{ "id": 12129617, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY SPENCER EDGERTON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Edgerton", "decision_date": "1987-07-07", "docket_number": "No. 869SC979", "first_page": "329", "last_page": "336", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 N.C. App. 329" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "234 S.E. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571372 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569736 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570976 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563997 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559926 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559994 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559246 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E. 2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700785 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E. 2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562400 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 737", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047392 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558175 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567447 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0249-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 669, "char_count": 15535, "ocr_confidence": 0.909, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9752261658694544e-07, "percentile": 0.8506171595332392 }, "sha256": "e1fe1110d4998546119ba7ccaca526971b1a24a68f4873cc1dec9da8d0ffbbda", "simhash": "1:a2bfe36bdc6afc42", "word_count": 2573 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:51.245722+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Wells and Eagles concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY SPENCER EDGERTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nDefendant was indicted for discharging a firearm into occupied property, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and first degree murder (N.C.G.S. Secs. 14-34.1, 14-32(a) and 14-17 respectively). He appeals from a jury verdict of guilty of discharging a firearm into an occupied building, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to a total of 21 years imprisonment.\nDefendant\u2019s arrest and conviction arise from an altercation in a trailer park located in Franklin County. At trial, the State claimed and defendant admitted he fired a shotgun into the trailer of William Bumpers. Defendant\u2019s evidence tended to show he shot into the trailer only after someone in the trailer shot at him. State\u2019s evidence tended to show defendant fired the first shot. It also tended to show he stood next to the trailer, broke a window, intentionally thrust the barrel of the shotgun into the interior of the trailer and fired. Fred Alston, Jr., and William Bumpers were both hit with shot from one firing of defendant\u2019s shotgun. Alston was also hit a second time. Alston died from his injuries. Bumpers survived.\nThe issues before us are: 1) whether a defendant for whom the State seeks the death penalty has the right to be apprised of the aggravating circumstances upon which the State will rely at the sentencing hearing and 2) whether the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s confession.\nI\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his pretrial motion to compel the State to apprise him of the aggravating circumstances it would rely on in seeking the death penalty under N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-2000. Defendant argues the court\u2019s denial violated his constitutional right to due process.\nThe aggravating circumstances which may be considered during the sentencing phase in a capital case are limited to the eleven listed in N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-2000(e). In State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 257, 283 S.E. 2d 761, 768 (1981), the Supreme Court held that N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-2000(e) gave sufficient notice to meet the constitutional requirements of due process and a defendant is not entitled to notice of the evidence the State intends to offer in support of and to prove aggravating circumstances. Thus, under Taylor, the trial court in the case before us did not err by denying defendant\u2019s pre-trial motion.\nWhile at the time defendant made his pre-trial motion for ap-prisal he was charged with the capital offense of first degree murder, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is not a capital offense but rather is a Class F felony, N.C.G.S. Sec. 14-18, for which the maximum sentence is 20 years imprisonment, N.C.G.S. Sec. 14-1.1(a)(6), and the presumptive sentence is six years. N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-1340.4(f)(4).\nThe list of aggravating circumstances the court can consider in imposing a sentence for a Class F felony include, but are not limited to, those listed in N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-1340.4(a)(l). After defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, he did not move to be apprised of the aggravating circumstances upon which the State would rely to increase defendant\u2019s sentence beyond the presumptive sentence of six years. Therefore, the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to notice of aggravating circumstances which the State will attempt to prove under N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-1340.4(a) is not before this Court. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nII\nAt trial, defendant objected to the admission of a confession the State contended he made to Franklin County Chief Deputy Astor Bowden. The court conducted a voir dire to determine its admissibility:\nDeputy Tommy Perry testified that when he arrived on the scene at Bumpers\u2019 trailer, he was told defendant had shot into the trailer. He found defendant at his mother\u2019s trailer not far from Bumpers\u2019. Defendant had worked at the local jail in years past and knew Deputy Perry; he complied when Deputy Perry told him he wanted to talk with him and asked him to get into the patrol car. Once defendant had gotten into the car, Deputy Perry asked defendant if he had shot into the trailer. Defendant answered that he had. Deputy Perry then told him not to say anything else and that he needed to talk with Chief Deputy Bowden who was still at Bumpers\u2019 trailer. He did not question defendant further but drove him to Bumpers\u2019 trailer. During the ride, they both sat in the front seat of the patrol car. At no time did Deputy Perry read defendant the Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).\nOnce at Bumpers\u2019 trailer, Deputy Perry left defendant alone in the car and went into the trailer to get Chief Deputy Bowden. When Chief Deputy Bowden came to the patrol car, he sat in the back seat behind defendant and began to advise him of his rights by reading him the Miranda warnings. Deputy Perry remained with defendant during this time. His testimony and Chief Deputy Bowden\u2019s testimony was that even while the warnings were being read to him, defendant talked about the shooting in great detail. Chief Deputy Bowden testified that defendant told him Fred Alston, Jr., \u201cjumped\u201d him while he was passing by Bumpers\u2019 trailer. A fight ensued. After getting away from Alston, defendant went to his brother\u2019s trailer nearby and procured a shotgun and Alston also got a gun. Defendant returned to Bumpers\u2019 trailer and shouted at Alston to come out. When Alston did not appear, defendant broke a window, stuck the shotgun in and fired. Alston then opened the door and fired at him, upon which defendant fired through the window a second time. Then defendant\u2019s brother came up and took the gun from him.\nDefendant testified during voir dire that when Deputy Perry approached him at his mother\u2019s trailer, he told him to get into the car and sit down. Deputy Perry asked him questions and they discussed the shooting and what led up to it. Deputy Perry never gave him Miranda warnings, and after their discussion, they drove to the courthouse where defendant was held in the county jail. He was questioned by Chief Deputy Bowden for the first time one or two days after his arrest. At that time, he was read the Miranda warnings, but although he requested an attorney, Chief Deputy Bowden and other police officers continued to interrogate him and he responded.\nFollowing the voir dire, the court made the required written findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 153, 166 S.E. 2d 53, 62 (1969). It found the confession had been made to Chief Deputy Bowden at the scene of the shooting and concluded that it had been made freely, voluntarily and knowingly. The confession was admitted into evidence.\nDefendant puts forth two arguments as to why the confession to Chief Deputy Bowden should have been excluded from the evidence. He first argues it should have been excluded because the evidence did not support the court\u2019s finding that it was made at the scene but rather only supports a finding that it was made at the courthouse in violation of his right to counsel under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. His second argument is that even if the confession was made at the scene, it was nonetheless involuntary.\nA\nIn determining whether the court\u2019s findings regarding the admissibility of the confession are supported by the evidence, we are required to consider not only the evidence adduced at the voir dire hearing, but all the evidence in the record. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966); State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 529, 173 S.E. 2d 753, 761 (1970). The trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 573, 342 S.E. 2d 811, 820 (1986).\nDefendant raises no issue that the testimony from Deputy Perry and Chief Deputy Bowden concerning where the confession was made was incompetent, he only contends it was inaccurate. There was competent evidence to support the court\u2019s finding that the confession was made at the scene of the shooting. We find no merit in defendant\u2019s contention that the court should have found the confession was made in the county jail one or two days after his arrest.\nB\nDefendant next contends his confession to Chief Deputy Bowden should have been excluded because it was involuntary. He argues it was the product of a confession he made to Deputy Perry before Chief Deputy Bowden spoke to him in the patrol car and because his confession to Deputy Perry was involuntary, his confession to Chief Deputy Bowden was also involuntary and therefore inadmissible.\nThe appellate record reveals very little evidence concerning defendant\u2019s alleged confession to Deputy Perry. During direct examination, Deputy Perry testified he told Chief Deputy Bowden the defendant \u201chad admitted to me that he was the one that did the shooting at the Bumpers\u2019 trailer.\u201d There was no objection from defendant\u2019s counsel; however, the court interrupted the examination and called counsel to the bench. The bench discussion does not appear in the record, but immediately thereafter, the court struck Deputy Perry\u2019s statement from the record.\nAny extrajudicial statement of an accused which admits his guilt of an essential part of the offense charged is a confession. State v. Williford, 275 N.C. 575, 582, 169 S.E. 2d 851, 857 (1969).\nIt is well settled \u201cthat where a confession has been obtained under circumstances rendering it involuntary, a presumption arises which imputes the same prior influence to any subsequent confession, and this presumption must be overcome before the subsequent confession can be received in evidence.\u201d State v. Moore, 210 N.C. 686, 188 S.E. 421 [1936]. The burden is upon the State to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E. 2d 492 [1968] ....\nState v. Silver, 286 N.C. 709, 718, 213 S.E. 2d 247, 253 (1975).\nWhen evidence before the court tends to show a defendant made a confession prior to the confession to which he objects, the court is required to determine whether the defendant made a prior confession and whether it was voluntary. State v. Silver, 286 N.C. 709, 213 S.E. 2d 247 (1975). If the court finds there was a prior confession and it was not voluntary, then the court must determine whether the second confession was made under the \u201csame prior influence\u201d which made the first confession involuntary. State v. Edwards, 284 N.C. 76, 199 S.E. 2d 459 (1973); State v. Edwards, 282 N.C. 201, 192 S.E. 2d 304 (1972); State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E. 2d 492 (1968). The State must overcome the presumption of \u201csame prior influence\u201d by showing something akin to surrendering the signed written confession to the defendant or informing him that his prior confession will not be used against him. State v. Edwards, 284 N.C. at 79, 199 S.E. 2d at 461. When there is conflicting evidence on any of the issues, the trial court is required to make findings; although the better practice is to always make findings. State v. Biggs, 289 N.C. 522, 529-30, 223 S.E. 2d 371, 376 (1976).\nThe record shows defendant confessed to Deputy Perry. There was conflicting evidence of how extensive the confession was and under what circumstances it was made. The court excluded from the jury\u2019s consideration the only record evidence of its content, but the record does not provide us with the reason for the exclusion.\nIt was incumbent on the trial court during voir dire to hear evidence concerning the prior confession and its influence on the second confession, make findings of fact and determine if the prior confession was voluntary or involuntary and, if involuntary, whether the second confession was made under the same prior influence. Because the court failed to do this, it is impossible for us to determine whether defendant\u2019s confession to Chief Deputy Bowden was correctly admitted. Therefore, we must hold its admission error.\nWe do not express an opinion whether defendant\u2019s confession to Chief Deputy Bowden was voluntary or involuntary. However, defendant would not be entitled to a new trial on the ground that its admission was error, if we can determine here that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-1443(b).\nEven when there is other evidence sufficient to support a conviction, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of a defendant\u2019s confession is harmless error, State v. Blackmon, 280 N.C. 42, 50, 185 S.E. 2d 123, 128 (1971), unless some evidence, just as weighty, was properly admitted into evidence, such as another confession substantially similar to the confession erroneously admitted. State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543, 552, 234 S.E. 2d 733, 739 (1977). Defendant claimed he shot at Alston in self-defense. His confession to Chief Deputy Bowden tended to show he went looking for Alston and shot first. Since it was the only confession admitted into evidence at defendant\u2019s trial and defendant\u2019s testimony contradicted the confession, we cannot say the admission of the confession to Chief Deputy Bowden was harmless error. Therefore, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for new trial.\nIll\nDefendant raised other issues which are unlikely to arise at the new trial, and we decline to address them.\nNew trial on each charge.\nJudges Wells and Eagles concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General John R. Come, for the State.", "D. Bernard Alston for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY SPENCER EDGERTON\nNo. 869SC979\n(Filed 7 July 1987)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 135.8, 138.14\u2014 notice to defendant of aggravating circumstances \u2014 question not before court on appeal\nA defendant charged with first degree murder is not entitled to notice of the evidence the State intends to offer in support of and to prove aggravating circumstances. Whether a defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter is entitled to notice of aggravating circumstances which the State will attempt to prove was not before the court on appeal where defendant, after he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, did not move to be apprised of the aggravating circumstances upon which the State would rely.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 76.7\u2014 voluntariness of confession \u2014 sufficiency of findings\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that his confession to a law enforcement officer should have been excluded because the evidence did not support the court\u2019s finding that the confession was made at the scene but rather only supported a finding that it was made a couple of days later at the courthouse in violation of his Miranda rights.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 76.5\u2014 effect of prior confession on subsequent confession-necessity for hearing and findings\nThe trial court erred in failing to hear evidence and make findings concerning defendant\u2019s first confession and its influence on his second confession, the voluntariness of the first confession, and, if involuntary, whether the second confession was made under the same prior influence; furthermore, since the second confession was the only confession admitted into evidence, and defendant\u2019s testimony contradicted the confession, it could not be said that admission of the second confession without appropriate findings was harmless error. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b).\nAPPEAL by defendant from Hob good, Judge. Judgment entered 21 April 1986 in Superior Court, FRANKLIN County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 1987.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General John R. Come, for the State.\nD. Bernard Alston for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0329-01", "first_page_order": 357, "last_page_order": 364 }