{ "id": 8521142, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LOGAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Logan", "decision_date": "1986-02-18", "docket_number": "No. 8526SC945", "first_page": "420", "last_page": "424", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 N.C. App. 420" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4721250, 4726152, 4720174, 4723376, 4721109 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0608-01", "/nc/313/0608-04", "/nc/313/0608-03", "/nc/313/0608-02", "/nc/313/0608-05" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521862 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558175 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 U.S. 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159521 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0053-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 10811, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1760663907527704e-08, "percentile": 0.2674621184478323 }, "sha256": "14e72d314e3fdf8d12743e2d7f1d4ae5688869b088bf40f9797910689e6af2cc", "simhash": "1:c7b5b1321fa868e6", "word_count": 1809 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:53.333939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WHICHARD and COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LOGAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nIn his brief, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, in denying his motion for continuance to allow him to locate a non-appearing confidential informant and in instructing the jury. We overrule each of defendant\u2019s assignments of error and find no error in the trial.\nOn direct examination, Agent Beatty testified that he had made visits to the Newland Road residence on 16 and 21 July and identified defendant as the person with whom he dealt. On cross-examination, Beatty testified that he did not know defendant before 16 July 1985 but was informed by a confidential and reliable informant that he could purchase \u201cdrugs\u201d from defendant. The informant was with Beatty on the 16 July visit but did not participate in the purchase. On defendant\u2019s motion, the State revealed the informant\u2019s identity as a person named \u201cButch.\u201d The State was unable to identify \u201cButch\u201d further or to furnish any information as to his whereabouts. Defendant requested that the State be ordered to produce the informant; that motion was denied. Defendant then moved in the alternative that the trial court strike all testimony as to the 16 July visit or that the trial court declare a mistrial; that motion was denied. Defendant also requested a continuance in order to try to locate the informant; that request was denied.\nWe agree with defendant that the State\u2019s privilege to withhold the identity of an informant must give way where the disclosure of identity \u201cis relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to the fair determination of a cause. . . .\u201d Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed. 2d 639 (1957); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E. 2d 53 (1969). This court has held, however, that the State\u2019s disclosure obligation is met when it discloses all the information it possesses as to an informant\u2019s identity or whereabouts. State v. Newkirk, 73 N.C. App. 83, 325 S.E. 2d 518, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 608, 332 S.E. 2d 81 (1985). Assuming without deciding that \u201cButch\u2019s\u201d testimony would have been relevant on the question of defendant\u2019s identity, we hold that, in this case, the State met its obligation of disclosure and that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motions to strike the testimony as to the 16 July visit or for a mistrial. We also hold that in the light of the paucity of information possessed by the State as to \u201cButch\u2019s\u201d identity or whereabouts, absent a showing by defendant that he might reasonably be able to locate \u201cButch,\u201d the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance.\nThe State contends that defendant\u2019s arguments on this aspect of the trial should be rejected because \u201cButch\u201d was not a participant in the offenses for which defendant was being tried. Because we have overruled defendant\u2019s assignments of error based on these aspects of the trial on other grounds, we need not reach that question.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in rein-structing the jury when it appeared that the jury was deadlocked by not giving all of the instructions set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1235(a) and (b) (1983). The statute provides:\n(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the judge must give an instruction which informs the jury that in order to return a verdict, all 12 jurors must agree to a verdict of guilty or not guilty.\n(b) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the judge may give an instruction which informs the jury that:\n(1) Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if/it can be done without violence to individual judgment;\n(2) Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;\n(3) In the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and\n(4) No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.\n(c) If it appears to the judge that the jury has been unable to agree, the judge may require the jury to continue its deliberations and may give or repeat the instructions provided in subsections (a) and (b). The judge may not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.\n(d) If it appears that there is no reasonable possibility of agreement, the judge may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.\nWhen the jury informed Judge Kirby that it had been unable to agree on a verdict, he reinstructed the jury as follows:\nMembers of the jury, of course your foreman has just informed me that so far you have been unable to agree upon a verdict. I want to emphasize the fact that it is your duty to do whatever you can to reach a verdict. You should reason the matter over together as reasonable men and women and reconcile your differences if you can without the surrender of your conscientious convictions. No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. I\u2019m going to let you go back to the juryroom and resume your deliberations.\nIn State v. Williams, slip op. No. 50A84, filed 7 January 1986, our Supreme Court held that when a trial judge attempts to give any of the G.S. 15A-1235(a) and (b) instructions to a deadlocked jury, he must give all those instructions. The Williams court held that the failure to so instruct the jury in that case was non-prejudicial because defendant did not object to the instruction given at trial and that the error committed did not rise to the level of \u201cplain error\u201d under the instruction given. We are faced with the same question, as defendant in this case did not object at trial. We have reviewed the entire record, see Williams, supra, and State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E. 2d 375 (1983), and conclude there was no \u201cplain error\u201d here. First, the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was very strong; second, the instructions given by Judge Kirby were in substantial conformity with the statute. We overrule this assignment of error.\nWe conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges WHICHARD and COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General James Peeler Smith, for the State.", "Public Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Marc D. Towler, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LOGAN\nNo. 8526SC945\n(Filed 18 February 1986)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 67\u2014 confidential informant \u2014 disclosure of State\u2019s information\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to strike testimony concerning a visit to defendant\u2019s apartment by an undercover police officer and a confidential informant for the purpose of buying drugs, properly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial, and properly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance, since the State met its obligation of disclosure by revealing the name of the informant, \u201cButch,\u201d which was all it knew about his identity, and there was no showing by defendant that he might reasonably be able to locate the informant.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 122.2\u2014 inability of jury to reach verdict \u2014 instructions proper\nDefendant was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s failure to give all of the instructions set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1235(a) and (b) when reinstructing the jury after it appeared that the jury was deadlocked, since defendant did not object at trial; moreover, there was no \u201cplain error\u201d because evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was very strong, and instructions given by the trial judge were in substantial conformity with the statute.\nOn certiorari to review the judgment of Kirby, Judge. Judgment entered 28 July 1982 in MECKLENBURG County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 February 1986.\nUpon proper indictments, defendant was convicted of sale and delivery of cocaine, possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, sale and delivery of heroin and possession with intent to sell and deliver heroin. Defendant\u2019s appeal was not timely perfected due to an inadvertent failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant on appeal when defendant entered notice of appeal on 28 July 1982. This Court subsequently allowed defendant\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following events and circumstances. In July of 1981, Agent Bryan Beatty was on assignment in the Charlotte area as an undercover narcotics agent for the State Bureau of Investigation. Officer D. L. Givens was employed as an officer in the Charlotte Police Department, also working as an undercover narcotics officer. At about 2:45 p.m. on 24 July 1981, Beatty and Givens went together by automobile to a duplex residence identified as 1400-B Newland Road in Charlotte. They went there for the purpose of purchasing a controlled substance from defendant (emphasis supplied). Beatty had previously visited the residence at 1400-B Newland Road on 16 and 21 July 1981 to purchase controlled substances from defendant. Officer Givens also accompanied Beatty on the 21 July visit but remained in the car. On 24 July, Beatty parked his car about twenty-five feet from the residence, went to the front door where he was met by defendant, entered the residence and remained there five or six minutes while he purchased both cocaine and heroin from defendant. When defendant came out to admit Beatty, Givens observed defendant on the porch of the residence. Beatty\u2019s and Givens\u2019 descriptions of defendant were consistent with each other. Officer W. H. Caldwell, Jr. of the Charlotte Police Department observed a green Pontiac automobile parked in front of the residence. Caldwell, who knew defendant, had seen defendant driving that car on numerous occasions. Both Beatty and Givens identified defendant as the person they saw at the Newland Road residence on 24 July and Beatty identified him as the person with whom he dealt on all three of his visits.\nDefendant did not testify, but presented alibi evidence through others. These witnesses testified that on 24 July 1981 defendant resided at 608 Georgetown Drive in Charlotte and that 1400-B Newland Road was the address of defendant\u2019s estranged wife. There was testimony that from 12:00 or 12:30 p.m. on 24 July 1981 until 6:00 or 8:00 p.m. defendant was at a birthday party at 2421-A Horne Drive, and specifically that defendant was there at about 2:50 p.m. These witnesses\u2019 description of defendant on that day did not agree with the description given by Beatty and Givens.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General James Peeler Smith, for the State.\nPublic Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Marc D. Towler, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0420-01", "first_page_order": 448, "last_page_order": 452 }