{
  "id": 8522312,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAREN GAIL CARAWAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Carawan",
  "decision_date": "1986-04-01",
  "docket_number": "No. 853SC890",
  "first_page": "151",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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          "parenthetical": "evidence sufficient to permit inference that driveway to condominium complex was a \"public vehicular area\" as that phrase was defined in prior version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32)"
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          "parenthetical": "evidence sufficient to permit inference that driveway to condominium complex was a \"public vehicular area\" as that phrase was defined in prior version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32)"
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          "parenthetical": "evidence sufficient to permit inference that driveway to condominium complex was a \"public vehicular area\" as that phrase was defined in prior version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32)"
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      "year": 1984,
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          "parenthetical": "evidence sufficient to permit inference that driveway to condominium complex was a \"public vehicular area\" as that phrase was defined in prior version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32)"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:08.586003+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges BECTON and PARKER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAREN GAIL CARAWAN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s sole contention is that the court erred in denying her motions to dismiss and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The basis of the contention is that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to permit a finding that the offense occurred upon a \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32). We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. 20-138.1(a) provides:\nA person commits the offense of impaired driving if he drives any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within this State:\n(1) While under the influence of an impairing substance; or\n(2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32) defines \u201cpublic vehicular area,\u201d as used in Chapter 20 of the General Statutes, in pertinent part as follows:\nAny area within the State of North Carolina that is generally open to and used by the public, including by way of illustration and not limitation any drive, driveway, road, roadway, street, alley, or parking lot upon the grounds and premises of:\na. Any public or private hospital, college, university, school, orphanage, church, or any of the institutions, parks or other facilities maintained and supported by the State of North Carolina or any of its subdivisions^]\nIt further provides: \u201cThe term \u2018public vehicular area\u2019 shall not be construed to mean any private property not generally open to and used by the public.\u201d\nThe evidence as to the locale of the alleged offense here, and the use of the locale at the time, was as follows:\nThe Bicentennial Park is located in the city of New Bern in Craven County. On the date in question the city and county each owned a portion of the park.\nGenerally, the park is used as a recreation area and is closed to motor vehicles. Signs at the entrances state: \u201c[N]o parking on the grass, no vehicles allowed.\u201d\nOn the occasion of special events, however, the city \u201cidentifies] a parking area out on the grass portion of the park\u201d in order to \u201chave better traffic control.\u201d There are usually ten to fifteen special events per year during which the city \u201callows people to come out and use the park and park out there.\u201d\nThe Trent River raft race, which took place on the date of defendant\u2019s alleged offense, was one such event. At least 200 vehicles were legally parked in the park for this event. Approximately fifty were still parked there when defendant backed her car into another vehicle while on the portion of the park grounds legally in use as a parking lot.\nDefendant argues that the park grounds cannot be a \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d because the uncontroverted evidence establishes that they are not \u201cgenerally open to and used by the public.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32) (emphasis supplied). In construing this statutory language \u201cwe are guided by the primary rule that the intent of the legislature controls.\u201d State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 546, 173 S.E. 2d 765, 773 (1970). The statutory definition of \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d includes, by way of illustration, \u201cany . . . parking lot upon the grounds and premises of . . . [a]ny parks . . . maintained and supported by the State ... or any of its subdivisions.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32). It is undisputed that the area in question was upon the grounds of a park maintained and supported by the city of New Bern and the county of Craven, which are subdivisions of the State. It is equally undisputed that at the time in question the area was legally in use as a parking lot for a special event, and that it generally was so used on the occasion of such events.\nWe believe the legislature, in the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stats. 20-138.1 and 20-4.01(32), clearly intended to protect persons in areas such as that in question from the dangers posed by others who drive there while impaired. Adoption of the construction of \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d for which defendant contends would be counter to that legislative purpose, and \u201c[a] construction which will operate to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\u201d Spencer, 276 N.C. at 546, 173 S.E. 2d at 773.\nWe therefore hold that the evidence permitted a finding that at the time in question the portion of the Bicentennial Park grounds legally in use as a parking lot was a \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d within the meaning and intent of that phrase as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32). See State v. Bowen, 67 N.C. App. 512, 313 S.E. 2d 196, appeal dismissed, 312 N.C. 79, 320 S.E. 2d 405 (1984) (evidence sufficient to permit inference that driveway to condominium complex was a \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d as that phrase was defined in prior version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-4.01(32)). The court thus correctly denied defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nNo error.\nJudges BECTON and PARKER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WHICHARD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isaac T. Avery, III, for the State.",
      "Voerman & Ward, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAREN GAIL CARAWAN\nNo. 853SC890\n(Filed 1 April 1986)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 122\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 park as public vehicular area\nWhere defendant allegedly drove while impaired in a park maintained and supported by a city and county, evidence permitted a finding that at the time in question, the portion of the park grounds legally in use as a parking lot for attendees at a river race was a \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(32).\nAppeal by defendant from Phillips, Judge. Judgment entered 14 May 1985 in Superior Court, CRAVEN County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 January 1986.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment entered upon a verdict of guilty of impaired driving.\nAttorney General Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isaac T. Avery, III, for the State.\nVoerman & Ward, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0151-01",
  "first_page_order": 179,
  "last_page_order": 182
}
