{ "id": 8550803, "name": "PEGGY L. REDDING v. F. W. WOOLWORTH COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Redding v. F. W. Woolworth Co.", "decision_date": "1970-09-16", "docket_number": "No. 7021SC398", "first_page": "406", "last_page": "410", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "9 N.C. App. 406" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "138 S.E. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570996 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 S.E. 2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560126 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559394 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621351 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550536 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 472, "char_count": 8611, "ocr_confidence": 0.533, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.711010244011708e-08, "percentile": 0.5300758847330481 }, "sha256": "ca27c4e4b259192fd241c52dadea5625bc5c06d3cea0760ccd1f826ff1926ff0", "simhash": "1:d43bc73f8f957554", "word_count": 1463 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:50:15.842675+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Morris and Graham, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "PEGGY L. REDDING v. F. W. WOOLWORTH COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Brock, J.\nThe sole question presented is whether plaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury. Defendant appellee contends that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of actionable negligence in that she failed to show (1) any duty or standard of care or any specific acts upon which the jury could predicate a finding of negligence, or plaintiff\u2019s status in relation to the store; (2) failed to show that any action of Mr. Arnold was the cause of her injury, and (3) assuming Mr. Arnold\u2019s conduct to have caused her injury, failed to show that it was reasonably foreseeable, i.e., that his conduct proximately caused her injuries.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s status in relation to the store was shown. She was a business invitee. The duty owed her by defendant was to keep in reasonably safe condition the areas of the store where customers are expected to go so as not unnecessarily to expose customers to danger, and to warn of unsafe conditions of which the defendant was charged with knowledge. Gaskill v. A. and P. Tea Co., 6 N.C. App. 690, 171 S.E. 2d 95. Duty and standard of care are matters of law to be explained by the Court to the jury; they are not matters which plaintiff is required to prove. Given the relationship between the parties, the duty and the standard of care are implied by law.\nOur Supreme Court has said that negligence is not a fact in itself, but rather, is the legal result of certain facts. Skipper v. Cheatham, 249 N.C. 706, 107 S.E. 2d 625 (1959). Negligence is a conclusion of law; plaintiff need not directly prove negligence, but must prove facts from which the jury would be warranted in inferring it.\nIt is neither alleged nor proved that Arnold\u2019s actual manner of assembling the planter was negligent. Nor does the evidence disclose the size of the planter, the complexity of its construction, the tension to which its part were subject during assembly, whether it was customary to assemble merchandise in the public part of the store, or any other circumstances indicating that it was negligent to assemble this particular planter at the particular time and place in question. Thus, the question reduces itself to whether the jury could properly infer negligence from the bare fact that Arnold assembled a planter in an area of the store frequented by customers.\nThis aspect of the case is within the rule that facts which are relied upon to raise an inference of negligence must establish the probability thereof, and not a mere conjecture or surmise. Ashe v. Acme Builders, Inc., 267 N.C. 384, 148 S.E. 2d 244 (1966). However, the jury would be justified in inferring negligence if it found that Arnold continued to assemble the planter with knowledge that the part had once flown off and struck the plaintiff.\nDefendant also contends that the evidence fails to connect the object which struck plaintiff with Mr. Arnold. However, plaintiff testified that the object appeared to be a part of the planter. From this the jury could infer that a part flew loose a second time from the planter which Arnold was assembling, without plaintiff or anyone else having observed its actual flight.\nDefendant further contends that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Redding were not foreseeable.\n\u201cForeseeability is an essential element of proximate cause. This does not mean that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form in which it occurred, but that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.\u201d Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 68, 149 S.E. 2d 590, 594 (1966).\n\u201cThe general rule is that if the defendant\u2019s act would not have resulted in any injury to an ordinary person, he is not liable for its harmful consequences to one of peculiar susceptibility, except insofar as he was on notice of the existence of such susceptibility, but if his misconduct amounted to a breach of duty to a person of ordinary susceptibility, he is liable for all damages suffered by plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that these damages were unusually extensive because of peculiar susceptibility.\u201d Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E. 2d 541 (1964).\n\u201cA tort-feasor is liable to the injured party for all of the consequences which are the natural and direct result of his conduct although he was not able to have anticipated the peculiar consequences that did ensue.\u201d Lockwood v. McCaskill, supra.\nThe part, or a part, having once flown loose from the planter, it was clearly foreseeable by defendant that it might do so again; and clearly it was foreseeable by defendant that some injury to an ordinary person was probable from a flying object, and particularly one which had a nail or a screw extending from it.\nReversed.\nMorris and Graham, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Brock, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson, Morrow & Boyles, by John F. Morrow for plaintiff.", "Deal, Hutchins & Minor by Fred S. Hutchins, Jr., for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PEGGY L. REDDING v. F. W. WOOLWORTH COMPANY\nNo. 7021SC398\n(Filed 16 September 1970)\n1. Negligence \u00a7\u00a7 5.1, 57\u2014 injury to invitee \u2014 liability of proprietor \u2014 sufficiency of evidence of negligence\nPlaintiff invitee who was injured in defendant\u2019s store when she was forced to jerk her head violently to one side in order to escape an object that flew past her ear, is held to have made out a prima facie case of defendant\u2019s actionable negligence, where plaintiff\u2019s evidence was to the effect that (1) she entered the store with her child in order to buy a toy, (2) she was struck on the neck by a wooden object that resembled a part of a planter being assembled nearby by one of the defendant\u2019s employees, (3) someone, possibly the employee, retrieved the object and returned it to the place of assembly, and (4) the same or a similar object with an extended screw or nail flew past the plaintiff\u2019s ear, causing her to move her head violently.\n2. Negligence \u00a7\u00a7 5.1, 53\u2014 liability of store proprietor to invitee \u2014 standard of care\nA store proprietor owes to his business invitees the duty to keep in reasonably safe condition the areas of the store where customers are expected to go so as not unnecessarily to expose customers to danger, and to warn of unsafe conditions of which the proprietor was charged with knowledge.\n3. Negligence \u00a7 5.1\u2014 duty and standard of care of store proprietor \u2014 questions of law\nThe duty and standard of care of a store proprietor are matters of law to he explained by the court to the jury; they are not matters which plaintiff is required to prove.\n4. Negligence \u00a7 20\u2014 negligence as legal result of certain facts\nNegligence is not a fact in itself, but rather it is the legal result of certain facts.\n5. Negligence \u00a7 29\u2014 proof of negligence\nNegligence is a conclusion of law; plaintiff need not directly prove negligence, but must prove facts from which the jury would be warranted in inferring it.\n6. Negligence \u00a7 29\u2014 proof of negligence\nFacts which are relied upon to raise an inference of negligence must establish the probability thereof and not a mere conjecture or surmise.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Exum, J., 9 March 1970 Session, Forsyth Superior Court.\nPlaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries allegedly inflicted by negligence of defendant\u2019s employee. Plaintiff\u2019s evidence taken in the light most favorable to her tended to show the following: On 4 November 1966, plaintiff entered defendant\u2019s store with her small child to buy him a toy. She had placed the child aboard a hobby horse ride at the front of the store and was waiting for him when she was struck on the neck by a wooden object. She stated that it resembled a part of a planter which was being assembled at a nearby checkout counter by defendant\u2019s employee, Arnold. A man, possibly Arnold, retrieved the object and returned it to the assembly point; whereupon it or another similar object with a nail or screw extending from it flew past plaintiff\u2019s ear, causing her to jerk her head violently to one side.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence further tended to show the following: The violent jerking of her head caused a cervical sprain, aggravating a pre-existing degenerative disc disease and degenerative osteo-arthritis. Since that time she has experienced pain, numbness, headaches, nausea, muscular weakness, and a partial loss in range of motion of her head and neck. She has incurred considerable medical expenses and has suffered a loss of earning capacity.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff appealed to this Court.\nWilson, Morrow & Boyles, by John F. Morrow for plaintiff.\nDeal, Hutchins & Minor by Fred S. Hutchins, Jr., for defendant." }, "file_name": "0406-01", "first_page_order": 430, "last_page_order": 434 }