{
  "id": 12136751,
  "name": "SAM WILLIS v. SARAH WILLIS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Willis v. Willis",
  "decision_date": "1987-08-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 8626DC1069",
  "first_page": "546",
  "last_page": "550",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 260",
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      "year": 1985,
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      "cite": "72 N.C. App. 372",
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      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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      "year": 1987,
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    {
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      "year": 1987,
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:51.245722+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WELLS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "SAM WILLIS v. SARAH WILLIS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nIn an opinion in the above-styled matter filed 19 May 1987, this Court addressed the two issues presented and \u201c[a]ffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded\u201d this case to the trial court. We affirmed on one issue, holding that the trial court\u2019s error, in not valuing all of the marital property as of the date of separation, was not prejudicial. We reversed on the other issue, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the Claremont Road property was marital property and in finding that it had actively appreciated in the amount of $9,990. We now conclude, based on the defendant-appellant\u2019s 24 June 1987 Petition to Rehear and a review of the Record on Appeal that the trial court\u2019s error, in not valuing all of the marital property as of the date of separation, was prejudicial and that the entire case should be reversed and remanded. The original opinion filed in this case, Willis v. Willis, 85 N.C. App. 708, 355 S.E. 2d 828 (1987), is hereby superseded by this opinion.\nI\nDefendant, Sarah Willis, appeals from an equitable distribution judgment entered pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 50-20 (1984). The trial judge concluded that the property should be divided equally. Plaintiff, Mr. Willis, was awarded property having a total value of $16,946.38, and Mrs. Willis received property valued at $18,331.38. Additionally, Mrs. Willis was ordered to pay Mr. Willis $1,385 to compensate for the difference between the values of their respective distributive awards. Mrs. Willis contends that the trial judge erred in his valuation and classification of some of the property. We agree and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nII\nPlaintiff, Sam Willis, filed his Complaint on 28 March 1985, seeking divorce from bed and board, alimony, pendente lite and permanent, and an equitable distribution of the marital property. Mrs. Willis filed an Answer and Counterclaim seeking the same relief for herself. The following facts are not in dispute.\nMr. and Mrs. Willis were married in August 1981. Before their marriage, in December 1979, Mr. Willis sold Mrs. Willis a house and lot on Claremont Road. During three years of marriage the Willises lived at the Claremont Road house, and Mr. Willis made all of the mortgage payments which amounted to $9,900.00.\nMrs. Willis raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Claremont Road property was marital and in finding that it had actively appreciated in the amount of $9,990; and (2) whether the trial court failed to evaluate all of the marital property as of the date of separation and there fore failed to equitably distribute the marital property. We address these in order.\nIll\nMrs. Willis first argues that the Claremont Road property is her separate property because she purchased it before the marriage and it has remained in her name only. Mrs. Willis\u2019s reliance on the inception of title to determine whether the property should have been classified as marital or separate is misguided. This Court recognized in Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 380, 325 S.E. 2d 260, 268-69 (1985) that \u201cacquisition is an ongoing process of making payment for property or contributing to the marital estate rather than being fixed on the date that legal title to property is obtained.\u201d The approach adopted by our courts is commonly known as the \u201csource of funds\u201d approach. See generally Sharp, \u201cThe Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina,\u201d 65 N.C.L. Rev. 195 (1987). Its objective is to ensure that \u201cboth the separate and marital estates receive a proportionate and fair return on its investment.\u201d Wade at 382, 325 S.E. 2d at 269. See also Lawrence v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. App. 592, 331 S.E. 2d 186 (1986). When acquisition is ongoing, the property may have a dual classification. In the instant case, the trial judge applied a dual classification to the Claremont Road property, finding that it had a separate property value of $8,410 and a marital property value of $9,900.\nAlthough the evidence supports the trial judge\u2019s dual classification of the property, in that the property was acquired in part by the separate estate and in part by the marital estate, we must still determine whether the trial judge erred in determining the proportions invested by the separate and marital estates. The sole factual finding regarding the Claremont Road property\u2019s increase in value during the marriage was that the property had a tax value of $23,410 at the time of the marriage and an estimated value of $40,000 at the time the couple separated. The property appreciated $16,990. The marital estate invested $9,900 into the home by way of mortgage payments during the marriage. The separate estate invested an amount not disclosed in the record. The equity is the net value of the property, i.e., its present value minus the outstanding mortgage. The trial judge must divide the equity based on the proportion invested by the marital and separate estates. However, the trial judge assigned a combined marital and separate property value of $18,310 when he distributed the property. The trial judge\u2019s characterization of $9,990 as active appreciation does nothing to clarify the award. Mortgage payments are acquisition, not appreciation. An active/passive distinction is of no utility when, as here, the property has a dual classification and each estate, marital and separate, is entitled to a proportionate return on its investment whether appreciation is active or passive. We fail to see any relationship between the values the trial judge assigned to the marital and separate interest in the Claremont Road property and the investment by each estate. The trial judge must determine what percentage of the total investment in the property was marital and what was separate, then award each estate a proportionate return on its investment.\nIV\nMrs. Willis next contends that the trial judge erred by failing to properly value all of the marital property as of the date of separation. She argues that the proceeds from a joint bank account, a Certificate of Deposit, and a jointly owned business known as \u201cSam\u2019s Cafe\u201d were not listed among the marital assets, and instead the trial judge listed a third of the proceeds from Mr. Willis\u2019s account with the United Carolina Bank (UCB account) as marital property, although that account did not come into existence until some time after the Willises separated. The problem faced by the trial judge was that between the date of separation and the date of the hearing, Mr. Willis closed the joint bank accounts, cashed in the Certificate of Deposit, and sold \u201cSam\u2019s Cafe.\u201d He placed all the proceeds in his own UCB account, commingling the funds with his separate property. The trial judge found that the UCB account was one-part marital and two-parts separate property. Thus he included one-third of the balance from the UCB account as marital property. Mrs. Willis contends that she was prejudiced by the trial judge\u2019s failure to assign a value to the property as it existed on the date of separation. We agree. By looking only to the funds in the UCB account at the time of the hearing, the trial judge failed to properly trace all of the marital property as it existed at the time of separation. By applying a two-to-one ratio to the funds as they existed in the UCB account, the trial judge failed to take into account that that account consisted of funds from three sources, two of which were part marital and part separate (proceeds from the sale of Sam\u2019s Cafe and the funds from the C&S account), and one of which was wholly marital (the proceeds from the Certificate of Deposit).\nThe trial judge is required to conduct a three-stage analysis in order to equitably distribute the marital assets. Little v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12, 327 S.E. 2d 283 (1985). He must first ascertain upon appropriate findings of fact, what is marital property; then determine the net market value of the marital property as of the date of separation; and finally, make an equitable distribution between the parties. Id. The marital property is to be distributed equally, unless the court determines equal is not equitable. We remand so that he may do so.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WELLS concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BECTON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Paul J. Williams for plaintiff appellee.",
      "R. Lee Myers for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SAM WILLIS v. SARAH WILLIS\nNo. 8626DC1069\n(Filed 4 August 1987)\n1. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 30\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 home purchased before marriage \u2014 separate and marital property\nWhere the wife purchased a home before the marriage and the husband made all the mortgage payments after the marriage, the trial court properly made a dual classification of the home as part separate and part marital, but the court erred when it failed to determine what percentages of the total investment in the home were marital and separate and then to award each estate a proportionate part of the equity in the home.\n2. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 30\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 marital property \u2014failure to value as of date of separation\nWhere, after the date of separation, defendant husband closed a joint bank account, cashed a joint certificate of deposit, sold a jointly owned cafe, and commingled the proceeds with his separate property in his own bank account, the trial court erred in failing to value such property for equitable distribution purposes as of the date of separation and in merely finding that one-third of the husband\u2019s new bank account was marital property since (1) by looking only to the funds in the husband\u2019s account at the time of the hearing, the court failed properly to trace all of the marital property as it existed on the date of separation and (2) by applying a two to one ratio to the funds as they existed in the husband\u2019s account, the court failed to consider that proceeds from the joint bank account and cafe sale were part marital and part separate and that proceeds from the certificate of deposit were wholly marital.\nAppeal by defendant from L. Stanley Brown, Judge. Judgment entered 22 May 1986 in District Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 1987. Defendant-appellant\u2019s Petition for Rehearing allowed 14 July 1987.\nPaul J. Williams for plaintiff appellee.\nR. Lee Myers for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0546-01",
  "first_page_order": 574,
  "last_page_order": 578
}