{
  "id": 8523824,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALPHONZO McNEILL",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. McNeill",
  "decision_date": "1988-05-17",
  "docket_number": "No. 8710SC1056",
  "first_page": "257",
  "last_page": "261",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "307 N.C. 224",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1982,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:12.261630+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Wells and COZORT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALPHONZO McNEILL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s first assignment of error is set out in the record as follows:\n1. Did the trial court commit error in allowing, over the objections of the Defendant, the State\u2019s witness, Dorothy Phillips Bryan to identify a photograph of some person in a photo line-up where the witness has no present recall of the photograph other than by identification by number on said photographic line-up.\nThis assignment of error purports to be based on Exception No. 1 noted in the record where the trial judge after voir dire examination of the victim denies the motion \u201cfor reasons stated. . . .\u201d The voir dire examination of the victim was ostensibly for the purpose of determining whether her out-of-court identification of defendant from a photographic line-up could be admitted at trial. The ruling of the court seemed to indicate that the court would allow the State to introduce evidence at trial that the victim had picked out defendant\u2019s photograph as being the photograph of the perpetrator of the crime charged.\nAt trial, the victim was unable to remember anything with respect to picking out defendant\u2019s photograph. Although she was led repeatedly by the State\u2019s attorney, she never identified any of the photographs as being one of defendant nor did she identify defendant as being perpetrator of the crime. Her testimony was sufficient, however, to show a crime had been committed, and coupled with the testimony of her daughter and the police officers, the evidence was sufficient to raise an inference that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. The exception upon which defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is based does not support the argument in his brief. Assuming arguendo, however, that the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion in regard to the photographic line-up, and in even allowing the State to examine the victim regarding it, such error was in no way prejudicial to defendant inasmuch as the victim never connected defendant to any photograph.\nDefendant\u2019s second assignment of error is set out in the record as follows:\n2. Did the trial court commit error in allowing, over the objections of the Defendant, the State\u2019s witness Joseph M. Ludas to identify the Defendant\u2019s fingerprints as those of the Defendant taken from the vehicle of the victim, when said comparison of the fingerprints were made the day of the trial of the Defendant pursuant to search warrant issued on the date of trial and after the commencement of the trial, and without notice to the Defendant.\nThis assignment of error appears to be based on an exception to the trial court\u2019s overruling of defendant\u2019s objection at trial to admission of evidence regarding comparison of defendant\u2019s fingerprints to latent fingerprints taken from the automobile of the victim immediately after the crime. Defendant argues that such evidence should not have been admitted because he was surprised when his fingerprints were taken for comparison purposes on the day the trial commenced. Defendant cites no authority in support of his argument. The State obtained a search warrant for taking defendant\u2019s fingerprints before trial, and the fingerprints were taken while defendant was in custody. We hold the trial court did not err in allowing the fingerprint expert to testify and compare defendant\u2019s fingerprints with those latent fingerprints lifted from the victim\u2019s automobile. This assignment of error has no merit.\nIn defendant\u2019s final two assignments of error, he argues the trial court erred by allowing testimony of the victim\u2019s daughter and a police detective about what the victim said happened. Defendant contends this testimony was inadmissible hearsay under the Rules of Evidence. Although the State\u2019s attorney argued at trial that several exceptions to the hearsay rule would allow the testimony to be admitted, the trial court apparently admitted it under the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception, G.S. 8C-1, Rule 803(2). Even if such a ruling were error, defendant was not unduly prejudiced since the testimony was admissible as corroborative of the victim\u2019s testimony. Corroborative evidence is supplementary evidence used to strengthen or confirm evidence already given. State v. Burns, 307 N.C. 224, 297 S.E. 2d 384 (1982). It is not necessary that the evidence tend to prove the precise facts brought out in a witness\u2019 testimony before it can be deemed corroborative of such testimony and therefore admissible. Id. Further, defendant had an affirmative duty to point out to the trial court any objectionable part which did not corroborate prior testimony, and he did not do so. State v. Harris, 46 N.C. App. 284, 264 S.E. 2d 790 (1980). Indeed, defendant at trial was unable to state to the trial judge any basis for his objection to the testimony. For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony.\nDefendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of larceny from the person. We hold defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Wells and COZORT concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert G. Webb and Associate Attorney General Richard G. Sowerby, Jr., for the State.",
      "Frederick W. Hehre, III, for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALPHONZO McNEILL\nNo. 8710SC1056\n(Filed 17 May 1988)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.8\u2014 photographic identification \u2014 admission at trial \u2014 no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice in a prosecution for kidnapping and common law robbery from allowing the State to examine the victim regarding a photographic identification where the victim never connected defendant to any photograph.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 60\u2014 fingerprints \u2014 taken day of trial \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for kidnapping and common law robbery by admitting evidence regarding defendant\u2019s fingerprints where defendant was surprised when his fingerprints were taken for comparison purposes on the day trial commenced. The State had obtained a search warrant before taking defendant\u2019s fingerprints and the fingerprints were taken while defendant was in custody.\n3. Criminal Law 8 73.4\u2014 statements of victim to daughter and police detective-admissible as corroborative evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for kidnapping and common law robbery by admitting testimony of the victim\u2019s daughter and a police detective about what the victim said had happened. Although the trial court apparently admitted the testimony under the excited utterance exception of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(2), there was no prejudice since the testimony was admissible as corroborative of the victim\u2019s testimony.\nAppeal by defendant from Hight, Judge. Judgment entered 16 April 1987 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 May 1988.\nDefendant was charged in proper bills of indictment with kidnapping in violation of G.S. 14-39 and with common law robbery. Evidence presented at trial tends to show that on 25 July 1986, a white female drove her automobile to Raleigh to visit her daughter. She became lost and asked a black man how to get to 705 North East Street. The man told her he would take her to where she wanted to go. He directed her, and they went to an apartment, where the victim and the man saw another black man, William Yates. Thereafter, the victim went with the black man who had first offered to assist her to a secluded area where he took her jewelry and told her to get out of the car. She did so, and then walked down to a service station where she called her daughter. Her daughter met her at the service station, and she told her daughter what happened. They then reported the incident to the police. A detective from the Wake County Sheriffs Department went to the apartment where the victim had been and talked to William Yates. At first, Yates refused to identify the man who had come to the apartment with a white woman, but later after being given $200 by detectives, Yates told officers that defendant, Alphonzo McNeill, had come to the apartment with a white woman and said \u201che was going to rob that old white lady.\u201d The Wake County Sheriffs Department lifted a palm print from the exterior of the passenger door of the victim\u2019s automobile. This palm print was identified as being that of defendant. The charge of kidnapping was dismissed by the court, and the jury found defendant guilty of larceny from the person in violation of G.S. 14-72(b)(l). From a judgment imposing a prison sentence of 10 years, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert G. Webb and Associate Attorney General Richard G. Sowerby, Jr., for the State.\nFrederick W. Hehre, III, for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0257-01",
  "first_page_order": 287,
  "last_page_order": 291
}