{
  "id": 8525752,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY DONNELL HARRISON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harrison",
  "decision_date": "1988-07-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 876SC1160",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges Arnold and Greene concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY DONNELL HARRISON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ORR, Judge.\nDefendant was arrested and tried for felonious larceny, in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-70 and 14-72(a), and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-32(a). After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced to terms of five years for the larceny conviction and ten years for the assault conviction.\nFrom the trial court\u2019s judgments, defendant appeals.\nFacts relevant to the discussion of the issues on appeal are set forth below.\nH-<\nOn appeal, defendant first contends the State exceeded the scope of permissible cross-examination, when questioning him about his prior convictions.\nThe cross-examination challenged by defendant consisted of the following:\nQ. Your lawyer asked you what you had been convicted of. You said you had been convicted of breaking and entering and larceny; is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. That was a breaking and entering and larceny of a store in Enfield?\nQ. Is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Stealing from that store, groceries, wine and beer?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Is that what you did?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And, the obtaining property by false pretense, I\u2019ll ask you in that case, did you not steal a man\u2019s checks and forge his checks?\nQ. Is that not what that consisted of?\nA. That\u2019s what they meant to be.\nQ. Excsue [sic] me. Would you speak loud enough\u2014\nA. That\u2019s what it was meant to be, yeah.\nQ. That what who meant that to be?\nA. Well, that\u2019s what they charged me with, yes.\nQ. Is that not what you did\u2014\nQ. \u2014take the checks of another person and forge those checks?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. What did you do?\nA. I cashed the check. That belonged to someone else.\nQ. That belonged to somebody else?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Did you forge that check?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. You didn\u2019t do that? You just cashed it?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Is that all you did?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Was cash somebody else\u2019s check?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. You knew the check wasn\u2019t yours?\nA. Yes, sir. At the time I did.\nQ. You also been convicted, have you not, of carrying a concealed weapon?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Would you please kindly tell the members of the Jury what that weapon was?\nA. It was a knife.\nQ. A knife?\nA. Yes, sir.\nIn State v. Finch, 293 N.C. 132, 235 S.E. 2d 819 (1977), the Supreme Court held that once a conviction was established, a limited inquiry on cross-examination, as to the time and place of conviction and the punishment imposed, was permissible. Our Court further said that cross-examination exceeding the Finch limitations was reversible error. State v. Greenhill, 66 N.C. App. 719, 311 S.E. 2d 641 (1984); State v. Bryant, 56 N.C. App. 734, 289 S.E. 2d 630 (1982).\nIn State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E. 2d 523 (1984), the Supreme Court implicitly expanded the scope of cross-examination for prior convictions by holding \u201cthat, rather than phrasing questions only in terms of convictions, the prosecutor may ask about the circumstances of a prior conviction in the same way he would ask about any specific prior misconduct.\u201d 310 N.C. at 551, 313 S.E. 2d at 530.\nBased upon the standard enunciated in Murray, the Supreme Court found the following cross-examination concerning prior convictions was proper:\nQ. And on the same day, the 26th of April, 1976, were you convicted of assaulting Nathanial Mosely, by hitting him with your fists?\nA. Yes, I was.\nQ. On the 18th of April, 1978, were you convicted of communicating threats by threatening to kill Wayne Watkins, and blow up his store?\nA. No, sir. I got charged with it, but I didn\u2019t do that. I got probation on that, but I didn\u2019t do that.\nQ. Well, were you convicted of that?\nA. I was with some friends, I guess yeah.\nQ. You were with some friends so you got convicted with them?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. On the 22nd of July, 1981, July a year ago, were you convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury by beating Charles Elbert Corbett on the head with a pistol on April the 11th, 1981?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And you were sentenced to prison for that, is that correct?\nA. Two year sentence.\nQ. And did you, in fact, hit Charles Elbert Corbett on the head with that pistol?\nA. No, sir.\nState v. Murray, 310 N.C. at 549-550, 313 S.E. 2d at 529-530.\nAfter comparing the cross-examination in Murray with defendant\u2019s, we conclude that while the cross-examination in this instance was not as concise and succinct as the one in Murray, its scope did not exceed the boundaries established by Murray.\nFor this reason, we find no error in the admission of this cross-examination at trial, and we overrule this assignment of error.\nII.\nDefendant next assigns error to testimony elicited on his cross-examination pertaining to his prior acts of misconduct.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b) permits specific instances of conduct to be inquired into on cross-examination, at the trial court\u2019s discretion, if probative of the witness\u2019s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.\nThe types of conduct most widely accepted as indicative of a defendant\u2019s character for truthfulness are \u201c \u2018use of false identity, making false statements on affidavits, applications or government forms (including tax returns), giving false testimony, attempting to corrupt or cheat others, and attempting to deceive or defraud others.\u2019 ... On the other hand, evidence routinely disapproved as irrelevant to the question of a witness\u2019 general veracity (credibility) includes specific instances of conduct relating to \u2018sexual relationships or proclivities, the bearing of illigitimate [sic] children, the use of drugs or alcohol, ... or violence against other persons. \u2019 \u201d State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 635, 340 S.E. 2d 84, 90 (1986) (citations omitted and emphasis supplied).\nIn the present case, the challenged testimony concerned defendant\u2019s prior misconduct of evading, resisting, and assaulting a police officer.\nThese acts do not involve fraud, trickery, or deceit. Therefore, we find the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of this misconduct as probative of defendant\u2019s character for truthfulness.\nAdmission of this testimony is not, however, reversible error. To obtain a new trial, defendant is required to show a reasonable possibility that but for this error he would have been found innocent of the crimes charged. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1983). This, defendant has failed to do.\nThe record discloses that defendant\u2019s testimony was properly impeached with evidence of prior convictions for breaking and entering, larceny, false pretense, shoplifting, disorderly conduct, creating a public disturbance, assault on a female, and resisting, delaying and obstructing a police officer. In light of the properly admitted prior convictions, we conclude the cross-examination complained of could not have appreciably undermined defendant\u2019s credibility and influenced the jury\u2019s verdict. We overrule this assignment of error.\nIII.\nFinally, defendant contends the trial court erred in preventing his counsel from reading certain case law in the closing argument.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-14 governs a trial court\u2019s control over oral argument and provides, in pertinent part: \u201cIn jury trials the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the jury.\u201d This statute grants counsel the right to read and comment on reported case law, relevant to the issues before the jury. State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605, 342 S.E. 2d 872 (1986).\nHere, defense counsel sought to read the following sentence, stated in State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318, 116 S.E. 2d 772 (1960), in his closing argument. \u201cThis full summary of the incriminating facts, taken in the strongest view of them adverse to the prisoner, excite suspicion in the just mind that he is guilty, but such view is far from excluding the rational conclusion that some other unknown person may he the guilty party . . . .\u2019\u2019Id. at 324, 116 S.E. 2d at 776 (emphasis added). The trial court stopped defendant\u2019s counsel from reading the last ten words of the sentence after ruling the legal principles in the case were inappropriate for oral argument, because the case citing these principles had found insufficient evidence existed for submission of the case to a jury.\nThe statement of law in Bass specifically addressed the State\u2019s use of circumstantial evidence to obtain a conviction, had not been reversed on appeal, and was relevant to the issue of circumstantial evidence before the jury in the present case. Therefore, we find the trial court improperly excluded the case law at trial. State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605, 342 S.E. 2d 872.\nHowever, as discussed in the previous issue, defendant bears the burden of proving this error was prejudicial. Id.-, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1983).\nOn appeal defendant presents no evidence of prejudice attributable to the trial court\u2019s error. Furthermore, the record shows defendant\u2019s counsel thoroughly argued the law pertaining to circumstantial evidence in his closing argument.\nBased on these facts, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility the trial court\u2019s act, preventing defense counsel from quoting the statement in Bass, effected the verdict returned by the jury. Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.\nFor the reasons given above, we conclude defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Arnold and Greene concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ORR, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Lorinzo L. Joyner, for the State.",
      "Hux, Livermon & Armstrong, by James S. Livermon, for defendant-appe llant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY DONNELL HARRISON\nNo. 876SC1160\n(Filed 5 July 1988)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.3\u2014 prior convictions of defendant \u2014 cross-examination proper\nCross-examination of defendant concerning his prior convictions and his behavior upon which those convictions were based was proper and did not exceed the boundaries established by State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.1\u2014 prior misconduct inadmissible on issue of defendant\u2019s truthfulness \u2014 error not prejudicial\nThe trial court erred in admitting testimony of defendant\u2019s prior misconduct in evading, resisting, and assaulting a police officer as probative of defendant\u2019s character for truthfulness, but such error was not reversible since defendant\u2019s testimony was properly impeached with evidence of prior convictions for breaking and entering, larceny, false pretense, shoplifting, disorderly conduct, creating a public disturbance, assault on a female, and resisting, delaying, and obstructing a police officer, and the improper testimony could not have appreciably undermined defendant\u2019s credibility and influenced the jury\u2019s verdict. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b).\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 102.6\u2014 closing argument \u2014 reading of case law not allowed\u2014 error not prejudicial\nThough the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to read appropriate case law regarding circumstantial evidence during the closing argument, such error was not prejudicial where defense counsel did thoroughly argue the law pertaining to circumstantial evidence in his closing argument, and there was no reasonable possibility that the court\u2019s error affected the jury\u2019s verdict. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-14; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\nAppeal by defendant from Fountain, Judge. Judgments entered 15 May 1987 in Superior Court, Halifax County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 1988.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Lorinzo L. Joyner, for the State.\nHux, Livermon & Armstrong, by James S. Livermon, for defendant-appe llant."
  },
  "file_name": "0629-01",
  "first_page_order": 659,
  "last_page_order": 666
}
