{ "id": 8521674, "name": "CARL M. WIGGINS and CLARA P. WIGGINS v. THE CITY OF MONROE, a Municipal Corporation, and JOHNNIE H. ROLLINS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "Wiggins v. City of Monroe", "decision_date": "1985-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 8420SC138", "first_page": "44", "last_page": "52", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "73 N.C. App. 44" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "209 S.E. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570120, 8570156, 8570223, 8570200, 8570175 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0757-01", "/nc/285/0757-02", "/nc/285/0757-05", "/nc/285/0757-04", "/nc/285/0757-03" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11306023 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526239 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "subjective examination of intent or expectation controls" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E. 2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559261 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E. 2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403756, 2395921, 2403313, 2394261, 2401497 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0308-03", "/nc/310/0308-01", "/nc/310/0308-04", "/nc/310/0308-05", "/nc/310/0308-02" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527335 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569666 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170704 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Campbell L. Rev. 41", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Campbell L. Rev.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572260, 8572231 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0188-02", "/nc/294/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549470 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560510 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.E. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620036 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572170, 8572107, 8572143, 8572079, 8572210 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0181-04", "/nc/303/0181-02", "/nc/303/0181-03", "/nc/303/0181-01", "/nc/303/0181-05" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E. 2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.C. App. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2673404 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/50/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E. 2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572064 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E. 2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574227 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575106 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0360-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 826, "char_count": 17993, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.826047995989836e-07, "percentile": 0.9640793729673043 }, "sha256": "bf973213f36e7f28a70c2da57f1038f290c330bef52f74e8fa4f4d4edd49ae6e", "simhash": "1:fe63147864271c4a", "word_count": 2893 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:13.639601+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Wells concur." ], "parties": [ "CARL M. WIGGINS and CLARA P. WIGGINS v. THE CITY OF MONROE, a Municipal Corporation, and JOHNNIE H. ROLLINS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nIn this case we must determine whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the defendants, the City of Monroe and Johnnie H. Rollins, Jr., the City\u2019s chief building inspector, in the Wigginses\u2019 action to recover damages sustained as a result of the demolition by the defendants of a house owned by the Wigginses.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 160A-441 (1982) authorizes cities and counties to exercise their police powers \u201cto repair, close or demolish\u201d dwellings which \u201care unfit for human habitation due to dilapidation. . . .\u201d Pursuant to G.S. Sec. 160A-441 et seq. (1982), the City of Monroe enacted its minimum housing standards, as codified in the Monroe City Code (Code) at Sec. 9-1031 et seq. (Supp. 1979). Finding that the house owned by the Wigginses was \u201cunfit for human habitation\u201d and that the cost of repairs would exceed 60% of the value of the building, thereby qualifying it as a \u201cdilapidated\u201d building under Code Sec. 9-1032(4) (Supp. 1979), Chief Building Inspector Rollins, on 17 April 1980, pursuant to Code Sec. 9-1045(b) (Supp. 1979) and G.S. Sec. 160A-443(3) (1982), ordered the Wigginses to bring the dwelling into compliance by \u201cvacating \u2014 repairing and/or demolishing\u201d it before 29 April 1980. The Wigginses did not pursue the administrative remedies provided under Code Sec. 9-1045(d) (Supp. 1979) and G.S. Sec. 160A-446(c) (1982). When the Wigginses failed to comply with Rollins\u2019 order, the Monroe City Council, by ordinance dated 20 May 1980, directed Rollins to take the actions dictated in his order. The ordinance set no time limit on the building inspector\u2019s actions. Again, the Wigginses did not appeal the Council\u2019s decision.\nRollins chose to have the house repaired, and, according to his affidavit, \u201cindulged the plaintiffs until April 6, 1981 in an effort to allow them to make the necessary repairs.\u201d On 24 March 1981, Rollins wrote the Wigginses a letter advising them that they had to begin repairs on the house within ten days and to complete the repairs within 60 days or the house would be demolished. Nine days later, on 2 April 1981, the Wigginses obtained what they contend was a building permit from the City, signed by Rollins, authorizing them to remodel and repair the house. Rollins contends that what he signed was a zoning check request with reference to the subject property and not the actual permit. The Wigginses further contend that they began to repair the house on 2 April 1981; the defendants contend that they merely began to assemble building repair materials on that date. In any event, on 6 April 1981, the defendants demolished the house despite the protests of the Wigginses. Defendant Rollins personally directed and completed the demolition.\nII\nOn appeal, the Wigginses contend that summary judgment was improper because the evidence before the court raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to (a) whether the defendants were estopped from demolishing the Wigginses\u2019 house, rather than insuring its repair; (b) whether Rollins was acting with a corrupt or malicious intent when he personally signed a building permit authorizing the repair of the house and later directed its destruction four days after repairs had been started; and (c) whether the demolition was done in accordance with G.S. Sec. 160A-443 (1982). The defendants, on the other hand, contend that (a) Rollins\u2019 letter to plaintiffs \u201cwas simply an additional extension granted by the defendant Rollins and was not a requirement of law . . . [and therefore] could not work an estoppel on the City insofar as its ordinance dated May 20, 1980 is concerned\u201d; (b) \u201cgovernmental immunity\u201d is a bar to the Wigginses\u2019 action; and (c) the Wigginses, by failing to challenge the administrative proceedings taken against them or to otherwise appeal from the enactment of the 20 May 1980 ordinance, are barred from now challenging the validity of the proceedings. For the following reasons, we believe summary judgment was improperly granted.\nIll\nSummary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ragland v. Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 261 S.E. 2d 666 (1980). And, the standard is well-known: All the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; and questions of witness credibility are to be resolved by the jury. Id.\nA.\nWe turn to the relevant provision of the Monroe City Code, Sec. 94045(c)(2) (Supp. 1979):\nAfter failure of an owner of a . . . dilapidated dwelling, to comply . . ., the Inspector shall submit to the City Council an ordinance ordering the Inspector to cause such dwelling ... to be repaired, altered, improved, or vacated and closed and removed or demolished, as provided in the original order of the Inspector. . . .\nand the relevant portion of the 20 May 1980 ordinance, issued pursuant thereto: \u201cThe building inspector is hereby authorized and directed to proceed to repair or demolish the above described dwelling in accordance with his order to the owner thereof dated the 17th day of April 1980, and with the housing code and G.S. Sec. 16A-443.\u201d Generally, municipal ordinances are to be construed according to the same rules as statutes enacted by the legislature. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Town of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E. 2d 379 (1980). The aim is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the municipal legislative body. George v. Town of Edenton, 294 N.C. 679, 242 S.E. 2d 877 (1978).\nConstruing the provisions of the Monroe City Code Sec. 94045(c)(2) (Supp. 1979), the 17 April 1980 order, and the 20 May 1980 ordinance together, we discern that Rollins had the option, under the terms of the 20 May 1980 ordinance, to either have city employees repair or demolish the Wigginses\u2019 dwelling, or to have the Wigginses themselves repair or demolish the dwelling. According to the Wigginses\u2019 pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits, Rollins chose to have the Wigginses proceed with the repairs. The Wigginses allege that they invested in materials and labor and timely commenced the repairs, but that the building was nevertheless demolished. The defendants argue that the 20 May 1980 ordinance authorized the demolition. In their pleadings the defendants state that Rollins\u2019 letter to the Wigginses \u201cwas simply an additional extension granted by the defendant Rollins and was not a requirement of law.\u201d We disagree.\nThe defendants rely on Helms v. Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E. 2d 817 (1961) to support their argument. We find Helms distinguishable, since the Helms ordinance was not phrased in the disjunctive. The 20 May 1980 ordinance authorized alternative remedies \u2014 repair or demolition, which, under certain circumstances, are mutually exclusive. This case is such an instance. Once the Wigginses allegedly began the repairs within the 10-day time limit set by Rollins in his letter, Rollins had no authority to pursue the demolition until the 60-day repair period had elapsed. Although Rollins had the legal right initially to pursue either remedy \u2014 repair or demolition \u2014 he could not abandon the chosen remedy \u2014 the reparations \u2014 in midstream.\nOur construction is consistent with the perceived intent of the municipal body, namely, to encourage property owners to invest in repairs rather than absorb the total loss of their property. Once the alternate remedy is elected, it cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn. We need not apply the doctrine of estoppel to grant the plaintiffs relief on this issue.\nB.\nFurther, the Wigginses\u2019 forecast of evidence suggests that governmental immunity will not be a bar in this case.\nRollins\u2019 Immunity\nIn Pigott v. City of Wilmington, 50 N.C. App. 401, 273 S.E. 2d 752, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 181, 280 S.E. 2d 453 (1981), this Court held that the chief building inspector for the City of Wilmington, in ordering the demolition of greenhouses which allegedly were not in compliance with the Wilmington building code, was a \u201cpublic official\u201d performing governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion. Applying the Pigott analysis to the present facts, we hold that chief building inspector Rollins, in initially ordering the repair or demolition of the Wigginses\u2019 dwelling and in later complying with the City Council\u2019s 20 May 1980 ordinance, duties assigned to him by G.S. Sec. 160A-441 et seq. (1982) and by the Monroe City Code Sec. 9-1031 et seq. (Supp. 1979), was similarly a \u201cpublic official\u201d performing governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion.\nSuch a \u201cpublic official\u201d is immune from liability for \u201cmere negligence\u201d in the performance of those duties, but he is not shielded from liability if his alleged actions were \u201ccorrupt or malicious\u201d of if \u201che acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.\u201d Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 7, 68 S.E. 2d 783, 787 (1952); Pigott v. City of Wilmington.\nAfter reviewing the Wigginses\u2019 allegations in their pleadings and their forecast of evidence, we conclude that Rollins\u2019 motion for summary judgment was improperly granted. First, the Wig-ginses alleged in their Complaint that Rollins \u201cwilfully, wantonly and maliciously ordered, supervised, and participated in the demolition of the property of the plaintiffs despite the obvious commencement of repairs. . . .\u201d Second, the Wigginses\u2019 affidavits support their allegations \u2014 that Rollins directed them to repair the house within ten days, signed a building permit authorizing them to begin repairs, and then demolished the house after they had begun timely repairs. The affidavits tend to show that Rollins\u2019 behavior was corrupt or malicious or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties. Therefore, Rollins, on these facts, is not immune from liability.\nThe City\u2019s Immunity\nTurning to the City\u2019s potential liability, we stress that, under the common law, a municipality is immune from liability for the torts of its officers committed while they were performing a governmental function. Galligan v. Town of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E. 2d 427 (1970); Vaughn v. County of Durham, 34 N.C. App. 416, 240 S.E. 2d 456 (1977), disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 188, 241 S.E. 2d 522 (1978). However, N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 160A-485(a) (1982) establishes an exception to the common-law rule:\nAny city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance. Immunity shall be waived only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract from tort liability. No formal action other than the purchase of liability insurance shall be required to waive tort immunity, and no city shall be deemed to have waived its tort immunity by any action other than the purchase of liability insurance.\nSee generally P. Harper, Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in North Carolina and the Municipal Liability Crisis, 4 Campbell L. Rev. 41 (1981).\nIncluded in the record on appeal is a Travelers Insurance Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy issued to the City of Monroe. The City asserts that, under the terms of its policy, it has not been indemnified against the intentional acts of its employees and, therefore, has not waived its immunity pursuant to G.S. Sec. 160A-485(a) (1982). In support of its motion for summary judgment, the City included a letter from Thomas L. Poe, a Travelers Insurance agent, denying coverage on the intentional act theory. We are not bound by the insurance company\u2019s interpretation of its own policy\u2019s coverage.\nThe Travelers Insurance policy provides, in pertinent part:\nThe company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of\nCoverage A. bodily injury\nCoverage B. property damage\nto which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence. . . .\n\u201cOccurrence\u201d is defined in the policy as \u201can accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. . . .\u201d\nIn Edwards v. Akion, 52 N.C. App. 688, 279 S.E. 2d 894, aff\u2019d per curiam, 304 N.C. 585, 284 S.E. 2d 518 (1981), this Court held that an intentional assault committed by a city employee qualified as an \u201coccurrence\u201d under an identically-worded South Carolina Insurance \u201coccurrence\u201d definition since the assault was neither intended nor expected by the City. This Court went on to hold in City of Wilmington v. Pigott, 64 N.C. App. 587, 307 S.E. 2d 857 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E. 2d 650 (1984), that the acts of a public official merely exercising his discretion in the performance of his governmental duties did not constitute an \u201caccident\u201d within an identically-worded Travelers Insurance \u201coccurrence\u201d definition.\nThe words \u2018accident\u2019 and \u2018accidental\u2019 have generally been held by the courts to mean \u2018that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.\u2019 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance, Sec. 559; Skillman v. Insurance Co., 258 N.C. 1, 7, 127 S.E. 2d 789, 793 (1962). We cannot label Inspector Rowan\u2019s order to the Pigotts to remove their greenhouses an \u2018accident.\u2019 The decision did not happen by chance and was not unexpected, unusual or unforeseen. It was certainly intended by the City that as chief building inspector Rowan would exercise his discretion to make these sorts of decisions as he saw fit.\nId. at 589, 307 S.E. 2d at 859. This Court had already ruled in the companion case, Pigott v. City of Wilmington, 50 N.C. App. 401, 273 S.E. 2d 752 (1981), discussed supra, that summary judgment was properly granted for the chief building inspector, absent allegations of corruption, malice, or exceeding the scope of his official duties. Thus, the 1983 case simply confirmed that the chief building inspector\u2019s conduct fell within the acceptable and foreseeable norms of official discretion. In the present case, however, the Wigginses\u2019 forecast of evidence that Rollins acted corruptly or with malice or exceeded the scope of his official authority, was sufficient to withstand Rollins\u2019 motion for summary judgment. By the same token, Rollins\u2019 alleged conduct, if proven, qualifies, under Edwards v. Akion, as an \u201coccurrence,\u201d since it was \u201cneither expected, nor intended from the standpoint of the [City] . . . .\u201d See generally Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, \u2014 S.E. 2d \u2014 (1984) (subjective examination of intent or expectation controls).\nConsequently, the liability insurance policy purchased by the City indemnifies the City from the torts alleged in the case at hand. We are persuaded that the City has waived its immunity from liability in tort on these facts.\nC.\nFinally, the Wigginses assign error to the wordings of the 17 April 1980 order and the 20 May 1980 ordinance. As mentioned earlier, the Wigginses did not pursue any of the administrative remedies set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 160A-446(c) (1982). They are, therefore, barred from arguing this issue on appeal. See Harrell v. City of Winston-Salem, 22 N.C. App. 386, 206 S.E. 2d 802, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 757, 209 S.E. 2d 281 (1974).\nIV\nFor the reasons stated, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was erroneously granted. The trial court\u2019s order is therefore\nReversed.\nJudges Arnold and Wells concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BECTON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Grier, Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, by Christian R. Troy, for plaintiff appellants.", "Love & Milliken, by John R. Milliken, for defendant ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARL M. WIGGINS and CLARA P. WIGGINS v. THE CITY OF MONROE, a Municipal Corporation, and JOHNNIE H. ROLLINS, JR.\nNo. 8420SC138\n(Filed 19 February 1985)\n1. Municipal Corporations 8 9\u2014 chief building inspector \u2014no authority to demolish dwelling\nDefendant\u2019s chief building inspector had no authority to have plaintiffs building demolished where, pursuant to the city code, the inspector\u2019s order requiring repair or demolition, and the city\u2019s order requiring the inspector to take the actions dictated in his order, the inspector had the option to have city employees repair or demolish the dwelling or to have plaintiffs do so; the inspector chose to have plaintiffs proceed with the repairs; and once plaintiffs began the repairs within the time limit set by the inspector, he had no authority to pursue the demolition until the 60-day repair period which he allowed for had elapsed.\n2. Municipal Corporations 8 10\u2014 demolition of dwelling \u2014 liability of building inspector\nDefendant city\u2019s building inspector, in initially ordering the repair or demolition of plaintiffs\u2019 dwelling and in later complying with the city council\u2019s ordinance requiring him to enforce his order, was a public official performing governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion; however, plaintiffs\u2019 affidavits that the inspector directed them to repair their house within ten days, signed a building permit authorizing them to begin repairs, and then demolished the house after they had begun timely repairs tended to show that the inspector\u2019s behavior was corrupt or malicious or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties, and the inspector therefore was not immune from liability.\n3. Municipal Corporations 8 12.3\u2014 acts of building inspector \u2014 liability of city \u2014 purchase of insurance \u2014waiver of sovereign immunity\nDefendant city waived its immunity from liability for torts of its officers committed while they were performing a governmental function by the purchase of a comprehensive general liability insurance policy which provided coverage for an \u201coccurrence\u201d which resulted in \u201cbodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.\u201d\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Helms, Judge. Order entered 30 October 1983 in Superior Court, Union County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 October 1984.\nGrier, Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, by Christian R. Troy, for plaintiff appellants.\nLove & Milliken, by John R. Milliken, for defendant ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0044-01", "first_page_order": 76, "last_page_order": 84 }