{
  "id": 8551232,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE CHAVIS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chavis",
  "decision_date": "1970-09-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 7018SC460",
  "first_page": "430",
  "last_page": "433",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name": "N.C."
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8624641
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1962,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "257 N.C. 464",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8568554
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      "year": 1962,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/257/0464-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:50:15.842675+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Mallard, C.J., and Parker, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE CHAVIS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Hedrick, J.\nThe defendant first assigns as error the court\u2019s denial of his motion for judgment as of nonsuit made at the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence. The evidence, when considered in its light most favorable to the State, tended to show that on 4 October 1969, at about nine or ten o\u2019clock p.m., an automobile operated by Glenn Henry Lakins on Lee Street in the City of Greensboro, North Carolina, was in collision with a 1959 Cadillac automobile operated by the defendant Robert Lee Chavis, and that after the accident the defendant immediately ran from the scene without identifying himself or rendering any assistance to any person injured in the collision.\nGlenn Henry Lakins testified that his wife, Judy Lakins, and Dannie Kendrick were passengers in the automobile he was operating at the time of the collision with the automobile operated by the defendant.\nJudy Lakins, a passenger in the automobile driven by her husband, testified: \u201cYes, I was injured. My head hit the windshield. I later went to the hospital. My head bothered me for about a week after that. . . . My head hurt for about a week. That hurt pretty bad. I was concerned about what happened to mother\u2019s car and my head. I did not get any treatment at the hospital.\u201d\nThe defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to show that anyone received personal injuries as a result of the accident. In the instant case the burden was on the State to offer evidence that the defendant was guilty of every element of the offense charged in the second count of the bill of indictment. State v. Overman, 257 N.C. 464, 125 S.E. 2d 920 (1962). The bill of indictment charged that Judy Lakins, and others, suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident. The evidence tended to show that Judy Lakins, a passenger in one of the automobiles involved in the collision, was injured and was taken to the hospital for examination. Whether Judy Lakins received personal injuries in the accident within the meaning of the statute was a matter for determination by the jury. State v. Overman, supra. There was ample evidence that the defendant had violated every element of the offense charged in the second count of the bill of indictment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nThe defendant next contends that the court failed to instruct the jury that the burden was on the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally failed to render aid and assistance to the party injured in the accident. At the beginning of his charge, the judge read the bill of indictment and the statute to the jury. The judge then proceeded to describe the various elements embraced in the offense charged in the bill of indictment. The judge then instructed the jury that the burden was on the State to satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had violated every element of the crime charged in the bill of indictment. This assignment of error is without merit.\nThe defendant\u2019s third assignment of error is that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury as to other possible lesser included offenses, specifically G.S. 20-166 (b), a misdemeanor, which, in pertinent part, provides: \u201cThe driver of any vehicle involved in an accident or collision resulting in damage to property and in which there is not involved injury or death of any person shall immediately stop his vehicle. . . .\u201d The defendant\u2019s contention is meritorious if the violation described in G.S. 20-166 (b) is a lesser included offense of that charged in the bill of indictment, G.S. 20-166 (c), and if there is evidence of such lesser included offense. G.S. 15-170 provides that a defendant may be convicted of the crime charged in the indictment or a lesser degree of the same crime.\nIn State v. Rorie, 252 N.C. 579, at 581, 114 S.E. 2d 233 (1960), Denny, J., later C.J., stated, . . that an indictment or information is insufficient to charge the accused with the commission of a minor offense, or one of less degree, unless, in charging the major offense, it necessarily includes within itself all of the essential elements of the minor offense. . . .\u201d G.S. 20-166 (b) has as one of its essential elements \u201cdamage to property and in which there is not involved injury or death\u201d; whereas, G.S. 20-166 (c) has as one of its essential elements \u201cinjury or death to any person.\u201d Therefore, G.S. 20-166 (b) is not a lesser included offense of the crime charged in the indictment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have carefully considered all of the defendant\u2019s assignments of error and conclude that the defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nMallard, C.J., and Parker, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hedrick, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert Morgan, Attorney General, William W. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, and T. Buie Costen, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Robert D. Douglas III, Assistant Public Defender for the Eighteenth Judicial District, for the defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE CHAVIS\nNo. 7018SC460\n(Filed 16 September 1970)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 131\u2014 failure to assist person injured in accident \u2014 sufficiency of evidence of personal injury\nIn this prosecution under G.S. 20-166 (c) for failure of the operator of an automobile involved in an accident to render assistance to a person injured in the accident and to give his name, address, driver\u2019s license number and the registration number of his vehicle, there was sufficient evidence that a person received personal injuries in the accident for submission of the case to the jury, where a passenger in one of the automobiles involved in the accident testified that her head struck the windshield, that she went to the hospital for an examination but received no treatment, and that her head hurt for about a week after the accident.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 131\u2014 failure to assist person injured in accident \u2014 instructions\nIn this prosecution for a violation of G.S. 20-166 (c), the trial court did not fail to instruct the jury that the burden was on the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and intentionally failed to render aid to the party injured in the accident.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 131\u2014 failure to stop after accident \u2014 prosecution under G.S. 20-166 (c) \u2014 necessity for instructing on misdemeanor defined in G.S. 20-166 (b)\nThe misdemeanor described in G.S. 20-166 (b) is not a lesser included offense of the crime described in G.S. 20-166 (c); therefore, in a prosecution for a violation of G.S. 20-166 (c), the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the offense defined in G.S. 20-166 (b).\nAppeal from Collier, J., 23 March 1970 Criminal Session, Guilford Superior Court.\nThe defendant Robert Lee Chavis was tried on a two-count bill of indictment, proper in form, charging him in the first count with a violation of G.S. 20-166 (a) by failing to stop the automobile of which he was driver after it was involved in an accident involving personal injury, and in a second count with a violation of G.S. 20-166 (c) by failing to render assistance to the injured party, identify himself, give his driver\u2019s license number and registration number of the automobile.\nThe defendant pleaded not guilty. At the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence the defendant\u2019s motion for a judgment as of nonsuit was allowed as to the first count in the bill of indictment. The defendant testified in his own behalf. His motion for a judgment as of nonsuit, made at the conclusion of all the evidence, was denied. The jury found the defendant guilty as charged in the second count of the bill of indictment. From a judgment entered on the verdict, the defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.\nRobert Morgan, Attorney General, William W. Melvin, Assistant Attorney General, and T. Buie Costen, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nRobert D. Douglas III, Assistant Public Defender for the Eighteenth Judicial District, for the defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0430-01",
  "first_page_order": 454,
  "last_page_order": 457
}