{ "id": 12167505, "name": "DUKE UNIVERSITY v. ROBERT L. STAINBACK, ELIZABETH STAINBACK and INVESTOR'S CONSOLIDATED INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Duke University v. Stainback", "decision_date": "1987-01-20", "docket_number": "No. 8614SC542", "first_page": "75", "last_page": "81", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 N.C. App. 75" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" }, { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624554 ], "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.E. 2d 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521804 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S.E. 2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625159 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Denial of motion for failure to state a claim not reviewable on appeal after case decided on the merits." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523105 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Denial of motion for failure to state a claim not reviewable on appeal after case decided on the merits." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Denial of motion for summary judgment not reviewable after case decided on the merits." }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694301 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Denial of motion for summary judgment not reviewable after case decided on the merits." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 S.E. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626492 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553830 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E. 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652401 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/154/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 359, 70 S.E. 824 (1911)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 359, 70 S.E. 824 (1911)" }, { "page": "674-75" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565922 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 659, "char_count": 12843, "ocr_confidence": 0.88, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.175011990943131e-07, "percentile": 0.7716530963774336 }, "sha256": "b2da23856e3c41e66e1ce31d4315c4a3808ae07f59911f7192f19e8ab17500de", "simhash": "1:267b56f2b410ec24", "word_count": 2130 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:23.119892+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Wells concurs.", "Judge ORR dissents." ], "parties": [ "DUKE UNIVERSITY v. ROBERT L. STAINBACK, ELIZABETH STAINBACK and INVESTOR\u2019S CONSOLIDATED INSURANCE COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nPlaintiff, Duke University Medical Center (Duke) sought to recover medical expenses for services rendered to Robert L. Stainback, Jr., from his parents, Robert L. and Elizabeth Stain-back, and their insurer, Investor\u2019s Consolidated Insurance Company (Investor\u2019s). The trial judge found Robert L. Stainback liable for the entire balance due, notwithstanding that the statute of limitations may have run against Duke\u2019s claim, because Stainback was equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar. Stainback appeals. We affirm.\nI\nRobert L. Stainback, Jr. was admitted to Duke on 21 May 1977 for treatment of injuries sustained in a bicycle-automobile accident. He was nine years old at the time. His father, Robert L. Stainback was legally responsible for his son\u2019s medical bills and, in addition, signed a written statement accepting personal responsibility for the costs.\nThe medical expenses amounted to $42,812.90. The Midsouth Insurance Company paid $2,000 on the bill in June 1978. Stain-back, himself, paid a total of $8,584.95 with his last payment credited on 1 November 1979. The balance of $32,227.95 was not paid.\nStainback was also insured by Investor\u2019s. However, Investor\u2019s denied coverage and refused to pay any portion of the bill. Stainback initiated suit against Investor\u2019s on 2 August 1978. He was represented by Bobby Rogers. Judgment was entered for Stainback on 13 May 1982 for $39,606.90, plus interest. Although Duke was aware of the suit between Stainback and Investor\u2019s, it neither joined nor intervened in that suit.\nThe following factual findings to which Stainback takes exception were nonetheless supported in the record. On 15 August 1978 Bobby Rogers informed Duke by letter that suit had been filed against Investor\u2019s. Also in the summer of 1978, Rogers told Duke that he was attempting to secure payment by Investor\u2019s of the balance of Stainback\u2019s bill and that he \u201cwould keep Duke informed of the situation.\u201d\nMr. Rogers advised a Duke representative by telephone on 26 October 1983 that he would not pay the bill. Duke initiated this action on 18 November 1983.\nII\nStainback first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Like motions for summary judgment and failure to state a claim for relief, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is an interlocutory order and is not appealable. Erickson v. Starling, 235 N.C. 643, 71 S.E. 2d 384 (1952). Also, denials of motions for summary judgment and failure to state a claim are not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment on the merits. Harris v. Walden, 314 N.C. 284, 333 S.E. 2d 254 (1985) (Denial of motion for summary judgment not reviewable after case decided on the merits.); Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 340 S.E. 2d 755 (1986) (Denial of motion for failure to state a claim not reviewable on appeal after case decided on the merits.). The rationale for nonre-viewability after a trial on the merits is that the purpose of these preliminary motions \u2014to bring litigation to an early decision on the merits when no material facts are in dispute \u2014can no longer be served after there has been a trial. To grant review of these denials \u201cwould allow a verdict reached after a presentation of all the evidence to be overcome by a limited forecast of the evidence.\u201d Harris, at 286, 333 S.E. 2d at 256. A similar rationale applies to denials of motions for judgment on the pleadings. The purpose of judgment on the pleadings is to avoid an unnecessary trial when an affirmative defense bars suit. Thus, permitting review of a denial after a judgment on the merits would allow a preliminary assertion of an affirmative defense to overcome a judgment reached after a full examination of the equities involved at trial. We hold that denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment in a trial on the merits.\nStainback\u2019s final assignment of error \u2014that the trial court committed reversible error in finding that he was equitably es-topped from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar to Duke\u2019s cause of action \u2014is the only issue properly before this Court. Stainback had a contractual obligation to pay Duke. The parties agreed in their briefs that Stainback made payments on 9 January 1978 and 1 November 1979. North Carolina General Statute Section 1-52(1) (1983) provides that a three-year statute of limitations is applicable to an action based on breach of contract. Stain-back failed to make any payment for more than four years prior to Duke initiating this action. We therefore find that the three-year statute of limitations has run and would bar Duke\u2019s claim.\nHowever, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked, in a proper case, to prevent a defendant from relying on the statute of limitations. See Nowell v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 250 N.C. 575, 108 S.E. 2d 889 (1959); Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co., 70 N.C. App. 309, 318 S.E. 2d 904 (1984). \u201cThe doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of the golden rule to the everyday affairs of men. It requires that one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he would have them do unto him. ... Its compulsion is one of fair play.\u201d McNeely v. Walters, 211 N.C. 112, 113, 189 S.E. 2d 114, 115 (1937). \u201cActual fraud, bad faith, or an intent to mislead or deceive is not essential to invoke the equitable doctrine of estoppel in pais.\u201d Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 139, 181 S.E. 2d 588, 593 (1971). Rather \u201cit is sufficient that the debtor made representations which misled the creditor, who acted upon them in good faith, to the extent that he failed to commence action within the statutory period.\u201d Watkins, 279 N.C. at 139, 181 S.E. 2d at 593 (1971) quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, Sec. 433.\nIn the case sub judice there are specific findings, supported by competent evidence, of conduct by Stainback\u2019s attorney which was designed to mislead Duke. The trial judge, as trier of fact, found that Stainback\u2019s attorney made statements to Duke which caused Duke to reasonably believe it would receive payment once the case between Stainback and Investor\u2019s was decided. Stain-back\u2019s final assignment of error is without merit.\nWe affirm.\nJudge Wells concurs.\nJudge ORR dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "BECTON, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge ORR\ndissenting.\nThe facts of this case are insufficient in my opinion, as a matter of law, to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. A review of the record finds only two instances in which the defendant\u2019s attorney, Rogers, communicated with plaintiff, Duke University. In June of 1978, Rogers told Duke that he was attempting to secure payment to his client by Investor\u2019s of the balance of Stainback\u2019s bill and that he \u201cwould keep Duke informed of the situation.\u201d Secondly, on 15 August 1978, defendant\u2019s attorney informed Duke by letter that suit had been filed against Investor\u2019s.\nThese two incidents are clearly inadequate to support the majority\u2019s holding that Stainback was equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations. Likewise, there is no evidence or finding of fact to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the actions of Stainback\u2019s attorney justifiably induced Duke to refrain from suing Stainback or to believe that they would be paid from the proceeds of the lawsuit against Investor\u2019s.\nThe essential elements of an equitable estoppel are set forth in Yancey v. Watkins, 2 N.C. App. 672, 163 S.E. 2d 625 (1968) (quoting Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 359, 70 S.E. 824 (1911)) as follows:\n1. Words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged, amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.\n2. The party against whom the estoppel is alleged must have knowledge, either actual or implied, at the time the representations were made, that they were untrue.\n3. The truth respecting the representations so made must be unknown to the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time they were made and at the time they were acted on by him.\n4. The party estopped must intend or expect that his conduct or representations will be acted on by the party asserting the estoppel, or by the public generally.\n5. The representations or conduct must have been relied and acted on by the party claiming the benefit of the estop-pel.\n6. The party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have so acted, because of such representations or conduct, that he would be prejudiced if the first party be permitted to deny the truth thereof.\n2 N.C. App. at 674-75, 63 S.E. 2d at 626-27.\nIn the case sub judice, there is no evidence of a misrepresentation. Stainback\u2019s attorney on two occasions informed Duke about what was happening in regard to Stainback\u2019s efforts to collect the insurance proceeds. Those statements attributed to the attorney, Rogers, neither misrepresent the situation nor conceal any material fact. According to the record, there is no evidence that Rogers or Stainback at any time asked Duke to forego its right to sue Stainback within the time frame of the applicable statute of limitations or promised to pay Duke from any insurance proceeds collected from the suit. Nor is there evidence in the record of Duke relying on the alleged misrepresentations to their detriment.\nEven under the standard set forth in Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 181 S.E. 2d 588 (1971), cited by the majority, there is insufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found that Rogers\u2019 representations misled Duke, who acted upon them in good faith to the extent that Duke failed to commence the action within the statutory period.\nIt would appear that invoking the doctrine of equitable estop-pel in this case as a means of avoiding the statute of limitations hinges upon the successful recovery of insurance proceeds by Stainback. Would the majority still hold that Duke is entitled to a judgment based on equitable estoppel had Stainback been unsuccessful in recovering insurance proceeds or recovered the exact amount which he, personally, had previously paid Duke?\nStatutes of limitation are statutes of repose, intended to require that litigation be initiated within the prescribed time or not at all. \u201cStatutes of limitations are inflexible and unyielding. They operate inexorably without reference to the merits of plaintiffs cause of action.\u201d Congleton v. City of Asheboro, 8 N.C. App. 571, 573, 174 S.E. 2d 870, 872 (1970).\nThe evidence showed that after 9 July 1980, Duke made no effort to collect this account from anyone. There was obviously ample opportunity prior to the running of the statute of limitations for Duke to protect its rights. However, Duke failed to pursue any such course of action. As the trial court\u2019s findings of fact point out, \u201c. . . Duke made no effort to intervene or otherwise join in Stainback\u2019s action against Investor\u2019s to protect its [Duke\u2019s] interests.\u201d\nEquitable estoppel must rest in part on a misrepresentation, a concealment of a material fact or a misleading statement upon which the creditor relied \u2014not the successful efforts by a debtor to collect insurance proceeds due him. Duke sat on its right to sue and must bear the burden of failing to pursue the matter in a timely and appropriate fashion. Equitable estoppel should not apply in this case and Duke\u2019s claim should have been dismissed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge ORR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Powe, Porter and Alphin, P.A., by Edward L. Embree III and Bryan E. Lessley, for plaintiff appellee.", "Bobby W. Rogers for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DUKE UNIVERSITY v. ROBERT L. STAINBACK, ELIZABETH STAINBACK and INVESTOR\u2019S CONSOLIDATED INSURANCE COMPANY\nNo. 8614SC542\n(Filed 20 January 1987)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 55\u2014 judgment on the pleadings denied \u2014no review on appeal from final judgment in trial on merits\nDenial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment in a trial on the merits.\n2. Estoppel \u00a7 4.3\u2014 recovery of medical costs \u2014 pleading of statute of limitations \u2014 equitable estoppel\nIn an action to recover for the costs of medical care rendered to defendant\u2019s son, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant was equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiffs cause of action where the trial judge found that defendant\u2019s attorney made statements to plaintiff which caused plaintiff reasonably to believe that it would receive payment once the case between defendant and his insurer was decided, and plaintiff therefore failed to commence this action until the other action was complete and plaintiff was informed by defendant\u2019s counsel that he would not pay the bill.\nJudge Orr dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from Wiley F. Bowen, Judge. Judgment entered 1 October 1985 in Superior Court, DURHAM County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 October 1986.\nPowe, Porter and Alphin, P.A., by Edward L. Embree III and Bryan E. Lessley, for plaintiff appellee.\nBobby W. Rogers for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0075-01", "first_page_order": 103, "last_page_order": 109 }