{
  "id": 8520448,
  "name": "AMBROSE A. SAWYER, SR., Employee, Plaintiff v. FEREBEE & SON, INC., Employer; GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Sawyer v. Ferebee & Son, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1985-12-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 8510IC556",
  "first_page": "212",
  "last_page": "214",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:04.225821+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges WHICHARD and JOHNSON concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "AMBROSE A. SAWYER, SR., Employee, Plaintiff v. FEREBEE & SON, INC., Employer; GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff has suffered a change of condition so as to entitle him to compensation for 100 percent total permanent disability based on that change.\nOur Supreme Court has defined \u201cchange of condition\u201d in the following manner:\nChange of condition \u2018refers to conditions different from those existent when the award was made; and a continued incapacity of the same kind and character and for the same injury is not a change of condition . . . the change must be actual, and not a mere change of opinion with respect to a pre-existing condition.\u2019 . . . Change of condition is a substantial change, after a final award of compensation, of physical capacity to earn. . . .\nPratt v. Upholstery Co., 252 N.C. 716, 722, 115 S.E. 2d 27, 33-34 (1960), quoting 101 C.J.S., Workmen\u2019s Compensation, Sec. 854(c), pp. 211-12.\nWe do not question that plaintiff\u2019s condition may have worsened after his surgery in March 1980. We find no evidence in the record, however, that there has been a change of condition, as that term is defined, since the September 1981 award.\nAccording to Dr. Dillon\u2019s own testimony, plaintiffs condition has remained \u201cessentially unchanged.\u201d In his opinion, the intensifying of plaintiffs physical problems was due to \u201cthe scar tissue that always infiltrates any area where an operation has been done.\u201d Plaintiffs \u201ccontinued incapacity,\u201d therefore, is of the same kind and character as his incapacity at the time of the September 1981 award, and is not a change of condition within the meaning of the statute. Additionally, the record discloses that Dr. Dillon did not examine plaintiff from December 1980 until September 1981 (the date of the original award), and so he would thus be unable to testify as to plaintiffs amount of disability at the time of the award. If he did not have first-hand knowledge of plaintiff s condition at the time of the original award, his testimony is certainly incompetent as to whether plaintiff has suffered a change of condition since that time.\nAccordingly, the Industrial Commission\u2019s award granting plaintiff compensation based on a rating of 100 percent total permanent disability must be reversed.\nReversed.\nJudges WHICHARD and JOHNSON concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Russell E. Twiford for plaintiff, appellee.",
      "Leroy, Wells, Shaw, Hornthal & Riley, by L. P. Hornthal, Jr., for defendants, appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "AMBROSE A. SAWYER, SR., Employee, Plaintiff v. FEREBEE & SON, INC., Employer; GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. 8510IC556\n(Filed 3 December 1985)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 77.1\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 scar tissue not change of condition\nPlaintiff was not entitled to additional compensation for a back injury based on a change of condition where the evidence showed that the intensifying of plaintiffs physical problems is due to scar tissue from an operation performed prior to the original award and that plaintiffs continued incapacity is, therefore, of the same kind and character as his incapacity at the time of the original award.\nAPPEAL by defendants from opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission dated 25 January 1985. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 1985.\nThis is a proceeding under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act wherein plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for injuries received while working for defendant Ferebee & Son, Inc. The record discloses the following pertinent facts: On 2 November 1979 plaintiff suffered a ruptured disk when he fell off a railroad hopper car. He was seen by a neurosurgeon, Dr. James Dillon, in February 1980, and was operated on by Dr. Dillon in March 1980. Dr. Dillon continued to treat plaintiff until December 1980 at which time Dr. Dillon took a sabbatical from private practice. Plaintiffs care was transferred to a Dr. Rish who was a member of Dr. Dillon\u2019s firm of neurosurgeons. Dr. Rish discharged plaintiff in July 1981, after giving him a 40 percent permanent partial disability rating of the back.\nOn 29 September 1981 the Industrial Commission awarded plaintiff compensation based upon Dr. Rish\u2019s 40 percent disability rating. The award was later amended to provide that plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement on 14 August 1981.\nDr. Dillon returned to private practice in November 1983 and resumed plaintiffs care. He found \u201cweakness of the dorsiflexor muscles of the right foot . . ., loss of sensation [in the back],\u201d and \u201c[t]he range of motion in his back was remarkably less than it was during the pre-operative evaluation that we did on him. . . . [H]e was unable to sit, or stand or bend comfortably even to a minimal degree.\u201d\nBased on these findings, plaintiff made a claim under G.S. 97-47 for additional compensation due to an alleged change of condition. The Commission concluded that \u201cplaintiffs physical condition has changed for the worse since he was awarded compensation for a 40 percent permanent partial disability rating of the back in September, 1981.\u201d The Commission then awarded plaintiff compensation based on a finding of total permanent disability \u201cfor as long as he remains totally incapable of earning any wages.\u201d The Chairman of the Industrial Commission dissented, and defendants appealed.\nRussell E. Twiford for plaintiff, appellee.\nLeroy, Wells, Shaw, Hornthal & Riley, by L. P. Hornthal, Jr., for defendants, appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0212-01",
  "first_page_order": 244,
  "last_page_order": 246
}