{
  "id": 8523379,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SONDRA STEVENSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stevenson",
  "decision_date": "1986-06-17",
  "docket_number": "No. 8518SC1149",
  "first_page": "409",
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Johnson and Martin concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SONDRA STEVENSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nFrom a judgment imposing a six-year sentence following her voluntary manslaughter conviction, the defendant, Sondra Stevenson, appeals. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give defendant\u2019s requested instruction that the defendant had no duty to retreat. We agree and grant defendant a new trial.\nI\nDefendant shot and killed William Curtis Albertson on 19 January 1985. Defendant and her husband, Michael Stevenson, began living in the apartment leased by the deceased man\u2019s girlfriend, Kimberly Forehand, about five days before the shooting. They had moved their clothes and stereo to Ms. Forehand\u2019s apartment, and she had given them permission to stay there for \u201ca week or so.\u201d Prior to the shooting, Albertson stayed at Ms. Forehand\u2019s apartment frequently, but also maintained a separate residence.\nOn the night of the shooting, defendant, Michael Stevenson, Kimberly Forehand, and Albertson went to a local pool room and drank beer. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that Albertson had been drinking heavily and was intoxicated when the four left the pool room and returned to Ms. Forehand\u2019s apartment. Albert-son continued drinking, and began arguing with Ms. Forehand about three Polaroid photographs of bruises inflicted by Albert-son on Ms. Forehand a few weeks earlier. Albertson had often beaten Ms. Forehand during their four-year relationship, and she had brought and dropped assault charges against him on numerous occasions.\nAlbertson grabbed Ms. Forehand by the hair and either led or dragged her, holding her in a bent-over position with her face to the floor, to the living room. He sat on the couch, still clutching her by the hair, and she knelt on the floor. Albertson cut the back of Ms. Forehand\u2019s head with a pocketknife. Ms. Forehand testified that she then succeeded in convincing Albertson that it was \u201csilly to fight like this.\u201d Unfortunately, Allen Holmes, the father of Ms. Forehand\u2019s seven-year-old son, Zack, stopped by at that moment to see his son, and Albertson became enraged. Albertson, who had been involved in a fist-fight with Allen Holmes on a prior occasion, attempted to go out after him. Ms. Forehand grabbed his arm to restrain him. Defendant entered at this point and assisted v in restraining Albertson, holding him by the other arm. When he did not desist, the defendant took the .32 revolver that Albertson always carried on his belt and backed down the hallway.\nMichael Stevenson testified that he came downstairs at this point and saw the defendant pointing a gun at Albertson and Ms. Forehand. He observed that Albertson was clutching Ms. Forehand\u2019s hair with his left hand and was holding a knife to her mouth. Michael Stevenson testified that Albertson said, \u201cTell her to give me my goddamn gun,\u201d pushed Ms. Forehand aside, and took a partial step toward the defendant with the knife pointed at her. Defendant shot, hitting Albertson in the abdomen.\nMs. Forehand\u2019s version of these facts differed in that she testified that the defendant backed down the hallway saying, \u201cHe\u2019s not going to hurt you. He\u2019s not going to hurt you.\u201d She further testified that she stood between Albertson and the defendant and that Albertson handed her the knife, at which point she told the defendant, \u201cSondra, I\u2019ve got the knife. For God\u2019s sake, put it down.\u201d Ms. Forehand testified that she turned sideways and at that moment the defendant fired the fatal shot.\nThe defendant did not testify.\nII\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of her request for a special jury instruction on the absence of a duty to retreat in one\u2019s own home. The duty to retreat requires a victim of an assault to retreat to the wall before using deadly force in self-defense. North Carolina, as does a majority of jurisdictions, recognizes the so-called \u201ccastle doctrine\u201d as an exception to the retreat rule.\n... [A] person is not obliged to retreat when assaulted while in his [or her] dwelling house or within the curtilage thereof, whether the assailant be an intruder or another lawful occupant of the premises.\nState v. Browning, 28 N.C. App. 376, 379, 221 S.E. 2d 375, 377 (1976).\nThe \u201ccastle doctrine\u201d is derived from the principle that one\u2019s home is one\u2019s castle and is based on the theory that if a person is bound to become a fugitive from her own home, there would be no refuge for her anywhere in the world. As Browning made clear, this doctrine applies in North Carolina even when the attacker is, for example, a co-tenant.\nOur determination whether defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense turns on the extent to which \u201cdwelling house\u201d includes a residence other than one in which the defendant had a leasehold or ownership interest or in which defendant was clearly a permanent resident. The State argues that our holding in State v. Harrison, 56 N.C. App. 368, 289 S.E. 2d 50, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 388, 294 S.E. 2d 214 (1982) is controlling. In Harrison, we held, based on the particular facts of that case, that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to indicate that defendant was in a place from which he had no duty to retreat when he stabbed the victim. We do not believe, as the State suggests, that Harrison stands for the general proposition that a person must have a proprietary or leasehold interest or be a permanent resident of a place before she can avail herself of the \u201ccastle doctrine.\u201d We believe that a person need only be a member of the household, however temporarily, with the intent to make that place her residence, in order to invoke the \u201ccastle doctrine.\u201d\nIn a case decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals which is strikingly similar to the instant case, the Court looked to the analogous doctrine as it applies in the civil law:\nThe phrase \u201cdwelling place\u201d is used ... to denote any building or habitation, or part of it, in which the actor is at the time temporarily or permanently residing and which is in the exclusive possession of the actor, or of a household of which he is a member. Only that part of the building or other habitation which is actually used for residential purposes is a dwelling place. Thus, a man\u2019s house is the dwelling place of himself, his family, his servants, and for the time being, the dwelling place of one who is residing, however temporarily, in the house as a guest. It is not the dwelling place of a visitor, social or business, who comes to the house for a particular purpose and not to reside therein. (Emphasis supplied.)\nBarton v. State, 46 Md. App. 616, 620, 420 A. 2d 1009, 1011-12 (1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 65 comment h (1965)).\nIn Barton, the defendant had followed his girlfriend, Wanda, to Baltimore from North Carolina, where he took up residence with Wanda and her two brothers. Defendant intended to stay there temporarily or until he and Wanda had saved enough money to move out on their own. The trial court\u2019s failure to give the requested \u201ccastle doctrine\u201d instruction, based on the fact that defendant \u201chad [no] proprietary or leasehold interest in the property whatsoever\u201d was held to be reversible error.\nWe believe that the trial court in the instant case acted under a similar misapprehension of the law in refusing defendant\u2019s written, timely request for the \u201ccastle doctrine\u201d instruction. In fact, the court stated as part of its basis for denial:\nI might be wrong. You might be completely right and I may be wrong, but that\u2019s the way I see it. . . . [T]he only person that I really know that lived there was [Ms. Forehand] . . . and her child and, perhaps, the deceased guy; that actually lived there permanently.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThe trial court took too narrow a view of the \u201ccastle doctrine,\u201d requiring defendant to show that she lived in the apartment permanently before she could avail herself of this defense. The better rule requires courts to look to the intent of the party seeking to invoke the \u201ccastle doctrine.\u201d\nMs. Forehand admitted that the defendant and her husband asked to live in the apartment \u201cfor a week or so\u201d because they had no place to stay, and that defendant\u2019s husband came back to the apartment as his home after work. Defendant moved her clothes, her husband\u2019s clothes, and the couple\u2019s stereo to the apartment. Defendant and her husband had been living there for about five days, sharing an extra bedroom, at the time of the shooting. They had no other residence.\nWe hold that the evidence adduced fairly permits the inference that Ms. Forehand\u2019s apartment was defendant\u2019s only place of shelter and that, however temporarily, she considered that apartment her home. The trial court should have instructed the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat because she was a member of the household at the time of the affray.\nA person may have no permanent or proprietary status in a particular residence, yet the intent to reside there, however temporarily, fully implicates the policy underlying the \u201ccastle doctrine.\u201d For example, a battered woman may flee a violent or abusive partner and go to stay temporarily with a friend or relative or in a shelter for battered women. If the abuser tracks her down and attacks her in the temporary shelter, is the temporary shelter not her \u201cresidence,\u201d since she intended to stay there temporarily? If she be forced to flee her temporary home, \u201cwhither shall [s]he flee, and how far, and when may [s]he be permitted to return.\u201d Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884).\nWe hold, therefore, that neither permanency of residence nor a leasehold interest in the premises is required before a person is legally justified in standing her ground, rather than retreating before using deadly force in self-defense. One must show only that she is a member of a household, however temporarily, and that she possesses an intent to reside in that particular place at the time of the attack.\nThe instruction which defendant requested was correct in law and supported by the evidence. See State v. Bradley, 65 N.C. App. 359, 309 S.E. 2d 510 (1983). We believe that a different result could well have been reached had the requested instruction been given. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 15A-1443(a) (1983). The failure to instruct on the \u201ccastle doctrine,\u201d therefore, constituted prejudicial error, and defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nThe issues raised by defendant in her remaining assignments of error are not likely to recur, and we need not consider them.\nNew trial.\nJudges Johnson and Martin concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BECTON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.",
      "Assistant Public Defender Ronald P. Butler, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SONDRA STEVENSON\nNo. 8518SC1149\n(Filed 17 June 1986)\nHomicide \u00a7 28.4\u2014 self-defense \u2014 right to stand ground \u2014 right of temporary dweller\nNeither permanency of residence nor a leasehold interest in the premises is required before a person is legally justified in standing her ground, rather than retreating before using deadly force in self-defense; rather, one must show only that she is a member of a household, however temporarily, and that she possesses an intent to reside in that particular place at the time of the attack, Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s request for a special jury instruction on the absence of a duty to retreat in one\u2019s own home where the evidence tended to show that she was living in an apartment leased by deceased\u2019s girlfriend who had given her permission to stay there for \u201ca week or so\u201d; defendant moved her clothes, her husband\u2019s clothes, and the couple\u2019s stereo to the apartment; defendant and her husband had been living there for about five days, sharing an extra bedroom, at the time of the shooting; and they had no other residence.\nAppeal by defendant from Mills, Judge. Judgment entered 23 May 1985 in Superior Court, GUILFORD County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 February 1986.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.\nAssistant Public Defender Ronald P. Butler, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0409-01",
  "first_page_order": 433,
  "last_page_order": 439
}
