{
  "id": 8359231,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT SPRINGER",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Springer",
  "decision_date": "1986-12-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 865SC383",
  "first_page": "657",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:07:52.921422+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges COZORT and ORR concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT SPRINGER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nDefendant first contends that it was error for the court to deny his motion to dismiss made at the close of all the evidence. He argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the blow allegedly struck by defendant proximately caused Jenkins\u2019 death. We disagree.\nThe question presented by a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 313 S.E. 2d 585 (1984). This standard is consistent with the federal standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781, reh\u2019g denied, 444 U.S. 890, 62 L.Ed. 2d 126, 100 S.Ct. 195 (1979), and urged upon us in this case by defendant. Id. In ruling upon the motion, the trial judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E. 2d 114 (1980). Conflicts in the evidence merely create issues for the jury and do not warrant dismissal of the charges. State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E. 2d 663 (1977).\nIn the present case it is true, as defendant argues, that the opinions of the several medical expert witnesses differed as to the cause of the subarachnoid hemorrhage from which Jenkins\u2019 death resulted. However, the evidence tending to show that defendant struck Jenkins with the iron bar, that Jenkins fell immediately and was rendered unconscious and went into cardiac arrest, together with the testimony of the State\u2019s pathologist that Jenkins\u2019 death was caused by the subarachnoid hemorrhage which in his opinion, was produced by trauma, is sufficiently substantial evidence on the issue of proximate cause to warrant submission of the case to the jury. See State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570, 206 S.E. 2d 238 (1974).\nBy his other assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to elicit testimony from a defense witness, James Edward Stokes, that he had obtained a warrant against defendant for assaulting him with a shotgun on the same day defendant assaulted Jenkins. Defendant contends that the evidence tended to show that he has a violent disposition, negating his claim of self-defense. He argues that the prejudicial effect of the evidence so outweighs its probative value that it should have been excluded pursuant to G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403.\nStokes gave testimony for defendant tending to support defendant\u2019s claim of self-defense. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Stokes if he had, on the same date, made a sworn statement to a magistrate in order to cause a warrant to issue against defendant for assault with a shotgun. Defendant\u2019s objection was overruled. Stokes admitted having made the statement to the magistrate, but denied that defendant had assaulted him. He claimed that he made the sworn statement to the magistrate because he was angry with defendant. The trial court limited the jury\u2019s consideration of the challenged testimony to the issue of Stokes\u2019 credibility.\nG.S. 8C-1, Rule 611(b) permits cross-examination of a witness \u201con any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.\u201d Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination of a witness as to specific instances of his conduct, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility. A specific instance of false swearing is clearly probative of untruthfulness. Thus, it was permissible for the prosecutor to impeach and cast doubt upon Stokes\u2019 other testimony by cross-examining Stokes concerning his false statement under oath to the magistrate. See State v. Gallagher, 313 N.C. 132, 326 S.E. 2d 873 (1985).\nFurthermore, we cannot agree with defendant\u2019s assertion that the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value. Stokes admitted that his claim as to defendant\u2019s violent conduct on the day in question was false. Especially considering that a limiting instruction was given by the court, we perceive no reasonable possibility that a different result might have been reached if the evidence had not been admitted. See State v. Gallagher, supra; G.S. 15A-1443(a).\nNo error.\nJudges COZORT and ORR concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Wilson Hayman, for the State.",
      "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT SPRINGER\nNo. 865SC383\n(Filed 30 December 1986)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 21.3\u2014 proximate cause of death \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThere was sufficient evidence in a homicide prosecution to support a finding that the blow allegedly struck by defendant proximately caused the victim\u2019s death where there was evidence tending to show that defendant struck the victim with an iron bar; that the victim fell immediately, was unconscious, and went into cardiac arrest; and that the victim\u2019s death was caused by a subarachnoid hemorrhage, which the State pathologist felt was caused by trauma, though other medical experts differed on the cause of the hemorrhage.\n2. Criminal Law 8 89.6\u2014 impeachment of witness \u2014 prior false statement\nThe trial court did not err in homicide prosecution by permitting the prosecutor to elicit testimony from a defense witness that he had obtained a warrant against defendant for assaulting him with a shotgun on the same day defendant assaulted the victim where the witness admitted that the statement to the magistrate was false. It was permissible for the prosecutor to impeach the witness by cross-examining him about a false statement under oath to the magistrate, and, considering the limiting instruction which was given, there was not a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached had the evidence not been omitted. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(b) Rule 608(b), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\nAppeal by defendant from Allsbrook, Judge. Judgment entered 5 December 1985 in Superior Court, NEW HANOVER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 December 1986.\nDefendant was properly indicted for the murder of James Harold Jenkins and the State elected to proceed upon a charge of second degree murder. At trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant struck Jenkins on the neck with an iron bar that was 40 inches long and weighed 13V2 pounds. Jenkins fell to the ground, was rendered immediately unconscious, and was in \u201cfull cardiac arrest\u201d when rescue personnel arrived. He was revived, but did not regain consciousness and died approximately three days later. The pathologist who performed an autopsy upon Jenkins\u2019 body testified that Jenkins died of a \u201cdiffuse subarach-noid hemorrhage of the brain\u201d that, in his opinion, was a result of trauma and could have been caused by Jenkins\u2019 fall after being struck. On cross-examination, the doctor testified that he found no physical evidence of trauma to Jenkins\u2019 head and based his opinion upon the absence of a naturally occurring aneurism and upon the information related to him as to the manner in which Jenkins was injured.\nDefendant presented evidence tending to show that he struck Jenkins in self-defense after Jenkins had pulled a knife. He also presented evidence from five medical doctors, four of whom had been involved in treating Jenkins at the hospital before his death. The fifth doctor had reviewed Jenkins\u2019 medical records. Each of these witnesses testified that he was unable to find evidence of trauma and could not reach the conclusion that Jenkins\u2019 hemorrhage resulted from the blow struck by defendant.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. From judgment imposing a prison sentence of 35 years, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Wilson Hayman, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0657-01",
  "first_page_order": 685,
  "last_page_order": 688
}
