{ "id": 12169609, "name": "BARBARA S. IPOCK, Guardian Ad Litem for JUDITH I. HILL, and TIMOTHY W. HILL, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for TIMOTHY JASON HILL, A minor v. SAMUEL J. GILMORE", "name_abbreviation": "Ipock v. Gilmore", "decision_date": "1987-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 868SC848", "first_page": "70", "last_page": "81", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 N.C. App. 70" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "332 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694724, 4688358, 4688327, 4694514, 4692506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0116-02", "/nc/314/0116-05", "/nc/314/0116-01", "/nc/314/0116-04", "/nc/314/0116-03" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566953, 8566889, 8566860, 8566917 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0703-04", "/nc/307/0703-02", "/nc/307/0703-01", "/nc/307/0703-03" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E. 2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564174 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714177, 4716485, 4715177, 4715661, 4716155 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0185-05", "/nc/315/0185-01", "/nc/315/0185-03", "/nc/315/0185-02", "/nc/315/0185-04" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525969 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557369 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624921 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E. 2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525500 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 N.E. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.Y.S. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.Y. 2d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2289621 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/24/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Cal. Rptr. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Cal. App. 3d 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4427189 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/45/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Cal. Rptr. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Cal. App. 3d 1025", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6041636 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/54/1025-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525916 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 A. 2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.J. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1931897 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/61/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 A.L.R. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Hawaii 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 1448125 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/41/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Or. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 8642102 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/293/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.Ct. 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719732 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525220 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 S.E. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628948 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694724, 4688358, 4688327, 4694514, 4692506 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0116-02", "/nc/314/0116-05", "/nc/314/0116-01", "/nc/314/0116-04", "/nc/314/0116-03" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522802 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624921 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 S.E. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628948 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0173-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1161, "char_count": 26109, "ocr_confidence": 0.891, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5804787833693016e-07, "percentile": 0.8171393390116567 }, "sha256": "a0cb3e54984e366c9c4ea980af4d9caab83a56180235a216fdd9724b24ca0964", "simhash": "1:4b4b56f6682514dc", "word_count": 4381 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:25.781259+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Orr concurs.", "Judge Phillips dissents." ], "parties": [ "BARBARA S. IPOCK, Guardian Ad Litem for JUDITH I. HILL, and TIMOTHY W. HILL, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for TIMOTHY JASON HILL, A minor v. SAMUEL J. GILMORE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nPlaintiffs first contend that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing Dr. Gilmore\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the claim of Timothy Jason Hill for loss of parental consortium. We disagree.\nRecognition of the claim of loss of parental consortium has twice been refused by the courts of this state. Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. 2d 432 (1949); Azzolio v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E. 2d 567 (1984), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E. 2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 131 (1986). This asserted cause of action was not acknowledged at common law and it has no statutory sanction. Henson at 176, 56 S.E. 2d at 434. It is the duty of the judiciary to enforce the law as we find it and to determine if a cause of action is existent or nonexistent as the law now exists, not to create new claims. Id.\nWe are aware of the dictum by way of footnote in the first appeal of this case which stated:\nWe do note . . . that in other suits involving an indirect impact on children, our appellate courts have declined to recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. See Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. 2d 432 (1949); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E. 2d 567 (1984). However, arguably in this case, the impact on the child is directly foreseeable.\nIpock v. Gilmore, 73 N.C. App. 182, 188, 326 S.E. 2d 271, 276, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 116, 332 S.E. 2d 481 (1985).\nWhile the loss of parental consortium in situations such as the present case may be quite real and worthy of compensation, recognition of a new cause of action is a policy decision which falls within the province of the legislature. \u201cThe \u2018excelsior cry for a better system\u2019 in order to keep step with the new conditions and spirit of a more progressive age must be made to the Legislature, rather than to the courts.\u201d Henson at 176, 56 S.E. 2d at 434.\nPlaintiffs contend that it would be a denial of both equal protection and due process (1) to allow a spouse but not a child to recover for the loss of consortium of an injured person, or (2) to allow the child of a deceased parent but not the child of a brain-damaged parent to recover for such loss. We disagree.\nFirst, the spousal relationship and the relationship between parent and child are not the same. Companionship, service, responsibility, love and affection between spouses differ in both degree and kind from those of a parent-child relationship. The law is not constitutionally required to treat these relationships as identical. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 652 P. 2d 318 (1982).\nSecond, allowing the child of a deceased parent but not the child of a brain-damaged parent to recover for such loss does not deny equal protection or due process. The distinction is not between kinds of children but between a defendant\u2019s scope of liability for causing fatal as distinct from nonfatal injuries to the people who are the immediate victims of his or her negligence. Id.\nAlso, if the parent lives then the tangible aspects of a child\u2019s loss can be included in the compensation awarded in the parent\u2019s own cause of action. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 59 A.L.R. 2d 445 (1957). With this in mind, a state legislature could rationally conclude that only upon the death of a parent should a child be compensated for intangible losses. See Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A. 2d 862 (1972).\nPlaintiffs argue that the middle tier test applicable in some equal protection cases should be used here. See Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App. 592, 306 S.E. 2d 477 (1983). We disagree.\nThere is neither a semi-suspect class nor a semi-fundamental interest involved in the present situation. We find no basis to support plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the middle tier (substantial state interest) test should be used. Therefore, all that is needed is a rational basis for denying minor plaintiffs claim. Id. Several rationales are listed as follows.\nFirst, there is the possible overlap in recovery of claims between the injured parent and the child. Second, there is the potential increase in insurance costs. There are also the derivative nature and indirectness of the injury; the uncertainty and remoteness of damages; the multiplication of tort litigation; and the splitting of the basic cause of action. See Garza v. Kanton, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976); see also Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 20 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975).\nWe do not suggest that in situations such as the one presently before us, that a child\u2019s claim is not genuine. However, there must be a line drawn which ends a tort-feasor\u2019s liability at some point.\nWhile it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.\nToby v. Grossman, 24 N.Y. 2d 609, 619, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 554, 561, 249 N.E. 2d 419, 424 (1969). It is the legislature\u2019s prerogative to extend such liability if they believe it proper, not ours.\nThis state does not recognize the claim of the minor plaintiff. The trial judge, therefore, properly granted partial summary judgment for defendant dismissing the claim for loss of parental consortium.\nPlaintiffs next contend that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claims of Barbara S. Ipock, guardian ad litem for Judith Hill, and of Timothy W. Hill, individually, for battery, on the ground that there were genuine issues as to material facts and defendant was, therefore, not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We disagree.\nIt has been established that only an unauthorized operation constitutes a battery. See Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546, 293 S.E. 2d 829 (1982). In fact, the N. C. Supreme Court stated that:\n. . . where an internal operation is indicated, a surgeon may lawfully perform, and it is his duty to perform, such operation as good surgery demands, even when it means an extension of the operation further than was originally contemplated, and for so doing he is not to be held in damages as for an unauthorized operation.\nKennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 363, 90 S.E. 2d 754, 759 (1956).\nThe request for sterilization signed by both Judith and Timothy W. Hill authorized Dr. Gilmore to perform the laparosco-py and \u201cto do any other procedure that his judgment may dictate during the above operation.\u201d The operation consent form which was signed by Mrs. Hill stated that, \u201c[i]f any conditions are revealed at the time of the operation that were not recognized before and which call for procedures in addition to those originally contemplated, I authorize the performance of such procedures.\u201d\nIn light of the established case law above and the consent forms signed by Mrs. Hill, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims for battery because the evidence presented did not support such claims.\nPlaintiffs lastly contend that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claims of Barbara Ipock, guardian ad litem for Judith Hill, and of Timothy W. Hill, individually, for punitive damages, on the grounds that there were genuine issues as to material facts and defendant was, therefore, not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We disagree.\nIn order to qualify for punitive damages in North Carolina, some element of aggravation must be proven. Newton v. Insurance Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E. 2d 297 (1976); Paris v. Kreitz, 75 N.C. App. 365, 331 S.E. 2d 234, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 185, 337 S.E. 2d 858 (1985). In the context of an intentional tort, aggravated conduct \u201c. . . usually consists of insult, indignity, malice, oppression, or bad motive in addition to the tort.\u201d Paris at 374, 331 S.E. 2d at 241.\nThe record does not indicate any evidence of aggravated facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. The trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs\u2019 claim for punitive damages.\nDefendant makes cross-assignments of error contending that the Court of Appeals erred in its first opinion in this case. \u201cOnce an appellate court has ruled on a question, that decision becomes the law of the case and governs the question not only on remand at trial, but on a subsequent appeal of the same case.\u201d N.C.N.B. v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 566, 299 S.E. 2d 629, 631, reh\u2019g denied, 307 N.C. 703 (1983). Defendant\u2019s cross-assignments of error are without merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudge Orr concurs.\nJudge Phillips dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Phillips\ndissenting.\nI dissent from all three holdings by the majority. First, in my opinion the claim of the child Timothy Jason Hill for the wrongful loss of his mother\u2019s care, guidance, society and training is well founded, and is not barred by either precedent or the inaction of the General Assembly. As to the notion that a claim for injury wrongfully done should not be considered by our courts unless such a claim either was approved by the courts of England before our republic was founded or has since been expressly authorized by the General Assembly, my views coincide with those expressed by Justice Seawell for himself and Justice Ervin in dissenting from the majority decision in Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. 2d 432 (1949). In that case the majority decision disallowed the claim of two children against an interloper who alienated their mother\u2019s affections and broke up their home. In Justice Seawell\u2019s soundly reasoned dissent, he showed in bold relief the shaky, insecure foundation of the leave it to the legislature doctrine of civil jurisprudence, the main effect and purpose of which is to grant immunity from liability to those who wrongfully injure and ruin others in a manner not previously litigated in our courts unless the claim has been explicitly authorized by the legislature. In doing so Justice Seawell made these compelling and unanswerable points: When we inherited the common law or received it by legislative adoption, we received neither a cadaver beset by rigor mortis nor a little short list of recognized rights and wrongs that our courts are limited to considering; what we received and is its genius was a living body of law whose principles can and should be applied to all our people, under all circumstances\u2014a system whose guiding principle is that under the variant and changing circumstances of life each person has a duty not to wrongfully harm others and is fully accountable for the consequences when he nevertheless does so; the system functions best and best serves the public when the courts apply this principle to all and sundry that come before them and make the adjustments that changing circumstances and the just adjudication of claims require, rather than leave such adjustments to the legislature, which has neither the time, the capacity, nor the inclination to make them; this is no radical doctrine, but is inherent in the law, and by their rulings our courts have been daily expanding and shrinking the elastic fabric of the common law from the beginning. Thus, we have not only the right, but the duty, in my opinion, to consider this child\u2019s claim and I vote to do so. Considering the claim would neither create a new cause of action nor impose any new duty on the defendant; though not asserted heretofore apparently, the cause of action has been available all along since no one has ever had the right to wrongfully injure others.\nBut the claim is entitled to consideration for another reason\u2014for instead of being without legislative support this claim has both legislative and constitutional sanction. Every person, so Art. I, Sec. 18 of the Constitution of North Carolina says, \u201cfor an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.\u201d This provision was adopted with a common law system in place and unless the provision is an utterly dead letter, as some of our court decisions would indicate, it certainly means that our courts have the authority and duty to hold wrongdoers accountable for tortiously injuring others whether the subordinate legislature has expressed its approval or not if it has not disapproved the claim, as is the case here. But the fact is the General Assembly has recognized the claim, at least impliedly, by enacting G.S. 28A-18-2(b)(4)b and c, which makes compensable the loss that children suffer when wrongfully deprived of their parents by death; and even under the narrowest view of the judicial function it would be no usurpation to apply that legislative policy to children whose loss of parental consortium is due to the parent being wrongfully brain damaged, rather than killed. These pertinent enactments by the people of the state and the General Assembly should weigh more heavily with our courts than the mere failure of the General Assembly to expressly approve a claim, the justness of which is self-evident. Nor is the majority opinion in Henson v. Thomas any precedent against the enforcement of this child\u2019s claim; for as Justice Seawell correctly noted in his dissent that decision is bottomed completely on non sequiturs, the premise of which is that our law does not permit a child to recover from his mother for her wrongdoing\u2014a problem certainly not present in this case and for that matter not present in that one either, since the Henson children did not sue their mother, but a stranger named Thomas. There being abundant evidence that due to the neglect, and perhaps even the folly, of the defendant this child suffered one of the most grievous injuries that any child can suffer \u2014the loss of his mother\u2019s care, guidance, and love when most in need of it \u2014 the courts of this state have the clear duty, in my judgment, to consider his claim and not to deny him relief upon the spurious ground that we have no authority to do otherwise. We do have the authority \u2014and law, justice and sound policy require that it be exercised.\nSecond, in my opinion the battery claim of Judith I. Hill and Timothy W. Hill was erroneously dismissed, because whether Dr. Gilmore was authorized to do the operation that he did is not a question of law that judges can decide, but is a question of fact that a jury must resolve. An authorization for medical treatment, when the intention of the parties is disputed with good reason as in this case, derives its meaning, as do other disputed authorizations and contracts, not merely from the words used, but from the circumstances that caused the writing to be executed in the first place. The context in which Mrs. Hill signed the authorization permitting Dr. Gilmore to invade her body was not that her body had to be rendered sterile at all perils and costs as Dr. Gilmore\u2019s conduct would seem to indicate. The evidence plainly shows that she and her husband merely wanted to avoid another pregnancy by some convenient and safe means, and it is a matter of common knowledge that a number of such means were available to them, some of which required only minor surgery on the wife or husband, and others of which required no surgery at all, but merely the use of a birth control device, of which there are several kinds. It was in that setting that Dr. Gilmore obtained Mrs. Hill\u2019s consent to do the band-aid procedure described and when he allegedly discovered that that simple little operation could not be completed as planned because of adhesions that did not jeopardize her health or life, he had no reason for assuming that she had consented, or would consent if given the chance, to the removal of her fallopian tubes, ovaries and uterus. Common decency and sense, as well as professional duty, required him to recognize, it seems to me, that drastic major surgery at that time was not justified, whether she had technically consented to it or not; for he knew that notwithstanding the boiler plate language in the authorization form, that Mrs. Hill did not expect to awaken with her ovaries, fallopian tubes and uterus gone and that he had done nothing whatever to prepare her for such a traumatic eventuality, the necessity for which, when possible, is a matter of common knowledge. Under the circumstances, therefore, his plain duty in my opinion was to terminate the operation, discuss the remaining alternatives with her, and let her decide whether to give up her bodily organs or not. That instead of doing these things Dr. Gilmore proceeded to conduct an undiscussed, unauthorized, unprepared for major operation and to remove her reproductive organs is evidence aplenty in my opinion that a battery was committed. The sweeping authority that the Court gave to surgeons by Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E. 2d 754 (1956) is not available to the defendant in this case; for Kennedy by its terms applies only to instances where the patient is operated on for some health threatening cause and during the operation the surgeon discovers another threat to the patient\u2019s health and good surgical practice requires that the operation authorized be extended and it is not feasible to obtain the patient\u2019s consent. None of which conditions existed in this case; for the evidence, viewed as we must view it, indicates that nothing was wrong with Mrs. Hill, the operation authorized was elective, and it was not necessary to extend it. Furthermore, even if it had been advisable or necessary to extend the operation the evidence indicates it did not have to be done then and could have been done just as well the next day after Mrs. Hill had given her consent and been prepared for its consequences.\nThe Kennedy opinion is relevant to this appeal, though, for in it Justice Barnhill, contrary to the view he expressed in Henson v. Thomas that only the legislature can modify the common law, declared with no encouragement whatever from the General Assembly that the rule of law theretofore in effect which limited surgeons only to operations that their patients had consented to was outmoded and unsuitable to that modern day and surgeons could thereafter extend operations as the patient\u2019s health and good surgical practice required without being liable for exceeding their authority. If without legislative enactment our Courts have the power to extend or modify the law for the benefit of an alleged tort-feasor as was done in Kennedy, and has been done in many other cases as the reports show, it would seem to follow as a matter of course that they have the power to do the same thing upon behalf of wrongfully injured children.\nThird, the claims for punitive damages were erroneously dismissed, in my opinion, because the evidence before the court, when viewed in its most favorable light for the plaintiffs, is sufficient to support the claim that defendant was either grossly negligent or acted with a reckless and wanton disregard for the bodily integrity and health of Mrs. Hill.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Phillips" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth B. Oettinger, Grover C. McCain, Jr. and Boyce, Mitchell, Burns & Smith, by Robert E. Smith, for plaintiff appellants.", "Homthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, by L. P. Homthal, Jr. and Robert B. Hobbs, Jr., for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BARBARA S. IPOCK, Guardian Ad Litem for JUDITH I. HILL, and TIMOTHY W. HILL, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for TIMOTHY JASON HILL, A minor v. SAMUEL J. GILMORE\nNo. 868SC848\n(Filed 7 April 1987)\n1. Parent and Child 8 1\u2014 loss of parental consortium \u2014no action in N. C.\nA claim for loss of parental consortium is not recognized in N. C., and it is not a denial of equal protection or due process to allow a spouse but not a child to recover for the loss of consortium of an injured person or to allow the child of a deceased parent but not the child of a brain damaged parent to recover for such loss.\n2. Physicians, Surgeons and Allied Professions 8 11\u2014 surgery more extensive than anticipated \u2014 no battery\nThe trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment order dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims for battery based on defendant surgeon\u2019s expansion of a laparoscopy (band-aid surgery) into a total abdominal hysterectomy where the evidence showed that the surgery was expanded because of conditions discovered during the laparoscopy; a request for sterilization signed by the patient and plaintiff husband authorized defendant to perform a laparoscopy and \u201cto do any other procedure that his judgment may dictate during the above operation\u201d; the patient signed an operation consent form which authorized additional procedures \u201cif any conditions are revealed at the time of the operation that were not recognized before and which call for procedures in addition to those originally contemplated\u201d; and the expanded surgery was thus not unauthorized.\n3. Physicians, Surgeons and Allied Professions 8 21\u2014 malpractice \u2014 no punitive damages\nThe trial court in a medical malpractice action properly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 claims for punitive damages where there was no evidence of any aggravated facts which would support such claims.\nJudge Phillips dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from Llewellyn, Judge. Judgment entered 18 March 1986 in Superior Court, LENOIR County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 1987.\nOn 18 February 1981, Judith Hill was admitted to Lenoir Memorial Hospital for the purpose of undergoing a permanent sterilization procedure called laparoscopy. Laparoscopy, often referred to as \u201cband-aid surgery,\u201d is a minor operation where small incisions are made in the abdominal wall, a laparoscope is inserted in the incision, and the fallopian tubes are sealed by clips or an electric current. The patient generally is released from the hospital the same day.\nBoth Mrs. Hill and Mr. Hill signed a request for sterilization on 18 February 1981 which authorized Dr. Gilmore to perform the laparoscopy. Mrs. Hill also signed an operation consent form that same day.\nOn 19 February 1981, during the operation it was discovered that the patient\u2019s tubes and ovaries were completely bound down bilaterally by adhesions. Dr. Gilmore also discovered a cystic mass and chronic infection. Dr. Gilmore determined that it would be in the patient\u2019s best interest to perform a total abdominal hysterectomy. He left the operating room to consult with Mr. Hill. He then returned to the operating room and performed the hysterectomy.\nPost-operatively, Mrs. Hill was noted to be confused. She was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from hypoxic brain damage (brain damage caused by a deprivation of oxygen to the brain) which occurred either during or immediately following the surgery performed by Dr. Gilmore.\nOn 11 January 1982, Mrs. Hill, through her guardian ad litem, Barbara Ipock, Timothy W. Hill, her husband, and Timothy Jason Hill, her son, through his guardian ad litem, instituted this action against Dr. Gilmore and several others, including an anesthesiologist, a nurse anesthetist and Lenoir Memorial Hospital, Inc., to recover damages for the injuries to Mrs. Hill and her family\u2019s loss of consortium.\nDefendant Gilmore filed a motion for summary judgment on 5 April 1982. Plaintiffs filed a Rule 56(f) motion requesting an order allowing the late filing of the affidavit of their gynecological expert. The hearing was set for 1 November 1982.\nOn 17 November 1982, the trial court entered orders denying plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 56(f) motion and allowing Dr. Gilmore\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs excepted and the case proceeded against Lenoir Memorial Hospital, Inc. and the anesthesia defendants.\nPrior to trial, the remaining defendants obtained summary judgment on the issue of Timothy Jason Hill\u2019s loss of parental consortium. After the trial had begun, the anesthesiologist settled with the remaining plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Hill.\nAt trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Judith Hill for $600,000 and plaintiff Timothy W. Hill for $150,000 against Lenoir Memorial Hospital and the nurse anesthetist. In its judgment, the trial court reduced Mrs. Hill\u2019s award by $100,000, presumably to reflect the earlier settlement.\nPlaintiffs appealed the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant Gilmore\u2019s motion for summary judgment. In an opinion reported in 73 N.C. App. 182, 326 S.E. 2d 271, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 116, 332 S.E. 2d 481 (1985), this Court vacated the order granting Dr. Gilmore\u2019s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.\nOn remand, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to allege claims against Dr. Gilmore for battery and for punitive damages. The motion was allowed.\nIn response to the amended complaint, Dr. Gilmore filed a motion for partial summary judgment, alleging that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to (1) the claim of the minor plaintiff, Timothy Jason Hill, for loss of parental consortium and (2) the claims of Barbara Ipock, guardian ad litem for Judith Hill, and of Timothy W. Hill, individually, for battery and punitive damages.\nOn 18 March 1986, the trial court allowed defendant Gilmore\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed Timothy Jason Hill\u2019s claim for loss of parental consortium, and the claims for battery and punitive damages of Barbara Ipock, guardian ad litem for Judith Hill, and of Timothy W. Hill, individually. The order of partial summary judgment was later amended by the trial court to find that its ruling dismissing part of plaintiffs\u2019 claims affected a substantial right of plaintiffs and that there was no just cause for delay of an appeal from said rulings.\nOn appeal, defendant Gilmore cross-assigns as error the prior decision of the Court of Appeals in Ipock v. Gilmore, 73 N.C. App. 182, 326 S.E. 2d 271, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 116, 332 S.E. 2d 481 (1985). From the judgments of the trial court, plaintiffs appeal.\nKenneth B. Oettinger, Grover C. McCain, Jr. and Boyce, Mitchell, Burns & Smith, by Robert E. Smith, for plaintiff appellants.\nHomthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, by L. P. Homthal, Jr. and Robert B. Hobbs, Jr., for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0070-01", "first_page_order": 98, "last_page_order": 109 }