{
  "id": 8522425,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT KEITH SHOWN",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Shown",
  "decision_date": "1985-02-19",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges JOHNSON and Cozort concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT KEITH SHOWN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nDefendant first assigns error to a statement made to defendant by the trial judge; defendant contends that the judge \u201cexpress[ed] an opinion to the jury on the credibility of the defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d The challenged statement is set out in the following excerpt from the trial transcript:\nMr. Lind: Then what happened?\nDefendant: I finished eating. She took a break\u2014\nMr. Panosh: Object to what she said.\nThe Court: Son, I want you to be able to tell your story, but don\u2019t go into anything she may have told you at this time.\nDefendant: Okay.\nMr. Lind: Go ahead. What happened next?\nDefendant\u2019s argument on appeal is, in essence, that by use of the word \u201cstory,\u201d the trial judge implied that \u201cdefendant\u2019s testimony is a lie or falsehood.\u201d We think it clear from an examination of the entire sentence in context that Judge Preston used the word \u201cstory\u201d in its more common sense of an account or narration of a series of events. We do not believe this statement could have had a prejudicial impact on the jury. Cf. State v. Staley, 292 N.C. 160, 232 S.E. 2d 680 (1977).\nDefendant next contends the court erred in excluding his testimony as to his \u201cmental state\u201d at the time he gave an inculpatory statement to two store security officers in response to questioning about the crime with which he was charged. At trial defendant sought to impeach this statement by demonstrating that it was made in response to \u201cduress and coercion.\u201d In support of this contention, defendant sought to testify that, at the time he made the statement, he was \u201cnervous,\u201d \u201cfearful of bodily harm,\u201d and \u201cangry.\u201d Defendant argues that this was crucial to his explanation of his reasons for making the incriminating statement ultimately introduced in the State\u2019s case in chief.\nAssuming arguendo that the court erred in excluding defendant\u2019s proferred testimony, we think any such error was harmless. The record contains testimony by the defendant, admitted without objection, that he was \u201cvery nervous and . . . had broke out in a sweat\u201d and that he did not believe he would be allowed to leave the room at the time he gave the statement. Defendant also testified that he was \u201cin a state of shock,\u201d that he was \u201cangry,\u201d and that he was \u201cafraid\u201d during most of the time during which he was questioned. We agree with the State that the evidence excluded was substantially admitted elsewhere in defendant\u2019s testimony, and that defendant thus suffered no harm from any error made by the trial court.\nDefendant\u2019s final assignment of error challenges the court\u2019s ruling allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant about his silence following arrest. This assignment of error is based on an exception to the following ruling by the trial judge:\nQ. And when you got into the police car, then did you tell the police officers that you didn\u2019t do it; the only reason you admitted to it inside was because you were afraid?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. You didn\u2019t?\nA. I didn\u2019t \u2014 I had very little conversation with the police officers.\nQ. Well, wouldn\u2019t that have been a good time to clear yourself if you felt that you were innocent?\nMr. Lind: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nTHE WITNESS: No, sir.\nMr. Lind: Move to strike.\nTHE COURT: Not allowed.\nThe Witness-. It would have done no good. They had what they wanted.\nDefendant contends that the State\u2019s question about his silence, which, the record shows, occurred after defendant was advised by one of the officers of his constitutional rights, amounted to a deprivation of due process, citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1976). We agree that the court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s question and denying defendant\u2019s motion to strike his answer to the challenged question. We now consider whether the court\u2019s error requires that defendant\u2019s conviction be reversed.\nIn State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E. 2d 677 (1972), our Supreme Court discussed the harmless error standard as it applies to errors affecting a constitutional right:\nEvery violation of a constitutional right is not prejudicial. Some constitutional errors are deemed harmless in the setting of a particular case, not requiring the automatic reversal of a conviction, where the appellate court can declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R. 3d 1065 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L.Ed. 2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969). Unless there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction, its admission is harmless. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229 (1963).\nId. at 280; 185 S.E. 2d at 682. We believe the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt in the instant case was so overwhelming as to render the court\u2019s error in allowing the challenged question harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to defendant\u2019s signed statement admitting his culpability, the State introduced evidence by a store security officer who testified that he saw defendant, a store employee, remove bills from a cash register and place them in his left front pants pocket. An audit of the register, taken after defendant left the register, revealed a cash shortage of $90.99. Defendant was stopped for questioning prior to leaving the store and was found to possess $77.00 in cash. In light of the considerable evidence introduced by the State, we believe there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence as to defendant\u2019s post-arrest silence might have contributed to his conviction. We hold defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges JOHNSON and Cozort concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Kaye R. Webb, for the State.",
      "Frederick G. Lind, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT KEITH SHOWN\nNo. 8418SC463\n(Filed 19 February 1985)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 99.4\u2014 court\u2019s statement to defendant \u2014 no expression of opinion\nThe trial court did not express an opinion to the jury on the credibility of defendant\u2019s testimony when the court stated to defendant, \u201cSon, I want you to be able to tell your story, but don\u2019t go into anything she may have told you at this time,\u201d since, by using the word, \u201cstory,\u201d the judge did not imply that defendant\u2019s testimony was a lie or falsehood, but instead used the word in its more common sense of an account or narration of a series of events.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 169.7\u2014 evidence excluded \u2014 similar evidence subsequently admitted\nDefendant could not complain that the trial court erred in excluding his testimony as to his \u201cmental state\u201d at the time he gave an inculpatory statement to two store security officers in response to questioning about the crime with which he was charged, since the evidence excluded was substantially admitted elsewhere in defendant\u2019s testimony.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 48.1; Constitutional Law 8 74\u2014 evidence of post-arrest silence \u2014 error not prejudicial\nThere was no reasonable possibility that evidence as to defendant\u2019s post-arrest silence might have contributed to his conviction, and the trial court\u2019s error in admitting such evidence therefore was not prejudicial to defendant.\nAppeal by defendant from Preston, Judge. Judgment entered 5 January 1984 in Superior Court, GUILFORD County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 February 1985.\nDefendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with two counts of embezzlement. At trial the State elected to proceed on only the second count. The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the court entered judgment on the verdict sentencing him to six years in prison. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Kaye R. Webb, for the State.\nFrederick G. Lind, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0150-01",
  "first_page_order": 182,
  "last_page_order": 186
}