{
  "id": 8525846,
  "name": "ARTIE BARNES, Plaintiff v. THE SINGER COMPANY and THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Barnes v. Singer Co.",
  "decision_date": "1988-07-05",
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judge Arnold concurs.",
      "Judge Phillips dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "ARTIE BARNES, Plaintiff v. THE SINGER COMPANY and THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nClaimant refused to accept a job offered her by her employer after the employer moved the plant eleven miles farther from claimant\u2019s home. Claimant, who does not drive, argues that she was \u201cforced\u201d to quit because she was unable to arrange transportation to the new plant location. Claimant was denied unemployment compensation by the Full Commission. The Commission\u2019s decision was affirmed by the Superior Court of Wilkes County. We affirm.\nClaimant Artie Barnes was employed by the Singer Company, hereinafter \u201cemployer,\u201d in Lenoir as a furniture cleaner. Claimant lives in Moravian Falls, twenty-two miles from her employer\u2019s Lenoir plant. For thirteen years claimant, who does not drive, caught a ride to and from work with her brother-in-law, who also lived in Moravian Falls and worked in Lenoir. In the summer of 1986 employer permanently closed the Lenoir plant. The work that had been done in Lenoir was transferred to a plant location eleven miles farther from claimant\u2019s home. Since claimant had a good work record, employer offered her a job at the new location doing the same work she had done in Lenoir.\nClaimant was unable to secure a ride to the new plant with her brother-in-law because he still worked in Lenoir. Claimant testified that she checked for rides to work and could not find any. Claimant declined the employer\u2019s offer to continue working at the new plant.\nClaimant applied for unemployment compensation on the theory that her employer\u2019s move \u201cforced\u201d her to quit because she was unable to arrange transportation to work. She claims that when an employer\u2019s relocation requires employees to drive thirty-three miles one way, that is \u201cgood cause\u201d to quit your job under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 96-14(1). We disagree.\nThe pertinent facts, as recited above, are not in dispute. The issue before this Court is whether the Commission erred in concluding that claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause attributable to the employer.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 96-14(1) provides that a claimant is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits \u201cif it is determined by the Commission that such individual is, at the time such claim is filed, unemployed because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Our courts have interpreted that statute to require evidence that claimant quit voluntarily and that she quit without good cause attributable to her employer. In other words, the test to be disqualified for unemployment benefits has two prongs: a \u201cvoluntary\u201d prong and a \u201cgood cause\u201d prong. In re Poteat v. Employment Security Comm., 319 N.C. 201, 203, 353 S.E. 2d 219, 221 (1987).\nLeaving work voluntarily for the purposes of \u00a7 96-14 means making the choice to leave free of coercion by the employer or by events beyond the employee\u2019s control. In re Poteat, 319 N.C. at 205, 353 S.E. 2d at 222. Our focus should be \u201cthe external factors motivating the employee\u2019s quitting].\u201d Id. We have held that employees who quit after being asked by their employers to leave do not quit \u201cvoluntarily\u201d for the purposes of \u00a7 96-14. In re Werner, 44 N.C. App. 723, 727, 263 S.E. 2d 4, 7 (1980). A pregnant woman\u2019s acceptance of a leave of absence is not \u201cvoluntarily\u201d quitting, but her failure to take the necessary steps to preserve her employment status was \u201cvoluntary\u201d under \u00a7 96-14. Sellers v. National Spinning Co., 64 N.C. App. 567, 570, 307 S.E. 2d 774, 776 (1983).\nThe second prong of the test under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 96-14, the good cause determination, is applied if the claimant\u2019s quitting is found to be voluntary. Poteat, 319 N.C. at 205, 353 S.E. 2d at 222. \u201cGood cause\u201d is a reason for leaving a job \u201cdeemed by reasonable men and women [as] valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work.\u201d In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 635, 161 S.E. 2d 1, 7 (1968). The cause is \u201cattributable to the employer\u201d when the reason for quitting is \u201cproduced, caused, or created as a result of actions by the employer.\u201d In re Huggins v. Precision Concrete Forming, 70 N.C. App. 571, 573, 320 S.E. 2d 416, 417 (1984).\nApplying these principles to this case, we are not convinced that claimant has produced sufficient evidence that external factors attributable to her employer forced her to quit. It is an economic reality that businesses must from time to time relocate or consolidate. We do not believe we are compelled by this case to establish a \u201cBright-Line test\u201d in terms of miles traveled or burden to the employee. We do not believe an employer\u2019s move requiring claimant to commute an additional eleven miles is unreasonable. It is generally the employee\u2019s responsibility to commute to work absent some agreement between employer and employee. While employer\u2019s move increased claimant\u2019s burden for finding transportation, we do not believe the employer\u2019s move forced claimant to quit. Therefore, the decision of the trial court affirming the order of the Commission disqualifying claimant for benefits is\nAffirmed.\nJudge Arnold concurs.\nJudge Phillips dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "COZORT, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Judge Phillips\ndissenting.\nIn my view the majority opinion is based upon semantics rather than reality. For the reality is, I think, according to all the evidence and findings, that the claimant did not quit her job either voluntarily or without good cause but quit because the plant she was assigned to was thirty-three miles away from her home; the relative who drove her to the other plant could not drive her there; and, as a practical matter, it was impossible for her to get there every day since she does not drive a car, could not find anybody to ride with, and no public transportation was available. Voluntariness requires a free choice, and choosing not to do that which is economically and physically impossible is not voluntary. In my opinion she is entitled to unemployment benefits, and I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the matter to the Employment Security Commission for a determination of the amount due her.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Judge Phillips"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Legal Services of the Blue Ridge by Louise Ashmore; and Richard Tarrier for petitioner appellant.",
      "Chief Counsel T. S. Whitaker and Staff Attorney James A. Haney, for respondent appellee, Employment Security Commission."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ARTIE BARNES, Plaintiff v. THE SINGER COMPANY and THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants\nNo. 8723SC848\n(Filed 5 July 1988)\nMaster and Servant 8 108\u2014 unemployment compensation \u2014 plant closed \u2014 job at more distant plant offered \u2014 employee\u2019s voluntary leaving of job\nPetitioner voluntarily quit her job without good cause attributable to the employer and was therefore not entitled to unemployment compensation where the employer closed its plant at which petitioner, a non-driver, had worked; that plant was 22 miles from petitioner\u2019s home; petitioner caught a ride to that plant with her brother-in-law who worked in the same city; employer offered petitioner a job in another plant located 11 miles farther from her home; petitioner had no means of transportation to the new job; and petitioner therefore declined the offer of the new job. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-14.\nJudge Phillips dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Rousseau, Judge. Judgment entered 27 April 1987 in Superior Court, Wilkes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 1988.\nLegal Services of the Blue Ridge by Louise Ashmore; and Richard Tarrier for petitioner appellant.\nChief Counsel T. S. Whitaker and Staff Attorney James A. Haney, for respondent appellee, Employment Security Commission."
  },
  "file_name": "0659-01",
  "first_page_order": 689,
  "last_page_order": 692
}
