{ "id": 8358100, "name": "WYMAN FRANKLIN ROACH, Employee/Plaintiff v. LUPOLI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO., Carrier/Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Roach v. Lupoli Construction Co.", "decision_date": "1987-12-22", "docket_number": "No. 8710IC234", "first_page": "271", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 N.C. App. 271" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2572390 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 S.E. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 379, "char_count": 7091, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0039364983666102e-07, "percentile": 0.5396710387362352 }, "sha256": "632dfb270f66609476b755a187437fc86494ca5db6fc0ac1665363c26424becd", "simhash": "1:14b1646831ae0985", "word_count": 1180 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:20:42.285314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Becton and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "WYMAN FRANKLIN ROACH, Employee/Plaintiff v. LUPOLI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO., Carrier/Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nIn late May and early June of 1984, Wyman Franklin Roach, plaintiff below, was holding down two jobs. For a portion of the day, Roach worked for Lupoli Construction Company, codefendant below, as a general carpenter and helper. At night, he was a dishwasher at the King\u2019s Inn in Highlands.\nOn 6 June 1984, at his construction job, Roach was required to carry boards varying in size, length, and weight. Later that night, while working at the King\u2019s Inn, Roach felt pain in his lower back. Roach alleged that he had injured himself while at his construction job and sought compensation from Lupoli Construction Company\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, codefendant below. Aetna denied coverage, and the issue of liability was heard by Deputy Commissioner Elizabeth G. McCrodden on 7 May 1985. Roach\u2019s claim was denied by the Deputy Commissioner, and her decision was affirmed by the Full Commission, with a dissent from Commissioner Clay, on 10 September 1985. Roach appealed to this Court, and on 20 May 1986, in an unpublished opinion, we remanded the case to the Commission with instruction that it find whether any of Roach\u2019s work with Lupoli on 6 June 1984 constituted \u201ca specific traumatic incident which was causally related to his alleged injury.\u201d Roach v. Lupoli Const. Co., 80 N.C. App. 724, 343 S.E. 2d 290 (1986).\nOn remand the Full Commission deleted its previous findings concerning Roach\u2019s injury and issued a second opinion on 8 December 1986. Factual findings of that recent opinion, relevant to this appeal, are as follows: (1) that at the time of the alleged injury, the parties were subject to and bound by the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act); (2) that Aetna Casualty and Surety Company was defendant Lupoli\u2019s compensation carrier; (3) that the \u201cinjury\u201d to Roach occurred on 6 June 1984, and he worked for the defendant Lupoli on that day; (4) that while working for Lupoli that day, the plaintiff carried various sizes and lengths of boards as part of his normal work routine; (5) that while on the construction job that day, he experienced no pain in his back, but that his back \u201cfelt very tired\u201d; (6) that while at his second job as a dishwasher at the King\u2019s Inn in Highlands, he felt \u201cpain\u201d in his back for the first time; and (7) that plaintiff Roach informed the physician he visited for treatment that he had hurt his back lifting 2x10 boards.\nBased on the above factual findings, the Commission made the legal conclusion that the plaintiff Roach \u201cdid not sustain a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned\u201d by the defendant Lupoli on 6 June 1984. For reasons stated below, this last conclusion of law is error, and the judgment of the Commission must be vacated and the cause remanded.\nIn its 8 December Order, the Commission correctly noted that before it could find coverage, it must be determined that Roach\u2019s injury was caused by a \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d that \u201coccurred at a recognizable time.\u201d Bradley v. E. B. Sportswear, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 450, 452, 335 S.E. 2d 52, 53 (1985). The Commission then concluded that since the \u201cplaintiff experienced no pain while performing the work assigned with [Lupoli Construction],\u201d recovery must be denied.\nIt is apparent that the Commission made its conclusion upon a theory that, unless the plaintiffs back pain was contemporaneous with carrying and lifting the 2x10 boards, plaintiff cannot recover. This conclusion is clearly in error, based on a misapprehension of the law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) states that a back injury is compensable when the injury in the course of employment \u201cis the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned.\u201d The onset of pain is not a \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d that will determine whether compensation will be allowed pursuant to the act; pain is, rather, as a general rule, the result of a \u201cspecific traumatic incident.\u201d\nThe Commission, as trier of fact, must determine whether Roach injured himself not \u201cgradually, but ... at a cognizable time.\u201d Bradley, 77 N.C. App. at 452, 335 S.E. 2d at 53. Roach offered evidence that he injured his back when lifting 2x10 boards and that he had not lifted that type of board before the day he got hurt. He testified that he had to lift these heavier boards \u201chigher up\u201d than other boards he had worked with. He stated that his back felt \u201cweak and tired like [he] had overexerted [him]self\u2019 at the same time he had lifted the 2x10s. Testimony that his back did not begin actually \u201churting\u201d until after the lifting was completed can be construed as evidence that his back was not injured by that lifting, but it certainly does not mandate such a finding. Based on the evidence, the Commission would be justified in determining that Roach injured himself while on the job with Lupoli on 6 June 1984. Just because Roach felt pain for the first time hours after the time he alleges he injured himself, does not mean that the \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d could not have occurred when he says it did. Logic dictates that injury and pain do not have to occur simultaneously for Roach to establish that he sustained a compensable injury on 6 June, especially when the controlling statute is silent on the issue. See Long v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Co., 321 N.C. 82, 361 S.E. 2d 575 (1987). It was error for the Commission to conclude otherwise.\nOn remand, the Commission must make findings based on the evidence and conclusions of law supported by the findings and consistent with legal precedent. We vacate the Commission\u2019s 8 December 1986 Order and remand the case to the Full Commission for their determination of whether Roach\u2019s lifting of 2x10 boards while on the job with Lupoli on 6 June 1984 was the \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d responsible for his injury.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges Becton and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Arnold & Magie by Roderic G. Magie for plaintiff appellant.", "Russell, King & Haigh by Sandra M. King for defendant ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WYMAN FRANKLIN ROACH, Employee/Plaintiff v. LUPOLI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO., Carrier/Defendant\nNo. 8710IC234\n(Filed 22 December 1987)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 65.2\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 back injury \u2014 later onset of pain \u2014 injury result of specific traumatic incident\nThe Industrial Commission erred in denying plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits for a back injury where the Commission based its conclusion upon the theory that, unless plaintiffs back pain was contemporaneous with carrying and lifting 2x10 boards on his construction job, he could not recover, since N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) requires that the injury must be the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned, but the onset of pain is, as a general rule, the result of a \u201cspecific traumatic incident,\u201d rather than the incident itself which determines whether compensation will be allowed pursuant to the Act.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 8 December 1986. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 August 1987.\nArnold & Magie by Roderic G. Magie for plaintiff appellant.\nRussell, King & Haigh by Sandra M. King for defendant ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0271-01", "first_page_order": 299, "last_page_order": 302 }