{ "id": 8522153, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN RALPH THOMAS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Thomas", "decision_date": "1986-06-03", "docket_number": "No. 8518SC1128", "first_page": "200", "last_page": "213", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "81 N.C. App. 200" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "343 S.E. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525250 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722898 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "775" }, { "page": "2864" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "2868" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176124 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" }, { "page": "550-51" }, { "page": "2485" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "2484" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "2484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/433/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25-26" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "1882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180644 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390-91" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "2412" }, { "page": "393" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "2413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/437/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 L.Ed. 59", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8519564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719442, 4715923, 4718900, 4718013, 4716574 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0189-02", "/nc/315/0189-04", "/nc/315/0189-01", "/nc/315/0189-05", "/nc/315/0189-03" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E. 2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520388 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719265, 4714405, 4718935, 4716283, 4715262 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0595-03", "/nc/315/0595-02", "/nc/315/0595-05", "/nc/315/0595-01", "/nc/315/0595-04" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522019 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0292-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1206, "char_count": 28674, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.4040384699107776e-07, "percentile": 0.8776106251754446 }, "sha256": "89056242c8be065a295df10ef4c0279e8bb62c428708114c82ea0dc28ee11aea", "simhash": "1:6a9f370033d386d3", "word_count": 4642 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:13.412578+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN RALPH THOMAS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Judge.\nFor reasons set forth below, we hold that the court properly denied the motion to suppress defendant\u2019s incriminating statements, but erred in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence agents obtained when they searched his luggage without a warrant. Accordingly, the order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment entered upon defendant\u2019s plea of guilty is vacated.\nI.\nTerry Turbeville and Steven G. Porter, narcotics agents for the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation (S.B.I.), were the only witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing. From their uncon-tradicted testimony the following facts can be adduced:\nOn the morning of 23 January 1985 defendant arrived at Greensboro Regional Airport aboard a regularly scheduled commercial flight. As he deplaned, defendant \u201cmade eye contact with\u201d Turbeville, who was working with Porter and two other officers on a drug interdiction assignment. Turbeville recalled having seen defendant in the Greensboro terminal a day or two earlier wearing a leather jacket, jeans and boots. He further described defendant\u2019s appearance on that prior occasion as \u201crather unkempt.\u201d Defendant was now wearing a three-piece suit which \u201cdidn\u2019t fit him very well\u201d and what appeared to be the same \u201cunkempt boots.\u201d\nThe four members of the interdiction team, none of whom wore a uniform, followed defendant as he proceeded across the terminal and down an escalator toward the baggage claim area. Turbeville and Porter followed directly, while the two other officers followed at a distance. Twice defendant looked back at Turbeville and Porter.\nOnce inside the baggage claim area defendant positioned himself against a wall at the far end of the baggage conveyor belt, twenty to twenty-five feet from the other passengers. While waiting for his baggage, defendant \u201cwatch[ed] the people around him.\u201d He would repeatedly focus on Turbeville and Porter and then look away. After most of the passengers had claimed their luggage, defendant walked over to the conveyor belt, picked up a large American Tourister suitcase, and turned to walk out of the terminal. The suitcase was \u201cobviously very heavy and cumbersome.\u201d\nTurbeville and Porter approached defendant. Turbeville identified himself and Porter as S.B.I. agents and they both showed defendant their credentials. Turbeville asked to see defendant\u2019s airline ticket; defendant complied with the request. The ticket indicated that it had been purchased with cash, that the passenger\u2019s name was Mike Dees, and that he had flown from Greensboro, North Carolina to Houston, Texas the day before. After both agents noted the above information, Turbeville returned the ticket to defendant.\nAddressing defendant as \u201cMr. Dees,\u201d Turbeville inquired whether he had seen defendant in the terminal in the last day or two. Defendant replied, \u201cNo, I don\u2019t think so.\u201d Again addressing defendant as \u201cMr. Dees,\u201d Turbeville asked whether defendant had \u201cfurther identification.\u201d Defendant produced a driver\u2019s license which bore the name Ralph Thomas and explained that a friend had made his travel reservation. Turbeville returned defendant\u2019s license. Turbeville testified that throughout the initial contact with defendant \u201che was very nervous, both in his manner of speech and in his not being able to move around too much without his hands shaking.\u201d\nAfter returning defendant\u2019s license Turbeville explained to defendant that he and Porter were conducting a narcotics investigation and that they would appreciate his cooperation. He told defendant that they had an office down the concourse \u201caways\u201d and asked if defendant would accompany them to that office so they \u201ccould explain further what it was [they] were trying to do\u201d and so they could avoid causing him \u201cany embarrassment by talking with him in the middle of the terminal.\u201d\nDefendant acquiesced without commenting. Defendant carried the large suitcase which he had just claimed and Turbeville carried defendant\u2019s carry-on luggage, a blue nylon bag. Porter accompanied defendant and Turbeville to the office. The two other officers followed at a distance but remained outside the office.\nOnce inside the office Turbeville again told defendant that he and Porter were conducting a narcotics investigation. He further explained that they were \u201cnot trying to find everybody\u2019s small amount of marijuana they had for personal use,\u201d but what they \u201cwere looking for was large amounts of narcotics coming into the area.\u201d The following dialogue then took place:\nAgent Turbeville: \u201cDo you have anything on you that you shouldn\u2019t have?\u201d\nDefendant: \u201cYes, [pause] I might have.\u201d\nAgent Turbeville: \u201cWell, why don\u2019t we go ahead and take care of that right now.\u201d\nDefendant: \u201cWell, what do you want me to do, show it to you?\u201d\nAgent Turbeville: \u201cWell, yes.\u201d\nDefendant: \u201cI\u2019m not sure I understand what my rights are.\u201d\nTurbeville asked defendant to consent to a search of his person and his luggage. He explained that defendant had the right to refuse consent. Defendant chose to exercise that right and refused to consent to a search. Turbeville then placed defendant under arrest for \u201c[possession of controlled substances.\u201d After arresting defendant, Turbeville and Porter conducted a search of his person and luggage. The large American Tourister suitcase was locked and upon request defendant supplied the key. The suitcase contained twenty-five one pound packages of marijuana.\nBased on the foregoing facts, the court concluded as a matter of law:\n[1.] that Agent Turbeville had reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant had committed a felony;\n[2.] that Agent Turbeville had reasonable grounds to stop the defendant and to arrest the defendant;\n[3.] that the arrest of the defendant was, in all respects, lawful and valid; [and]\n[4.] that the search of the person of the defendant and his two bags was, in all respects, reasonable, incident to a valid arrest.\nAccordingly, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nII.\nDefendant contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made to Turbeville and Porter once inside the private office and the marijuana the agents seized following his arrest. He argues that this evidence was obtained in violation of his Foyrth Amendment rights and therefore should have been excluded. In particular defendant maintains (1) that he was unlawfully seized when Turbeville and Porter escorted him from the public area of the airport terminal to a private office without having \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d of his involvement in criminal activity; (2) that he was arrested without probable cause; and (3) that Turbeville and Porter could not lawfully search his luggage following his arrest without first obtaining a search warrant.\nOn several occasions this Court has examined the Fourth Amendment implications raised by facts similar to those here. State v. Perkerol, 77 N.C. App. 292, 335 S.E. 2d 60 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 595, 341 S.E. 2d 36 (1986); State v. White, 77 N.C. App. 45, 334 S.E. 2d 786, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 189, 337 S.E. 2d 864 (1985); State v. Sugg, 61 N.C. App. 106, 300 S.E. 2d 248, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 390, 302 S.E. 2d 257 (1983); State v. Casey, 59 N.C. App. 99, 296 S.E. 2d 473 (1982); State v. Grimmett, 54 N.C. App. 494, 284 S.E. 2d 144, disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 304, 290 S.E. 2d 706 (1982); State v. Cooke, 54 N.C. App. 33, 282 S.E. 2d 800 (1981), aff'd, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E. 2d 618 (1982). To a large extent leading United States Supreme Court decisions have guided this Court on the lawfulness of a law enforcement officer\u2019s questioning and/or search or seizure of an air traveler based on the belief that the traveler is engaged in criminal activity. Florida v. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. 1, 83 L.Ed. 2d 165, 105 S.Ct. 308 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L.Ed. 2d 229, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 65 L.Ed. 2d 890, 100 S.Ct. 2752 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 64 L.Ed. 2d 497, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980). The analysis which has emerged from these decisions can be summarized as follows:\n\u201c1. Communications between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention are outside the scope of the fourth amendment;\n2. Brief seizures must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and\n3. Full-scale arrests must be supported by probable cause.\u201d\nPerkerol, 77 N.C. App. at 298, 335 S.E. 2d at 64. See also Sugg, 61 N.C. App. at 108-09, 300 S.E. 2d at 250.\nDefendant concedes that his Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated when Turbeville and Porter approached him in the baggage claim area and asked to see his airline ticket and further identification. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. at 5-6, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 170-71, 105 S.Ct. at 310-11; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-55, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 509-10, 100 S.Ct. at 1877-78; see Casey, 59 N.C. App. at 105, 296 S.E. 2d at 477; Grimmett, 54 N.C. App. at 498, 284 S.E. 2d at 148. He maintains, however, that he was unlawfully seized when the agents escorted him from the public area of the airport terminal to the private office.\nRelying on Mendenhall, supra, and White, supra, the State maintains that defendant was not unlawfully seized when escorted by the agents to a private office because defendant voluntarily consented to accompany them. We agree..\nIn Mendenhall two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents working in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport approached respondent, an air traveler who had just arrived aboard a commercial flight from Los Angeles, because her conduct \u201cappeared to the agents to be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics.\u201d 446 U.S. at 547-48, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 505, 103 S.Ct. at 1873. Respondent complied with one agent\u2019s request to see her airline ticket and her driver\u2019s license. The agent returned respondent\u2019s ticket and license and asked her to accompany the agents to the DEA office, which was up a flight of stairs and approximately fifty feet from where the agents had first approached her. 446 U.S. at 547-48, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 505, 103 S.Ct. at 1873-74. The court stated that \u201c[t]he question whether the respondent\u2019s consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances, . . . and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving. [Citations omitted.]\u201d 446 U.S. at 557, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 511, 103 S.Ct. at 1879. Emphasizing \u201cthat the respondent was not told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if she would accompany the officers,\u201d that \u201c[t]here were neither threats nor any show of force,\u201d that \u201c[t]he respondent had been questioned only briefly, and [that] her ticket and identification were returned to her before she was asked to accompany the officers,\u201d the Court found the \u201ctotality of the evidence . . . plainly adequate to support the District Court\u2019s finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office.\u201d 446 U.S. at 557-58, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 512, 103 S.Ct. at 1879. Cf. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501, 75 L.Ed. 2d at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 1326 (\u201c[W]hen the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room while retaining his ticket and driver\u2019s license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.\u201d).\nIn White and Grimmett, supra, this Court, faced with facts almost identical to those in Mendenhall, found the evidence sufficient to support a determination that defendants voluntarily accompanied narcotics agents to private offices within airports. We cannot distinguish the facts here from those in Mendenhall, White, and Grimmett. Before requesting that defendant accompany them to the private office, Turbeville and Porter had only briefly questioned defendant and had returned his ticket and license. The court specifically found that \u201cdefendant, without any force or coercion on the part of the officer, went with Agent Turbeville and Agent Porter . . . and he was not commanded to go with the officers.\u201d The court thus properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made shortly after entering the private office.\nIII.\nDefendant next contends the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him and thus could not lawfully search his luggage. \u201cProbable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense.\u201d State v. Gray, 55 N.C. App. 568, 570, 286 S.E. 2d 357, 359 (1982). \u201cThe existence of probable cause so as to justify an arrest without a warrant \u2018is determined by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.\u2019 \u201d State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 684, 268 S.E. 2d 452, 456 (1980), quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest Sec. 48.\nAt the suppression hearing Porter enumerated \u201cten ar-ticulable facts\u201d which led him and Turbeville to believe they had probable cause to arrest defendant:\n(1) Defendant arrived from Houston, Texas, a city identified by a \u201cFederal [Narcotics] Task Force\u201d as a source city for marijuana distribution.\n(2) Shortly after deplaning defendant made \u201cdistinct eye contact\u201d with Turbeville.\n(3) Turbeville had seen defendant in the airport a day or two earlier wearing \u201cwork clothes.\u201d\n(4) As Turbeville and Porter followed defendant up the concourse, \u201che made an abrupt turn\u201d and looked back at them. A similar incident occurred on the escalator.\n(5) Once inside the baggage claim area defendant positioned himself twenty to twenty-five feet away from the other passengers. \u201cHe . . . began scanning the area. He would repeatedly focus ... on Agent Turbeville and [Agent Porter], look away, and then look back.\u201d Defendant did not readily claim his luggage.\n(6) Defendant paid for his ticket in cash.\n(7) Defendant had flown from Greensboro to Houston the day before. The amount of luggage defendant carried \u2014 a carry-on bag and \u201can extremely large suitcase\u201d \u2014 was disproportionate to the length of his stay. In addition, according to Porter, defendant\u2019s \u201cAmerican Tourister hard-shell type luggage\u201d is often used to transport narcotics.\n(8) When asked by Turbeville, \u201cDid I see you in the airport in the last day or two,\u201d defendant responded, \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant\u2019s response was inconsistent with the fact that Turbeville had observed him in the airport terminal the day before.\n(9) Defendant was travelling under an assumed name. Twice defendant acknowledged Turbeville\u2019s use of the name which appeared on the airline ticket. It was not until Turbeville asked to see defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license that defendant explained that a friend had made the reservation and \u201cMike Dees\u201d was not his name.\n(10) After Turbeville explained that he and Porter were \u201clooking for large amounts of narcotics coming into the area,\u201d Turbeville asked if defendant had anything on him he shouldn\u2019t have and defendant responded, \u201cYes, [pause] I might have.\u201d Turbeville asked defendant if they could \u201cgo ahead and take care of that right now,\u201d and defendant responded, \u201cWell, what do you want me to do, show it to you?\u201d Porter interpreted defendant\u2019s statement as an admission: \u201cHe as much as told Agent Turbeville that he had narcotics on him.\u201d\nPorter\u2019s particularization of defendant\u2019s conduct includes acts from which it would often be difficult to draw inferences of criminality. Using cash to purchase an airline ticket, carrying American Tourister luggage, and making short trips clearly can be the acts of an innocent traveler. According to Porter, however, such conduct is characteristic of persons trafficking in narcotics. The interception of narcotics traffickers as they move narcotics from \u201csource cities\u201d to points of distribution is \u201ca highly specialized law enforcement operation designed to combat the serious societal threat posed by narcotics distribution.\u201d Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 515, 103 S.Ct. at 1881 (Powell, J., concurring). Turbeville and Porter were well-trained in narcotics law enforcement. While \u201cthe fact that certain characteristics [are] claimed to be part of a drug courier profile in no way enhances the \u2018quantum of individualized suspicion\u2019 usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure,\u201d Casey, 59 N.C. App. at 111, 296 S.E. 2d at 481, quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1116, 1130, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084 (1976), trained law enforcement officers are \u201c \u2018entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] experience.\u2019 \u201d Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 564, 64 L.Ed. 2d at 515, 103 S.Ct. at 1882 (Powell, J., concurring) quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 45 L.Ed. 2d 607, 619, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582.\nWe find the totality of the facts and circumstances known to Turbeville and Porter \u201csufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that defendant was in possession of a controlled substance\u201d and thus sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. Gray, supra. In so finding, we rely heavily on the incriminating statements defendant made shortly after entering the private office. See Grimmett, 54 N.C. App. at 504, 284 S.E. 2d at 151. The court thus properly rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the agents could not lawfully search his luggage because they lacked probable cause to arrest him.\nIV.\nDefendant next contends the warrantless search of his luggage was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We agree.\nThe Fourth Amendment requires that searches of private property be performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance with the Warrant Clause whenever reasonably practicable. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758, 23 L.Ed. 2d 685, 691, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2037 (1969). The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that \u201csearches made without a valid search warrant are presumptively unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the [warrant requirement].\u201d Cooke, 54 N.C. App. at 38, 282 S.E. 2d at 804, citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 11 L.Ed. 2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889 (1964). Exceptions to the search warrant requirement are \u201cjealously and carefully drawn,\u201d Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1514, 1519, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257 (1958), and \u2018\u201cthe burden is on those seeking [an] exemption ... to show the need for it . . . .\u2019 \u201d Chimel, 395 at 762, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 693, 89 S.Ct. at 2039, quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 96 L.Ed. 59, 64, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95 (1951); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91, 57 L.Ed. 2d 290, 299, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 (1978).\nThe State relies on the court\u2019s conclusion that the search of defendant\u2019s luggage was proper as within the \u201csearch incident to arrest\u201d exception to the warrant requirement. An officer may, incident to a lawful arrest, conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee\u2019s person and the area within the arrestee\u2019s immediate control. Chimel, supra. Such warrantless searches are justified by the need for police safety and the preservation of evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 694, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. As \u201ca warrantless search must be \u2018strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,\u2019 \u201d Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 300, 98 S.Ct. at 2413, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 908, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968), the scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to \u201cthe area from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.\u201d Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 23 L.Ed. 2d at 694, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. Thus, in essence the State contends that the search of defendant\u2019s luggage following his lawful arrest was proper because the luggage may have contained contraband that the defendant could destroy or weapons that he could use against the arresting agents. As applied to defendant\u2019s locked, \u201cextremely large,\u201d \u201ccumbersome\u201d suitcase, the State\u2019s contention is implausible and contrary to the case law.\nIn United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L.Ed. 2d 538, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (1976), at the time of their arrest respondents were in possession of a double-locked footlocker. In considering the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the footlocker by federal agents more than an hour after they had gained exclusive control of it, the Court stated:\n[Warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the \u201csearch is remote in time or place from the arrest,\u201d Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. at 367, or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. [Emphasis supplied.]\nChadwick, 433 U.S. at 15, 53 L.Ed. 2d at 550-51, 97 S.Ct. at 2485. While Turbeville\u2019s search of defendant\u2019s luggage was less \u201c \u2018remote in time or place from the arrest\u2019 \u201d than the search held unconstitutional in Chadwick, as in Chadwick there were no exigent circumstances to justify the search. The large suitcase which defendant carried into the private office was not, at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, \u201cimmediately associated\u201d with defendant\u2019s person. A properly conducted search of defendant\u2019s person following his arrest revealed that defendant was unarmed. Turbeville had ascertained that the large suitcase was locked and had obtained the key. Defendant was in the immediate custody of two S.B.I. agents, at least one of whom was armed. Two additional law enforcement officers were outside the small private office. Defendant could not have reached the contents of the locked suitcase. The suitcase was effectively reduced to the agents\u2019 exclusive control and, as a result, the agents could not lawfully search it without first obtaining a warrant. Chadwick, supra; see, Note, 6 Am. J. Crim. Law 81, 94 (1978).\nArguably, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L.Ed. 2d 768, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981), lays the foundation for a different result. In Belton the Court abandoned use of the Chimel subjective inquiry to determine the proper scope of a search incident to arrest when the arrestee is an occupant of a motor vehicle. 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. The court forged an objective \u201cbright-line\u201d rule that allows police officers incident to the arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle, to \u201cexamine the contents of any containers found within the [vehicle\u2019s] passenger compartment . . . .\u201d Id. The Court, however, expressly stated: \u201cOur holding . . . does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel\u2019s principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to . . . arrests.\u201d [Emphasis supplied.] Id. at n. 3. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan laments:\nBy approving the constitutionality of the warrantless search in this case, the Court carves out a dangerous precedent that is not justified by the concerns underlying Chimel. Disregarding the principle \u201cthat the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement,\u201d . . . the Court for the first time grants police officers authority to conduct a warrantless \u201carea\u201d search under circumstances where there is no chance that the arrestee \u201cmight gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.\u201d . . . Under the approach taken today, the result would presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under arrest, and even if his search had extended to locked luggage or other inaccessible containers located in the back seat of the car. [Citations omitted.]\n453 U.S. at 468, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 780, 101 S.Ct. at 2868.\nWe decline to extend the \u201cbright-line\u201d Belton approach to arrests outside the automobile context. Based in part on the automobile\u2019s inherent mobility, its occupants\u2019 expectation of privacy is diminished and, as a result, warrantless searches of automobiles are permitted \u201cin circumstances in which [they] would not be reasonable in other contexts.\u201d Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12, 53 L.Ed. 2d at 549, 97 S.Ct. at 2484. Cf. State v. Isleib, 80 N.C. App. 599, 343 S.E. 2d 234 (1986). However, \u201c[u]nlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. . . . [A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13, 53 L.Ed. 2d at 549, 97 S.Ct. at 2484. The Belton approach thus is properly confined to the automobile context and does not extend to personal luggage situated outside that context.\nInsofar as the order denies defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his incriminating statements, it is affirmed. Insofar as it denies defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained when agents searched his luggage without a warrant following his arrest, it is reversed. Because the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized, the judgment entered upon defendant\u2019s plea of guilty is vacated.\nOrder affirmed in part, reversed in part; judgment vacated.\nJudges Wells and COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas D. Zweigart, for the State.", "Cofer and Mitchell, by William L. Cofer, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN RALPH THOMAS\nNo. 8518SC1128\n(Filed 3 June 1986)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.1\u2014 incriminating statements \u2014 no coercion\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress incriminating statements made by him to SBI agents inside their private office where the agents approached defendant at the baggage claim area of ah airport and requested to see his ticket and driver\u2019s license; these items were returned and defendant was told that the agents were conducting an investigation and they would appreciate his cooperation; the agents asked defendant to accompany them down the concourse to their office so they could explain further what they were trying to do; defendant acquiesced without comment; and the agents at no time used any force or coercion.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 8\u2014 warrantless arrest \u2014 probable cause \u2014search of luggage lawful\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that SBI agents lacked probable cause to arrest him and thus could not lawfully search his luggage where the agents enumerated behavior of defendant which they contended was characteristic of persons trafficking in narcotics; in response to the agents\u2019 questions, defendant told them that he might have something on him which he shouldn\u2019t have; and defendant asked the agents if they wanted him to show it to them.\n3. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 8\u2014 warrantless arrest \u2014 warrantless search of luggage improper\nSBI agents could not lawfully search defendant\u2019s suitcase without a warrant as a search incident to a lawful arrest, since the suitcase was locked, extremely large and cumbersome; the unnamed defendant was in the private office of two SBI agents, one of whom was armed; two additional law enforcement officers were outside the small private office; and the suitcase was thus effectively reduced to the agents\u2019 exclusive control.\nAppeal by defendant from 26 June 1985 order of Davis, Judge, and 12 June 1985 judgment of Beaty, Judge, entered in Superior Court, GUILFORD County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 1986.\nOn 12 June 1985 defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana, a schedule VI controlled substance (N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-94), with the intent to sell and deliver. N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-95(a)(l). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-979(b), which provides that the denial of a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty, defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made and evidence seized from his person.\nAttorney General Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas D. Zweigart, for the State.\nCofer and Mitchell, by William L. Cofer, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0200-01", "first_page_order": 224, "last_page_order": 237 }