{
  "id": 8524734,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE BROWN, JR.",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brown",
  "decision_date": "1986-07-01",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges WHICHARD and JOHNSON concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE BROWN, JR."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony regarding another burglary and safecracking incident in Craven County because this testimony constituted evidence of a distinct and unrelated crime, violated due process, and denied defendant a fair trial. We do not agree.\nThe general rule in North Carolina is that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible on the issue of guilt if its only relevance is to show defendant\u2019s bad character or disposition to commit an offense similar to the one charged. State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 333 S.E. 2d 701 (1985). This general rule prohibiting the admission of evidence of \u201cother crimes\u201d does have exceptions, however. Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides:\nOther Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nJohnny Evans testified that about one month before the trial, he and defendant entered a house in Craven County, removed a safe, and took it to a wooded area. Defendant took a sledgehammer and hit the combination dial and handle until they were removed. Defendant then used a tapered iron stake to open the face of the safe. Using a crowbar, defendant next peeled back the faceplate to reveal the concrete underneath. Defendant broke away the concrete allowing the removal of an underlying plate and entrance into the safe. Evans also testified that while engaged in opening this safe, defendant confessed to the charges pending against defendant in this case.\nEvans\u2019s statement concerning defendant\u2019s confession is admissible as a hearsay exception under Rule 801(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, as an admission by a party-opponent. Evans\u2019s testimony as to defendant\u2019s method and manner used in opening this safe in Craven County is admissible under Rule 404(b) to show identity.\nIf . . . evidence tends to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime charged it is admissible notwithstanding that it also shows defendant guilty of another criminal offense. \u201cWhere the accused is not definitely identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged and the circumstances tend to show that the crime charged and another offense were committed by the same person, evidence that the accused committed the other offense is admissible to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime charged.\u201d\nState v. Freeman, 303 N.C. 299, 301-02, 278 S.E. 2d 207, 208 (1981), quoting State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E. 2d 364, 367 (1954). In the instant case, defendant relied upon a defense of alibi, thus putting his identity in issue. State v. Thomas, 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E. 2d 458 (1984). The remaining question is thus whether the circumstances of the two safecracking incidents were so similar as to tend to show that the crime charged and the second offense were committed by the same person. Id.\nExperts testified at trial that the method of peeling back the faceplate to gain entry into the safe as described in the testimony of Johnny Evans was also the method used to gain entry into Lyman Harris\u2019s safe. We find that the two instances of safecrack-ing are sufficiently similar as to provide a reasonable inference that the same person committed both offenses. See id. We conclude, therefore, that there was no error in the admission of Johnny Evans\u2019s testimony as substantive evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of felonious possession of stolen goods because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not agree.\nIn order to sustain the conviction of felonious possession of stolen goods as per the indictment, the State must establish the following elements:\n(1) Possession of personal property;\n(2) Which has been stolen pursuant to a burglary;\n(3) The possessor knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the property to have been stolen pursuant to a burglary; and\n(4) The possessor acting with a dishonest purpose.\nG.S. 14-72(c); see also State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 287 S.E. 2d 810 (1982). Upon a motion to dismiss in a criminal action, the evidence must be considered .by the trial judge in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference that might be drawn therefrom. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 313 S.E. 2d 585 (1984). Any contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for resolution by the jury. Id. The trial judge must decide whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.\nThe evidence in the instant case indicates that a van fitting the description of defendant\u2019s van was seen within 325 feet of the Harris residence on the night the safe was stolen. A man generally fitting the description of defendant was seen driving this van. Paint sample evidence indicates that Lyman Harris\u2019s safe had been in defendant\u2019s van. The van bolt hitch contained brick dust, and the Harrises\u2019 brick porch had been recently chipped. The safe was found in a wooded area near the home of defendant\u2019s girlfriend. The underside of defendant\u2019s van contained tree fragments. Testimony indicated defendant stole a second safe from a home at night, took it to a wooded area, and opened it by peeling away the faceplate in the same manner in which Lyman Harris\u2019s safe had been opened. Johnny Evans testified that defendant had admitted to the crimes with which defendant was charged in this case. Furthermore, in the week following the burglary of the Harris safe and its contents, defendant spent cash totalling in excess of $4,500, primarily in denominations of one hundred dollar bills. We believe this evidence is sufficient to establish substantial evidence of each element of the charge of felonious possession of stolen property.\nFor the reasons set forth above, we find\nNo error.\nJudges WHICHARD and JOHNSON concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ARNOLD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Abraham Penn Jones, for the State.",
      "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Leland Q. Towns, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE BROWN, JR.\nNo. 853SC1265\n(Filed 1 July 1986)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 34.5\u2014 evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of other offense \u2014admissibility to show identity\nIn a prosecution of defendant for burglary, felonious larceny, and felonious possession of stolen property where the evidence tended to show that defendant stole a safe, opened it, and removed the contents, the trial court did not err in allowing into evidence testimony regarding another burglary and safecracking incident, since the circumstances of the two safecracking incidents were so similar as to tend to show that the crime charged and the other offense were committed by the same person.\n2. Larceny \u00a7 7.4 \u2014 possession of stolen property \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence of felonious possession of stolen goods was sufficient to be submitted to the jury where it tended to show that a van fitting the description of defendant\u2019s van was seen within 325 feet of the victim\u2019s home on the night his safe was stolen; a man generally fitting the description of defendant was seen driving the van; paint sample evidence indicated that the safe had been in defendant\u2019s van; the safe was found in a wooded area near the home of defendant\u2019s girlfriend; the underside of defendant\u2019s van contained tree fragments; testimony indicated that defendant stole a second safe from a home at night, took it to a wooded area, and opened it by peeling away the faceplate in the same manner in which the safe in this case had been opened; another person testified that defendant had admitted to the crimes with which defendant was charged in this case; and in the week following the larceny of the safe and its contents, primarily $100 bills, defendant spent cash totalling in excess of $4,500, most of it in denominations of $100 bills.\nAppeal by defendant from Phillips (Herbert O., Ill), Judge. Judgment entered 22 July 1985 in Superior Court, PITT County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 April 1986.\nDefendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with second degree burglary, felonious larceny, and felonious possession of stolen property. At trial, the State presented evidence which tended to show the following facts. Lyman Harris and his wife, Mary Edna Harris, resided on Route 1, Winterville, North Carolina. The utility room of the house contained a cabinet with closing doors which enclosed a safe. The safe contained among other things approximately $27,000 in cash \u2014 $26,000 in one hundred dollar bills and the rest in smaller denominations.\nOn 20 November 1984, defendant\u2019s father, a Terminix employee, came to the Harris home to spray for roaches and bugs. During this call, defendant\u2019s father opened the cabinet containing the safe, and sprayed inside the cabinet and around the safe. On 10 December 1984, defendant accompanied his father on a return call to do more spraying. The cabinet containing the safe was in plain view of defendant, though the safe could be seen only if the cabinet doors were open.\nOn 2 January 1985, Lyman Harris left his home at approximately 5:00 p.m. to visit his wife in the hospital and returned at approximately 9:30 p.m. Upon returning home, he found that someone had broken into the house and removed the safe and its contents. On this same night, Sidney Harris and his wife, Frances Harris, observed a light blue Ford van parked on the side of the road approximately 325 feet from the Lyman Harris home between 7:20 p.m. and 8:10 p.m. The van had chrome wheels, no side panel windows on the driver\u2019s side, and two windows in the back doors of the van. A van matching this description is registered to Larry Brown Carpet Installation, defendant\u2019s self-owned business. Furthermore, Frances Harris observed the driver of this van at an intersection about a mile from the Lyman Harris home. This driver appeared to be a white male, in his twenties, with a pointed nose, dark hair, and what looked like a beard. This description generally matches that of defendant.\nOn 5 January 1985, the safe was found in a wooded area in Greenville, approximately 2,300 feet from Cemetery Road on which defendant\u2019s girlfriend lives and where defendant often stayed.\nInvestigators took paint and rust samples from the safe, the inside of the van, the bumper of the van, and the van\u2019s bolt hitch. Investigators also took various paint and rust samples and samples of chipped pieces of brick from the Harris residence. Wood samples were also collected from the wooded area in which the safe was found, and from underneath defendant\u2019s van.\nPatricia Harrell, a forensic chemist with the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), performed a chemical analysis of the paint and rust chips from the Harris residence, from the van, and from the safe. She concluded that the paint and rust samples from all three places were the same. William E. Pierce, another forensic chemist with the SBI, could not show a relationship between the pieces of chipped brick found on the van\u2019s bolt hitch with chipped brick from the Harrises\u2019 front porch due to an insufficient amount of material found on the bolt hitch. Furthermore, Elizabeth Wheeler, an expert in wood anatomy, concluded that the wood samples found under the van were from oak, sweet gum, and other hardwood trees similar to those trees in the area where the safe was found. However, due to the nature of the science, she could not conclusively state that these samples were from the very trees in that wooded area.\nFinally, defendant engaged in several financial transactions between 3 January 1985 and 9 January 1985 in which he spent cash totalling in excess of $4,500, primarily in denominations of one hundred dollar bills.\nDefendant presented evidence which tended to show that he and his parents were at a shopping mall from approximately 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. on 2 January 1985. After arriving home, defendant then drove to his girlfriend\u2019s house in his black Dodge Daytona, and there watched television until he left around 10:30 p.m.\nFollowing the close of the State\u2019s evidence and again at the close of all evidence, defendant moved to have all charges dismissed. The trial court denied the motions. Defendant was found guilty of felonious possession of stolen goods. From a judgment imposing a ten-year term of imprisonment, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Abraham Penn Jones, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Leland Q. Towns, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0622-01",
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