{ "id": 8524011, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARCELLE ANTONIO BOGLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bogle", "decision_date": "1988-05-31", "docket_number": "No. 876SC1068", "first_page": "277", "last_page": "286", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "90 N.C. App. 277" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "98 L.Ed. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 S.Ct. 336", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 S.E. 2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4742661, 4740409, 4739060, 4748564, 4745657 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0677-04", "/nc/319/0677-03", "/nc/319/0677-05", "/nc/319/0677-02", "/nc/319/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E. 2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "927" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168562 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701428 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 F. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 41762 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/775/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 L.Ed. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 S.Ct. 2882", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532192, 1532128, 1532032, 1531939, 1532167, 1531817, 1531951, 1531919, 1531924, 1532061, 1531965, 1531966 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0941-03", "/us/442/0941-06", "/us/442/0941-05", "/us/442/0941-01", "/us/442/0941-09", "/us/442/0941-10", "/us/442/0941-12", "/us/442/0941-02", "/us/442/0941-08", "/us/442/0941-07", "/us/442/0941-04", "/us/442/0941-11" ] }, { "cite": "588 F. 2d 1046", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 832215 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/588/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568804 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546-47" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8595356 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717832, 4720296, 4720212, 4718169, 4715071 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0593-03", "/nc/315/0593-02", "/nc/315/0593-04", "/nc/315/0593-05", "/nc/315/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523896 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572197, 8572171, 8572139, 8572078, 8572112 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0187-05", "/nc/294/0187-04", "/nc/294/0187-03", "/nc/294/0187-01", "/nc/294/0187-02" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E. 2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549374 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 F. 2d 1323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 974702 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1326", "parenthetical": "Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/552/1323-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "receiving stolen goods" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610807 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "receiving stolen goods" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491-92", "parenthetical": "failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569175 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478-79", "parenthetical": "failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 S.E. 2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615676 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 F. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1671099 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/817/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564967, 8565000, 8565070, 8565049, 8565023 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0234-01", "/nc/301/0234-02", "/nc/301/0234-05", "/nc/301/0234-04", "/nc/301/0234-03" ] }, { "cite": "267 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549115 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549779 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557-59" }, { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291-95" }, { "page": "294-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 F. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1643307 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/809/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 L.Ed. 2d 1188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 S.Ct. 3173", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 951", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6284065, 6285569, 6284323, 6285893, 6284614, 6286280, 6287529, 6287179, 6286573, 6286863, 6284886, 6285276 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0951-02", "/us/426/0951-07", "/us/426/0951-03", "/us/426/0951-08", "/us/426/0951-04", "/us/426/0951-09", "/us/426/0951-13", "/us/426/0951-12", "/us/426/0951-10", "/us/426/0951-11", "/us/426/0951-05", "/us/426/0951-06" ] }, { "cite": "532 F. 2d 697", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10591837 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" }, { "page": "700-01" }, { "page": "706-07", "parenthetical": "Kennedy, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "Kennedy, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/532/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E. 2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693853 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402923 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 895, "char_count": 21346, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2545655727606994e-07, "percentile": 0.7819399895515144 }, "sha256": "41364d8110f851db34f834b964f196d20521181820a52afe6ce057f34f95f835", "simhash": "1:9b08402a04079870", "word_count": 3554 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:12.261630+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ORR concurs.", "Judge Wells dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARCELLE ANTONIO BOGLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nDefendant brings forward three assignments of error. Defendant first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury concerning the element of knowledge in each offense. Defendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s failure to give a requested instruction that evidence of defendant\u2019s good character could be considered as substantive evidence. Defendant\u2019s final assignment of error is directed to the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment against defendant for both trafficking by possession and trafficking by transportation.\nOn 7 April 1987, defendant was driving a Toyota truck from Florida to New York. Defendant was stopped for speeding by a North Carolina State Trooper on Interstate Route ninety-five in Northampton County. After the trooper issued a citation for speeding, he asked defendant if he could search the truck. Defendant consented to the search and signed a \u201cConsent to Search\u201d form. The back of the truck contained some furniture and five boxes sealed with duct tape. The trooper opened one of the boxes, found that it contained marijuana, and placed defendant under arrest. A subsequent analysis of the contents of the boxes revealed that they contained approximately 176 pounds of marijuana.\nTo convict defendant of the charged offenses, the State was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed and transported the marijuana found in the truck. See State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 403, 333 S.E. 2d 701, 702 (1985). The evidence in this case showed that defendant was not the owner of the truck. Defendant testified that he was promised $1,000 for driving the truck to New York, and he claimed that he was unaware that there was marijuana in the truck. The trial court charged the jury as follows with respect to the element of knowledge:\n[T]he term \u201cknowingly possessed\u201d in this case and under this criminal statute, is not limited to positive knowledge. But when the defendant is aware that the fact in question is highly probable, includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge merely and only because he consciously avoids so \u2014 let me correct myself \u2014 so the required knowledge is established if the defendant is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question unless he actually believes it not to exist and consciously avoids enlightenment.\n[T]he term \u201cknowingly transported\u201d in this criminal statute is not limited to positive knowledge. But includes \u2014 but when the defendant is aware that the fact in question is highly probable, it includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge only because he consciously avoids it. So, the required knowledge is established if the defendant is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question, unless he actually believes it not to exist and consciously avoids enlightenment.\nDefendant contends that the quoted instructions are erroneous because they are not an accurate statement of the law of this State.\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions are based upon the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1188 (1976). Like the defendant in the present case, the defendant in Jewell claimed that he had no knowledge of marijuana that was discovered in the vehicle he was driving. The Jewell Court held that the trial court in that case did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found that he was not actually aware that there was marijuana in the vehicle but that \u201chis ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of his having made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.\u201d Jewell, 532 F. 2d at 700. The Court also held, however, that a proper instruction on deliberate ignorance should require the jury to find (i) that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the presence of the marijuana, and (ii) that the defendant did not actually believe that there was no marijuana in the vehicle. Id. at 704 n.21. Jewell has been followed by other federal circuit courts. See, e.g., United States v. Krowen, 809 F. 2d 144 (1st Cir. 1987).\nDefendant here contends that, under North Carolina law, he cannot be convicted unless a jury finds that he actually knew that there was marijuana in the truck. See State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 291-95, 311 S.E. 2d 552, 557-59 (1984). In Boone, our Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of possessing marijuana if he knew or had reason to know that it was in his car. Id. The Court held:\n[T]he court should have instructed the jury that the defendant is guilty only in the event he knew the marijuana was in the trunk of his automobile and that if he was ignorant of that fact, and the jury should so find, they should return a verdict of not guilty.\nId. at 294, 311 S.E. 2d at 559 (citation omitted); see also State v. Stacy, 19 N.C. App. 35, 197 S.E. 2d 881 (1973). Defendant argues that the doctrine of \u201cwillful blindness\u201d as adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Jewell is inconsistent with the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Boone. We disagree.\nIn Boone, the challenged instruction would have permitted the jury to convict if it found that the defendant had \u201creason to know\u201d that marijuana was in his car. The Supreme Court was not ruling on a willful blindness instruction. The phrase \u201creason to know\u201d commonly denotes a basis for liability in certain negligence actions. See, e.g., Davis v. Siloo Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 247, 267 S.E. 2d 354, 360, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E. 2d 131 (1980). In contrast, the doctrine of willful blindness is based on the premise that a conscious effort to avoid knowledge is equivalent to positive knowledge for the purpose of imposing criminal liability. United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d at 700-01. A willful blindness instruction cannot be given if the defendant merely should have known of the fact in question. Such an instruction is only proper when the evidence indicates that the defendant purposefully avoided knowledge in order to have a defense to criminal charges. United States v. Alvarado, 817 F. 2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1987).\nAlthough the courts of this State have not yet had the opportunity to adopt the doctrine of willful blindness, the doctrine is consistent with North Carolina law. The question of what amounts to actual knowledge has most often arisen in cases concerning the offense of receiving stolen goods. Under prior law, actual knowledge that the goods were stolen was an essential element of that offense. See, e.g., State v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659, 27 S.E. 2d 814 (1943). The test was whether the defendant \u201cknew, or must have known\u201d that the goods were stolen. Id. Our Supreme Court has looked to the receiving stolen property cases in order to define the element of knowledge in another offense. State v. Fearing, 304 N.C. 471, 478-79, 284 S.E. 2d 487, 491-92 (1981) (failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death). The Court defined the element of knowledge as follows:\n[T]he knowledge required may be actual or may be implied. Implied knowledge can be inferred when the circumstances of an accident are such as would lead a driver to believe that he had been in an accident which killed or caused physical injury to a person.\nId. at 477, 284 S.E. 2d at 491; see also State v. Stathos, 208 N.C. 456, 181 S.E. 273 (1935) (receiving stolen goods), quoted in State v. Fearing, supra.\nWe cannot see any real distinction between implied knowledge as defined in Fearing and willful blindness as defined in Jewell. Knowledge may be implied when there is no direct evidence that a defendant actually had knowledge of a certain fact but the circumstances are such as would lead the defendant to believe that the fact existed. Similarly, the doctrine of willful blindness applies when the defendant is aware of a high probability that a certain fact exists. An \u201cawareness of a high probability\u201d is equivalent to being \u201cled to believe.\u201d The doctrine of willful blindness merely goes a step further by explicitly stating that, once a defendant has information that would lead him to believe a fact exists, he cannot avoid liability by deliberately ignoring its existence. This extra step is consistent with the principle of implied knowledge.\nWe also find no direct conflict between the doctrine of willful blindness and the decision of our Supreme Court in State v. Boone, supra. In Boone, the Court held that a defendant could not be convicted if he was ignorant of the presence of marijuana in his car even though he may have had \u201creason to know\u201d of its existence. Similarly, the doctrine of willful blindness does not permit a finding of knowledge if the defendant actually believes that the fact in question does not exist. This aspect of the doctrine prevents the jury from basing a conviction on a negligence standard. The defendant\u2019s subjective state of mind, as opposed to the objective standard of the reasonably prudent person, controls and true ignorance on the part of the defendant, no matter how unreasonable, cannot support a conviction. United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d at 706-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).\nAlthough we are of the opinion that the doctrine of willful blindness is consistent with the law of this State, we decline to adopt the doctrine as the basis for a proper jury instruction on the element of knowledge in a criminal case. The reason for this decision is twofold.\nFirst, as we have reasoned above, the doctrine is merely a slight extension of the principle of implied knowledge, and we are not convinced by the State\u2019s argument that such an extension is needed to combat drug traffickers effectively. Our Supreme Court has recognized that knowledge often must be inferred from circumstantial evidence and has held that juries are free to make such inferences. State v. Boone, 310 N.C. at 294-95, 311 S.E. 2d at 559. We are confident that, in any case where a willful blindness instruction would be appropriate, the jurors will reach the same verdict if they are simply instructed that they may infer knowledge from the circumstances of the case.\nSecond, and more important, the doctrine is difficult to apply and susceptible to abuse. The federal courts have limited its application to cases where the evidence shows that the defendant deliberately avoided learning the truth in order to establish a defense. United States v. Alvarado, supra. In Alvarado, the Court held that the instruction was erroneously given because the evidence tended to show actual knowledge rather than a conscious avoidance of knowledge, but the Court found that the error was harmless. Alvarado, 817 F. 2d at 586. Alvarado illustrates the difficulty in determining what type of evidence will support the instruction. Furthermore, former Judge, now Justice Kennedy has pointed out that there is a danger that the jury will base its conviction on a negligence standard if the instruction is not properly phrased, United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), or if the instruction is not appropriate under the facts of the case. United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F. 2d 1323, 1326 (9th Cir. 1977) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).\nWe are of the opinion that the potential problems posed by the use of a willful blindness instruction outweigh any advantages its use may entail. Accordingly, we hold that it is not proper to give such an instruction when defining the element of knowledge in a criminal offense. Nevertheless, we find no prejudicial error in the giving of the instruction in the present case.\nAlthough we are rejecting the use of a willful blindness instruction, our decision is based on practical considerations. As we have stated above, the doctrine is consistent with the laws of this State. Thus, the trial court\u2019s instruction in this case was not an erroneous statement of law so as to require reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction. Contra, State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 70, 296 S.E. 2d 649, 654 (1982). Regardless of the particular words employed by the trial judge, an instruction is adequate if it accurately presents the applicable principles of law. State v. Wilkins, 34 N.C. App. 392, 399, 238 S.E. 2d 659, 664, disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 187, 241 S.E. 2d 516 (1977).\nMoreover, the evidence in this case supports the instruction under the standards enunciated by the Ninth Circuit. Defendant testified that someone he knew only as \u201cTony\u201d asked him to drive the truck from Florida to New York. Tony gave defendant $100 for the trip, and promised him $1,000 when he reached New York. Defendant also testified that Tony instructed him that, if he was stopped by the police, he should tell them that the truck belonged to defendant\u2019s uncle and that he was going to visit his mother. Under these circumstances, the jury could find that, if defendant had no knowledge that there were drugs in the truck, it was only because he consciously avoided that knowledge. This evidence would also permit the jury to infer from the circumstances that defendant knew the drugs were in the truck.\nDefendant also argues that, even if a willful blindness instruction was appropriate in this case, the trial court\u2019s instruction was improper. We agree that the instruction is somewhat confusing because the trial court misplaced the phrase \u201cand consciously avoids enlightenment.\u201d Defendant did not, however, object to the instruction on these grounds. The record shows that defendant objected to the instruction before it was given on the grounds that it was not an accurate statement of the law in this State and that it was not appropriate in this case. After charging the jury, the trial court asked if there were any specific requests for corrections or additions to the charge, and defendant only renewed his earlier objections. Because defendant failed to object specifically to the wording of the instruction, he cannot raise this issue on appeal. Rule 10(b)(2), N.C. Rules App. Proc.; State v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. 506, 515, 335 S.E. 2d 506, 512 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 593, 341 S.E. 2d 33 (1986). The instructions do not constitute plain error so as to permit review in the absence of a properly made objection. See State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E. 2d 375 (1983).\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of defendant\u2019s good character as substantive evidence. Defendant presented evidence showing that he had no prior criminal record, and defendant\u2019s uncle testified that he had a good reputation for honesty and a good reputation for being a law-abiding citizen. The trial court instructed the jury that evidence of defendant\u2019s character for truthfulness could only be considered in assessing defendant\u2019s credibility as a witness.\nPrior to the enactment of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, a defendant who testified in his own behalf and introduced evidence of his good character was entitled to have the jury consider such evidence both as it affected his credibility and as substantive evidence on the question of guilt or innocence. State v. Wortham, 240 N.C. 132, 134, 81 S.E. 2d 254, 255 (1954). The Rules of Evidence changed this practice in that, under Rule 404(a)(1), the accused can only offer character evidence relating to a \u201cpertinent\u201d trait of his character. State v. Squire, 321 N.C. 541, 546-47, 364 S.E. 2d 354, 357 (1988).\nThe crimes charged in this case do not involve dishonesty or deception on the part of defendant. Thus, defendant\u2019s truthfulness is not a pertinent character trait for substantive purposes. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F. 2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S.Ct. 2882, 61 L.Ed. 2d 310 (1979).\nThe general trait of being a law-abiding citizen is pertinent to almost any criminal offense. State v. Squire, 321 N.C. at 548, 364 S.E. 2d at 358. Unless character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, however, the Rules of Evidence limit the methods of proving character to testimony as to reputation and testimony in the form of an opinion. Rule 405, N.C. Rules Evid. Therefore, evidence of defendant\u2019s lack of a prior criminal record was not competent character evidence and did not warrant a jury instruction on substantive character evidence. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Grant, 775 F. 2d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1985).\nDefendant\u2019s uncle testified that defendant had a good reputation for being a law-abiding citizen. That testimony, however, was limited to the following exchange:\nQ. Do you know his reputation for being a law-abiding citizen?\nA. I would say excellent. Because there was nothing before this incident.\nAlthough the question above was phrased in terms of reputation, the witness\u2019s answer was clearly based on defendant\u2019s lack of prior arrests or convictions, which is not competent character evidence. Since this answer is the only evidence in the record that is even arguably competent as substantive character evidence, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to give the requested instruction.\nDefendant\u2019s final assignment of error is that he could not properly be convicted and sentenced for both trafficking in marijuana by possession and trafficking in marijuana by transportation based upon the same transaction. It is now well-established that convictions for the separate offenses of transporting and possessing a controlled substance are consistent with the intent of the legislature and do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 102-04, 340 S.E. 2d 450, 460-61 (1986); State v. Russell, 84 N.C. App. 383, 391, 352 S.E. 2d 922, 927, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 319 N.C. 677, 356 S.E. 2d 784, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 336, 98 L.Ed. 2d 363 (1987). The assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons stated above, we find that defendant\u2019s trial was free of reversible error.\nNo error.\nJudge ORR concurs.\nJudge Wells dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Wells\ndissenting.\nIn my opinion, there is no substantial difference in the \u201cwillful blindness\u201d instruction given by the trial court in this case and the \u201creason to know\u201d instruction disapproved of by our Supreme Court in State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 S.E. 2d 552 (1984). In my opinion, the \u201cwillful blindness\u201d instruction given in this case entitles defendant to a new trial, and I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s no error holding.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Wells" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Howard E. Hill, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Mark D. Montgomery, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARCELLE ANTONIO BOGLE\nNo. 876SC1068\n(Filed 31 May 1988)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 111.1; Narcotics \u00a7 4.5\u2014 willful blindness instruction not proper on element of knowledge \u2014 defendant not prejudiced by instruction\nAlthough the doctrine of \u201cwillful blindness\u201d is consistent with the law of this State, the Court of Appeals nevertheless declines to adopt it as the basis for a proper jury instruction on the element of knowledge in a criminal case, since the doctrine is merely a slight extension of the principle of implied knowledge which is not needed to combat drug traffickers effectively, and the doctrine is difficult to apply and susceptible to abuse. Defendant was not prejudiced by such an instruction in this case, since it was not an erroneous statement of the law, and defendant did not object to the instruction on the ground that it was confusing, nor did he request a correction or addition.\n2. Narcotics 8 4.5\u2014 trafficking in marijuana \u2014 defendant\u2019s good character not substantive evidence \u2014 instruction properly refused\nIn a prosecution of defendant for trafficking in marijuana, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of defendant\u2019s good character as substantive evidence, since N.C. Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(a)(1) allows an accused only to offer character evidence relating to a pertinent trait of his character; the crimes charged in this case did not involve dishonesty or deception on the part of defendant; and defendant\u2019s truthfulness thus was not a pertinent character trait for substantive purposes.\n3. Narcotics 8 1.3\u2014 trafficking in marijuana by possession and by transportation \u2014 one transaction \u2014 two offenses\nDefendant could properly be convicted and sentenced for both trafficking in marijuana by possession and trafficking in marijuana by transportation based upon the same transaction.\nJudge Wells dissenting.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Phillips (Herbert O., Ill), Judge. Judgments entered 2 July 1987 in Superior Court, NORTHAMPTON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 March 1988.\nDefendant was tried and convicted of trafficking in marijuana by transportation and trafficking in marijuana by possession under G.S. 90-95(h). From judgments imposing concurrent sentences of a seven-year prison term and a fine of $25,000 for each offense, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Associate Attorney General Howard E. Hill, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Mark D. Montgomery, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0277-01", "first_page_order": 307, "last_page_order": 316 }