{ "id": 12136917, "name": "COLLEEN SHIELS STACK v. MECKLENBURG COUNTY, MECKLENBURG COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LUTHERAN FAMILY HOMES IN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and KEN GOLDEN", "name_abbreviation": "Stack v. Mecklenburg County", "decision_date": "1987-08-04", "docket_number": "No. 8626SC1216", "first_page": "550", "last_page": "555", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 N.C. App. 550" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "276 S.E. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521761 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E. 2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526416 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749409 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4681850 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524825 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624408 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 S.E. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597374 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "Billings, J., concurring" }, { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "Martin, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "300", "parenthetical": "quoting 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, section 65.14 (1984)" }, { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720378 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "507-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0500-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 11411, "ocr_confidence": 0.873, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.505928514573934e-07, "percentile": 0.8100074560331509 }, "sha256": "8d11158af433d8ff0a0185e419bcdf34b99f55397532304373643aaadefbb560", "simhash": "1:5e60474f5df49f70", "word_count": 1765 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:51.245722+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Hedrick and Judge Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "COLLEEN SHIELS STACK v. MECKLENBURG COUNTY, MECKLENBURG COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LUTHERAN FAMILY HOMES IN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and KEN GOLDEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nI\nPlaintiff first contends that the court erred in dismissing her claim for willful, wanton and reckless negligence. This contention presents the question of whether the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act represents an employee\u2019s exclusive means of recovery for personal injuries resulting from the willful, wanton and reckless negligence of an employer. Following the precedent of Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E. 2d 295 (1986), we hold that it is an employee\u2019s exclusive remedy.\nG.S. 97-10.1 states that:\nIf the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, theii the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.\nThe exclusive remedy portion of the statute limits an employee to recovery under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Accordingly, an employee must pursue those claims covered by the Act before the North Carolina Industrial Commission.\nBecause of the limited recovery afforded by the Act, our courts have recognized a few exceptions to its exclusive coverage. When an employer intentionally injures an employee, an independent civil action is available. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E. 2d 106 (1950). Likewise, an injured employee may maintain a tort action against a co-employee for intentional injury. Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E. 2d 350 (1960). This court, on the basis of a selection of remedies, denied an employee\u2019s right to sue outside the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to recover for willful, wanton and reckless negligence of a fellow employee. Freeman v. SCM Corporation, 66 N.C. App. 341, 311 S.E. 2d 75 (1984). The Supreme Court allowed discretionary review and in a per curiam decision made clear that an employee\u2019s purported selection of remedies was not the determinative factor in the decision that claimant\u2019s only avenue of recovery was the Industrial Commission. Freeman v. SCM Corporation, 311 N.C. 294, 316 S.E. 2d 81 (1984). Subsequently, in Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E. 2d 244 (1985), the exception for recovery against a co-employee was extended to conduct which is willful, wanton and reckless. Freeman precludes an employee who qualifies for workers\u2019 compensation from bringing a similar negligence action against an employer.\nMost recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Freeman in Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., supra. In a split decision, the Court rejected an independent action for the willful, wanton and reckless negligence of an employee and refused the separate action because of the Freeman precedent. Id. at 510, 340 S.E. 2d at 302. Two justices agreed that the civil action was not available but relied instead on an election of remedies theory. The plaintiffs \u201celection\u201d to receive benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act precluded an independent civil action. Id. at 516, 340 S.E. 2d at 309 (Billings, J., concurring). The three remaining justices dissented, disputing that plaintiff did not have an alternative remedy. Id. at 517, 340 S.E. 2d at 305 (Martin, J., dissenting).\nPlaintiff now contends that the Barrino decision permits an election for an employee injured by the willful, wanton and reckless negligence of an employer. Plaintiff argues that the injured worker can choose either the Act\u2019s compensation or a civil action. We hold that the Barrino decision, when read in context with Freeman requires a contrary conclusion.\nThe Freeman decision expressly negated any inference that an employer\u2019s willful negligence creates alternative remedies. Freeman, 311 N.C. at 296, 316 S.E. 2d at 82. Likewise, Barrino, in refusing to overrule Freeman, recognized that \u201c[t]he operative fact in establishing exclusiveness is that of actual coverage, not of election to claim compensation in a particular case.\u201d Barrino, 315 N.C. at 506, 340 S.E. 2d at 300 (quoting 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, section 65.14 (1984)). Accordingly, when an employee\u2019s injury is covered by the Act, the right to bring an independent negligence action against the employer is barred by the existence of the workers\u2019 compensation remedy.\nSince the Act\u2019s coverage extends to injuries resulting from an employer\u2019s willful, wanton and reckless negligence, there is no issue regarding an election of remedies in this case. This coverage relegates the plaintiff to the compensation designated by the Act.\nOur decision here is controlled by the Freeman and Barrino precedents. Plaintiffs employment at the time of the rape subjects her to the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Her rights and remedies against defendant employer were determined by the Act and she was required to pursue them before the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Freeman, supra. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed this claim.\nII\nPlaintiff also alleges claims based on intentional injury and intentional infliction of emotional distress. By doing so, plaintiff attempts to utilize the intentional conduct exception from the exclusive remedy rule pursuant to the decision in Essick v. City of Lexington, supra.\nThe trial court granted the defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The scope of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion involves a determination of whether the complaint\u2019s allegations contain sufficient material to comprise the elements of some claim recognizable in law. Hendrix v. Hendrix, 67 N.C. App. 354, 313 S.E. 2d 25 (1984).\nPlaintiff first claims intentional injury. By her employer\u2019s failure to disclose the history of sexual misconduct associated with the group home, plaintiff claims defendant-employer intentionally misrepresented the danger involved.\nPlaintiffs allegations asserting intentional injury do not differ from those used to support her wanton, willful and reckless claim. She cannot change a negligence claim simply by applying an \u201cintentional conduct\u201d label. Plaintiff fails to allege that Lutheran intended to harm her through its conduct. The failure to allege an actual intent to injure precludes the plaintiff from invoking the exemption for intentional conduct. See Barrino, 315 N.C. at 507-08, 340 S.E. 2d at 300. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed this claim.\nPlaintiff also alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E. 2d 116 (1986), this court recognized that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act does not bar a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. An essential element of this tort requires the plaintiff to prove the intent to cause emotional distress. Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E. 2d 325 (1981). Again, the absence of allegations that Lutheran intended to injure the plaintiff requires dismissal of this claim.\nFinally, plaintiff assigns as error the court\u2019s dismissal of her claim for punitive damages. Recovery of punitive damages depends on the successful maintenance of one of plaintiffs other claims. Since plaintiffs underlying causes of action were properly dismissed, this claim must also be dismissed.\nClaims against an employer for willful, wanton and reckless negligence fall under the coverage of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Accordingly, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction of plaintiffs claim and properly dismissed it. Similarly, plaintiffs claims involving intentional conduct were properly dismissed for their failure to state claims on which relief could be granted.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Hedrick and Judge Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark A. Michael for the plaintiff-appellant.", "Smith Helms Mullis & Moore, by H. Landis Wade, Jr. and Elizabeth M. Quattlebaum and Gerdes, Mason, Wilson & Tolbert, by Michael Wilson for the defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COLLEEN SHIELS STACK v. MECKLENBURG COUNTY, MECKLENBURG COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LUTHERAN FAMILY HOMES IN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and KEN GOLDEN\nNo. 8626SC1216\n(Filed 4 August 1987)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 87\u2014 claim for willful, wanton and reckless negligence by employer \u2014recovery limited to Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\nThe trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) of plaintiffs claim for willful, wanton and reckless negligence in an action arising from the rape of plaintiff by a \u201cWillie M\u201d child while plaintiff was supervising a group home operated by defendant Lutheran Family Services. When an employee\u2019s injury is covered by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, the right to bring an independent negligence action against the employer is barred by the existence of the Workers\u2019 Compensation remedy, and, since the Act\u2019s coverage extends to injuries resulting from the employer\u2019s willful, wanton and reckless negligence, there is no issue regarding an election of remedies in this case. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-10.1.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 87\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 exclusive remedy rule \u2014intentional conduct exception \u2014 intentional infliction of emotional distress \u2014claims properly dismissed\nThe trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) plaintiffs claims for intentional injury, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages arising from the rape of plaintiff in a group home which she was supervising as an employee of defendant where plaintiff failed to allege that defendant intended to harm her through its conduct.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Ferrell, Judge. Judgment entered 8 September 1986 in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 May 1987.\nThis is a civil action by an employee for personal injuries caused by the tortious conduct of her employer. From an order allowing defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff appeals.\nThe complaint alleges the following:\nIn January of 1984, the plaintiff accepted an internship with the defendant, Lutheran Family Services in North Carolina, Inc., which operates group homes for minors. Her primary responsibility involved weekend duty as a resident supervisor of the defendant\u2019s group homes.\nPlaintiffs internship ended in May of 1984 but she agreed to remain after this date because of a shortage of personnel. In July of 1984, plaintiff was raped while supervising one of defendant\u2019s group homes. Plaintiff alleged that the rapist, a resident of the group home, was a \u201cWillie M\u201d child, a designation which refers to youths who are unusually dangerous or difficult to treat. Plaintiff filed this action against her employer alleging willful, wanton and reckless negligence, intentional injury and intentional infliction of emotional distress and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages.\nThe trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim for willful, wanton and reckless negligence because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs remaining claims were dismissed because they failed to state claims on which relief could be granted. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff appeals.\nMark A. Michael for the plaintiff-appellant.\nSmith Helms Mullis & Moore, by H. Landis Wade, Jr. and Elizabeth M. Quattlebaum and Gerdes, Mason, Wilson & Tolbert, by Michael Wilson for the defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0550-01", "first_page_order": 578, "last_page_order": 583 }