{ "id": 8358140, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYANT GRAVES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Graves", "decision_date": "1986-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 8619SC313", "first_page": "126", "last_page": "131", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 N.C. App. 126" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "341 S.E. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704458 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4766681 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567244 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757088, 4756131, 4750890, 4753899, 4753206 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0797-04", "/nc/312/0797-03", "/nc/312/0797-05", "/nc/312/0797-02", "/nc/312/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E. 2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523256 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0498-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 10863, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20294214064217644 }, "sha256": "7df32579867c7bddc3f8790e464ad85a9893d98cb8f657e5d542e6a60c95f280", "simhash": "1:432bc3e3786696f5", "word_count": 1792 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:07:52.921422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Orr concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYANT GRAVES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice in \u201cinterrupting\u201d defense counsel during his examination of witnesses. Defendant argues that, in twice sustaining its own objections to questions, and once telling a witness, \u201cJust answer the question,\u201d the trial court \u201cappeared partial.\u201d\nThe conduct of a trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion. Marcoin, Inc. v. McDaniel, 70 N.C. App. 498, 320 S.E. 2d 892 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 797, 325 S.E. 2d 631 (1985). Examination of the record reveals that each of the judge\u2019s actions to which defendant assigns error was calculated to prevent waste of time, and none demonstrated any partiality. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion here.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in sustaining the State\u2019s objection to a question defense counsel asked David Lackey, a witness for the State, on cross-examination. Defense counsel asked Mr. Lackey, who owned some personal property destroyed in the fire, \u201cHave you ever frequented any gambling establishments in that area?\u201d On voir dire, Mr. Lackey answered, \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant contends that the question was relevant to show that Mr. Lackey had gambling debts, and thus had a motive to start the fire defendant was accused of starting, namely insurance money. Since Mr. Lackey answered in the negative on voir dire, any error in sustaining the State\u2019s objection to the question cannot be prejudicial.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice in sustaining the State\u2019s objection to a question defense counsel asked Charles Kelly, a witness for the State, on cross-examination. Mr. Kelly mentioned that he had turned himself in to the police. Defense counsel asked:\nQ: And what were you turning yourself in for?\nA: A bunch of stuff.\nQ: What, for example?\nA: If I was to tell you that, I would be incriminating myself.\nSTATE: Objection.\nCOURT: Sustained.\nDefense counsel argues that this information is relevant to impeach Mr. Kelly.\nThe names of the crimes for which Mr. Kelly turned himself in were all the court kept out by sustaining the State\u2019s objection. Mr. Kelly had already admitted that he had turned himself in for \u201c[a] bunch of stuff,\u201d so it was clear to the jury that he had committed some crimes. Furthermore, defense counsel had earlier impeached Mr. Kelly by asking him in detail whether he had committed eight specific crimes. Therefore, we find that any error by the trial court in failing to require that Mr. Kelly name the crimes for which he turned himself in cannot possibly be prejudicial.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice in sustaining the State\u2019s objection to defendant\u2019s testimony regarding the use of drugs by Charles Kelly and Harvey Boone, witnesses for the State. Defendant argues that this testimony is relevant to impeach the testimony of these witnesses by showing that their ability to observe events was impaired.\nThe testimony that was objected to referred to drug use by Mr. Kelly on the Saturday morning before the fire, and by Mr. Boone on that Saturday night. However, all of the crucial testimony of these two witnesses refers to events occurring on Friday night, Sunday night, Monday morning, or afterwards. The testimony objected to did not show any drug use at any of those times. Therefore, any error by the trial court in sustaining objections to this testimony cannot possibly be prejudicial.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling defense counsel\u2019s objection to a question the prosecutor asked defendant on cross-examination. The prosecutor asked defendant, \u201cYou have been over this case with [defense counsel] Mr. Browne, haven\u2019t you?\u201d Defense counsel objected on the ground that the question was in violation of the attorney-client privilege. The court overruled the objection. However, defendant never answered the question, and the prosecutor did not ask it again, so any error the court committed in overruling the objection was not prejudicial.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice in failing to grant defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all evidence, and in denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief. Defendant argues in support of these assignments of error that there was insufficient evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt to present to the jury, or to sustain a verdict of guilty.\nBetween the testimony of Harvey Boone, Jr., and Charles Kelly, the following evidence was presented:\nDefendant had had a grudge against Mr. Lackey and said he was planning to burn Mr. Lackey\u2019s \u201cwork shop\u201d when he and Mr. Kelly went to take Mr. Boone to Fort Bragg. On the Sunday night before the fire, defendant had offered Mr. Kelly two hundred dollars to \u201cburn something,\u201d then later said, \u201cI don\u2019t want no mistakes. I\u2019ll do it myself.\u201d\nOn the morning of the fire, defendant placed in the car a milk jug full of green liquid that looked like chain saw oil, and a bag of newspapers. Defendant, Mr. Boone and Mr. Kelly drove to the barn, stopped there, and defendant got out of the car with the jug and newspapers. Mr. Boone and Mr. Kelly drove away and returned a few minutes later. Defendant got back in the car, without the jug and newspapers, and smelling of varnish or \u201csome kind of chemical.\u201d When he got in the car, defendant said, \u201cIt\u2019s lit, let\u2019s go.\u201d They drove away, then drove by the barn again, whereupon defendant said \u201cI see smoke.\u201d They drove away again, and later stopped once to let defendant get rid of his jacket, which smelled of chemicals, and again to let defendant clean the smell off of his body. On the way back from Ft. Bragg, after dropping Mr. Boone off there, defendant and Mr. Kelly drove by the barn, and defendant said, \u201cI burnt it to the ground.\u201d A few days later defendant, talking about the burning, said \u201cHe didn\u2019t do it. I done it.\u201d\nTo sustain a conviction, there must be sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the jury to find that (1) the crime charged was in fact committed, (2) by the person charged. State v. Conrad, 293 N.C. 735, 239 S.E. 2d 260 (1977). We hold that the evidence in the present case clearly meets this standard.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice in considering defendant\u2019s prior convictions as aggravating factors. Defendant claims that the State did not prove that defendant had previously been convicted of an offense punishable by more than sixty days\u2019 confinement, which is required by G.S. 15A-1340.4 in order to use a prior conviction as an aggravating factor.\nA defendant\u2019s own statements under oath constitute an acceptable method of proof of a prior conviction. State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E. 2d 156 (1983). In the present case, defendant testified that he had been convicted of driving while his license was revoked, a violation of G.S. 20-28, and reckless driving, a violation of G.S. 20-140. Both offenses are punishable by more than sixty days\u2019 confinement as evident from the face of the statutes.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to make separate findings of aggravation and mitigation as to each of the two offenses. In cases where offenses are not consolidated for judgment, where the sentencing judge is required to make findings in aggravation and mitigation to support a sentence which varies from the presumptive term, each offense, whether consolidated for hearing or not, must be treated separately in determining which aggravating or mitigating factors pertain to which offenses. However, if, as in the present case, the offenses are consolidated also for judgment, this separate treatment is not necessary. State v. Miller, 316 N.C. 273, 341 S.E. 2d 531 (1986).\nWe hold that defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Orr concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Robert R. Reilly, for the State.", "Bell and Broume, P.A., by Charles T. Browne, for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRYANT GRAVES\nNo. 8619SC313\n(Filed 21 October 1986)\n1. Arson 8 4.1\u2014 burning of horse barn \u2014 defendant as perpetrator \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution of defendant for burning a horse barn and burning personal property, evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury where it tended to show that plaintiff had a grudge against the victim and said he was planning to burn the victim\u2019s \u201cwork shop\u201d; a few days before the fire defendant offered a friend $200 to \u201cburn something,\u201d then later changed his mind and said he\u2019d do it himself; on the morning of the fire defendant placed in a car a milk jug full of green liquid which looked like chain saw oil and a bag of newspapers; defendant and two friends drove to the barn and stopped, and defendant got out with the jug and newspapers; the two friends drove away and returned a few minutes later; defendant got back in the car without the jug and newspapers and smelled of varnish or some chemical; and defendant stated several times that he had burned the barn.\n2. Criminal Law 8 138.28\u2014 prior offenses \u2014 proof by defendant\u2019s testimony \u2014 consideration as aggravating factor proper\nDefendant\u2019s testimony under oath that he had been convicted of driving while his license was revoked and reckless driving constituted an acceptable method of proof of a prior conviction of an offense punishable by more than 60 days\u2019 confinement, and the trial court therefore did not err in considering defendant\u2019s prior convictions as aggravating factors.\n3. Criminal Law 8 138.14\u2014 offenses consolidated for judgment \u2014 consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors\nIn cases where offenses are not consolidated for judgment where the sentencing judge is required to make findings in aggravation and mitigation to support a sentence which varies from the presumptive term, each offense, whether consolidated for hearing or not, must be treated separately in determining which aggravating or mitigating factors pertain to which offense; however, if the offenses are consolidated also for judgment, this separate treatment is not necessary.\nAppeal by defendant from Davis, Judge. Judgment entered 31 October 1985 in Superior Court, Randolph County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 September 1986.\nDefendant was charged in proper bills of indictment with burning a horse barn, in violation of G.S. 14-62, and of burning personal property, in violation of G.S. 14-66. He was tried and found guilty as charged. The two cases were consolidated for purposes of judgment. From a judgment imposing a prison sentence of twenty years, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Robert R. Reilly, for the State.\nBell and Broume, P.A., by Charles T. Browne, for defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0126-01", "first_page_order": 154, "last_page_order": 159 }