{ "id": 8553327, "name": "PINE STATE YARN MILLS, INC. v. THE TROUTMAN FOUNDRY. INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Pine State Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Troutman Foundry. Inc.", "decision_date": "1970-06-24", "docket_number": "No. 7022SC214", "first_page": "521", "last_page": "524", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "8 N.C. App. 521" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "70 S.E. 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652465 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/154/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 S.E. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623887 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624582 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626752 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572978 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562601 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 S.E. 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662729 ], "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/122/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 N.C. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269960 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/173/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570212 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 403, "char_count": 7930, "ocr_confidence": 0.601, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.628077722442039e-07, "percentile": 0.8219635584931786 }, "sha256": "ecec096861488b8ab73217c8dfac5d72fd7ecb2a5a905c05f44440a0e07b746b", "simhash": "1:bfcf5fcbded03118", "word_count": 1348 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:36:14.673474+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MoKRis and Geaham, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "PINE STATE YARN MILLS, INC. v. THE TROUTMAN FOUNDRY. INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mallaed, C.J.\nPlaintiff asserts that the court erred in allowing defendant\u2019s motion for judgment as of nonsuit.\nOn motion for nonsuit the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Trial, \u00a7 21. When the evidence is so taken, the following facts appear: That the property owned by plaintiff was adjacent to that owned by defendant; that defendant\u2019s building was located approximately north of plaintiff\u2019s building; that defendant\u2019s smokestack was fifty-three feet from the northeast corner of plaintiff\u2019s building; that there was a fence between the smokestack and the plaintiff\u2019s building and a fence east of plaintiff\u2019s building extending north and south; that there was a railroad track east of this east fence; that there was high grass from the railroad track to plaintiff\u2019s east fence; that it was twenty-eight feet from the northeast corner of plaintiff\u2019s building to the fence east of the building; that \u201cit is approximately 10 to 12 feet from the fence to the shoulder of the railroad\u201d; that on 1 April 1966 the wind was blowdng \u201cto the south\u201d; that during the months of March and February the defendant\u2019s smokestack emitted smoke and sparks about 1:00 p.m. every day; that a fire started at about 1:00 p.m. on 1 April 1966 and went down the railroad tracks \u201ccoming from the north and going in a southeast direction\u201d; that the fire \u201chad come in at a point about 28 feet from the north corner\u201d of plaintiff\u2019s fence and after burning the dead grass between plaintiff\u2019s warehouse and the fence spread to plaintiff\u2019s warehouse; and that plaintiff\u2019s goods and warehouse were damaged by the fire. There was some evidence that defendant fired its \u201cequipment\u201d that day. However, the plaintiff offered no evidence that the \u201cequipment\u201d was fired before the fire occurred, and, more importantly, there was no evidence that any smoke or sparks emitted from defendant\u2019s smokestack on 1 April 1966.\nProof of the origin of fire may be established by circumstantial evidence. Phelps v. Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E. 2d 719 (1967). However, it is not enough to show only that (1) the fire occurred and (2) defendant had a smokestack which emitted sparks in the past. The plaintiff must show that the fire in question originated due to a spark or sparks from defendant\u2019s smokestack. Phelps v. Winston-Salem, supra; Moore v. R. R., 173 N.C. 311, 92 S.E. 1 (1917); Mfg. Co. v. R. R., 122 N.C. 881, 29 S.E. 575 (1898).\nThe plaintiff in this case takes the position that we should infer (1) that sparks emitted from defendant\u2019s smokestack and (2) that those sparks started the grass fire that subsequently injured plaintiff\u2019s warehouse. It is settled law in North Carolina that an inference of fact may not be based upon an inference. Petree v. Power Company, 268 N.C. 419, 150 S.E. 2d 749 (1966); Powell v. Cross, 263 N.C. 764, 140 S.E. 2d 393 (1965); Johnson v. Fox, 254 N.C. 454, 119 S.E. 2d 185 (1961); Lane v. Bryan, 246 N.C. 108, 97 S.E. 2d 411 (1957).\nThe question at issue is whether defendant\u2019s negligence can be inferred where there is no showing as to the cause of the fire or a showing of smoke or sparks emitting from the defendant\u2019s smokestack. In Mfg. C. v. R. R., supra, the Court said:\n\u201c(W)here plaintiff alleges that he has been injured by fire originating from sparks issued from defendant\u2019s locomotive, \u2018he must not only prove that the fire might have proceeded from defendant\u2019s locomotive, but must show by reasonable affirmative evidence that it did so originate.\u2019 \u201d\nIn Phelps v. Winston-Salem, supra, the Court said:\n\u201cIn order to go to the jury on the question of defendant\u2019s negligence causing the fire, plaintiffs must not only show that the fire might have been started due to the defendant\u2019s negligence, but must show by reasonable affirmative evidence that it did so originate. Moore v. R. R., supra. In Lumber Co. v. Elizabeth City, 227 N.C. 270, 41 S.E. 2d 761, the Court held that nonsuit was proper where the origin of the fire was left in speculation and conjecture.\nThis is an \u2018unexplained fire\u2019. Proof of the burning alone is not sufficient to establish liability, for if nothing more appears, the presumption is that the fire was the residt of accident or some providential cause. There can be no liability without satisfactory proof, by either direct or circumstantial evidence, not only of the burning of the property in question but that it was the proximate result of negligence and did not result from natural or accidental causes. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, 836.\u201d (Emphasis Added.)\nThe evidence in this case revealed that there were several smokestacks in the general area of plaintiff\u2019s warehouse; that children and others often walked along the railroad track; that workmen smoked outside the building; that there had been previous \u201cunexplained\u201d fires in the same grass; and that a railroad track was located next to the high grass.\nIn Maguire v. R. R., 154 N.C. 384, 70 S.E. 737 (1911), fire occurred along the right-of-way next to the railroad track, but there was no evidence that the locomotive using the track emitted sparks. The Supreme Court held that defendant's motion for nonsuit should be granted and said:\n\u201cThere was every opportunity for this fire to have originated from some other source as well as from defendant\u2019s engine. All that can be reasonably said is that the fire may possibly have been set out by the engine, and it is equally true that it may not.\u201d\nIn the case at bar the fire may possibly have been set by sparks emitted from defendant\u2019s smokestack, and it is equally true that it may not; the evidence presents a mere choice of possibilities and leaves the source of the fire in doubt.\nThe plaintiff has failed to show that the fire originated due to defendant\u2019s negligence. Consequently, the judgment of the superior court in granting the nonsuit is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMoKRis and Geaham, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mallaed, C.J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Woodson, Hudson & Busby by Donald D. Sayers for plaintiff appellant.", "Raymer, Lewis & Eisele by Douglas G. Eisele, and Adams, Dearman & Pope by William P. Pope for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PINE STATE YARN MILLS, INC. v. THE TROUTMAN FOUNDRY. INC.\nNo. 7022SC214\n(Filed 24 June 1970)\n1. Trial \u00a7 21\u2014 motion for nonsuit \u2014 consideration of evidence\nOn motion for nonsuit the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.\n2. Fires \u00a7 3\u2014 origin of fire \u2014 circumstantial evidence\nProof of the origin of fire may be established by circumstantial evidence.\n3. Fires \u00a7 3\u2014 sparks from smokestack as cause of fire \u2014 sufficiency of proof\nIn order to recover for fire damage caused by negligence in permitting sparks to escape from a smokestack, it is not enough to show only that (1) the fire occurred and (2) defendant had a smokestack which in the past emitted sparks, but plaintiff must show that the fire in question originated due to a spark or sparks from defendant\u2019s smokestack.\n4. Trial \u00a7 22\u2014 inference upon an inference\nAn inference of fact may not be based upon an inference.\n5. Fires \u00a7 3\u2014 negligence in causing fire \u2014 emission of sparks from smokestack \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence was insufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant\u2019s negligence in causing a fire which damaged plaintiff\u2019s building by permitting sparks to escape from its smokestack where it failed to show the cause of the fire or that smoke or sparks were emitted from defendant\u2019s smokestack on the date of the fire.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Seay, J., 17 November 1969 Session of Superior Court held in IREdell County.\nThis action is brought to recover damages for the burning of plaintiff\u2019s goods and part of its warehouse, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant in negligently permitting fire to escape from its smokestack.\nAt the conclusion of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, a motion for judgment as of nonsuit was sustained. Plaintiff assigned error and appealed to the Court of Appeals.\nWoodson, Hudson & Busby by Donald D. Sayers for plaintiff appellant.\nRaymer, Lewis & Eisele by Douglas G. Eisele, and Adams, Dearman & Pope by William P. Pope for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0521-01", "first_page_order": 545, "last_page_order": 548 }