{ "id": 8358891, "name": "SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY v. HALLMARK ENTERPRISES, INC.; BAILEY'S TUNNEL ROAD CAFETERIA, INC.; and GURTHA HUGGINS v. McNEIL-PATTERSON AGENCY, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "South Carolina Insurance v. Hallmark Enterprises, Inc.", "decision_date": "1988-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 8728SC547", "first_page": "642", "last_page": "651", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 N.C. App. 642" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715967 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572773, 8572811, 8572750, 8572791, 8572734 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0728-03", "/nc/292/0728-05", "/nc/292/0728-02", "/nc/292/0728-04", "/nc/292/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550622 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" }, { "page": "774-75" }, { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573853 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "398-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.C. L. Rev. 167", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548060 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558358 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553361 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403258 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526622 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562978 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774741 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12167341 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0015-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 700, "char_count": 17940, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9643311001372153e-07, "percentile": 0.8498234839174021 }, "sha256": "569edacfce316debc8b2a6b64cb68f4f7c3e68f2573ecff95de6eeaf7105e8ca", "simhash": "1:94cd4063ac748e48", "word_count": 2934 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:20:42.285314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Johnson concur." ], "parties": [ "SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY v. HALLMARK ENTERPRISES, INC.; BAILEY\u2019S TUNNEL ROAD CAFETERIA, INC.; and GURTHA HUGGINS v. McNEIL-PATTERSON AGENCY, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nPlaintiff South Carolina Insurance Company (S.C. Ins. Co.) moved for a declaratory judgment to determine its liability for the judgment obtained by defendant Gurtha Huggins (Huggins), against S.C. Ins. Co.\u2019s policyholder, Bailey\u2019s Tunnel Road Cafeteria (Bailey\u2019s). In response to the declaratory judgment action, Huggins counterclaimed for the payment of a default judgment previously entered against Bailey\u2019s. S.C. Ins. Co. replied to Huggins\u2019 claim by cross-claiming against Bailey\u2019s\u2019 insurance agent, McNeil-Patterson Agency, Inc., for indemnity.\nThe trial court, sitting without a jury, entered judgment in S.C. Ins. Co.\u2019s favor, finding it was not liable for any judgments received by Huggins in her action against Bailey\u2019s.\nThe undisputed facts of this case are as follows:\nOn 15 April 1981 Huggins fell on Bailey\u2019s\u2019 premises and was injured. At the time of the accident, Bailey\u2019s\u2019 general manager prepared an accident report which his superior submitted to Bailey\u2019s\u2019 insurance agent, McNeil-Patterson Agency, Inc. The insurance agent did not forward notice of the accident to Bailey\u2019s\u2019 Insurer, S.C. Ins. Co.'\nOn 3 'February 1984 Huggins filed a negligence suit against Bailey\u2019s to recover damages for the injuries she suffered in her 15 April 1981 fall. Huggins served process for her action by sending the summons and complaint, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-15, to the office of the Secretary of State on 8 February 1984.\nThe Secretary of State\u2019s office forwarded the documents by certified mail to E. O. Hall at 4808 Montclair Avenue, Charlotte, North Carolina, the registered agent and address listed by Bailey\u2019s with the Secretary of State, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-13. Hall, however, had moved to Spartanburg, South Carolina in July 1973 and had failed to notify the Secretary of State, as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-14, of his change of address. Consequently, the summons and complaint were returned to the Secretary of State marked \u201creturn to sender, not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward.\u201d\nHuggins proceeded to trial in her action, and on 27 June 1984 she requested and received a default judgment for $121,126 against Bailey\u2019s.\nApproximately one year later on 9 July 1985 Huggins notified Bailey\u2019s of the judgment and demanded payment. Bailey\u2019s immediately called its insurance agent, McNeil-Patterson Agency, Inc., which then contacted Bailey\u2019s\u2019 insurer, S.C. Ins. Co.\nBailey\u2019s sought to overturn Huggins\u2019 default judgment. However, this Court in Huggins v. Hallmark Enterprises, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 15, 351 S.E. 2d 779 (1987), affirmed the judgment\u2019s enforceability on appeal.\nS.C. Ins. Co. denied insurance coverage to Bailey\u2019s for Huggins\u2019 judgment, contending Bailey\u2019s had failed to comply with the following notice requirements, contained in its insurance contract.\nD. Insured\u2019s Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Claim OR SUIT:\n1. In the event of an occurrence, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for the insured to the Company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable.\n2. If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the Company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative.\nBased upon the above facts the trial court concluded as a matter of law: (1) Huggins\u2019 service of process upon Bailey\u2019s was effective; (2) Bailey\u2019s failed to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 55-13 and 66-68 and because of this dereliction was estopped from complaining it did not receive Huggins\u2019 complaint and summons forwarded by the Secretary of State; (3) Bailey\u2019s failed to forward to S.C. Ins. Co. the summons and complaint as required by its insurance contract prior to entry of the default judgment; (4) as a result of Bailey\u2019s\u2019 failure, S.C. Ins. Co.\u2019s ability to defend against Huggins\u2019 action was materially prejudiced. The trial court then held S.C. Ins. Co. was not liable for any of Huggins\u2019 claims or judgments against Bailey\u2019s.\nI.\nOn appeal, Huggins listed three exceptions in her brief. However, she argued and cited authority in support of only one exception; therefore, she is presumed to have abandoned the two unsupported exceptions. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5); State v. West, 317 N.C. 219, 345 S.E. 2d 186 (1986).\nII.\nThe single issue before this Court on appeal is whether entry of the trial court\u2019s judgment was proper.\nWhen entry of a judgment is challenged and no exceptions to the evidence or the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are made, the questions presented for appellate review are (1) whether the facts found are sufficient to support the conclusions of law and the entry of the judgment, and (2) whether the judgment is proper in form. Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E. 2d 102 (1975); State v. Johnson, 64 N.C. App. 256, 307 S.E. 2d 188 (1983), remanded on other grounds, 310 N.C. 581, 313 S.E. 2d 580 (1984). A challenge to entry of the judgment does not bring up for review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings. Modica v. Rodgers, 27 N.C. App. 332, 219 S.E. 2d 260 (1975).\nDefendant Huggins argues entry of the judgment was error as a matter of law because Bailey\u2019s never received notice of Huggins\u2019 lawsuit before entry of the default judgment and, therefore, could not have complied with the contract notice provision by giving notice of the lawsuit to its insurer, S.C. Ins. Co., at an earlier time.\nNotice provisions in insurance contracts have long been recognized as valid in North Carolina. Davenport v. Indemnity Co.,\n283 N.C. 234, 195 S.E. 2d 529 (1973); Poultry Corp. v. Insurance Co., 34 N.C. App. 224, 237 S.E. 2d 564 (1977). \u201cThe purpose and intention of an insurance contract\u2019s notice provision is to enable the insurer to begin its investigation and to initiate other procedures as soon as possible after a claim arises, and to avoid any prejudice that might be caused by a delay in receiving notice.\u201d H. Ralston, Great American Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co.: Interpretation of Notice Provisions in Insurance Contracts, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 167 (1982); Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E. 2d 769 (1981).\nThe enforcement of notice provisions was specifically addressed by the Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E. 2d 769, where it adopted the modern rule of reasonable expectations. This promotes the social policy of compensating the injuries of the innocent public, fulfills the reasonable expectations of the insurer, and protects the insurer\u2019s ability to defend its own interests. It is embodied in the following three-part test which states:\nWhen faced with a claim that notice was not timely given, the trier of fact must first decide whether the notice was given as soon as practicable. If not, the trier of fact must decide whether the insured has shown that he acted in good faith, e.g., that he had no actual knowledge that a claim might be filed against him. If the good faith test is met the burden then shifts to the insurer to show that its ability to investigate and defend was materially prejudiced by the delay.\nInsurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. at 399, 279 S.E. 2d at 776.\nFirst, to determine if notice was given as soon as practicable, the trial court must examine the specific facts and circumstances of each case. Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E. 2d 769. A notice provision will not be \u201cgiven a greater scope than required to fulfill its purpose ... {of protecting] the ability of the insurer to defend by preserving its ability fully to investigate [and litigate] the accident .... If, under the circumstances of a particular case, the purpose behind the requirement has been met, the insurer will not be relieved of its obligations. If, on the other hand, the purpose of protecting the insurer\u2019s ability to defend has been frustrated, the insurer has no duty under the contract.\u201d Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E. 2d at 774-75.\nThree of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact address the circumstances surrounding Bailey\u2019s\u2019 receipt of notice of Huggins\u2019 lawsuit, and state:\n(1) When Hallmark purchased its 80% share of Bailey\u2019s in 1972, the name and address of the registered agent for both corporations were changed in the Secretary of State\u2019s office to E. 0. Hall, 4808 Montclair Avenue, Charlotte, North Carolina. Hall moved from Charlotte to Spartanburg, South Carolina in July, 1973. Thereafter, neither Hallmark nor Bailey\u2019s maintained a registered agent in North Carolina.\n(2) The original Summons in Case No. 84 CVS 0277 was issued on February 3, 1984 and was directed to the \u201cHonorable Thad Eure, Secretary of State of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina 27611, Civil Process Agent for Bailey\u2019s Tunnel Road Cafeteria, Inc., C/O E. 0. Hall, Registered Agent, 4808 Montclair Avenue, Charlotte, North Carolina.\u201d The Summons was served by the Sheriff of Wake County upon the Secretary of State\u2019s office on February 9, 1984. The Secretary\u2019s office did forward by certified mail a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Bailey\u2019s, in care of E. 0. Hall, 4808 Montclair Avenue, Charlotte, North Carolina. The Summons and Complaint were returned by the U.S. Postal Office to the Secretary of State marked \u201cReturn to Sender, Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward.\u201d\n(3) Hall first learned of both lawsuits more than a year later in July of 1985 from a telephone call from Huggins\u2019 attorney. Following that call he received from Huggins\u2019 attorney copies of the suit papers and forwarded these to the Third-Party Defendant, McNeil-Patterson Agency, Inc., an agent for Plaintiff. On July 11, 1985, McNeil-Patterson notified South Carolina Insurance of Huggins\u2019 claim by sending a loss notice.\nThese findings clearly show that Bailey\u2019s failed to receive notice of Huggins\u2019 lawsuit in February 1984, when the Secretary of State forwarded a copy of the summons and complaint to Hall at 4808 Montclair Avenue, Charlotte, North Carolina, because it failed to properly maintain an agent and address for service of process.\nThe listing of an agent for corporate service of process with the Secretary of State is not a voluntary action, subject to the discretion of the corporation. This listing is legislatively mandated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-13. Furthermore, this Court has held that service of process on the Secretary of State, when a corporation has complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-13, is reasonably calculated to give parties to an action actual notice and the opportunity to defend. Business Funds Corp. v. Development Corp., 32 N.C. App. 362, 232 S.E. 2d 215, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 728, 235 S.E. 2d 784 (1977).\nBased on the facts and law discussed above, we conclude that Bailey\u2019s may not rely on its violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-13 to justify its failure to receive notice in February 1984. Consequently, Bailey\u2019s did not give notice of the suit to S.C. Ins. Co. at the time it was reasonably expected to receive actual notice of the action, February 1984. Therefore, Bailey\u2019s failed to notify S.C. Ins. Co. as soon as practicable.\nIn addition we hold that the findings of fact discussed above support the trial court\u2019s Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3, which address this question and state:\n2. Bailey\u2019s failed to comply with the provisions of G.S. 55-13 and G.S. 66-68 and is estopped to complain that it did not receive the Complaint and Summons forwarded to it by the Secretary of State when its own dereliction resulted in those documents being returned undelivered.\n3. Bailey\u2019s failed to forward to Plaintiff copies of the Complaint and Summons as required by the policy prior to entry of judgment against it.\nSecondly, the trial court must determine whether Bailey\u2019s acted in good faith when it failed to give timely notice of Huggins\u2019 suit to S.C. Ins. Co.\nThe test \u201cof good faith involves a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the insured aware of his possible fault, and (2) Did the insured purposefully and knowingly fail to notify the insurer?\u201d Great American Ins. Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co., 315 N.C. 714, 720, 340 S.E. 2d 743, 747 (1986).\n\u201cThe good faith test is phrased in the conjunctive: both knowledge and the deliberate decision not to notify must be met for lack of good faith to be shown. If the insured can show that either does not apply, then the trial court must find that the insured acted in good faith.\u201d Id. (emphasis supplied).\nIn the present case, Finding of Fact No. 12 states, in pertinent part: \u201cHall [i.e. Bailey\u2019s] first learned of both lawsuits more than a year later in July 1985 from a telephone call from Huggins\u2019 attorney.\u201d\nThis finding shows that Bailey\u2019s did not know of the lawsuit and, therefore, could not have deliberately failed to notify S.C. Ins. Co. of the pending action prior to July 1985.\nAlthough Bailey\u2019s\u2019 failure to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-13 prevented it from notifying S.C. Ins. Co. as soon as practicable, under the standard articulated above, this failure does not constitute bad faith.\nFinally, the trial court must determine whether S.C. Ins. Co. was materially prejudiced by Bailey\u2019s\u2019 delay in giving notice.\nS.C. Ins. Co. bears the burden of proving it was materially prejudiced by Bailey\u2019s\u2019 delay. Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E. 2d 769. To meet this burden S.C. Ins. Co. must show that the changed circumstances caused by the delay \u201cmaterially impaired] its ability to investigate the claim or defend and, thus, to prepare a viable defense.\u201d Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. at 398-99, 279 S.E. 2d at 776.\nThe trial court made the following findings pertaining to this question:\n(1) On February 3, 1984, Huggins filed a second lawsuit against Bailey\u2019s in Case 84 CVS 0277 with nearly the same allegations she had asserted against Hallmark, but alleged that her April 15, 1981 fall occurred on Bailey\u2019s[\u2019] premises.\n(2) Huggins moved for entry of default on May 19, 1984, and the Clerk entered Bailey\u2019s[\u2019] default that same day. Judge C. Walter Allen heard the default and inquiry without a jury and entered a default judgment against Bailey\u2019s in the amount of $121,126.00 on June 27, 1984.\n(3) Hall first learned of both lawsuits more than a year later in July of 1985 from a telephone call from Huggins\u2019 attorney. Following that call he received from Huggins\u2019 attorney copies of the suit papers and forwarded these to the Third-Party Defendant, McNeil-Patterson Agency, Inc., an agent for Plaintiff. On July 11, 1985, McNeil-Patterson notified South Carolina Insurance of Huggins\u2019 claim by sending a loss notice.\nFrom these findings it is clear S.C. Ins. Co. did not receive notice of Huggins\u2019 action until more than a year after the default judgment was entered in Huggins\u2019 favor. As a result of Bailey\u2019s\u2019 delay, S.C. Ins. Co. was prevented from either investigating or litigating Huggins\u2019 action, and instead, was presented with a valid and enforceable default judgment. Accordingly we conclude that Bailey\u2019s\u2019 delay materially prejudiced S.C. Ins. Co.\u2019s ability to protect its interests.\nThese findings fully support the trial court\u2019s Conclusion of Law No. 4, which states:\n4. Plaintiff\u2019s ability to defend the action brought by Huggins against Bailey\u2019s was materially prejudiced by that failure [to notify],\nA review of the trial court\u2019s judgment discloses that the findings of fact support the conclusions of law drawn therefrom.\nFurther review shows that these findings and conclusions sufficiently address each of the three inquiries contained in the test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v. Construction Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E. 2d 769; thus, permitting this Court to find, based upon the evidence before it, that Bailey\u2019s\u2019 failure to comply with the notice provisions relieved S.C. Ins. Co. from liability under its insurance contract.\nFor the reasons discussed above, this Court concludes that the judgment was proper in form and that the facts found by the trial court were sufficient to support its conclusions of law and the entry of its judgment.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Johnson concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes and Davis, P.A., by Michelle Rippon and Allan R. Tarleton, attorneys for plaintiff-appel-lee.", "Reynolds & Stewart, by G. Crawford Rippy, III, attorney for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY v. HALLMARK ENTERPRISES, INC.; BAILEY\u2019S TUNNEL ROAD CAFETERIA, INC.; and GURTHA HUGGINS v. McNEIL-PATTERSON AGENCY, INC.\nNo. 8728SC547\n(Filed 16 February 1988)\nProcess 8 12; Insurance \u00a7 66\u2014 failure to maintain agent for corporate service of process \u2014 service of process effective \u2014 failure to give notice to insurer\nWhere a patron of defendant cafeteria slipped and fell, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant cafeteria\u2019s insurer, finding that plaintiff was not liable for any judgment received by the patron in her action against the cafeteria, since the patron\u2019s service of process upon defendant was effective; defendant failed to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 55-13 by failing to maintain an agent and address for corporate service of process and because of this failure was estopped from complaining it did not receive the patron's complaint and summons forwarded by the Secretary of State; defendant failed to forward to plaintiff insurer the summons and complaint as required by its insurance contract prior to entry of the default judgment; and as a result of defendant\u2019s failure, plaintiffs ability to defend against the patron\u2019s action was materially prejudiced.\nAppeal by defendant Gurtha Huggins from Lewis (Robert D.), Judge. Judgment entered 19 March 1987 in Superior Court,\nBuncombe County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 December 1987.\nVan Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes and Davis, P.A., by Michelle Rippon and Allan R. Tarleton, attorneys for plaintiff-appel-lee.\nReynolds & Stewart, by G. Crawford Rippy, III, attorney for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0642-01", "first_page_order": 670, "last_page_order": 679 }