{
  "id": 12167534,
  "name": "ROGER LONG, Employee/Plaintiff v. MORGANTON DYEING & FINISHING CO., Employee, and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Long v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Co.",
  "decision_date": "1987-01-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 8610IC555",
  "first_page": "81",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:23.119892+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judge Arnold concurs.",
      "Judge Johnson dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "ROGER LONG, Employee/Plaintiff v. MORGANTON DYEING & FINISHING CO., Employee, and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nIn reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission, we are limited to determining whether the findings of the Commission are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings justify its legal conclusions. Roper v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 65 N.C. App. 69, 308 S.E. 2d 485 (1983), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 309, 312 S.E. 2d 652 (1984). Plaintiff argues that the Commission\u2019s finding that he failed to prove that his hernia was accompanied by pain is unsupported by the evidence and that the finding does not justify the Commission\u2019s conclusion that there was no causal connection between defendant\u2019s hernia and the accident. Plaintiff has failed to show where there is any error in the Commission\u2019s decision. Therefore, we must affirm.\nG.S. 97-2(18) provides that, in all claims for compensation for hernia resulting from an injury by accident, the claimant must prove to the satisfaction of the Commission:\n(a) That there was an injury resulting in a hernia;\n(b) That the hernia appeared suddenly;\n(c) That it was accompanied by pain;\n(d) That the hernia immediately followed an accident; and\n(e) That the hernia did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed. G.S. 97-2(18). [Emphasis added.]\nTo recover compensation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of each of the above five elements. Hensley v. Cooperative, 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E. 2d 289 (1957). The absence of any one of them will result in the denial of compensation. Lutes v. Tobacco Co., 19 N.C. App. 380, 198 S.E. 2d 746 (1973).\nHere, the Commission found that plaintiff failed to prove that his hernia was accompanied by any pain. An examination of the record reveals that there is competent evidence to support that finding. Plaintiff testified that, after the lump appeared, he experienced muscular \u201cstrain\u201d while lifting the 75-100 pound rolls of cloth at work and that about a month after the accident he began to feel \u201csick to my stomach.\u201d He contends that this testimony is sufficient to constitute proof of \u201cpain.\u201d While we agree with plaintiff that the feeling of pain is subjective and that an employee need not necessarily use the term \u201cpain\u201d before compensation may be awarded, plaintiffs testimony here clearly does not satisfy the mandatory requirement of G.S. 97-2(18)(c).\nAlthough plaintiff testified that he felt sick to his stomach, he also stated that it \u201creally never hurt.\u201d Furthermore, the muscle strain which he alluded to was, according to his own testimony, unrelated to his hernia. In fact, plaintiff stated that the muscle strain was the same kind of strain anyone feels when lifting a heavy object. Therefore, neither the general feeling of nausea nor the muscle strain which plaintiff described in his testimony can be equated with \u201cpain\u201d as that term is used in G.S. 97-2(18)(c). Since plaintiff never testified that he suffered any pain, the Commission\u2019s finding that he failed to prove that his hernia was accompanied by pain is supported by competent evidence.\nPlaintiff also argues that the Commission erred in concluding that he failed to establish a causal connection between his hernia and his injury by accident. More specifically, plaintiff states that, even without a finding of pain, he established a causal connection by proving to the satisfaction of the Commission that the hernia was a result of the accident. Plaintiff contends that the showing of pain is not necessary under a liberal construction of the statute where the Commission is otherwise satisfied as to causation. We agree that the statute must be liberally construed. McMahan v. Supermarket, 24 N.C. App. 113, 210 S.E. 2d 214 (1974). We also agree that the record indicates that the Commission believed that plaintiff s hernia was, in fact, caused by his accident at work. Nevertheless, the Commission properly found that no causal connection was established, as required by G.S. 97-2(18).\nHere, the statute is unambiguous in requiring that each of the five listed elements must be proven before compensation may be awarded. Where a statute is clear, there is no reason for judicial construction and courts must give the statute its plain meaning. News and Observer v. State; Co. of Wake v. State; Murphy v. State, 312 N.C. 276, 322 S.E. 2d 133 (1984). The statute, in effect, defines what constitutes a causal connection for purposes of a hernia injury and, when any one of the statute\u2019s elements is not proven, a causal connection does not exist. See, Lutes v. Tobacco Co., supra; 1B Larson, The Law of Workers\u2019 Compensation Section 39.71 (1986). This is true even if the Commission is otherwise convinced that the hernia was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Plaintiffs failure to prove the hernia was accompanied by pain requires that his claim be denied.\nAffirmed.\nJudge Arnold concurs.\nJudge Johnson dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Judge Johnson\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In upholding the Commission\u2019s decision (Commissioner Clay dissenting) the majority opinion correctly states our standard of review and the burden of proof plaintiff must carry in order to receive compensation. I agree with the majority opinion that \u201cthe record indicates that the Commission believed that plaintiffs hernia was, in fact, caused by his accident at work.\u201d However, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that \u201cthe Commission properly found that no causal connection was established, as required by G.S. 97-2(18).\u201d\nDeputy Commissioner Page found as fact, inter alia, as follows:\n6. On January 22, 1985, plaintiffs normal work routine was interrupted and plaintiff thereby sustained an injury. Plaintiffs hernia appeared the following day but was not accompanied by any pain until approximately six weeks following the date of injury.\nThe majority opinion by the Full Commission states: \u201c[w]hile it appears obvious from the medical evidence in this matter that the hernia complained of by the Plaintiff arose out of his employment, we are unable to award compensation in the face of a clear and unequivocal requirement in the statute which remains unsatisfied in this matter.\u201d\nI fully agree with Commissioner Clay\u2019s dissent on the basis that the facts of this case dictate that when the statute is construed liberally plaintiffs testimony about the \u201cstrain\u201d he felt should be sufficient to establish the \u201cpain\u201d required by G.S. 97-2(18) when there is no question that plaintiff\u2019s injury was sustained in the course of his employment. My understanding of the technical requirements of G.S. 97-2(18) is that they serve the purpose of insuring that only valid claims may be filed pursuant to G.S. 97-2(18). There is no question that plaintiff is asserting a valid claim inasmuch as Deputy Commissioner Page and the Full Commission concluded, and the evidence fully supports, that plaintiff sustained his injury in the course of his employment.\nCommissioner Clay, in his dissent, appropriately includes a statement of the purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as follows: \u201c[t]he Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate the broad intent of the Act to provide compensation for employees sustaining an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, and no technical or strained construction should be given to defeat this purpose.\u201d See generally, Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 153 S.E. 2d 591 (1930). In the case sub judice, plaintiff honestly, and obviously without any prior \u201ccoaching,\u201d described the circumstances of his injury. The Commission concedes that plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment. But for the lack of plaintiffs use of the magic word \u201cpain\u201d he would have been compensated. Moreover, expert testimony established that pain is not universally experienced when a hernia occurs. However, plaintiffs hernia was accompanied by pain, according to the findings made by Commissioner Page, but this pain was not experienced by plaintiff until six weeks after his injury. Plaintiff repeatedly testified that the hernia made him feel sick and further testified that the hernia \u201cfelt like somebody hit me in the stomach.\u201d Since plaintiff sustained his injury in the course of employment he is entitled to compensation. The technical construction of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act utilized by the Commission to deny compensation to plaintiff was error as a matter of law. I vote to reverse and remand to the Commission to render an award of compensation in plaintiffs behalf.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Judge Johnson"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "McMurray & McMurray, by Martha McMurray, for the plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Patton, Starnes, Thompson & Aycock, by Thomas M. Starnes, for the defendant-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ROGER LONG, Employee/Plaintiff v. MORGANTON DYEING & FINISHING CO., Employee, and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. 8610IC555\n(Filed 20 January 1987)\n1. Master and Servant 8 65.1\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014hernia\u2014failure of employee to show pain\nPlaintiffs testimony that he experienced muscular \u201cstrain\u201d after the appearance of a lump in his groin and that, about a month after his accident, he began to feel \u201csick to [his] stomach\u201d was insufficient to prove that his hernia was accompanied by \u201cpain\u201d as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(18)(c).\n2. Master and Servant 8 65.1\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 hernia \u2014 failure to show pain \u2014no causal connection between hernia and accident\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between his hernia and his injury by accident, since without a finding of pain, there could be no causal connection between the hernia and the injury even if the Commission was otherwise convinced that the hernia was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.\nJudge Johnson dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff-employee from the Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 6 March 1986. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 November 1986.\nThis is a workers\u2019 compensation case where plaintiff seeks to recover for a hernia. Plaintiff had worked in defendant\u2019s packing department for about five years. On 22 January 1985, at the request of his supervisor, plaintiff began temporarily working at a different job. That position required him to lift rolls of cloth which were much heavier than the ones that his usual job required him to lift. The next day, plaintiff noticed a lump in his groin area. He suffered no pain, however, and continued to work in that capacity for another two weeks before returning to his usual job. It was not until approximately a month after the lump first appeared that plaintiff became nauseated and sought treatment.\nPlaintiffs doctor diagnosed the lump as a direct inguinal hernia. After it was successfully treated, plaintiff filed this claim for workers\u2019 compensation. After a hearing, the deputy commissioner found that although plaintiff had sustained an injury by accident, he had failed to show that the hernia was accompanied by pain. Consequently, the deputy commissioner concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between his hernia and the injury by accident. Plaintiff appealed to the full Commission, which affirmed the deputy commissioner.\nMcMurray & McMurray, by Martha McMurray, for the plaintiff-appellant.\nPatton, Starnes, Thompson & Aycock, by Thomas M. Starnes, for the defendant-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0081-01",
  "first_page_order": 109,
  "last_page_order": 114
}
