{ "id": 8525445, "name": "JAMES C. BOOZER v. ROSALIND WELLMAN (formerly Rosalind Boozer)", "name_abbreviation": "Boozer v. Wellman", "decision_date": "1986-05-20", "docket_number": "No. 8529SC1138", "first_page": "673", "last_page": "678", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "80 N.C. App. 673" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "302 S.E. 2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" }, { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707437 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520969 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0306-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 11848, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.3566862392363416 }, "sha256": "db26835a689a29bc96bc5d96e5433db15030650781c66544e7357e2702693996", "simhash": "1:dc2b44e35e1162e4", "word_count": 1911 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:08.586003+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Becton and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES C. BOOZER v. ROSALIND WELLMAN (formerly Rosalind Boozer)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThe sole issue before us is whether the Florida judgment and the companion judgment for attorney\u2019s fees should be accorded full faith and credit in a North Carolina court. We think they should.\nThe facts pertinent to this appeal as they appear from the record are as follows: On 20 December 1976, plaintiff in this action was served by a sheriff from the Transylvania Sheriffs Office with a complaint signed by defendant, an amended complaint, and a summons issued from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Dade County, Florida. In defendant\u2019s complaint she petitioned, inter alia, for a dissolution of the marriage, child custody of James Christopher Boozer, the minor born of the marriage, child support, alimony and attorney\u2019s fees. In this complaint defendant alleged that plaintiff and defendant jointly owned the marital residence located at 9480 S.W. 25th Drive, Miami, Florida. In defendant\u2019s amended complaint she alleged that plaintiff had removed himself and the minor child from Florida \u201cfor the primary purpose of avoiding in personam jurisdiction over himself and a determination of child custody under the jurisdiction of this Court.\u201d Defendant prayed that the Florida court assume jurisdiction over plaintiff and the minor child. Plaintiff did not respond to defendant\u2019s complaint. An order for default judgment against plaintiff was entered 25 January 1977. On 11 November 1977 the Florida court entered a \u201cFinal Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage,\u201d which stated, inter alia: \u201cthis Court having jurisdiction over the child of the parties, JAMES CHRISTOPHER Boozer, pursuant to Florida Statutes sec. 61.13(2)(a), and a duly noticed Final Hearing having been had and the Court having heard and considered the evidence and testimony of [defendant here], argument of counsel and independent witness as to residency, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises. . . .\u201d The court ratified and confirmed the default judgment previously entered; granted a divorce; granted child custody to defendant; ordered, inter alia, alimony and exclusive possession of the Florida home in favor of defendant; and specifically retained jurisdiction of the cause for the entry of further orders. The record indicates that plaintiff was represented by North Carolina counsel at this hearing.\nIn May 1982, almost four and one-half years later, defendant filed a motion in the Florida action for an order adjudging plaintiff in contempt of court for violation of the 11 November 1977 order. On 21 May 1982, a notice of hearing was mailed to plaintiff at his North Carolina address. The court instructed defendant to move the court for an order of referral to a General Master.\nOn 22 July 1982, the Dade County Circuit Court ordered that the matter be referred to a General Master for further proceedings as deemed necessary by the General Master, who was requested to report his findings and recommendations to the court. Copies of this order were sent to plaintiff in North Carolina and defendant\u2019s attorney. Defendant then applied to the General Master for an order finding plaintiff in contempt of court for noncompliance with the 11 November 1977 order. Plaintiff was served with the motion and notice of hearing by the Transylvania County Sheriffs Office at his Brevard, North Carolina address. The motion and notice were also sent to John M. Thompson of the Florida law firm Tobin and Thompson, who the record identifies as the \u201cattorney for husband.\u201d On 30 September 1982, the Dade County Circuit Court approved and ratified the report of the General Master and entered \u201cOrder on Report of General Master\u201d in favor of Rosalind Boozer. The General Master retained jurisdiction to file a report regarding attorney\u2019s fees and custody of the minor. On 13 October 1982, the Dade County Circuit Court, after hearing the \u201cOrder on Report of General Master\u201d and exceptions filed thereto, entered \u201cFinal Judgment\u201d in favor of defendant Rosalind Boozer, holding plaintiff in arrears in the amount of $58,415.58. On 4 October 1982, subsequent to the 30 September 1982 \u201cOrder on the Report of General Master\u201d but prior to the 13 October 1982 \u201cFinal Judgment,\u201d plaintiff filed an affidavit with the Florida court in which he stated, inter alia: that in the summer of 1977 defendant lived with plaintiff in Brevard, North Carolina as man and wife, that they \u201chad moved there with the intention of making North Carolina our permanent residence,\u201d that the minor child of the marriage and defendant\u2019s two children were attending public school in Brevard, North Carolina in the fall of 1977 until defendant \u201creturned to our former home in Miami\u201d with her two children.\nOn 10 November 1982, plaintiff filed notice of appeal regarding five of the Florida orders, including the 13 October 1982 order at issue here, to the District Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District. In an opinion filed 7 June 1983 the Florida appellate court affirmed the orders from the Dade County Circuit Court per curiam. The Dade County Circuit Court thereafter entered several judgments consistent with this affirmance, including the 1 November 1983 order for attorney\u2019s fees.\nThe Constitution of the United States provides, \u201cFull faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.\u201d U.S. Const, art. IV, sec. I. Accordingly, a judgment from a rendering state is entitled to the \u201csame credit, validity and effect\u201d in a sister state that it has in the state where it was pronounced. Montague v. Wilder, 78 N.C. App. 306, 308, 337 S.E. 2d 627, 628 (1985), so long as certain requirements of a valid judgment have been satisfied, Boyles v. Boyles, 308 N.C. 488, 491, 302 S.E. 2d 790, 793 (1983). The judgment is deemed by the second court to be valid in the rendering state if the minimal requirements of proper subject matter jurisdiction, and the due process concerns of personal jurisdiction, and adequate notice were satisfied. Montague v. Wilder, supra, at 309, 337 S.E. 2d at 628-29. \u201cWe note that the second court\u2019s scope of review concerning the rendering court\u2019s jurisdiction is very limited.\u201d Boyles v. Boyles, supra, at 491, 302 S.E. 2d at 793. If the second court\u2019s inquiry reveals that these questions have been \u201cfully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the judgment,\u201d the inquiry need go no further. Id. However, if the situation presented is one where default judgment was entered in the rendering state and the party against whom the default was entered subsequently challenges the validity of the proceeding on the grounds that he did not receive notice, the reviewing court must examine the underlying facts to determine whether notice prior to entry of default was adequate. Id.\nHere, defendant is seeking to enforce in North Carolina the 13 October 1982 order for an arrearage of $58,415.58 and the $6,795.75 attorney fee award as ordered on 1 November 1983. Applying the rules stated above, the proper scope of review on these facts is a limited review. We need not examine the underlying facts because neither judgment at issue is a default judgment and because the issue of notice was fully and fairly litigated in the court which rendered the judgment as indicated by the entire .r\u00e9c-ord before us and, specifically, by the language in the 13 October 1982 order, to wit: James Boozer \u201cwas properly served notice of all proceedings in the [cause].\u201d We need not address the facts underlying the 25 January 1977 order of default because that judgment is not at issue. Although we note that plaintiff was represented by counsel at that 11 November 1977 hearing where the court adopted and ratified the order of default, we need inquire only as to whether the two judgments which defendant seeks to enforce in North Carolina are valid judgments.\nPlaintiff does not challenge subject matter jurisdiction. The language in the 13 October 1982 order \u201cCopies furnished to counsel\u201d and \u201ccopies of the above order were mailed to J. T. \u2014 H & H,\u201d that is, John Thompson, then counsel of record for plaintiff and Hendricks & Hendricks, then counsel of record for defendant, show that plaintiff was represented by an attorney. Plaintiff voluntarily submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the Florida court and actively participated in the litigation. Because the requirements of a valid judgment, to wit: subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and notice, have been satisfied, the 13 October 1982 judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Because the court specifically retained jurisdiction for a later determination on the issue of attorneys\u2019 fees, it follows that the 1 November 1983 award of $6,795.75 is also entitled to full faith and credit. Summary judgment for defendant is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Becton and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ramsey, Cilley and Perkins, by Robert S. Gilley, for plaintiff appellant.", "White & Dalton, by William R. White, for defendant ap-pellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES C. BOOZER v. ROSALIND WELLMAN (formerly Rosalind Boozer)\nNo. 8529SC1138\n(Filed 20 May 1986)\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 26.5\u2014 child support \u2014 Florida judgment \u2014 full faith and credit\nFlorida judgments awarding defendant arrearages in child support and alimony and awarding her attorney\u2019s fees were entitled to full faith and credit where the Florida court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and plaintiff had notice of the action against him.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Friday, John, Judge. Judgment entered 5 June 1985 in Superior Court, TRANSYLVANIA County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 February 1986.\nOn 3 November 1983, plaintiff filed a petition with the Clerk of Superior Court of Transylvania County seeking a partition by sale of certain tracts of land and an equal division of the proceeds. In that petition plaintiff alleged that he and defendant were formerly married, that defendant had \u201cobtained a divorce in Florida,\u201d that ownership of the tract of land at issue was as tenancy by the entirety, but, since the divorce, had been converted by law to a tenancy in common. In an answer and counterclaim filed 30 November 1983, defendant alleged in part that she is a resident of Florida, that plaintiff was formerly a resident of Florida, that on 13 October 1982, she obtained one judgment against plaintiff in the amount of fifty-eight thousand four hundred fifteen dollars and fifty-eight cents ($58,415.58) and a companion judgment ordering attorney\u2019s fees. Defendant prayed that the court grant full faith and credit to the Florida decrees. In plaintiffs reply he maintained that \u201cthe so called Judgment and all other elements of [that] action . . . are void and ineffective as to the Petitioner [plaintiff].\u201d On 27 March 1985, defendant moved for summary judgment for the sum of $58,415.58 plus twelve percent (12%) interest from 13 October 1982 and for attorney\u2019s fees in the amount of six thousand seven hundred ninety-five dollars and seventy-five cents ($6,795.75) plus twelve percent (12%) interest from 29 November 1983. In support of defendant\u2019s motion, she submitted to the court certified records of the Florida action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County. The record indicates plaintiff filed nothing in opposition to defendant\u2019s motion. On 5 June 1985, the court, having \u201cheard arguments of Counsel and considered the authority submitted to it,\u201d held that plaintiff \u201cwas duly served, participated in and appealed from the Florida decree\u201d and that the Florida decrees were entitled to full faith and credit. Accordingly, the court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and ordered plaintiff to pay the sums prayed for in defendant\u2019s motion. The matter was retained for the determination of setoffs due plaintiff and other matters at issue. Plaintiff appeals.\nRamsey, Cilley and Perkins, by Robert S. Gilley, for plaintiff appellant.\nWhite & Dalton, by William R. White, for defendant ap-pellee." }, "file_name": "0673-01", "first_page_order": 701, "last_page_order": 706 }