{
  "id": 8521617,
  "name": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. American Mutual Liability Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1988-03-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 8718SC210",
  "first_page": "299",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "70 S.E. 2d 706",
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      "year": 1976,
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      "cite": "291 N.C. 180",
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      "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 751",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1970,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "755",
          "parenthetical": "applying Boney"
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        {
          "page": "756"
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        {
          "page": "756",
          "parenthetical": "where party's obligation could be determined by court of general jurisdiction, subrogation action arising from alleged payment of that obligation would accrue after first payment"
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    {
      "cite": "277 N.C. 216",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8563799
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      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1970,
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          "parenthetical": "applying Boney"
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          "page": "222"
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    {
      "cite": "197 S.E. 122",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1938,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "126"
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          "page": "126"
        }
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    {
      "cite": "213 N.C. 563",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8629380
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1938,
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          "page": "567"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:39:00.818604+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges PHILLIPS and Cozort concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nThis appeal arises from a civil action in which plaintiff sought to recover from defendant monies allegedly paid to an insured on defendant\u2019s behalf. The stipulated facts show plaintiff issued an automobile liability insurance policy covering a truck owned by James Clark. The policy excluded coverage for \u201cany obligation for which the insured . . . may be held liable under any worker\u2019s compensation law.\u201d Defendant meanwhile provided workers\u2019 compensation coverage to Clark. On 9 July 1981 (when both policies were in effect), an employee of Clark named Southard was injured as a passenger in the insured truck when the truck overturned while being driven by another employee. The employees were returning from Virginia where they had been doing work for which Clark furnished the truck for transportation to and from the job site. After Southard submitted his insurance claim to plaintiff, plaintiff took statements from the injured employee and his fellow-employees. Within less than a month of the injury, plaintiff began making payments to Southard. By 30 August 1982, plaintiff had paid either directly to Southard or for his benefit a total of $21,922.06 for lost wages and medical and rehabilitation expenses; however, in early September 1982, plaintiff determined that its liability policy in fact did not cover any of Southard\u2019s claims since they appeared to be covered by workers\u2019 compensation.\nSouthard had also filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim against defendant in November 1981. On 30 December 1981, defendant denied coverage. Three years later, the Industrial Commission concluded that Southard\u2019s injuries resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of Southard\u2019s employment with Clark. The Commission ordered defendant to pay Southard for his injuries but credited defendant with $14,208.60 which represented lost wages plaintiff previously paid to Southard.\nPlaintiff then sued defendant to recover all monies it had allegedly paid Southard on defendant\u2019s behalf. The parties stipulated among other things that, under applicable workers\u2019 compensation statutes, defendant would have had to pay Southard over $7,000 in medical and rehabilitation expenses had plaintiff not done so. The parties waived jury trial and the trial court awarded plaintiff $21,922.06. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant raises two issues: I) whether plaintiff was a mere \u201cvolunteer\u201d and thus not entitled to recover those monies allegedly paid Southard on defendant\u2019s behalf; and II) whether all or part of plaintiff\u2019s claim was in any event barred by the statute of limitations.\nI\nSubrogation is not generally decreed in favor of a \u201cvolunteer\u201d who, without any moral or other duty, pays the debt or discharges the obligation of another; thus, one making payment to another is ordinarily a volunteer without subrogation rights if he had no right or interest of his own to protect and acts without any obligation. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Subrogation Secs. 23-24 (1974). However, a party making payments in good faith \u201cunder a moral obligation, or in ignorance of the real state of facts, or under an erroneous impression of one\u2019s legal duty\u201d is not a mere volunteer. State ex rel Boney v. Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N.C. 563, 567, 197 S.E. 122, 126 (1938); see also Jamestown Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 277 N.C. 216, 221-22, 176 S.E. 2d 751, 755 (1970) (applying Boney).\nIn this case, all the evidence indicates plaintiffs payments to Southard were made in good faith under the erroneous impression that plaintiff\u2019s liability policy covered Southard\u2019s injuries arising from the truck accident. We note that defendant denied any coverage of Southard\u2019s losses for three and one-half years until its liability was finally determined by the Industrial Commission. Liberal application of the doctrine of subrogation is especially encouraged under such circumstances: the doctrine allows swift treatment of a claimant\u2019s injuries without unjustly enriching another carrier who in fact was liable for payment.\nUnder these circumstances, plaintiff was certainly not an in-termeddling volunteer. Accordingly, as plaintiff has paid what has now been either adjudicated or stipulated to be defendant\u2019s obligation, plaintiff is entitled to recover those monies by equitable subrogation, which is \u201cthe mode which equity adopts to compel ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good conscience ought to pay.\u201d Boney, 213 N.C. at 568, 197 S.E. at 126.\nII\nDefendant contends in the alternative that, even if plaintiff had a subrogation claim against defendant, the claim is entirely or partially barred by the relevant statute of limitations. However, our statutes of limitations do not generally begin to run against a civil claim until the claim first accrues. N.C.G.S. Sec. 145(a) (1983). Assuming no legal disability exists, a claim does not accrue until the injured party is at liberty to sue or is entitled to institute an action. Jamestown, 277 N.C. at 222, 176 S.E. 2d at 756; Raftery v. Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co., 291 N.C. 180, 183, 230 S.E. 2d 405, 408 (1976).\nAn essential element of plaintiff\u2019s claim against defendant is defendant\u2019s liability for Southard\u2019s injuries. That issue, which could only be decided by the Industrial Commission, was not finally determined until 31 January 1985, the date of the Full Commission\u2019s final opinion. See Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 604, 70 S.E. 2d 706, 708 (1952) (stating Commission\u2019s exclusive jurisdiction). While the Industrial Commission had exclusive jurisdiction of Southard\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, it noted it had no jurisdiction to determine whether any payments by plaintiff would have been deemed those of a mere volunteer. Cf. Jamestown, 277 N.C. at 222, 176 S.E. 2d at 756 (where party\u2019s obligation could be determined by court of general jurisdiction, subrogation action arising from alleged payment of that obligation would accrue after first payment). As plaintiff was not here entitled to institute its subrogation action against defendant until the Commission\u2019s final determination on 31 January 1985, its subrogation action against defendant accrued on that date. As plaintiff\u2019s complaint was filed on 10 May 1985, it was therefore filed within any relevant statute of limitations.\nIll\nAccordingly, the trial court committed no error in determining that plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant the sum of $21,922.06.\nAffirmed.\nJudges PHILLIPS and Cozort concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GREENE, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Tuggle Duggins Meschan & Elrod, P.A., by J. Reed Johnston, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, by J. Donald Cowan Jr., for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY\nNo. 8718SC210\n(Filed 15 March 1988)\n1. Subrogation \u00a7 2\u2014 plaintiffs payments made in good faith that plaintiff was liable-plaintiff not a volunteer \u2014 plaintiff entitled to subrogation\nPlaintiffs payments to an injured employee were made in good faith under the erroneous impression that plaintiffs liability policy covered the employee\u2019s injuries arising from a truck accident; therefore, plaintiff was not a volunteer and was entitled to recover by equitable subrogation those monies it had paid to the employee which defendant, as the workers\u2019 compensation provider, was ultimately determined to be liable for by the Industrial Commission.\n2. Subrogation \u00a7 1\u2014 accrual of right of action for subrogation \u2014 action timely\nPlaintiff was not entitled to institute its subrogation action against defendant until the Industrial Commission\u2019s final determination of liability on 31 January 1985, and plaintiffs complaint filed on 10 May 1985 was therefore filed within the period of the applicable statute of limitations.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Cornelius (C. Preston), Judge. Judgment entered 28 October 1986 in Superior Court, GUILFORD County. Heard in Court of Appeals 25 September 1987.\nTuggle Duggins Meschan & Elrod, P.A., by J. Reed Johnston, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.\nSmith Helms Mulliss & Moore, by J. Donald Cowan Jr., for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0299-01",
  "first_page_order": 327,
  "last_page_order": 330
}
