{
  "id": 8525307,
  "name": "JOHN THOMAS PEARCE, Administrator of the Estate of LISA COLLEEN PEARCE v. RONNIE EARL FLETCHER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pearce v. Fletcher",
  "decision_date": "1985-05-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 8410SC768",
  "first_page": "543",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:43.207286+00:00",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges Johnson and Eagles concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "JOHN THOMAS PEARCE, Administrator of the Estate of LISA COLLEEN PEARCE v. RONNIE EARL FLETCHER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nPlaintiffs sole contention is that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion \u201cto set aside the verdict as to damages as being against the evidence and the greater weight.\u201d In light of the standard for appellate review and of the evidence presented at trial, we find no abuse of discretion.\nThe standard for review of a trial court\u2019s discretionary ruling either granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and order a new trial is virtually prohibitive of appellate intervention. Appellate review \u201cis strictly limited to the determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion by the judge.\u201d Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 482, 290 S.E. 2d 599, 602 (1982). The trial court\u2019s discretion is \u201c \u2018practically unlimited.\u2019 \u201d Id., 290 S.E. 2d at 603, quoting from Settee v. Electric Ry., 170 N.C. 365, 367, 86 S.E. 1050, 1051 (1915). A \u201cdiscretionary order pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.\u201d Worthington, 305 N.C. at 484, 290 S.E. 2d at 603. \u201c[A] manifest abuse of discretion must be made to appear from the record as a whole with the party alleging the existence of an abuse bearing that heavy burden of proof.\u201d Id. at 484-85, 290 S.E. 2d at 604. \u201c[A]n appellate court should not disturb a discretionary Rule 59 order unless it is reasonably convinced by the cold record that the trial judge\u2019s ruling probably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice.\u201d Id. at 487, 290 S.E. 2d at 605.\nThe \u201ccold record\u201d here reveals the following pertinent evidence:\nOn 20-21 June 1980 decedent and defendant spent most of the evening at a nightclub. A witness observed the defendant there drinking; she described his speech as \u201cslurred\u201d and his behavior as \u201crambunctious.\u201d Because of defendant\u2019s condition, the witness was concerned about decedent\u2019s plans to ride to the beach with him.\nAt approximately 3:00 a.m. decedent and defendant stopped by decedent\u2019s home. Decedent\u2019s mother observed defendant stumble at the foot of a bed and \u201csurmised\u201d that he had been drinking. She was concerned about decedent\u2019s leaving with defendant and she attempted to follow them.\nShortly after decedent and defendant departed from decedent\u2019s home the automobile owned and operated by defendant overturned. Decedent died from injuries sustained in the accident. When the investigating officer arrived at the scene, defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath.\nDecedent was nineteen years old at the time of her death. She had stopped attending school during her sophomore year in high school. She subsequently \u201cpicked up two credits\u201d in summer school but was not attending school at the time of her death. She worked periodically as a waitress but did not hold a regular job and was unemployed at the time of her death. She lived at home and her parents supported her.\nSix days before decedent\u2019s death she was hospitalized for drug overdose treatment. A urine drug screen showed evidence of alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines and methamphetamines. She had evidence of marks on her arms which were consistent with intravenous consumption of cocaine. She told her treating physician that she had been \u201cusing various types of drugs both injectable and orally and had been smoking marijuana approximately four or five years.\u201d Her parents told the physician that decedent \u201chad been somewhat of a problem for four to five years with drug usage and alcohol.\u201d\nDecedent\u2019s funeral bill totalled $4,092.00.\nThe evidence regarding decedent\u2019s low level of educational attainment, absence of regular employment, status of dependency, and history of alcohol and drug abuse was clearly relevant to a determination of her \u201cpresent monetary value ... to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered.\u201d G.S. 28A-18-2(c). The jury could conclude that these negative factors offset, to the extent found, what decedent\u2019s present monetary value would have been in their absence. Our Supreme Court noted in Worthington that \u201ctrial judges . . . have traditionally exercised their discretionary power to grant a new trial in civil cases quite sparingly in proper deference to the finality and sanctity of the jury\u2019s findings.\u201d Worthington, 305 N.C. at 487, 290 S.E. 2d at 605. In light of the evidence here, we cannot conclude that the trial court\u2019s decision to defer to the finality and sanctity of the jury\u2019s findings was a manifest abuse of discretion or probably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice. We thus affirm the ruling.\nAt oral argument counsel for defendant stipulated to the dismissal of defendant\u2019s cross appeal in the event we affirmed in plaintiffs appeal. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s cross appeal is dismissed.\nIn plaintiffs appeal, affirmed.\nIn defendant\u2019s cross appeal, dismissed.\nJudges Johnson and Eagles concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WHICHARD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Farris and Farris, P.A., by Thomas J. Farris and Robert A. Farris, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Merriman, Nicholls, Crampton, Dombalis & Aldridge, P.A., by Nicholas J. Dombalis, II, and W. Sidney Aldridge, for defendant appellee and cross appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOHN THOMAS PEARCE, Administrator of the Estate of LISA COLLEEN PEARCE v. RONNIE EARL FLETCHER\nNo. 8410SC768\n(Filed 7 May 1985)\nRules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 59\u2014 denial of motion to set aside verdict as to damages \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThere was no abuse of discretion in the denial of plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict as to damages and for a new trial where the jury had found that plaintiffs decedent had died as a result of defendant\u2019s negligence and awarded damages of $5,000. The evidence at trial was that decedent was nineteen years old; had stopped attending school during her sophomore year in high school; had subsequently \u201cpicked up two credits\u201d but was not attending school at the time of her death; had worked periodically as a waitress but did not hold a regular job; was unemployed at the time of her death, lived at home, and was supported by her parents; had been hospitalized for drug overdose treatment six days prior to her death; a urine drug screen showed evidence of alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines and methamphetamines, and she had evidence of marks on her arms consistent with intravenous consumption of cocaine; decedent and her parents had told her physician that she had had a drug problem for four or five years; and decedent\u2019s funeral expenses totalled $4,092.00. G.S. 28A-18-2(c), G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59.\nOn certiorari to review judgment entered 26 September 1983 by Battle, Judge, in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 1985.\nPlaintiff brought this action in his administrative capacity seeking damages for the wrongful death of his decedent in an automobile accident. The jury found that decedent died as a result of defendant\u2019s negligence and that she was not con-tributorily negligent. It awarded damages in the sum of $5,000.00.\nThis Court allowed plaintiffs petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment. Plaintiff appeals and defendant cross appeals.\nFarris and Farris, P.A., by Thomas J. Farris and Robert A. Farris, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nMerriman, Nicholls, Crampton, Dombalis & Aldridge, P.A., by Nicholas J. Dombalis, II, and W. Sidney Aldridge, for defendant appellee and cross appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0543-01",
  "first_page_order": 575,
  "last_page_order": 578
}