{ "id": 8359911, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP S. ROBERTS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Roberts", "decision_date": "1986-09-16", "docket_number": "No. 8624SC361", "first_page": "733", "last_page": "737", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "82 N.C. App. 733" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-55", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "106 S.Ct. 2056", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12807 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "2061" }, { "page": "528, n. 5" }, { "page": "2064, n. 5" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548750 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/24/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560020 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180104 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-181", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 515, "char_count": 10262, "ocr_confidence": 0.804, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20298635171394164 }, "sha256": "459bfdb3e0e8f882c2a314044290f780d7820da3798811f14fdcdd5362e04719", "simhash": "1:0ceb8db42304e5c7", "word_count": 1631 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:29:18.916973+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Johnson and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP S. ROBERTS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendant contends that various items and tools should not have been admitted into evidence because the officer had no probable cause to stop the vehicle he was operating and there were no exigent circumstances which justified a warrantless search. However, the State\u2019s evidence showed that defendant, as operator of an oncoming vehicle, failed to dim his lights in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-181 as he drove toward a deputy sheriff. The deputy turned around and followed defendant, noticed that defendant was driving in an erratic manner, and therefore stopped him. This traffic violation in the officer\u2019s presence justified stopping the defendant, requesting a routine driver\u2019s license check, and ordering defendant to exit from the vehicle. See Penn sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed. 2d 331 (1977). As a result of the license check, the deputy was notified that defendant was suspected of possessing an automatic weapon. After performing a frisk search on defendant as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the deputy requested and received permission to search the vehicle from both defendant, as operator, and his codefendant, as owner. It was pursuant to this consensual search that the deputy discovered the items and tools. When a person consents to a search by law enforcement officers, this consent dispenses with necessity for a search warrant. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E. 2d 376 (1968). Accordingly, the items and tools were seized in a constitutionally valid manner and were properly admitted into evidence.\nDefendant contends the court erred in denying his motions to dismiss because the State failed to show that he knew or reasonably should have known of the presence of the implements of housebreaking in and about the car. He admits that he was operating the vehicle when it was stopped, but asserts he was not the owner and thus was not chargeable with knowledge of the presence of these items and tools.\nThis contention has been resolved against defendant in State v. Glaze, 24 N.C. App. 60, 210 S.E. 2d 124 (1974). We hold that the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury.\nFinally, defendant contends that the Court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence a statement from codefendant Laney, which implicated him, because such statement was violative of the hearsay rule and of his right of confrontation. We agree.\nIn a recent case, Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. \u2014, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed. 2d 514 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court\u2019s reliance on a codefendant\u2019s uncross-examined confession in finding defendant guilty violated her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation where the confession was not shown to be independently reliable. There, counsel for the State of Illinois contended that defendant Lee\u2019s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation had not been violated because her codefendant was unavailable and his statement was \u201creliable\u201d enough to warrant its untested admission. 476 U.S. at \u2014, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 525, 106 S.Ct. at 2061. Counsel for the State in Lee apparently categorized codefendant\u2019s hearsay confession as a declaration against penal interest. 476 U.S. at \u2014, n. 5, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 528, n. 5, 106 S.Ct. at 2064, n. 5. The Supreme Court rejected Illinois\u2019 argument, however, finding that the State had failed to produce \u201csufficient \u2018indicia of reliability,\u2019 flowing from . . . the circumstances surrounding the confession ... to overcome the weighty presumption against the admission of such uncross-examined evidence.\u201d 476 U.S. at 90 L.Ed. 2d at 530, 106 S.Ct. at 2065.\nThe facts in the case at hand are quite similar. Here the State sought to introduce codefendant Laney\u2019s confession against defendant Roberts as a declaration against penal interest claiming that Laney was unavailable because he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C, Rule 804 (Supp. 1981). Laney\u2019s assertion of the Fifth Amendment, however, would have also made futile any attempt by defendant to cross-examine him.\nAlthough Detective Baker\u2019s rendition of Laney\u2019s confession would have explained the presence of housebreaking implements in and about the car defendant was operating, such a correlation does not necessarily make this hearsay confession inherently reliable. Moreover, the purported confession was never reduced to writing, a factor weighing heavily against the statement\u2019s reliability. There is the ever-present danger that Laney, in confessing, had a motive \u201cto mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by spreading the blame. . . .\u201d Lee, 476 U.S. at \u2014, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 528, 106 S.Ct. at 2064. These reliability factors simply cannot be tested where, as here, the codefendant making the purported confession cannot be cross-examined.\nAccordingly, we find that defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Because admission of Laney\u2019s confession cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we remand this case for a new trial. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1442 (5)(a) and 1443.\nNew trial.\nJudges Johnson and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General J. Charles Waldrup, for the State.", "C. Gary Triggs for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP S. ROBERTS\nNo. 8624SC361\n(Filed 16 September 1986)\n1. Searches and Seizures 8 18\u2014 driver properly stopped for traffic violation \u2014 consent to search vehicle \u2014 items properly admitted\nItems and tools taken from the car which defendant was driving were properly admitted into evidence where defendant failed to dim his lights as he drove toward a deputy sheriff; the officer turned around, followed defendant, and noticed that he was driving in an erratic manner; this traffic violation in the officer\u2019s presence justified stopping defendant, requesting a routine driver\u2019s license check, and ordering defendant to exit from the vehicle; as a result of the license check, the deputy was notified that defendant was suspected of possessing an automatic weapon; after performing a proper frisk search on defendant, the deputy requested and received permission to search the vehicle from both defendant as operator and his codefendant as owner; and it was pursuant to this consensual search that the deputy discovered the items and tools.\n2. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings \u00a7 10.2\u2014 possession of housebreaking tools\u2014 driver but not owner of car in which tools found \u2014 admissibility of evidence\nIn a prosecution of defendant for felonious possession of implements of housebreaking, there was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court should have granted his motions to dismiss because he was operating a vehicle when implements were found therein, but he was not the owner and thus was not chargeable with knowledge of the presence of the items and tools.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 72; Criminal Law \u00a7 74.2\u2014 codefendant\u2019s confession \u2014co-defendant\u2019s refusal to testify \u2014 admission of confession improper\nThe trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce a statement from an unavailable codefendant which implicated defendant because the statement was violative of the hearsay rule and of defendant\u2019s right of confrontation, since the codefendant asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and was thus unavailable for cross-examination; the purported confession was never reduced to writing, a factor weighing heavily against its reliability; and there was the danger that the codefendant in confessing had a motive to lessen the appearance of his own guilt by spreading the blame.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Pachnowski, Judge. Judgment entered 4 December 1985 in AVERY County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 1986.\nDefendant was indicted for felonious possession of implements of housebreaking in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-55. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show, in pertinent part, that:\nOn 11 April 1985 around 11:50 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Warren of the Avery County Sheriffs Department was patrolling Highway 194 in Newland. Defendant was driving a car in the opposite direction down Highway 194. When the two cars approached and passed each other, defendant \u201cfailed to dim his lights.\u201d Deputy Warren turned around and followed defendant for \u201capproximately a half mile or three-quarters of a mile.\u201d Defendant \u201chit the yellow line a couple of times\u201d and then Deputy Warren stopped him.\nDeputy Warren made a routine driver\u2019s license check and learned that defendant was suspected of possessing an automatic weapon. Deputy Warren then ordered defendant and his companion to exit the car and performed a frisk search on both of them. After performing the frisk searches, Deputy Warren told them that they were suspected of possessing an automatic weapon and that he needed to search their car. Both men consented to a search of the car. Pursuant to this search, Deputy Warren discovered various housebreaking implements in the car.\nAt trial, the State called Jimmy Dale Laney, codefendant of defendant, to testify. After being duly sworn, Laney refused to answer questions on direct examination, exercising his right not to testify under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court then excused Laney from further testimony. The State then introduced, and the court admitted into evidence through the testimony of Detective B. R. Baker, an alleged oral statement by Laney to Detective Baker made during an interview which implicated defendant. Specifically, Detective Baker testified that Laney\ntold me that he got up with [defendant] on April the 11th in Tennessee. He told me that [defendant] was standing near the car at that time talking to, to some other person, I don\u2019t recall who he said. That he, Mr. Laney, during the time that [defendant] was standing there talking to someone else, that Mr. Laney put the tools in the car in various places in the car, and that he Mr. Laney, and [defendant] came to North Carolina looking for a place to break into.\nDefendant was convicted of felonious possession of implements of housebreaking in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-55. He appeals from a judgment of imprisonment.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General J. Charles Waldrup, for the State.\nC. Gary Triggs for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0733-01", "first_page_order": 761, "last_page_order": 765 }