{ "id": 8525323, "name": "NORMAN K. STANLEY and EVELYN B. STANLEY v. ELIZA HARVEY", "name_abbreviation": "Stanley v. Harvey", "decision_date": "1988-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 8710DC703", "first_page": "535", "last_page": "540", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "90 N.C. App. 535" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549191 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 S.E. 2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "Section 42-14 does not prevent agreement for different notice since provisions are permissive" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600675 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "Section 42-14 does not prevent agreement for different notice since provisions are permissive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "158-59", "parenthetical": "Section 42-3 implies forfeiture only where lease is \"silent\" on forfeiture for nonpayment of rent" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562594 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0218-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 550, "char_count": 12617, "ocr_confidence": 0.812, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.146628744809123e-07, "percentile": 0.956230266706669 }, "sha256": "9c7e809692ae1b2b90b1b4428f55bd18a560f85a3ca982276b6c9b3dd9d3bc40", "simhash": "1:baff97b9b5237dd6", "word_count": 2039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:12.261630+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges PARKER and Cozort concur." ], "parties": [ "NORMAN K. STANLEY and EVELYN B. STANLEY v. ELIZA HARVEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nDefendant-lessee appeals from an order ejecting her from properties she leased from plaintiff-lessors and awarding lessors certain bond monies. The evidence tends to show lessors and lessee executed a written lease agreement on 25 January 1980. Although the original term of the lease expired on 24 January 1981, the lease provided that the terms and conditions of the lease would \u201cautomatically\u201d continue after the original term on a month-to-month basis. Other than allowing lessors to modify the rent or other provisions should lessee offer to renew the lease for a longer term, the lease did not provide for any unilateral modification of the lease during the automatic extension period. The lease did provide that either party could terminate the lease during the extension period upon thirty days\u2019 notice. Furthermore, if lessee breached the lease during this period, lessors could terminate the lease upon one day\u2019s notice.\nAfter the original term ended, lessors notified lessee in July 1981 that the rent would increase from the original $239.00 per month to $282.00; however, lessee continued to pay, and lessors accepted, the original rental amount for almost one year thereafter. On 12 January 1982, lessors also notified lessee that she had violated the lease since she allegedly had more occupants living with her on the premises than were permitted under the lease. Lessee denied any default as she contended that the occupancy provision had been expressly waived by lessors. Despite the 12 January 1982 letter, lessors continued to accept the original rental amount provided by the original lease until 16 July 1982 when lessors notified lessee in writing that:\nDue to your default and failure to abide by the terms of your lease [the lessors] have elected to request that you vacate the premises by the 24th day of July 1982. Please take this as formal notice that [lessors] desire to take possession of the premises on July 25, 1982.\nLessee refused to vacate the premises and lessors filed a summary ejectment complaint requesting possession of the leased properties and past due rent. The magistrate granted judgment for lessors and lessee appealed to the district court. As allowed under N.C.G.S. Sec. 42-34(b) (1984), the Clerk permitted lessee to stay execution so long as she paid into court the disputed rental amount of $282.00 each month the matter was pending. In district court, lessors again requested past due rent and ejectment of lessee from the premises based on nonpayment of the increased rent and violation of the provision limiting the number of occupants. Lessee again alleged lessors had waived any default under the lease and asserted lessors were in any event estopped because the lessors\u2019 attempted eviction was retaliatory in nature. Lessee also contended lessors\u2019 16 July 1982 notice to \u201cvacate\u201d did not terminate the lease as required before lessors could retake possession under the lease.\nThe trial court granted lessors possession of the property and ordered the clerk to pay lessors all rent monies collected while the action was pending. However, the court denied lessors\u2019 claim for any other past due rent arising from lessors\u2019 July 1981 demand for increased rent. Lessee appeals.\nThe issues presented are: I) as the relevant provisions of the summary ejectment statute allow ejectment only when the lessee\u2019s estate has first \u201cceased,\u201d whether lessors\u2019 16 July 1982 letter requesting lessee to \u201cvacate\u201d terminated lessee\u2019s leasehold estate; and II) whether lessee is entitled to a refund of rent paid into court in excess of the rent required under the original lease.\npH\nSection 42-26 allows the remedy of summary ejectment in only the following cases: \u201c(1) When a tenant in possession of real estate holds over after his term has expired; (2) when the tenant . . . has done or omitted any act by which, according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has ceased; (3) when any tenant or lessee of lands [who owes rent or has granted a lien on his crop] deserts the demised premises . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. Sec. 42-26 (1984). Under Subsection (2), a breach of the lease cannot be made the basis of summary ejectment unless the lease itself provides for termination by such breach or reserves a right of reentry for such breach. Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 222, 152 S.E. 2d 155, 159 (1967). Conversely, statutory forfeitures under Section 42-3 are not implied where the lease itself provides for termination upon nonpayment of rent. Compare N.C.G.S. Sec. 42-3 (1984) (implying forfeiture upon failure to pay rent within ten days after demand) with Morris, 269 N.C. at 222, 152 S.E. 2d at 158-59 (Section 42-3 implies forfeiture only where lease is \u201csilent\u201d on forfeiture for nonpayment of rent). Furthermore, the parties\u2019 lease may require a notice of termination that differs both in type and extent from that allowed under Section 42-14. Compare N.C.G.S. Sec. 42-14 (1984) (month-to-month tenancy may be terminated by seven days\u2019 \u201cnotice to quit\u201d) with Cherry v. Whitehurst, 216 N.C. 340, 343, 4 S.E. 2d 900, 902 (1939) (Section 42-14 does not prevent agreement for different notice since provisions are permissive).\nThe instant lessee was not holding over after the expiration of her term but instead remained in possession under the automatic extension provisions of the original lease; furthermore, this is not an agricultural lease. Thus, this is not a case for summary ejectment under either subsections (1) or (3) of Section 42-26. Instead, lessors could bring this action for summary ejectment only if lessee\u2019s estate had \u201cceased\u201d under Section 42-26(2). The dis-positive provision of the lease reads:\nIf the Lessee shall fail to pay any installment of rent when due and payable or to perform any of the other conditions as herein provided, such failure shall at the option of the Lessor, terminate this lease and upon one days notice to the Lessee the Lessor may without further notice or demand reenter upon and take possession of said premises without prejudice to other remedies, the Lessee hereby expressly waiving all the legal formalities. If Lessee defaults on lease conditions herein or is evicted for non-payment of rent, this action shall not void this lease and Lessee shall be held liable and agrees to pay any lost rent, late payment charges, bad check charges, damages, and cost of advertising house or apartment at one dollar ($1.00) per day. [Emphasis added.]\nLessee argues the exercise of lessors\u2019 \u201coption\u201d to terminate required lessors to notify lessee that the lease had terminated before lessors could \u201cwithout further notice or demand\u201d re-take possession. Lessee contends the 16 July 1982 notice did not terminate the lease as required but merely requested lessee to \u201cvacate\u201d the premises. As lessee\u2019s leasehold interest did not automatically terminate upon lessee\u2019s breach and as lessors allegedly did not properly terminate the lease, lessee contends there is no basis for summary ejectment under Section 42-26(2).\nWe agree. Our courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures. Couch v. ADC Realty Corp., 48 N.C. App. 108, 114, 268 S.E. 2d 237, 242 (1980). When termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents. See 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant Sec. 1048 (1970) (where lessor must exercise option to terminate, lessor\u2019s declaration of forfeiture must be unequivocal and decisive). The lease here provided that lessee\u2019s breach would not automatically \u201cvoid\u201d the lease: lessee\u2019s breach would instead give lessors the option to \u201cterminate\u201d the lease. However, lessors\u2019 written notice merely stated lessors \u201celected to request that [lessee] vacate the premises\u201d on 24 July 1982. While Section 42-17 permits termination of month-to-month tenancies upon a seven-day \u201cnotice to quit,\u201d lessors and lessee agreed to a different type of notice and a different period of notice. Aside from the arguably less-than-unequivocal \u201crequest\u201d that lessee vacate, nowhere does the notice state that lessors have elected to \u201cterminate\u201d the lease as required under the contract. This was not a clear and unequivocal notice that the lease was terminated since lessee could reasonably believe lessors were requesting that she vacate without terminating the lease. Lessee could have arguably refused such a request since the lease did not provide for any automatic right of re-entry.\nAccordingly, lessors\u2019 letter requesting lessee to vacate was insufficient to comply with the terms of the lease allowing lessors to terminate lessee\u2019s estate. As no statutory forfeiture under Section 42-3 was otherwise implied under these circumstances, we conclude lessors had not terminated lessee\u2019s estate before commencing this summary ejectment action. As the summary ejectment remedy is restricted to those cases expressly covered by Section 42-26, Morris, 269 N.C. at 223, 152 S.E. 2d at 159, we hold the court should have denied lessors\u2019 claim for summary ejectment.\nAs we have determined that lessors had no authority under the lease to proceed with this summary ejectment action, we find it unnecessary to address any other assignment of error raised by lessee other than that stated below.\nII\nLessee next argues that the court should have ordered the Clerk to refund to her all rent paid to the court in excess of the original rent of $239.00 per month. At the time lessors allegedly notified lessee the rent was being increased to $282.00 per month, the lease had automatically converted to a month-to-month tenancy with the same terms and conditions as during the original lease term. Neither before or after the institution of the summary ejectment action did lessee agree to any rent increase. Instead, she merely paid the increased rent as a condition of her appeal. Since the lease expressly provided that its terms and conditions \u2014including rent \u2014 would automatically continue during the extension period and as lessee had not offered to renew the lease for a longer period, the lease did not permit lessors\u2019 unilateral modification of any provision of the lease during the automatic extension period. Accordingly, lessee was not liable for any increased rent demanded by lessors. If lessee would not agree to a modification of the rent provisions of the lease agreement, lessors\u2019 only recourse was to terminate the lease. As we have noted, they did not do this.\nTherefore, as respects the bond posted by lessee with the clerk during the pendency of this action, lessors were only entitled to receive from that fund outstanding rent based on the original rental rate. The balance of lessee\u2019s bond in excess of that amount was due and payable to lessee. Thus, we vacate the court\u2019s judgment insofar as it awarded lessors possession of the leased premises and the entire bond fund posted by lessee. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges PARKER and Cozort concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lawrence F. Mazer for plaintiff-appellees.", "East Central Community Legal Services, by Augustus S. Anderson Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORMAN K. STANLEY and EVELYN B. STANLEY v. ELIZA HARVEY\nNo. 8710DC703\n(Filed 21 June 1988)\n1. Landlord and Tenant 8 13.1; Ejectment 8 4\u2014 summary ejectment \u2014 notice to vacate \u2014 insufficient to terminate lease\nThe trial court should have denied lessors\u2019 claim for summary ejectment where the lessors\u2019 letter requesting lessee to vacate was insufficient to comply with the terms of the lease allowing lessors to terminate lessee\u2019s estate, and no statutory forfeiture under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 42-3 was otherwise implied. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 42-26.\n2. Landlord and Tenant 8 14\u2014 summary ejectment \u2014 appeal\u2014amount of rent increase paid to clerk \u2014 return to lessee\nLessors were not entitled to all rent paid to the court in excess of the original rent as a condition of appeal in a summary ejectment action where, at the time lessors allegedly notified lessee of a rent increase, the lease had automatically converted to a month-to-month tenancy with the same terms and conditions as during the original lease terms; the lessee never agreed to any rent increase; the lease expressly provided that its terms and conditions, including rent, would continue during the extension period; the lease did not permit lessors\u2019 unilateral modification of any provision of the lease; and lessors\u2019 only recourse was to terminate the lease, which was not done.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Creech (William A.), Judge. Order entered 19 March 1987 in District Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 January 1988.\nLawrence F. Mazer for plaintiff-appellees.\nEast Central Community Legal Services, by Augustus S. Anderson Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0535-01", "first_page_order": 565, "last_page_order": 570 }