{ "id": 8527531, "name": "NANCY L. CAMPBELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CATAWBA COUNTY SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT, and DOTTIE TRIPLETT", "name_abbreviation": "Campbell v. Board of Education of the Catawba County School Administrative Unit", "decision_date": "1985-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 8525SC44", "first_page": "495", "last_page": "499", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 N.C. App. 495" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "242 S.E. 2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574213 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569908 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567655 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552852 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561041 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0523-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 443, "char_count": 8668, "ocr_confidence": 0.814, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.902291840783749e-07, "percentile": 0.845161049929938 }, "sha256": "c237ceda4fd6e789670ceb63017772ba5c15cbf9e9de6bf6c3a2fdcd80103a94", "simhash": "1:271305ec6c10ae4d", "word_count": 1355 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:57.071049+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Phillips concur." ], "parties": [ "NANCY L. CAMPBELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CATAWBA COUNTY SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT, and DOTTIE TRIPLETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nPlaintiff contends the court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. We disagree.\n\u201cThe purpose of summary judgment [is] to bring litigation to an early decision on the merits without the delay and expense of a trial where it can be readily demonstrated that no material facts are in issue.\u201d Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E. 2d 823, 829 (1971); see also Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 233, 178 S.E. 2d 101, 103 (1970). The court is not authorized to decide an issue of fact but to determine if such an issue exists. Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 470, 251 S.E. 2d 419, 422 (1979). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369-70, 289 S.E. 2d 363, 366 (1982). Once the moving party has submitted materials in support of the motion, however, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence establishing that the motion should not be granted. Id. at 370, 289 S.E. 2d at 366.\nHere defendants presented the following evidence in support of their motion:\nPlaintiff was hired only as an interim teacher for the first semester. Her application for the position in question was considered and appropriate procedures were followed in making the selection.\nAffidavits from the principals of the schools where plaintiff taught stated that Triplett was not consulted prior to the hiring decision and that any difficulties between plaintiff and Triplett had no bearing on their decision. Members of the Board submitted affidavits which stated that any strained relation between plaintiff and Triplett did not affect their hiring decision.\nPlaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that on 16 November 1983 she was informed by Triplett that plaintiff was to attend a music convention in Winston-Salem on 20 November 1983. Plaintiff states that she informed Triplett that she would be unable to attend and that Triplett responded by telling plaintiff that nonattendance would be unfavorably regarded should plaintiff seek permanent employment.\nPlaintiff claimed further that she had received no criticism of her performance during her contract period and that she was encouraged to apply for the vacant position by the principals of the respective schools. Plaintiffs complaint states that her refusal to attend the convention led Triplett to influence the hiring process to plaintiffs detriment.\nPlaintiff contends that the decision not to hire her is a violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2). That statute governs the failure to renew contracts of probationary teachers and specifies that such nonrenewal may not be for arbitrary, capricious or personal reasons. Defendants contend that plaintiff was not a probationary teacher but an interim teacher hired to fill a temporary vacancy.\nG.S. 115C-325 does not define the status of interim or other temporary teachers. It is, however, a matter of common knowledge that such personnel are employed routinely by local school boards. G.S 115C-295 authorizes employment of \u201ctemporary personnel\u201d provided they meet certain criteria. Such positions generally are not considered a part of the career teacher ladder that leads to permanent employment and tenure, however. See generally Gatti & Gatti, The Teacher and the Law at 116 (1972). We thus do not believe the General Assembly intended that the \u201ctemporary personnel\u201d authorized by G.S. 115C-295 be included within the definition of \u201cprobationary teacher\u201d contained in G.S. 115C-325(a)(5).\nPlaintiff alleges and the forecast of evidence shows that she was hired as a \u201ctemporary teacher\u201d for a term which ended 20 December 1983. Given our interpretation of legislative intent, she therefore was not a probationary teacher and the Board\u2019s failure to employ her for the permanent position was not a violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2). The Board\u2019s forecast of evidence established the fact of plaintiffs temporary status. Plaintiff offered no forecast of evidence which placed this fact in dispute. Summary judgment for the Board on plaintiffs claim for violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2) thus was proper.\nIn support of their motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that Triplett tortiously interfered with plaintiffs freedom of contract by influencing the hiring process to her detriment, defendant submitted affidavits averring that Triplett was not consulted prior to the hiring decision, that Triplett played no role in the hiring or interview process for this vacancy, and that any friction between plaintiff and Triplett had no relation to the decision not to hire plaintiff. Plaintiff submitted in response: (1) a letter from a former interim teacher who allegedly had experienced problems with Triplett; (2) affidavits from parents supportive of plaintiffs performance; (3) plaintiffs employment form; and (4) a sworn affidavit from plaintiff basically restating the allegations of her complaint. With the exception of plaintiffs affidavit, none of the above bear any relation to whether Triplett influenced the hiring procedure for the vacancy. Plaintiffs affidavit merely restating the allegations of the complaint consists of conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts. It thus does not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Lowe at 370, 289 S.E. 2d at 366.\n\u201c[W]hen the moving party presents an adequately supported motion, the opposing party must come forward with facts, not mere allegations, which controvert the facts set forth in the moving party\u2019s case, or otherwise suffer a summary judgment.\u201d Conner Co. v. Spanish Inns, 294 N.C. 661, 675, 242 S.E. 2d 785, 793 (1978). Plaintiff has submitted no forecast of evidence showing that Triplett was involved in the hiring decision in any way, much less that such involvement constituted tortious interference. Summary judgment for Triplett on plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with her freedom of contract thus was proper.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Wells and Phillips concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas, Gaither, Gorham & Crone, by James M. Gaither, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.", "Williams & Pannell, by Richard A. Williams, Jr., for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANCY L. CAMPBELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CATAWBA COUNTY SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT, and DOTTIE TRIPLETT\nNo. 8525SC44\n(Filed 3 September 1985)\n1. Schools g 13.1\u2014 temporary teacher \u2014 failure to hire for permanent position \u2014 no violation of statute\nThe General Assembly did not intend that the \u201ctemporary personnel\u201d authorized by G.S. 115C-295 be included within the term \u201cprobationary teacher\u201d contained in G.S. 115C-325(a)(5). Thus, where plaintiff alleged and the forecast of evidence showed that she was hired as a \u201ctemporary teacher\u201d for a term which ended on a specified date, she was not a probationary teacher and a board of education\u2019s failure to employ her for a permanent position was not a violation of G.S. 115C-325(m)(2).\n2. Contracts 8 34\u2014 tortious interference with freedom of contract \u2014 insufficient forecast of evidence\nSummary judgment was properly entered for defendant on plaintiffs claim that defendant tortiously interfered with plaintiffs freedom of contract by influencing the hiring process for a school music teacher position to plaintiffs detriment where defendant submitted affidavits averring that defendant was not consulted prior to the hiring decision, that defendant played no role in the hiring or interview process for the music teacher vacancy, and that any friction between plaintiff and defendant had no relation to the decision not to hire plaintiff, and where plaintiffs affidavit merely restated the conclusory allegations of the complaint, and plaintiff submitted no forecast of evidence showing that defendant was involved in the hiring decision or that such involvement constituted tortious interference.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Sitton, Judge. Judgment entered 14 November 1984 in Superior Court, CATAWBA County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 1985.\nPlaintiff was employed as an interim music teacher in the Catawba County school system. She was serving as a replacement for Deborah Jordan, who had taken a maternity leave. Plaintiffs contract ran from 22 August 1983 until 20 December 1983. On 5 December 1983 Jordan resigned, creating a vacancy. Plaintiff applied but was not hired for the position.\nPlaintiff alleges that defendant Board of Education (Board) violated G.S. 115C-325(m)(2) in that she was not rehired for arbitrary, capricious and personal reasons. She also alleges tortious interference with her freedom of contract by defendant Triplett (Triplett).\nDefendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment was granted. Plaintiff appeals.\nThomas, Gaither, Gorham & Crone, by James M. Gaither, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nWilliams & Pannell, by Richard A. Williams, Jr., for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0495-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 533 }