{ "id": 8550122, "name": "CARL R. GRAY v. JESSE B. CLARK and wife, JEANNE W. CLARK", "name_abbreviation": "Gray v. Clark", "decision_date": "1970-08-26", "docket_number": "No. 7026SC415", "first_page": "319", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "9 N.C. App. 319" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 S.E. 2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614735 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600989 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564179 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605142 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559268 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 484, "char_count": 8512, "ocr_confidence": 0.524, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1386179980419764e-07, "percentile": 0.8618865424200407 }, "sha256": "5742f3ef7de19b0ba352abc708d09117f7e7b0bc7f4e2946dfc31cd99baf40d3", "simhash": "1:34fc7cb16bfd6d9b", "word_count": 1430 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:50:15.842675+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Mallard, C.J., and Parker, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "CARL R. GRAY v. JESSE B. CLARK and wife, JEANNE W. CLARK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Hedrick, J.\nThe sole question presented on this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence of the defendants\u2019 negligence to require the submission of the case to the jury over the defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict.\nIn Sink v. Moore and Hall v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 148 S.E. 2d 265 (1966), our Supreme Court held that evidence that a small dog frequently dashed into the street to bark at and pursue motorcycles, automobiles, and other noisy vehicles was not sufficient to justify classifying him as a \u201cvicious\u201d animal and did not make him \u201ca menace to the public health,\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 106-381. The Court pointed out, however, that the accident there involved occurred outside the corporate limits and that no municipal ordinance requiring dogs to be kept under restraint was involved.\nSection 3-22 of the Code of the City of Charlotte, introduced into evidence by the plaintiff, provides:\n\u201cActs Deemed Public Nuisance\nIt shall be unlawful for any dog owner to keep or have within the City a dog which habitually or repeatedly chases, snaps at, attacks or barks at pedestrians, bicycles or vehicles or turns over garbage pails or damages gardens, flowers or vegetables, or conducts itself so as to be a public nuisance or permits a female dog to run at large during the erotic stage of copulation.\u201d\nIn State v. Harrell, 203 N.C. 210, 165 S.E. 551 (1932), we find the following:\n\u201cIn Vol. 3 (2d ed.), sec. 1004, McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, is found, the law in regard to the Regulation of Dogs, as follows: \u2018To safeguard and promote the public health, safety and convenience municipal power to regulate the keeping and licensing of dogs within the corporate area is generally recognized. Accordingly ordinances regulating dogs and requiring them to be registered and licensed, and at times muzzled and prevented from going at large, are within the police powers usually conferred upon the local corporation. Such ordinances are authorized by virtue of general powers and the usual general welfare clause. . . .\u2019 \u201d\nFrom the foregoing, it appears that the City of Charlotte had the authority to pass an ordinance regulating the keeping and licensing of dogs and that Section 3-22 of the Code of the City of Charlotte is within the police power of the municipality.\nIn Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E. 2d 711 (1967), Bobbitt, J., now C.J., speaking for the Court, said:\n\u201cThe violation of a municipal ordinance imposing a public duty and designed for the protection of life and limb is negligence per se. However, to impose liability therefor it must be established that such violation proximately caused the alleged injury. . .\nSee also Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E. 2d 273 (1954); Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E. 2d 333 (1955); 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, sec. 158.\nThe plaintiff testified: \"... as I came up to approximately the front or just before I got to the front of Mrs. Clark\u2019s house (I know where Mr. and Mrs. Clarks\u2019 house is now) a dog ran at my right leg and tried to bite at it. It barked at it. I jerked my right leg up and he darted off to the right, then darted right back in front and hit the front wheel. When he hit the front wheel that knocked the front wheel over to the left and threw the bike over on my right leg and threw me into the street, approximately the middle of the street.\u201d\nJimmie K. Price, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that on two occasions prior to the date of the plaintiff\u2019s accident, while riding by the defendants\u2019 home on his motorcycle, he was chased by the same dog.\nEdward Thompson testified for the plaintiff that he had gone down Galway Drive on his motorcycle prior to the collision involved in this case, and that he had been chased several times by a dog which he described as being similar to Bubba, the defendants\u2019 dog.\nThe defendant, Jesse B. Clark, by adverse examination, stated that he was the owner of a black and white or brown and white bird dog at the time of the accident.\nMrs. Clark, on direct examination, testified that their dog, Bubba, was involved in the collision and that she told the plaintiff, after he got out of the hospital, that they had to have the dog put to sleep.\nWe hold that the evidence, when considered in its light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to raise an inference that the defendants violated Section 3-22 of the Code of the City of Charlotte by keeping within the corporate limits of the municipality a dog which habitually or repeatedly chased, snapped at, attacked or barked at pedestrians, bicycles or vehicles, and that such violation was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision between the defendants\u2019 dog, Bubba, and the motorcycle being ridden and operated by the plaintiff. For the reasons stated, the judgment allowing the defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict is reversed.\nReversed.\nMallard, C.J., and Parker, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Hedrick, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Don Davis for the plaintiff appellant.", "Carpenter, Golding, Crews and MeeJcins, by John G. Golding, for the defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARL R. GRAY v. JESSE B. CLARK and wife, JEANNE W. CLARK\nNo. 7026SC415\n(Filed 26 August 1970)\n1. Animals \u00a7 2; Municipal Corporations \u00a7 37 \u2014 ordinance making it unlawful to keep dog which habitually chases persons and vehicles \u2014 validity\nOrdinance of the City of Charlotte making it unlawful to keep within the city a dog which habitually or repeatedly chases, snaps at, attacks or barks at pedestrians, bicycles or vehicles was a valid exercise of the city\u2019s police power.\n2. Animals \u00a7 2 \u2014 collision between, dog and motorcycle \u2014 violation of municipal ordinance in keeping dog which chases vehicle \u2014 negligence \u2014 proximate cause\nIn this action for personal injuries resulting from a collision between a dog owned by defendants and a motorcycle operated by plaintiff, plaintiff\u2019s evidence presented jury questions as to whether defendants violated a municipal ordinance making it unlawful to keep within the municipality any dog which habitually or repeatedly chases, snaps at, attacks or barks at pedestrians, bicycles or vehicles, which would be negligence per se, and whether such violation was a proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nAppeal from Jackson, J., 9 March 1970 Schedule \u201cA\u201d Civil Jury Session, Mecklenburg Superior Court.\nThis action was instituted by the plaintiff, Carl It. Gray, to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a collision between a dog owned by the defendants, Jesse B. Clark and wife, Jeanne W. Clark, and a motorcycle being driven by Gray.\nThe plaintiff alleged and offered evidence tending to show that about six o\u2019clock p.m. on 9 September 1966, while riding his neighbor\u2019s motorcycle on Galway Drive near the defendants\u2019 home within the corporate limits of the City of Charlotte, the defendants\u2019 dog ran into and upset the motorcycle causing severe personal injuries to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendants were negligent in that they violated Section 3-22 of the Code of the City of Charlotte which required certain dogs to be kept under restraint, and that such violation on the part of the defendants was the proximate cause of the collision between the motorcycle being operated by the plaintiff and the defendants\u2019 dog, and the resulting injuries to plaintiff.\nThe defendants answered denying negligence and alleged contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, and alleged that Section 3-22 of the Code of the City of Charlotte was \u201c. . . unconstitutional and beyond the power granted by the Legislature of North Carolina to the City of Charlotte, vague, and not an ordinance creating a standard of care such as would impose civil liability on these defendants as to the plaintiff.\u201d\nAt the close of all the evidence the defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict was allowed and the court entered judgment, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cIt is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the motion of the defendants for a directed verdict be allowed, the court holding as a matter of law that the plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants proximately causing his injuries, that the plaintiff have and recover nothing of the defendants in this action and that the same be dismissed, and that the costs of this action be taxed against the plaintiff.\u201d\nFrom the entry of the judgment, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.\nDon Davis for the plaintiff appellant.\nCarpenter, Golding, Crews and MeeJcins, by John G. Golding, for the defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0319-01", "first_page_order": 343, "last_page_order": 347 }