{ "id": 8358548, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ORAL EUBANKS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Eubanks", "decision_date": "1986-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 8629SC543", "first_page": "338", "last_page": "340", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 N.C. App. 338" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "289 S.E. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569780 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E. 2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567497 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566261 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557385 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0118-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 252, "char_count": 3295, "ocr_confidence": 0.797, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3139346231377602e-07, "percentile": 0.6250443558678518 }, "sha256": "d6b402b6dd6d05d13cf080b045a1f597d84db144f977ced3de82089864984890", "simhash": "1:871410d63c56c2e4", "word_count": 571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:07:52.921422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and COZORT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ORAL EUBANKS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nThe only assignment of error defendant argues in his brief is that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for second degree arson. Arson is defined at the common law as the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person. Under G.S. 14-58, if the dwelling burned was unoccupied at the time of the burning, the offense is arson in the second degree.\nFor a burning to be \u201cwillful and malicious\u201d in the law of arson, it must simply be done voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim of right. An intent or animus against either the property itself or its owner is not required. State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E. 2d 152 (1976).\nThe \u201cburning\u201d element requires that some portion of the dwelling itself be burned. State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126, 286 S.E. 2d 546 (1982). The house is a \u201cdwelling house\u201d if someone lives there. State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E. 2d 599 (1982). It is the dwelling house \u201cof another\u201d if someone other than the defendant lives there. State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E. 2d 325 (1982).\nIn the present case, evidence was presented tending to show the following: The house belonged to Cynthia Williams, who lived there. The house was burned. The fire was the result of an incendiary act, and not an accidental cause, according to the testimony of a State Bureau of Investigation arson investigator. Defendant had told Jim Smith, who also lived there, that he had to get his \u201cclothes and stuff out\u201d and \u201cfind a place to stay\u201d because \u201cit was going to be set afire.\u201d Defendant told Mr. Smith on the day of the fire, \u201cwe\u2019re going to do it tonight.\u201d Later that night, after the house had burned, Mr. Smith asked defendant, \u201cHow did it go?\u201d referring to the fire. Defendant answered \u201cK-WOOOSH.\u201d The house was unoccupied at the time of the burning. We hold that the State introduced sufficient evidence of each element of second degree arson to support the conviction.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN and COZORT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General James A. Wellons, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Robin E. Hudson, for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ORAL EUBANKS\nNo. 8629SC543\n(Filed 18 November 1986)\nArson \u00a7 4.1\u2014 second degree arson \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury in a prosecution for second degree arson where it tended to show that the house belonged to a named person who lived there, but it was unoccupied at the time of the burning; the fire was the result of an incendiary act; and defendant told an occupant of the house that he should remove his personal belongings because the house was going to be set on fire, warned the occupant on the day of the fire, and reported how the burning had gone after the deed was done.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Allen (C. Walter), Judge. Judgment entered 15 November 1985 in Superior Court, HENDERSON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 October 1986.\nDefendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with second degree arson, in violation of G.S. 14-58. He was found guilty as charged. From a judgment imposing a prison sentence of twelve years, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General James A. Wellons, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Robin E. Hudson, for defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0338-01", "first_page_order": 366, "last_page_order": 368 }