{
  "id": 8523260,
  "name": "IN RE: LEONARD, a minor child",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Leonard",
  "decision_date": "1985-10-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 8519DC43",
  "first_page": "439",
  "last_page": "442",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "77 N.C. App. 439"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 469",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "312 N.C. 626",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4757989
      ],
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/312/0626-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 52",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "280 N.C. 600",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8573011
      ],
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/280/0600-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 723",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "286 N.C. 723",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8570635,
        8570669,
        8570584,
        8570517,
        8570552
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/286/0723-04",
        "/nc/286/0723-05",
        "/nc/286/0723-03",
        "/nc/286/0723-01",
        "/nc/286/0723-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "211 S.E. 2d 844",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "24 N.C. App. 653",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8554013
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/24/0653-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 414,
    "char_count": 6360,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.82,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.8238169485363165e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7195844236478652
    },
    "sha256": "ef0e69774fcff4b1fbd5a5bc85282b6de9461fbf8050203c958496e783697fba",
    "simhash": "1:3a45ba12820fc802",
    "word_count": 1039
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:01.691260+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges WHICHARD and PHILLIPS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN RE: LEONARD, a minor child"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nThe sole issue before this Court is interpretation of the termination of parental rights jurisdictional statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-289.23 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The pertinent language follows:\nThe district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any petition relating to termination of parental rights to any child who resides in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition. . . .\nRespondent contends that, since the mother left with the child for Ohio four days before the petition was filed, the child was not \u201cresiding in\u201d or \u201cfound in\u201d the district \u201cat the time of filing\u201d and therefore the petition should fail for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree and vacate.\nA statute must be construed as it is written unless a literal interpretation leads to an absurd result. [Citations omitted.] When the language is clear and unambiguous the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning. We are powerless to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions or limitations not contained therein. [Citations omitted.]\nPiland v. Piland, 24 N.C. App. 653, 211 S.E. 2d 844, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 723, 213 S.E. 2d 723 (1975). See also Evans v. Roberson, slip op. No. 489A84 (N.C. Aug. 13, 1985). The legislature chose to use the phrases \u201cresides in\u201d and \u201cis found in\u201d and upon these phrases we must base our interpretation. \u201cResidence\u201d and \u201cdomicile\u201d have been held to be synonymous; but generally \u201cresidence\u201d indicates the person\u2019s actual place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, and \u201cdomicile\u201d indicates the person\u2019s permanent home to which, when absent, he intends to return. Residence is a prerequisite to establishing a domicile, and not vice versa. See Hall v. Board of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E. 2d 52 (1972). Therefore, it is simpler to establish a change of residence than a change of domicile. We hold that, by moving to Ohio, petitioner\u2019s actions were effective to change Michael\u2019s residence to one outside the court\u2019s jurisdiction.\nUsually, words of a statute will be given their natural, approved and recognized meaning. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E. 2d 469 (1985). A person is said to be \u201cfound\u201d within a state for purposes of service of process when actually present therein. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 590-91 (5th ed. 1979). It seems clear that at the time this action was instituted, Michael was not to be found in North Carolina; therefore, the court below did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to determine respondent\u2019s parental rights based on the statutory criteria.\nPetitioner contends that the codified legislative intent of Article 24B (Termination of Parental Rights) should serve to expand our reading of the statutes therein.\nThis Article shall not be used to circumvent the provisions of Chapter 50A, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-289.22(4) (1981). Before determining parental rights, the court must find under G.S. \u00a7 50A-3 that it has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination. G.S. \u00a7 7A-289.23. The court concluded that it would have jurisdiction to determine Michael Leonard\u2019s custody under G.S. \u00a7 50A-3 and this conclusion has not been contested. While a determination of jurisdiction over child custody matters will precede a determination of jurisdiction over parental rights, it does not supplant the parental rights proceedings. The language of the statute is that it shall not be \u201cused to circumvent\u201d Chapter 50A, not that it shall \u201cbe in conformity with\u201d Chapter 50A.\nThe result in this case is not absurd, but it is nonetheless unfortunate. Though residence or physical presence of the child in the district at the time of filing is some indication of the child\u2019s connections with the state, the requirement is too easily overcome by a visit to the district on the filing date. In this case it is undisputed that virtually all of Michael Leonard\u2019s young life was spent in this state and witnesses who know the family members and other sources of evidence of the relationship with his father are here. In addition, respondent would surely be disadvantaged if his parental rights would be challenged in Ohio.\nDespite these concerns, the legislature has amended G.S. \u00a7 7A-289.23 four times since its original passage and has not seen fit to alter the words that grant jurisdiction. The wisdom of the enactment, and the power to change or alter, is exclusively the concern of the legislature. Piland v. Piland, supra.\nVacated and remanded for order dismissing the petition.\nJudges WHICHARD and PHILLIPS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Beck, O\u2019Briant and O\u2019Briant, by Lillian B. O\u2019Briant for petitioner-appellee.",
      "Central Carolina Legal Services, Inc., by Stanley B. Sprague, for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN RE: LEONARD, a minor child\nNo. 8519DC43\n(Filed 15 October 1985)\nParent and Child \u00a7 1.5\u2014 petition to terminate parental rights \u2014child living in Ohio when petition filed \u2014absence of jurisdiction\nA child was not \u201cresiding in\u201d or \u201cfound in\u201d the district \u201cat the time of filing\u201d of a petition to terminate parental rights so as to give the district court jurisdiction under G.S. 7A-289.23 to determine the petition where the child had moved to Ohio with its mother four days before the petition was filed.\nAPPEAL by respondent from van Noppen, Judge. Judgment entered 20 December 1984 in RANDOLPH County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 1985.\nThis case arises out of a petition to terminate the parental rights of Darrel Leonard as to his son, Michael Leonard. The petition was filed 19 June 1984 in Randolph County. At the hearing, the petitioner Rita McMasters Leonard testified that she married David Avery on 10 June 1984. On 15 June 1984, she left North Carolina with the child to join her new husband in Ohio while he completed a two-year course of schooling. She did not know where they would move after her husband completed his studies.\nRespondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-289.23 (Cum. Supp. 1983). Judge van Noppen denied the motion and heard the grounds for termination. The order granting termination of Darrel Leonard\u2019s parental rights was entered 20 December 1984.\nBeck, O\u2019Briant and O\u2019Briant, by Lillian B. O\u2019Briant for petitioner-appellee.\nCentral Carolina Legal Services, Inc., by Stanley B. Sprague, for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0439-01",
  "first_page_order": 471,
  "last_page_order": 474
}
