1981).\nThe final factor we must consider is prejudice to defendant. Prejudice:\n[SJhould be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.\nBarker v. Wingo, supra (citation omitted); see also State v. Johnson, supra. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that:\nArrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant\u2019s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.\nUnited States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); see also e.g., State v. McCoy, supra (liberty interest). Defendant does not, therefore, carry the burden to affirmatively demonstrate prejudice, Dickey v. Florida, supra; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), even though demonstration of actual prejudice to the defense of criminal charges carries the greatest weight in balancing the factors in defendant\u2019s claim of denial of a speedy trial.\nIn analyzing prejudice to the defendant, we review the facts before us in light of Barker and Marion. First, defendant was incarcerated twice for only brief periods and was released on bond for the balance of the proceedings against him. Second, at the time of the alleged offense defendant was a sixteen year old high school student, attempting to complete his high school education. The undue, negligent delay by the state in resolving the criminal charges against defendant certainly interfered with the associational interests recognized in and protected by Marion. Third, defendant argued that his defense has been significantly impaired as he was twice forced to prepare for trials that were not conducted thereby draining his and his family\u2019s financial resources. The Marion court specifically recognized this factor as prejudicial. The trial court in the case before us found as a fact that \u201cdefendant and his family have exhausted their financial resources to the extent that further appellate proceedings may well require that defendant proceed in forma pauperis.\u201d Defendant did not contend that he had sustained any actual prejudice in mounting his defense as recognized in the third Barker criteria.\nThe state contends that the trial court erred in finding as fact that trial preparation had exhausted defendant and his family\u2019s financial resources. The state\u2019s position is simply that the trial court could not make these findings based on oral arguments of counsel. We disagree.\nThe Official Commentary to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-952 (1983) provides that \u201cpretrial motions . . . can be disposed of on affidavit or representations of counsel.\u201d Furthermore, in State v. Hollars, supra, our supreme court decided defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy trial claim on its merits while specifically noting that all evidence presented to the trial court was based on oral representations of counsel. See also 60 C.J.S. Motions & Orders \u00a7 37(5) (1969) (\u201cMere oral statements of counsel should not be received as evidence although objection to their reception may be waived\u201d). Appellate courts in this state have, in the context of speedy trial claims, criticized the failure of counsel to properly develop evidentiary records, e.g., State v. Wright, supra, and have clearly expressed that the better practice is to use affidavits and other evidence, Cf, State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 291 S.E. 2d 653 (1982). We also note that while the state alleges that the trial court erred in receiving defense counsel\u2019s oral statements as evidence, the assistant district attorney expressed no objection to the trial court on hearing counsel\u2019s arguments and, more importantly, the trial court relied on several representations made by the assistant district attorney, even though his representations were matters within his personal knowledge as compared to defense counsel\u2019s representations of defendant\u2019s financial status.\nIn balancing the four Barker factors, we find that defendant had presented a prima facie case that the district attorney\u2019s delay in bringing him to trial for approximately fourteen months was caused, in significant part, by the negligence of the district attorney in securing an indictment under which defendant could be properly tried. Except for the one continuance requested by defendant and his petition for a writ of certiorari to this court, the resulting delays must be weighed against the state, albeit more neutrally than if the delay had been purposefully designed. Once the defendant presented a prima facie case that substantial delay was the result of the district attorney\u2019s negligence, the burden of proof shifted to the state to fully explain and justify the reasons for the delay. The state failed to carry its burden of proof, as the trial court properly found. Two factors counterbalance the length of delay and the district attorney\u2019s negligence, however; the defendant\u2019s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial and the degree of prejudice resulting from the delay. We conclude that while the degree of prejudice to this defendant is not as severe as in those cases in which defendant\u2019s ability to present a defense has been actually impaired, the defendant here demonstrated more than minimal prejudice. Taking all of the facts found by the trial court, and affording the trial court\u2019s discretionary judgment the weight it deserves, we affirm the dismissal of charges against defendant.\nFinally, the state argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against defendant with prejudice violating the rule that ordinarily one superior court may not modify, overrule or change the judgment of another superior court made in the same action. We find that the authority cited by the State is inapposite to the facts before us.\nOur research reveals only one case in the context of speedy trials addressing this issue, State v. Neas, 278 N.C. 506, 180 S.E. 2d 12 (1971). In Neas, defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal of charges against him based on a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied by the trial court prior to trial. Defendant plead not guilty, but withdrew his plea prior to jury selection and attempted to enter a plea of guilty. The trial court, for reasons not material to the issue before us, refused to accept the guilty plea and continued the case to the next term of court. Defendant again raised his motion for dismissal for want of a speedy trial based on constitutional law and on the same facts presented to the first trial court. The trial court refused to entertain the motion because of the previous court\u2019s order. Our supreme court held that the second trial court correctly refused to entertain defendant\u2019s motion as the second motion for dismissal was predicated on the same law and facts as defendant\u2019s first motion. Id. The facts before us, as distinguished from Neas, reveal that defendant\u2019s first motion for dismissal was for violation of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the North Carolina Speedy Trial Act. Defendant\u2019s second motion alleged a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The North Carolina Speedy Trial Act specifically provides that \u201c[n]o provision of this Article shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of a speedy trial as required by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-704 (1983), and this court has held that the protection of the Speedy Trial Act are new rights that are supplemental to the constitutional rights to a speedy trial, State v. Reekes, 59 N.C. App. 672, 297 S.E. 2d 763, disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 472, 298 S.E. 2d 693 (1982). We must, therefore, reject the state\u2019s argument.\nFor the reasons previously discussed, the order of the trial court dismissing charges against defendant with prejudice must be\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Phillips concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ann Reed, for the State.",
      "Harrell, Titus & Hassell, by Robert A. Hassell, for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFRED ALLAN PIPPIN, IV\nNo. 8410SC215\n(Filed 5 February 1985)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 50\u2014 14 months between arrest and trial \u2014 delay prima facie unreasonable\nWhere the offense for which defendant was indicted occurred on 12 July 1982 and defendant voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on the same day, admitting his act, a delay of fourteen months in bringing him to trial was prima facie unreasonable and required the district attorney to fully justify the delay.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 51\u2014 speedy trial \u2014 time engaged in plea bargaining not excluded \u2014 no error\nBy entering into plea bargaining with the assistant district attorney, defendant did not acquiesce in the full 273 days between his arrest and indictment, thereby waving his right to assert a denial of a speedy trial, but instead acquiesced only in those time periods actually attributable to defense counsel\u2019s requested plea negotiations. The State failed to meet its burden of establishing any periods relating to plea bargaining and therefore could not complain that the trial court failed to exclude that time.\n3. Criminal Law 8 91\u2014 140 days between first and final indictment \u2014 violation of Speedy Trial Act\nA 140-day delay between defendant\u2019s first indictment and his final indictment constituted a violation of the N. C. Speedy Trial Act where, except for a seven-day continuance granted on defendant\u2019s motion to enable him to take high school exams, the delay was attributable to the district attorney\u2019s failure to secure a proper indictment and prosecute the case and, to a much lesser extent, to the assistant district attorney\u2019s illness.\n4. Constitutional Law 8 50\u2014 motion under N. C. Speedy Trial Act \u2014 no assertion of constitutional right to speedy trial\nDefendant\u2019s speedy trial motion under the N. C. Speedy Trial Act was not as assertion of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.\n5. Constitutional Law 8 50\u2014 14 months between arrest and trial \u2014 defendant prejudiced\nDefendant was prejudiced by a 14-month delay in the proceedings against him where he was incarcerated twice for only brief periods and was released on bond for the balance of the time; at the time of the alleged offense, defendant was a 16-year-old attempting to complete his high school education, and the undue negligent delay by the State certainly interfered with the associational interests of defendant; and defendant\u2019s defense was significantly impaired in that he was twice forced to prepare for trials which were not conducted thereby draining his and his family\u2019s financial resources.\n6. Constitutional Law 8 50\u2014 speedy trial motion \u2014 defendant\u2019s financial resources exhausted \u2014 basis of trial court\u2019s finding\nThough the better practice would have been for the trial court to rely on affidavits and other evidence in determining that trial preparations had exhausted defendant\u2019s and his family\u2019s financial resources, the State nevertheless could not complain that the trial court relied on oral arguments of counsel, since the assistant district attorney expressed no objection to the trial court on hearing counsel\u2019s arguments and, more importantly, the trial court relied on several representations made by the assistant district attorney, even though his representations were matters within his personal knowledge.\n7. Courts 8 9\u2014 speedy trial motions \u2014 no review of one superior court\u2019s judgment by another\nThere was no merit to the State\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against defendant with prejudice, thereby violating the rule that ordinarily one superior court may not modify, overrule or change the judgment of another superior court made in the same action, since defendant\u2019s first motion for dismissal was for violation of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the N. C. Speedy Trial Act, and his second motion alleged a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.\nAppeal by the State from Preston, Judge. Judgment entered 22 September 1983 in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 December 1984.\nDefendant was arrested on 12 July 1982 for the murder of Allan Pippin, his father. On 25 March 1983, the Wake County Grand Jury declined indictment of defendant for first degree murder. The district attorney submitted, and the Grand Jury returned, an indictment for second degree murder on 11 April 1983. The solicitor sought to supersede the 11 April 1983 indictment because of deficiencies in properly naming defendant and victim, and the Grand Jury issued another second degree murder indictment on 6 June 1983, the scheduled trial date. Defendant sought and was granted a continuance of the trial on 6 June 1983 until 13 June 1983 in order that he might complete high school examinations.\nDefendant moved to quash the indictment on 13 June 1983 as it did not allege \u201cmalice,\u201d an element of the crime of second degree murder. The trial court, Judge Bowen presiding, ordered the indictment quashed and granted the assistant district attorney\u2019s motion to send a new indictment to the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury reindicted defendant for second degree murder on 20 June 1983.\nTrial was rescheduled on 22 August 1983. Defendant moved, prior to trial, for dismissal of the charges with prejudice, alleging a violation of the North Carolina Speedy Trial Act. The trial court, Judge Brewer presiding, dismissed the charges against defendant without prejudice on 18 August 1983.\nThe Grand Jury again indicted defendant for second degree murder on 29 August 1983. Defendant moved for dismissal of the charges with prejudice for lack of a speedy trial as required by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of North Carolina. Pending arguments on that motion, defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari alleging that the trial court erred on 18 August 1983 in not dismissing the indictment with prejudice and that the trial court failed to make proper findings of fact as required by law. The petition for cer-tiorari was denied by this court on 15 September 1983. The trial court, Judge Preston presiding, heard oral arguments on defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy trial motion and entered an order on 22 September 1983 dismissing the charges against defendant with prejudice.\nThe State has appealed.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ann Reed, for the State.\nHarrell, Titus & Hassell, by Robert A. Hassell, for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0387-01",
  "first_page_order": 413,
  "last_page_order": 425
}
