{ "id": 8525637, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JACK RANDALL ELLEDGE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Elledge", "decision_date": "1986-05-20", "docket_number": "No. 8523SC1120", "first_page": "714", "last_page": "716", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "80 N.C. App. 714" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "270 S.E. 2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564609 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564183 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0621-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 362, "char_count": 5156, "ocr_confidence": 0.806, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3669169515288343 }, "sha256": "4548fcfa2a103a3454cd76d0d296bce55ae790f78b8425ca7b804ac3a8ea20d2", "simhash": "1:1b5ed4716fdf06e0", "word_count": 862 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:08.586003+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Eagles concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JACK RANDALL ELLEDGE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PHILLIPS, Judge.\nFollowing appeal from the District Court and a trial de novo in the Superior Court defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of communicating threats to his estranged wife in violation of G.S. 14-277.1. The State\u2019s evidence, in gist, tended to show that: He had broken into her house and assaulted her on previous occasions and about 4 o\u2019clock in the morning on 1 December 1984 he telephoned her stating, among other things, \u201cthat I had better get that man out of my bed or he was going to come down and blow my brains out\u201d and \u201cthat he would bring the Northwest Housing Authority to throw me out.\u201d None of defendant\u2019s four assignments of error have merit and two of them have no basis in the record. The assignment asserting that the court erred in refusing to let defendant\u2019s mother testify as to the condition of a door that defendant purportedly damaged on an earlier occasion is not supported by an offer of proof showing what her testimony would have been. State v. Satterfield, 300 N.C. 621, 268 S.E. 2d 510 (1980). And the assignment contending that the court erred in charging the jury is not supported by an objection to the charge, though the record shows that defendant was given the opportunity to object before the jury retired to consider the case. Rule 10(b)(2), N.C. Rules of Appellate Procedure. Furthermore, the portion of the charge now complained of was an accurate summary of the State\u2019s evidence and contentions concerning defendant\u2019s telephone call.\nThe defendant did object though to testimony that he had assaulted his wife on other occasions and contends that this evidence was erroneously received to his prejudice. We disagree. As pointed out in State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954), it has long been our law that evidence which reasonably tends to prove a material fact in issue is not to be rejected merely because it also tends to show that the defendant had committed another crime. In enacting the Evidence Code, Chapter 8C of the General Statutes, this long followed principle was brought forward by Rule 404(b), which expressly provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible for purposes other than proving the character of a person. The crime of communicating threats under G.S. 14-277.1 involves more than making a threat to injure one\u2019s person or property and communicating it to the other person; it is also necessary, as the statute expressly provides, that the threat was made \u201cin a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out\u201d and that \u201c[t]he person threatened believes that the threat will be carried out.\u201d Evidence that on earlier occasions defendant had broken into his wife\u2019s house and assaulted her certainly tended to prove these two elements of the offense and its receipt did not violate Rule 404(b) of the N.C. Rules of Evidence, as defendant contends. All that Rule 404(b) forbids is receiving evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to \u201cprove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.\u201d The evidence in question was not received to prove defendant\u2019s character; it was received to prove two facts necessary for his conviction.\nDefendant\u2019s other assignment concerns an out of court statement purportedly made by a doctor in committing defendant to Broughton Hospital for observation after his wife \u201ctook out the papers to put in D-tox,\u201d a 24-ho\u00fcr holding facility for alleged drug and alcohol addicts awaiting a hearing. While defendant objected to the statement that he was \u201ctoo violent\u201d for the detoxification unit, that defendant was sent to Broughton Hospital and his wife\u2019s testimony that he \u201cjumped on the doctors\u201d who made the statement were not objected to. Assuming arguendo that the statement was improper hearsay, in our opinion it merely supplemented and explained information that the jury already had and could not have affected their verdict. State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E. 2d 98 (1980).\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Eagles concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PHILLIPS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr. and Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.", "Ferree, Cunningham & Gray, by William C. Gray, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JACK RANDALL ELLEDGE\nNo. 8523SC1120\n(Filed 20 May 1986)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 34.4\u2014 communicating threats \u2014 evidence of prior offenses \u2014 admissibility\nIn a prosecution of defendant for communicating threats to his estranged wife, the trial court did not err in allowing testimony that defendant had broken into his wife\u2019s house and assaulted her on earlier occasions, since the evidence was admissible to show that the threats in question were made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threats were likely to be carried out and the person threatened believed they would be carried out. N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\nAppeal by defendant from Wood, Judge. Judgment entered 11 June 1985 in Superior Court, Wilkes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 1986.\nAttorney General Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr. and Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.\nFerree, Cunningham & Gray, by William C. Gray, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0714-01", "first_page_order": 742, "last_page_order": 744 }