{ "id": 12169739, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN F. ADAMS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Adams", "decision_date": "1987-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 8626SC1019", "first_page": "200", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 N.C. App. 200" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763094 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777-778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574115 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564130 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717875 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326-327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548115 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708380 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560063 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 233", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178254 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570479 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561231 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569769 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" }, { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 S.E. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4684892 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558004 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4767552 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564082 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561507 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720397 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570986 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 S.E. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560773 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 L.Ed. 2d 1044", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 S.Ct. 1936", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 1020", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12095046, 12094727, 12094696, 12094666, 12094635, 12094927, 12094770, 12094866, 12094999, 12094651, 12094815 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/1020-11", "/us/384/1020-05", "/us/384/1020-04", "/us/384/1020-03", "/us/384/1020-01", "/us/384/1020-09", "/us/384/1020-06", "/us/384/1020-08", "/us/384/1020-10", "/us/384/1020-02", "/us/384/1020-07" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572632 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567167 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 U.S. 199", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167093 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/361/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 L.Ed. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 S.Ct. 372", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 960", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11803324, 11803268, 11803117, 11803598, 11803378, 11803827, 11803669, 11803157, 11803512, 11803196, 11803454 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0960-05", "/us/449/0960-04", "/us/449/0960-01", "/us/449/0960-09", "/us/449/0960-06", "/us/449/0960-11", "/us/449/0960-10", "/us/449/0960-02", "/us/449/0960-08", "/us/449/0960-03", "/us/449/0960-07" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E. 2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560989 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.Ct. 515", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6213196 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0157-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1025, "char_count": 24524, "ocr_confidence": 0.912, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4318031821609222e-07, "percentile": 0.6514229207957684 }, "sha256": "87420f9fcb202407a3131d79eb308a2a35ff85ab0eb39d916fb712a3fb610b92", "simhash": "1:c36bc20952ee58d4", "word_count": 4078 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:25.781259+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Martin and Cozort concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN F. ADAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nIn this appeal, defendant raises five assignments of error: (i) the court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress defendant\u2019s confession; (ii) the court\u2019s ruling that a knife found in the vicinity of the victim\u2019s body was admissible in evidence; (iii) the court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence; (iv) the court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter; and (v) the court\u2019s decision to give additional instructions after the jury had been deliberating for over two hours. We will address these assignments of error seriatim.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain in-culpatory statements defendant made to law enforcement officers. Defendant asserts that these statements were involuntarily made because he was mentally incompetent at the time and that these statements should, therefore, be suppressed pursuant to G.S. 15A-974(1). We disagree.\nAt the hearing before Judge Saunders on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements he made in June 1985, the evidence tended to show that on or about 11 June 1985, defendant went to the Mecklenburg County Jail and told Sheriffs Department employees that he had killed someone and wanted to confess. Charlotte Police Officer Shelton then came to the jail at the request of jail personnel to escort defendant to the Law Enforcement Center. At this time, Officer Shelton noted that although defendant was coherent, he seemed to have \u201cmental problems.\u201d As they walked to the Law Enforcement Center, defendant identified himself, gave his address as 1504 Luther Street, and stated that he had \u201ccut off Alonzo\u2019s head\u201d over on Luther Street. Once at the Law Enforcement Center, Officer Shelton checked the current homicide reports and then took defendant to 1504 Luther Street where he was identified by relatives. Officer Shelton gave the information he had gathered to homicide investigators. Later that same day, defendant was taken into police custody.\nAt the hearing, defendant presented evidence tending to show that he had an extensive history of mental illness. Defendant\u2019s expert witness testified that defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic who, in a psychotic condition, when delusional and hallucinating, \u201cwouldn\u2019t be able to make use of the fact the Miranda is for his own benefit.\u201d The expert also testified that defendant\u2019s mental illness prevented him from \u201cparticipating rationally in the legal process,\u201d and that in a psychiatric examination several days after defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements, defendant\u2019s \u201cbehavior and statements were determined more by his mental illness than by his normal self.\u201d\nAfter the close of the evidence on the motion to suppress, Judge Saunders ordered that statements made by defendant after he was in police custody be suppressed, but that the other \u201cnoncustodial admissions of criminal conduct\u201d made to jail personnel and to Officer Shelton were admissible. At trial, defendant again made a motion to suppress this evidence, and again this motion was denied.\nGeneral Statute 15A-974(1) states:\nUpon timely motion, evidence must be suppressed if:\n(1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina ....\nThe United States Supreme Court has recently held in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. ---, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed. 2d 473 (1986), a case factually similar to the case at bar, that there is no federal constitutional ground for the exclusion of a noncustodial confession. In Connelly, the defendant, a chronic schizophrenic who, when in a psychotic state, suffered from hallucinations which interfered with his ability to make free and rational choices, walked up to a Denver Police Officer and confessed to having committed a murder. The defendant sought to suppress his confession on the grounds that his mental state interfered with his free will at the time of the confession. The Supreme Court held that the admissibility of this kind of statement is governed by state rules of evidence rather than by Supreme Court decisions regarding coerced confessions and Miranda waivers. Id. The basis of this holding is that \u201ccoercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not \u2018voluntary\u2019 within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d Connelly, 479 U.S. at ---, 107 S.Ct. at 522, 93 L.Ed. 2d at 484.\nUpon examination of North Carolina decisions, we must conclude that there is no State basis for the exclusion of defendant\u2019s noncustodial, self-initiated inculpatory statements. In State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E. 2d 631, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 372, 66 L.Ed. 2d 227 (1980), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the State may offer in evidence testimony describing a defendant\u2019s self-initiated acts, statements, and questions without a preliminary inquiry into defendant\u2019s mental competence, so long as these acts, statements, and questions are relevant to an issue in the case. The defendant in Leonard was a diagnosed chronic schizophrenic who could not tell the difference between right and wrong because of her mental illness, and who heard and talked to numerous voices including those of God and Satan. While in police custody for the shooting of her sister, after having refused to waive her constitutional rights, defendant asked police, \u201cHow many times did I shoot her?\u201d and whether the State still had the death penalty.\nWe find the Leonard case controlling on the facts before us. Defendant relies on Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed. 2d 242 (1960), and State v. Ross, 297 N.C. 137, 254 S.E. 2d 10 (1979), to support his argument for suppression of the confession. However, these cases may be distinguished from the case before us because in Blackburn and in Ross the confessions of the defendants were in response to interrogation by police while the defendants were in police custody. In contrast, in the case before us, as in the Leonard case, supra, defendant\u2019s confession was initiated by defendant, and not a response to interrogation. Additionally, in the case before us, defendant was not even in custody when he made his inculpatory statements. These distinguishing factors make the argument for admissibility of defendant\u2019s statements much stronger than in Ross. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence State\u2019s Exhibit Number 10, a knife stained with human blood found in a park two hundred ninety-one feet from the victim\u2019s body. Defendant argues that there was no evidence that the knife had any relevant connection to the crime and that testimony regarding the knife was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We do not agree.\nAt trial, the State presented the testimony of a \u201cCrime Scene Search Technician\u201d employed with the Charlotte Police Department Crime Lab who testified that she located a \u201cbutcher-type knife stuck in the ground\u201d in a park two hundred ninety-one feet, four inches from where the body was found. The court received that knife into evidence over the objection of defendant. The parties stipulated that stains on the knife were found to be that of human blood, but that the blood could not be typed. No fingerprints could be raised on the knife. The State also presented testimony of the Medical Examiner who stated that his autopsy on the victim revealed that the victim died of stab wounds to the neck and back, and that those stab wounds could have been made by the State\u2019s Exhibit Number 10, the knife. Finally, the State presented the testimony of Officer Shelton that on 12 June 1985 defendant stated he \u201ccut off\u2019 Alonzo\u2019s head.\nIn a criminal case, any circumstance that is calculated to throw light upon the alleged crime is admissible. The weight of circumstantial evidence is for the jury. State v. Warren, 292 N.C. 235, 239, 232 S.E. 2d 419, 422 (1977); State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 286-287, 141 S.E. 2d 506, 513 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1020, 86 S.Ct. 1936, 16 L.Ed. 2d 1044 (1966). Any object having a relevant connection to the crime is admissible in evidence. A weapon may be admitted when there is evidence tending to show it was used in the commission of the crime. Warren, 292 N.C. at 239, 232 S.E. 2d at 422; State v. Sneeden, 274 N.C. 498, 502, 164 S.E. 2d 190, 193 (1968). While in the case before us there is no direct evidence linking the knife to the crime or the defendant to the knife, the knife was clearly a part of a chain of circumstances tending to show the commission of the crime. The distance between where the knife was found and the body of the victim affects only the probative weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. See State v. Thomas, 294 N.C. 105, 118, 240 S.E. 2d 426, 436 (1978). Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to admit the knife into evidence or to allow testimony concerning the knife.\nDefendant\u2019s third assignment of error is to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him at the close of the State\u2019s evidence. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show defendant committed an unlawful killing. This argument is without merit.\nIn State v. Bates, 313 N.C. 580, 581, 330 S.E. 2d 200, 201 (1985), our Supreme Court addressed the test for denial of a criminal defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss:\nA defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal for insufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case raises the question of whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and of the defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense. . . . In determining this issue the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and the state is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. ... If there is substantial evidence \u2014whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, a case for the jury is made and a motion to dismiss should be denied. . . . Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Citations omitted.)\nHowever, these principles of law are more easily stated than applied, and each case turns on its own peculiar facts; decisions in prior cases are rarely controlling because the evidence differs from case to case. State v. White, 293 N.C. 91, 95, 235 S.E. 2d 55, 58 (1977); State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 383, 156 S.E. 2d 679, 682 (1967).\nIn this case, the State presented, among other evidence, the testimony of an eyewitness to a fight on Luther Street between defendant and the victim in which defendant attacked the victim hours before the victim\u2019s body was found stabbed to death on Luther Street. The State produced a knife stained with human blood less than three hundred feet from where the victim\u2019s body was found, and the medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified that the victim had sustained numerous stab wounds to the neck and head. Defendant\u2019s cousin, who lived with defendant, and her friend both testified to statements made by defendant the day after the victim\u2019s death. Defendant\u2019s cousin testified that defendant said to her: \u201cBitch, you think I cut Alonzo, mother f-\u2014. I will cut your mother f-\u2014 throat.\u201d The friend of defendant\u2019s cousin testified that defendant said to his cousin, \u201cBitch, I cut Alonzo\u2019s throat. I will cut you, too.\u201d Finally, several days after the stabbing death of the victim, defendant appeared at the Meck-lenburg County Jail and told jail personnel that he wanted to confess to killing someone. Defendant thereafter told the police officer who was summoned to the jail that he had \u201ccut off Alonzo\u2019s head\u201d on Luther Street.\nViewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and giving the State every reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom, we find there is substantial evidence that defendant killed the victim Alonzo Morris unlawfully and with malice.\nIn his fourth assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in its refusal to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant contends that his mental illness and chronic alcoholism rendered him incapable of forming the mens rea necessary to support a conviction of second degree murder. We again disagree.\nIt is well settled that when there is evidence from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense, the defendant is entitled to jury instructions on the lesser offense. State v. Wallace, 309 N.C. 141, 145, 305 S.E. 2d 548, 551 (1983); State v. Redfern, 291 N.C. 319, 321, 230 S.E. 2d 152, 153 (1976). Murder in the second degree is \u201cthe unlawful killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 393, 317 S.E. 2d 394, 395 (1984). Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, premeditation, or deliberation. State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 777, 309 S.E. 2d 188, 191 (1983); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 55, 185 S.E. 2d 221, 224 (1971). Where there is no evidence of mitigating or justifying factors, a killing accomplished by the intentional use of a deadly weapon is deemed to be unlawful and malicious. State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 191, 297 S.E. 2d 532, 536 (1982); State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 650, 220 S.E. 2d 575, 584 (1975), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S.Ct. 2339, 53 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1977). As our Supreme Court has stated, \u201cIn order for an accused to reduce the crime of second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter he must rely on evidence presented by the State or assume a burden to go forward with or produce some evidence of all elements of heat of passion on sudden provocation.\u201d Robbins, 309 N.C. at 777-778, 309 S.E. 2d at 192. In the case before us, no such evidence of the elements of heat of passion on sudden provocation has been presented.\nDefendant, however, would have this Court create a new rule that mental illness and chronic alcoholism should be considered in determining whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the element of malice in a second degree murder charge. This we decline to do.\nOur Supreme Court has on numerous occasions rejected the contention that mental disease or incapacity should be considered on the issue of specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberation. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E. 2d 238 (1981); State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E. 2d 595 (1976). A mental disorder which is insufficient to establish legal insanity may not be used to negate premeditation and deliberation or specific intent. State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 213, 302 S.E. 2d 144, 154 (1983); Anderson, 303 N.C. at 200, 278 S.E. 2d at 247. Moreover, even voluntary drunkenness, which may be used to negate specific intent or premeditation and deliberation in a first degree murder case, is no defense to the general intent crime of second degree murder. State v. Couch, 35 N.C. App. 202, 207, 241 S.E. 2d 105, 108 (1978).\nTherefore, in a second degree murder case, evidence of a defendant\u2019s mental illness and alcoholism will not rebut the presumption of malice where the killing was accomplished by the intentional use of a deadly weapon. Consequently, the trial judge in the case before us did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.\nIn his fifth and final assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury pursuant to G.S. 15A-1235 was premature. We find this contention to be meritless.\nGeneral Statute 15A-1235(c), sometimes referred to as \u201cthe dynamite charge,\u201d provides, \u201cIf it appears to the judge that the jury has been unable to agree, the judge may require the jury to continue its deliberations and may give or repeat the instructions provided in subsections (a) and (b).\u201d Subsection (b) of 15A-1235 provides the following instructions:\n(1) Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;\n(2) Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;\n(3) In the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and\n(4) No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.\nIn the case at bar, the jury retired to begin its deliberations at 11:06 a.m. on 16 April 1986. The court recessed for lunch from 12:20 p.m. until 2:20 p.m., when the jury resumed its deliberations. At 2:40 p.m., the jury returned to the jury box requesting further instructions. The jury retired again at 2:45 p.m. At 3:30 p.m., when the court called the jury to the jury box in order to give jurors their afternoon break, the judge gave the jury the following additional charge:\nNumber one, that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment. Two, each juror must decide the case for himself or herself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his or her fellow jurors, and, three, that in the course of deliberations a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and change his or her opinion, if convinced it is erroneous, and, fourth, that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his or her fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Now, the Court wants to emphasize, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it is the jury\u2019s duty to do whatever it can to reach a verdict, if it can be done. You should reason and discuss the matter over together as reasonable men and women and reconcile any differences, if you can without the surrender of any conscientious convictions, but the Court would mention that no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his or her fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.\nDefendant contends that the giving of a \u201cdynamite charge\u201d when the jury has been deliberating less than two hours and where there is no indication that the jury is deadlocked is prejudicial error for which defendant should receive a new trial. However, whether or not to give an instruction pursuant to G.S. 15A-1235(c) is clearly within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 326-327, 338 S.E. 2d 75, 85 (1986). Defendant has failed to show any abuse of discretion.\nIn any case, the additional charge to the jury was not prejudicial to defendant. In State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E. 2d 800 (1980), our Supreme Court held that where the record provided no indication that the jury was deadlocked in its deliberations or in any other way open to pressure by the trial judge to force a verdict, even a charge that is in part impermissible under G.S. 15A-1235 is not prejudicial error requiring a new trial. In the case before us, the contents of the charge were entirely proper under G.S. 15A-1235. Moreover, the charge was given during a break in the deliberations, and no inquiry was made nor indication given as to the numerical division of the jury. After considering the circumstances under which the additional instructions were given and the probable impact of those instructions on the jury, as we are required to do under State v. Alston, 294 N.C. 577, 243 S.E. 2d 354 (1978), we hold that any error in the court\u2019s decision to instruct the jury pursuant to G.S. 1235(c) in the absence of any indication of deadlock was not prejudicial to defendant.\nAfter careful review of each assignment of error, we are satisfied that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Martin and Cozort concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg by Assistant Attorney General Doris J. Holton for the State.", "Wishart, Norris, Henninger and Pittman, P.A., by Charles L. Morgan, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN F. ADAMS\nNo. 8626SC1019\n(Filed 7 April 1987)\n1. Criminal Law 8 75.14\u2014 noncustodial statements \u2014admissibility without regard to mental competency\nDefendant\u2019s noncustodial, self-initiated inculpatory statements were admissible in defendant\u2019s murder trial without regard to defendant\u2019s mental competency at the time he made the statements.\n2. Homicide 8 15.1\u2014 admissibility of knife found in vicinity of body\nA knife stained with human blood found in a park 291 feet from a murder victim\u2019s body was properly admitted in defendant\u2019s murder trial, although there was no direct evidence linking the knife to the crime or to defendant, where an autopsy revealed the victim died of stab wounds to the neck and back; a medical examiner testified that those stab wounds could have been made by such knife; and an officer testified that defendant stated that he \u201ccut off\u2019 the victim\u2019s head.\n3. Homicide 8 21.7\u2014 second degree murder \u2014 sufficient evidence of unlawfulness and malice\nThere was sufficient evidence that defendant killed the victim unlawfully and with malice to support defendant\u2019s conviction of second degree murder where there was evidence tending to show that the victim died of stab wounds to the neck and back; an eyewitness saw a fight between defendant and the victim in which defendant attacked the victim some hours before the victim\u2019s body was found; a knife stained with human blood was found two hundred ninety-one feet from the victim\u2019s body; defendant made statements to two witnesses the day after the victim\u2019s death in which defendant indicated that he had cut the victim\u2019s throat; several days after the stabbing death of the victim, defendant appeared at a county jail and told jail personnel that he wanted to confess to killing someone; and defendant thereafter told a police officer that he had \u201ccut off\u2019 the victim\u2019s head.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 30.2\u2014 evidence of mental illness and alcoholism \u2014 instruction on voluntary manslaughter not required\nIn a second degree murder case, defendant\u2019s mental illness and alcoholism will not rebut the presumption of malice where the killing was accomplished by the intentional use of a deadly weapon; consequently, evidence of defendant\u2019s mental illness and alcoholism did not require the trial court to instruct on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.\n5. Criminal Law 8 122.2\u2014 jury not deadlocked \u2014 \u201cdynamite charge\u201d \u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury the \u201cdynamite charge\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1235(c) prior to an afternoon break when the jury had been deliberating less than two hours and there was no indication that the jury was deadlocked.\nAppeal by defendant from Friday, Judge. Judgment entered 16 April 1986 in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 1987.\nOn 9 June 1985, the Charlotte police found Alonzo Morris dead from stab wounds on Luther Street in the neighborhood known as the Cherry Community in Charlotte.\nSeveral days later, on or about 11 June 1985, police arrested defendant charging him with the murder of Alonzo Morris. On a motion questioning defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed to trial, defendant was sent to Dorothea Dix Hospital where a staff doctor adjudged him incapable of proceeding to trial and recommended his commitment to Broughton Hospital. At Broughton Hospital, defendant was found not to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment, and was returned to Dorothea Dix Hospital for further evaluation. On 8 August 1985, defendant was deemed capable of proceeding to trial.\nOn 14 October 1985, defendant was indicted by a grand jury for the murder of Alonzo Morris. At trial the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of second degree murder, and the court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for a term of fifteen years. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg by Assistant Attorney General Doris J. Holton for the State.\nWishart, Norris, Henninger and Pittman, P.A., by Charles L. Morgan, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0200-01", "first_page_order": 228, "last_page_order": 238 }