{
  "id": 12167562,
  "name": "THE AMERICAN MARBLE CORPORATION v. RONALD LEE CRAWFORD, and DEAN HUNTER, d/b/a QUALITY MARBLE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "American Marble Corp. v. Crawford",
  "decision_date": "1987-01-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 8623SC726",
  "first_page": "86",
  "last_page": "91",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "84 N.C. App. 86"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "113 S.E. 570",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1922,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "184 N.C. 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11268844
      ],
      "year": 1922,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/184/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "341 S.E. 2d 570",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1986,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "316 N.C. 193",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4703557,
        4703496,
        4698857,
        4699597,
        4702541
      ],
      "year": 1986,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/316/0193-02",
        "/nc/316/0193-05",
        "/nc/316/0193-04",
        "/nc/316/0193-01",
        "/nc/316/0193-03"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "335 S.E. 2d 335",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "77 N.C. App. 475",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8523711
      ],
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/77/0475-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 799",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "284 N.C. 348",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8561845
      ],
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/284/0348-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "26 A.L.R. 2d 1227",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 396",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "278 N.C. 153",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559876
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/278/0153-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 176",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "240 N.C. 667",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8609041
      ],
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/240/0667-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 282",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "289 N.C. 71",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8566728
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/289/0071-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 639",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "78 N.C. App. 458",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522041
      ],
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/78/0458-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "319 S.E. 2d 139",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "311 N.C. 679",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4685095
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/311/0679-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "292 S.E. 2d 574",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "305 N.C. 759",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8573251,
        8573289,
        8573226,
        8573201,
        8573274
      ],
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/305/0759-03",
        "/nc/305/0759-05",
        "/nc/305/0759-02",
        "/nc/305/0759-01",
        "/nc/305/0759-04"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "289 S.E. 2d 118",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "56 N.C. App. 445",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8521757
      ],
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/56/0445-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 600,
    "char_count": 12625,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.873,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.2554113729175792e-07,
      "percentile": 0.782019530868402
    },
    "sha256": "6021b6b6020cab827f76380fce70ecc22b225f132104fd9f6c06f91aff08c246",
    "simhash": "1:effe78657c3c0bed",
    "word_count": 1977
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:23.119892+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Martin and Parker concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "THE AMERICAN MARBLE CORPORATION v. RONALD LEE CRAWFORD, and DEAN HUNTER, d/b/a QUALITY MARBLE COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendant Crawford (hereinafter defendant) contends that the court erred in entering summary judgment against his claim that plaintiff violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 and that he thus was entitled to treble damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-16. We disagree.\nDefendant\u2019s counterclaim alleged that the \u201ccovenant not to compete, as used by the plaintiff, is an unfair trade practice pursuant to [G.S.] \u00a7 75-1.1 et seq.\u201d We have held previously that \u201cemployer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 . . . .\u201d Buie v. Daniel International, 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E. 2d 118, disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 759, 292 S.E. 2d 574 (1982). As defendant\u2019s counterclaim involves such a relationship, we hold, following Buie, that it lies outside the scope of G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. Accordingly, we hold that the court did not err in entering summary judgment against this claim.\nDefendant contends the court improperly entered summary judgment for plaintiff regarding his claim that plaintiff wrongfully interfered with his contractual rights. We agree.\nIn general,\nIn order to prevail when moving for summary judgment, the moving party must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when all factual inferences arising from the evidence are taken in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party. Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Foundation, Inc., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E. 2d 139 (1984).\nUzzell v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 78 N.C. App. 458, 337 S.E. 2d 639 (1985). One who procures the discharge of an employee by malicious or wanton interference may be liable to that employee in an action for damages. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E. 2d 282 (1976). See also 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interference \u00a7 47. To establish such a claim defendant must prove: (1) that a valid contract existed between him and a third person; (2) that plaintiff had knowledge of such contract; (3) that plaintiff intentionally induced the third person not to perform his contract with defendant; (4) that plaintiff acted without justification; and (5) that the outsider\u2019s acts caused the defendant actual damages. Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E. 2d 176 (1954). The facts here, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, clearly establish the first three elements and the fifth element for defendant\u2019s action. The central question is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the element of justification. See Uzzell, supra.\nIn general, \u201c \u2018[o]ne is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract, or enter into or continue a business relation, with a third party by in good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally protected interest of his own which he believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.\u2019 \u201d Kelly v. Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E. 2d 396 (1971), quoting Restatement of Torts \u00a7 773. Further, the question of justification for procuring a breach of contract or interference with another\u2019s employment is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. 2d 1227.\nWe hold that defendant has forecast sufficient evidence to establish that plaintiff acted without justification in that plaintiff was seeking to enforce a covenant not to compete from the parties\u2019 employment contract which was legally invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade. Accordingly, we hold that the court erred in granting summary judgment against defendant\u2019s claim for wrongful or malicious interference with contractual rights.\nOrdinarily, the issue, on remand, regarding the \u201cwithout justification\u201d element would be whether plaintiffs actions constituted a good faith assertion to protect a legally protected interest which plaintiff believed might otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of defendant\u2019s employment contract with Dean Hunter. See Kelly, supra. However, as the parties have already fully litigated the question of the validity of the covenant not to compete in the determination of plaintiffs original action, plaintiff, on remand, will be collaterally estopped from contesting the fact that this covenant is legally invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade. See King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E. 2d 799 (1973). The remaining question for the \u201cwithout justification\u201d element on remand, then, will be as follows: Whether plaintiff, even though it was in fact not protecting a legally protected interest (since the covenant not to compete was invalid), still acted in the good faith belief that it was protecting a legally protected interest which it believed might otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of defendant\u2019s employment contract with Dean Hunter.\nDefendant contends that his second counterclaim also included a claim for recovery of damages pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(e), and that the court erred in failing to conclude that he was entitled to such damages as a matter of law. Rule 65(e) provides that an order or judgment dissolving an injunction or restraining order may include an award of damages against the party procuring the injunction. Despite defendant\u2019s suggestion to the contrary, he does not expressly assert a claim for damages under Rule 65(e) in any of his counterclaims. The record also reveals no motion by defendant for such damages. We thus do not reach the merits of defendant\u2019s contention. We note instead that defendant may seek leave to amend his counterclaim pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 15(a) to assert an additional claim for such damages.\nDefendant contends the court improperly entered summary judgment against his claim for punitive damages. We agree.\n\u201cAs a general rule, punitive damages are recoverable only when the tortious conduct which causes the injury partakes of or is accompanied by some element of aggravation such as \u2018fraud, malice, gross negligence, insult,\u2019 or \u2018when the wrong is done willfully, or under circumstances of rudeness or oppression, or in a manner which evidences a reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiffs rights.\u2019 \u201d Hornby v. Penn. Nat\u2019l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 77 N.C. App. 475, 335 S.E. 2d 335 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 193, 341 S.E. 2d 570 (1986), quoting Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 113 S.E. 570 (1922). \u201cPunitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory damages for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer and deterring others from committing similar acts.\u201d Id.\nWe hold that the evidence here, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, is sufficient to establish a claim for punitive damages. Specifically, from the evidence of plaintiffs \u201cside agreement\u201d with defendant Dean Hunter to drop Hunter from its suit in exchange for Hunter\u2019s promise not to rehire Crawford and the evidence that plaintiff did not follow through on its preliminary injunction by posting the required bond, a jury could find or reasonably infer willful, oppressive or reckless conduct in wanton disregard of defendant\u2019s rights warranting damages \u201cfor the purpose of punishing [plaintiff] and deterring others from committing similar acts.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that the court erred in entering summary judgment against defendant\u2019s claim for punitive damages.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.\nJudges Martin and Parker concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "White and Crumpler, by G. Edgar Parker, Robin J. Stinson and Christopher J. Beal, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Legal Aid Society of Northwest North Carolina, Inc., by J. Griffin Morgan and Susan Gottsegen, for defendant-appellant Ronald Lee Crawford."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE AMERICAN MARBLE CORPORATION v. RONALD LEE CRAWFORD, and DEAN HUNTER, d/b/a QUALITY MARBLE COMPANY\nNo. 8623SC726\n(Filed 20 January 1987)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 11.1; Unfair Competition \u00a7 1\u2014 covenant not to compete \u2014 unfair trade practices statutes inapplicable\nThe trial court properly dismissed defendant\u2019s counterclaim which alleged that a covenant not to compete, as used by plaintiff, was an unfair trade practice pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 et seq., since employer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of that statute.\n2. Master and Servant i 13\u2014 interference with employment contract\u2014summary judgment improper\nThe trial court erred in granting summary judgment against defendant\u2019s claim for wrongful or malicious interference with contractual rights where defendant\u2019s evidence tended to establish that a valid contract existed between him and a third person; plaintiff had knowledge of such contract; plaintiff intentionally induced the third person not to perform his contract with defendant; plaintiffs acts caused defendant actual damages; and plaintiff acted without justification in that plaintiff was seeking to enforce a covenant not to compete from the parties\u2019 employment contract which was legally invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade.\n3. Master and Servant \u00a712\u2014 interference with employee\u2019s obtaining other employment-punitive damages claimed \u2014 summary judgment improper\nThe trial court erred in entering summary judgment against defendant on his claim for punitive damages where the evidence tended to show that plaintiff had a \u201cside agreement\u201d with defendant employer to drop defendant employer from its suit for breach of a covenant not to compete in exchange for defendant employer\u2019s promise not to rehire defendant employee; plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction restraining defendant employee from working for defendant employer, but plaintiff never followed through on the injunction by posting the required bond; and the jury could thus reasonably infer willful, oppressive or reckless conduct in wanton disregard of defendant\u2019s rights warranting damages for the purpose of punishing plaintiff and deterring others from committing similar acts.\nAPPEAL by defendant Ronald Lee Crawford from Hyatt, Judge. Judgment entered 25 February 1986 in YADKIN County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 December 1986.\nPlaintiff American Marble Corporation is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cultured marble products. Defendant Ronald Lee Crawford began working as an employee for American Marble in January of 1984. Crawford signed an employment contract which included a covenant not to compete. In July 1984, Crawford voluntarily left American Marble and began working for defendant Dean Hunter d/b/a Quality Marble Company pursuant to an oral contract of employment.\nAmerican Marble brought this action against defendants on 8 August 1984 seeking inter alia to enjoin Crawford \u201cfrom working for or engaging in any activity on behalf of, defendant, Dean Hunter. . . .\u201d On the same day, the court granted American Marble\u2019s motion for a temporary restraining order restraining Crawford from working for Quality Marble. This order expired on 20 August 1984. The trial judge subsequently granted a preliminary injunction and required plaintiff to post a $12,000 bond pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(c). Plaintiff failed to post the required bond, and a written preliminary injunction order was never proffered for signature.\nAccording to the affidavit of N. Lawrence Hudspeth, III, attorney for Dean Hunter, Dean Hunter signed a consent order prior to 20 August 1984 whereby he \u201cwould be dropped from the case provided that he agree not to rehire Ronald Crawford, or any other former American Marble Corp. employees, at any time.\u201d Hudspeth \u201cwas led to believe that [American Marble] signed the consent order but found out some time later that [it] had declined to do so.\u201d\nDefendant Crawford filed an answer which raised several counterclaims. By his first counterclaim, Crawford alleged that the covenant not to compete constituted an unfair trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 and that he thus was entitled to treble damages and attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 75-16 et seq. Crawford also alleged in two additional counterclaims that American Marble wrongfully interfered with his contractual rights and that such interference entitled him to compensatory and punitive damages.\nThe court granted plaintiff American Marble\u2019s motion for summary judgment dismissing all of defendant Crawford\u2019s counterclaims. Plaintiff s action was tried before the trial court sitting without a jury. The court concluded that the covenant not to compete was an unreasonable restraint of trade and thus was invalid. Accordingly, it entered judgment for defendants.\nDefendant Crawford appealed from the court\u2019s entry of summary judgment dismissing all of his counterclaims.\nWhite and Crumpler, by G. Edgar Parker, Robin J. Stinson and Christopher J. Beal, for plaintiff-appellee.\nLegal Aid Society of Northwest North Carolina, Inc., by J. Griffin Morgan and Susan Gottsegen, for defendant-appellant Ronald Lee Crawford."
  },
  "file_name": "0086-01",
  "first_page_order": 114,
  "last_page_order": 119
}
