{ "id": 8522828, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRELL YATES FIELDS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fields", "decision_date": "1985-10-15", "docket_number": "No. 8424SC1335", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "407", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 N.C. App. 404" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "190 S.E. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting \"driving\" under & former statute to require motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550723 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting \"driving\" under & former statute to require motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/15/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E. 2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 400, "char_count": 7097, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2966756438342352e-07, "percentile": 0.6211981856857292 }, "sha256": "5edbd9717052d1ed9c7ce253deefb105485911f7eb9085f02119af3ae6fb8af7", "simhash": "1:af35d011d5e9adf4", "word_count": 1190 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:01.691260+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Hedrick and Judge Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRELL YATES FIELDS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nOn 12 September 1984 defendant was convicted of driving while impaired in violation of G.S. 20-138.1. On appeal defendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s \u201cfailing to dismiss the charge of driving while impaired when the State offered no evidence the motor vehicle had been in motion or that defendant cranked the motor for purposes of driving the car.\u201d The sole issue presented by this assignment of error is whether the defendant was \u201cdriving\u201d a vehicle within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1 when he sat behind the steering wheel in the driver\u2019s seat of the car and started the car\u2019s engine in order to make the heater operable, but the car remained motionless on the street. We find no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 10 February 1984 at 1:14 a.m. then Blowing Rock Police Department Patrolman Jack Cooper saw a car sitting in the right-hand lane just across the center line of West Green Hill Drive in Blowing Rock. Patrolman Cooper pulled his patrol car in front of the stopped car, got out of his car and approached the other car. Patrolman Cooper found the defendant sitting behind the wheel of the motionless car with the engine running. Patrolman Cooper observed the owner of the vehicle, Mr. Honeycutt, on the passenger side of the vehicle. Defendant\u2019s eyes were glassy, his face was flushed, and he had a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath. Patrolman Cooper administered certain sobriety performance tests to the defendant, arrested the defendant and transported him to Watauga County Jail to have a breathalyzer test administered. At trial the defendant stipulated to admission of the affidavit and revocation report of the breathalyzer operator which showed that \u201ca breathalyzer was performed at 3:05 a.m. on the 10th of February on the Defendant, and that his alcohol concentration was a point fourteen.\u201d Patrolman Cooper never saw the car move while the defendant was sitting behind the wheel.\nAt trial defendant did not dispute the State\u2019s evidence. Rather, defendant and Mr. Honeycutt testified: that Mr. Honey-cutt drove the car on the night in question; that defendant never drove the car; that the reason they had stopped on the street was to get out and use the bathroom; and that defendant got back into the car behind the wheel and cranked the car up to turn the heat on because he was cold. Defendant further testified that he never put the car in gear and that the car never moved while he was behind the wheel.\nDefendant contends that the trial court should have dismissed the driving while impaired charge because the State never proved he \u201cdrove\u201d the car within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1. G.S. 20-138.1(a) provides in pertinent part:\n(a) Offense. \u2014 A person commits the offense of impaired driving if he drives any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within this State:\n(1) While under the influence of an impairing substance; or\n(2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. [Emphasis added.]\nDefendant\u2019s position is that under G.S. 20-138.1(a) \u201cdrives\u201d requires that the car be in motion or at least that a \u201cdefendant had the engine running for the purpose of moving the car.\u201d Defendant\u2019s position is not the law.\nIn State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 436, 323 S.E. 2d 343, 347 (1984), our Supreme Court noted that while \u201cChapter 20 of the General Statutes contains no definition of \u2018drive\u2019 or \u2018operate,\u2019 \u2018driver\u2019 and \u2018operator\u2019 are defined.\u201d While the Supreme Court recognized that in the past distinctions have been made between \u201cdriving\u201d and \u201coperating,\u201d it did not believe such a distinction currently exists. 312 N.C. at 436, 323 S.E. 2d at 347. The Supreme Court explained its reasoning in the following way:\nIn N.C.G.S. 20-4.01(7), \u201cdriver\u201d is defined as \u201cthe operator of a vehicle.\u201d \u201cOperator\u201d is defined as \u201ca person in actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or which has the engine running.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(25).\nWe recognize that distinctions may have been made between driving and operating in prior case law and prior statutes regulating motor vehicles. See e.g. State v. Carter, 15 N.C. App. 391, 190 S.E. 2d 241 (1972) (interpreting \u201cdriving\u201d under & former statute to require motion); Act of March 5, 1935, Chapter 52, Sec. 1, 19 Public Laws 34, (formerly codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-6 (1935)) (repealed 1973) (defining \u201coperator\u201d as a person who is in the driver\u2019s seat while the engine is running or who steers while the vehicle is being towed or pushed by another vehicle).\nWe do not believe, however, that such a distinction [between \u201cdriving\u201d and \u201coperating\u201d] is supportable under N.C.G.S. 20-138.1. Since \u201cdriver\u201d is defined simply as an \u201coperator\u201d of a vehicle, we are satisfied that the legislature intended the two words to be synonymous.\nId. Accordingly, we hold that one \u201cdrives\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1 if he is in actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or which has the engine running. In this case the State\u2019s evidence showed that the defendant sat behind the wheel of the car in the driver\u2019s seat and started the engine. This evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was in actual physical control of a vehicle which had the engine running. Thus, the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant \u201cdrove\u201d a vehicle within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1. Defendant\u2019s purpose for taking actual physical control of the car and starting the engine is irrelevant.\nWe take judicial notice of the fact that during the 1985 Session of the General Assembly, G.S. 20-4.01 was amended to provide that \u201c[t]he terms \u2018driver\u2019 and \u2018operator\u2019 and their cognates are synonymous.\u201d 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 509.\nNo error.\nChief Judge Hedrick and Judge Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg by Assistant Attorney General W. Dale Talbert for the State.", "Appellate Defender Adam Stein by Assistant Appellate Defender Geoffrey C. Mangum for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRELL YATES FIELDS\nNo. 8424SC1335\n(Filed 15 October 1985)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 121\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 sitting behind steering wheel of motionless car with motor running \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of driving while impaired where the State\u2019s evidence was that defendant was found upon a street in Blowing Rock behind the wheel of a motionless car with the engine running, and defendant\u2019s evidence was that he had started the car in order to operate the heater and had no intention of driving. One \u201cdrives\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1 if he is in actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or which has the engine running; defendant\u2019s purpose for taking actual physical control of the car and starting the engine is irrelevant. G.S. 20-4.01(7).\nAppeal by defendant from Lamm, Judge. Judgment entered 12 September 1984 in Superior Court, WATAUGA County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 September 1985.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg by Assistant Attorney General W. Dale Talbert for the State.\nAppellate Defender Adam Stein by Assistant Appellate Defender Geoffrey C. Mangum for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 436, "last_page_order": 439 }