{ "id": 8525183, "name": "WILLIAM EDGAR STAPLES by his duly appointed Guardian Ad Litem, GARLAND STAPLES, GARLAND STAPLES and ANITA STAPLES v. WOMAN'S CLINIC OF THE ALBEMARLE, P.A., ALFRED M. MONCLA, M.D., and ALBEMARLE HOSPITAL, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Staples v. Woman's Clinic", "decision_date": "1985-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 841SC642", "first_page": "617", "last_page": "620", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "73 N.C. App. 617" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 S.E. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565242 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 S.E. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627880 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525881 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 P. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10575139 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/387/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Ala. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 8490014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ala/170/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 A.L.R. 1161", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "relief from stipulations" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "268 F. Supp. 623", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1571830 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/268/0623-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 429, "char_count": 6756, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20554827713893745 }, "sha256": "46a8e31d390d4582c8d963e41ccf48d9a6b2e7a279f64f76b66c52c7ee36a60e", "simhash": "1:dee2d3a873772d5d", "word_count": 1089 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:13.639601+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Becton concur." ], "parties": [ "WILLIAM EDGAR STAPLES by his duly appointed Guardian Ad Litem, GARLAND STAPLES, GARLAND STAPLES and ANITA STAPLES v. WOMAN\u2019S CLINIC OF THE ALBEMARLE, P.A., ALFRED M. MONCLA, M.D., and ALBEMARLE HOSPITAL, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nUnder G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(2), the court has discretion to relieve a party from a final judgment upon a showing of newly discovered evidence \u201cwhich by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial\u201d within ten days after entry of the original judgment as required by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59. Conrad Industries v. Sonderegger, 69 N.C. App. 159, 161, 316 S.E. 2d 327, 328 (1984). Plaintiffs contend that the court gave no reason for its ruling and \u201cdid not even exercise discretion in denying Plaintiffs\u2019 motion.\u201d They contend, alternatively, that the court abused its discretion.\nWhen no reason is assigned by the court for a ruling which may be made as a matter of discretion for the promotion of justice or because of a mistaken view of the law, the presumption on appeal is that the court made the ruling in the exercise of its discretion.\nBrittain v. Aviation, Inc., 254 N.C. 697, 703, 120 S.E. 2d 72, 76 (1961). Nothing in this record rebuts the presumption that the court here ruled in the exercise of its discretion. Further, the court couched its ruling in the following language: \u201cthe [c]ourt being of the opinion, based upon the evidence before it, that the summary judgment in favor of defendant should not be rescinded\u201d (emphasis added) renews the order as to defendant. Absent evidence to the contrary, this language appears affirmatively to suggest that the court was acting in its discretion. We therefore do not believe the court acted under the misapprehension that it was bound by the parties\u2019 stipulation and was powerless to set aside the summary judgment. Appellate review thus is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion. Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 198, 217 S.E. 2d 532, 541 (1975).\nWhere as here parties have stipulated that by a specific date they will \u201cfile full and complete response to [an] interrogatory answering with particularity each and every request\u201d as to the identity of expert witnesses, and they fail to comply with said stipulation, we find no basis for holding that the court abused its discretion in denying their motion for relief from the judgment entered as a consequence of their failure to comply.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Wells and Becton concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge BECTON\nconcurring.\nProcedural stipulations entered into by counsel are not absolutely binding on the trial court. Thus, summary judgment based on procedural stipulations may be set aside at the discretion of the trial court. Under Rule 16 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure pre-trial orders, including stipulations, may be \u201cmodified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.\u201d \u201cThe Court may . . . set [stipulations] aside, on timely application, for inadvertence, improvidence or excusable neglect by either party if there is no prejudice to the opposite party and it would be inequitable or oppressive to hold the parties to the agreement.\u201d Hester v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 268 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D.S.C. 1967). See generally Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1161 (1946) (relief from stipulations).\nThe clear distinction drawn between stipulations relating to substantive rights and procedural matters is important. See Palliser v. Home Tel Co., 170 Ala. 341, 54 So. 499 (1911); 161 A.L.R. 1161, supra. Relief from procedural stipulations should be much more liberally granted absent a showing of prejudice to the opposing party. See Lillard Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Bailey, 387 P. 2d 118 (Okla. 1963).\nBecause and only because of the presumption enunciated in Brittain, do I concur with the majority\u2019s conclusion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Judge BECTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Clark & Stant, P.C., by Stephen C. Swain and D. Keith Teague, for plaintiff appellant.", "Harris, Cheshire, Leager & Southern, by Claire L. Moritz, for defendant appellee Albemarle Hospital, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM EDGAR STAPLES by his duly appointed Guardian Ad Litem, GARLAND STAPLES, GARLAND STAPLES and ANITA STAPLES v. WOMAN\u2019S CLINIC OF THE ALBEMARLE, P.A., ALFRED M. MONCLA, M.D., and ALBEMARLE HOSPITAL, INC.\nNo. 841SC642\n(Filed 19 March 1985)\nRules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 60.2\u2014 motion to set aside summary judgment \u2014 newly discovered evidence \u2014 discovery of expert witness\nWhere the parties in a medical malpractice case stipulated that by a specific date plaintiffs would file a complete response to interrogatories as to the identity of their expert witnesses, plaintiffs failed to identify experts as stipulated, and plaintiffs stated in response to a request for an admission that they had no expert to testify against defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside summary judgment entered for defendant on the ground that plaintiffs subsequent discovery of an expert constituted \u201cnewly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59(b).\u201d G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(2).\nJudge Becton concurring.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from Small, Judge. Order entered 27 January 1984 in Superior Court, PASQUOTANK County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 1985.\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint on 3 February 1982 alleging failure of defendant Albemarle Hospital, Inc. (defendant) to provide obstetrical and pediatric care and treatment to plaintiffs mother and child in accordance with the standard of practice among hospitals in similar communities at the time of the treatment. On 1 September 1982 defendant served plaintiffs with interrogatories requesting, inter alia, information as to expert witnesses who would testify against it. Plaintiffs responded that their experts were \u201cunknown.\u201d On 28 December 1982 defendant moved to compel identification of plaintiffs\u2019 experts. On 25 January 1982 plaintiffs and defendant stipulated that in lieu of a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion plaintiffs would identify their experts by 19 February 1983. Plaintiffs failed to identify experts as stipulated. In response to defendant\u2019s 29 March 1983 request for admission plaintiffs stated they had no expert to testify against defendant. In the absence of evidence to support plaintiffs\u2019 allegations, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on 31 May 1983.\nIn August 1983 plaintiffs located an expert witness. On 16 August 1983 they requested relief from the summary judgment order on the ground that discovery of an expert constituted \u201cnewly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under [G.S. 1A-1] Rule 59(b).\u201d See G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(2).\nThe court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion and renewed the order of summary judgment for defendant. It found, pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), \u201cthat there is no just reason for delay,\u201d thus making the order subject to immediate appeal. From that order plaintiffs appeal.\nClark & Stant, P.C., by Stephen C. Swain and D. Keith Teague, for plaintiff appellant.\nHarris, Cheshire, Leager & Southern, by Claire L. Moritz, for defendant appellee Albemarle Hospital, Inc." }, "file_name": "0617-01", "first_page_order": 649, "last_page_order": 652 }