{
  "id": 8523642,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONALD DAVID",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. David",
  "decision_date": "1986-04-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 8520SC1143",
  "first_page": "327",
  "last_page": "330",
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    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name": "N.C."
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      "year": 1981,
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      "year": 1982,
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          "page": "338"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:08.586003+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Wells and Martin concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONALD DAVID"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nBy his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to remove his attorney and in denying defendant\u2019s motion for continuance.\nThe grounds stated in support of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss his attorney were: 1) defendant lacked confidence in counsel because defendant had not fully paid counsel fees; and 2) defendant disagreed with counsel\u2019s judgment regarding the evidence to present at trial. When faced with a request that counsel be withdrawn, a trial court\u2019s sole obligation is to make a sufficient inquiry to determine whether defendant will receive effective assistance of counsel. State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 312, 289 S.E. 2d 335, 338 (1982).\nDefendant\u2019s attorney assured the court that he was not less inclined to ably represent defendant because defendant had not yet fully paid counsel fees. Defendant\u2019s attorney further assured the court that he was prepared for trial. We have carefully examined the record. We conclude that defendant was adequately represented at trial and that his right to effective assistance of counsel was not abridged. State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 272 S.E. 2d 842 (1981).\nThe grounds stated in support of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance were: 1) defendant lacked confidence in counsel; 2) defendant disagreed with counsel\u2019s trial strategy; 3) defendant only recently informed counsel of a witness; and 4) defendant spoke with an attorney who indicated an interest in reviewing defendant\u2019s case. In reviewing defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, we note that ordinarily the decision to grant or deny a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.\nIt is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a motion for continuance motivated by a defendant\u2019s lack of confidence in his counsel. State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 272 S.E. 2d 842 (1981). A mere disagreement between a defendant and his counsel as to trial tactics is not sufficient to require the trial court to grant a continuance. See State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E. 2d 174 (1976). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for continuance when defendant waits until the trial date, 14 months after indictment, to inform his attorney that he has a witness. See State v. McDiarmid, 36 N.C. App. 230, 243 S.E. 2d 398 (1978). The trial court is certainly not required to grant a motion for continuance grounded on the possibility of obtaining new counsel. Defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignment of error is to the court\u2019s failure to find a mitigating factor that \u201c[t]he victim was more than 16 years of age and was a voluntary participant in or consented to the defendant\u2019s conduct.\u201d At the sentencing stage of trial, the trial court must find each mitigating factor enumerated in the Fair Sentencing Act and supported by uncontradicted, substantial and manifestly credible evidence. State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E. 2d 451 (1983).\nDefendant contends that the paid police informant who volunteered to purchase cocaine in furtherance of a police investigation is a victim within the meaning of G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(2)g. Such an interpretation is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the term victim. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have carefully considered defendant\u2019s assignments of error and find\nNo error.\nJudges Wells and Martin concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney. General Daniel F. McLawhom, for the State.",
      "Assistant Appellate Defender Louis D. Bilionis for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONALD DAVID\nNo. 8520SC1143\n(Filed 15 April 1986)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 45\u2014 motion to remove attorney \u2014 denial proper\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to remove his attorney where the attorney assured the court that he was not less inclined ably to represent defendant because defendant had not yet fully paid counsel fees, and the attorney further assured the court that he was prepared for trial.\n2. Criminal Law 8 91.1\u2014 defendant\u2019s dealings with attorney \u2014 denial of continuance proper\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for continuance made on the grounds that defendant lacked confidence in his counsel and disagreed with counsel\u2019s trial strategy; defendant only recently informed counsel of a witness; and defendant spoke with an attorney who indicated an interest in reviewing defendant\u2019s case.\n3. Criminal Law 8 138.42\u2014 age of victim as mitigating circumstance \u2014 no \u201cvictim\u201d\nIn a prosecution of defendant for sale and delivery of cocaine, there was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in failing to find as a mitigating factor that \u201c[t]he victim was more than 16 years of age and was a voluntary participant in or consented to the defendant\u2019s conduct,\u201d since the paid police informant who volunteered to purchase cocaine in furtherance of a police investigation was not a victim within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(2)g.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Freeman, Judge. Judgments entered 16 July 1985 in Superior Court, RICHMOND County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 April 1986.\nDefendant was charged in proper bills of indictment with possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and of sale or delivery of cocaine. The State presented evidence tending to show that a paid informant purchased from defendant one-fourth gram of a white powdery substance subsequently determined to be cocaine. Defendant presented no evidence. From judgments imposing an eight-year prison sentence for sale and delivery of cocaine and a three-year concurrent prison sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney. General Daniel F. McLawhom, for the State.\nAssistant Appellate Defender Louis D. Bilionis for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0327-01",
  "first_page_order": 355,
  "last_page_order": 358
}