{
  "id": 8525566,
  "name": "BRUCE G. HAGEMAN, Plaintiff v. TWIN CITY CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1988-06-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 8721SC1239",
  "first_page": "594",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge COZORT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BRUCE G. HAGEMAN, Plaintiff v. TWIN CITY CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nA motion for a directed verdict presents the question of whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, will justify a verdict in defendant\u2019s favor. Snow v. Power Co., 297 N.C. 591, 256 S.E. 2d 227 (1979). Defendant argued at the close of trial, and contends now in his brief, that plaintiffs evidence failed to establish any actionable claim or violation of the FCRA as a matter of law. We agree.\nThe main bulk of FCRA requirements are imposed on consumer reporting agencies, and only four sections of the Act place requirements on persons who are not consumer reporting agencies: \u00a7\u00a7 1681d, 1681m, 1681q and 1681r. Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 668 (M.D.N.C. 1978). Plaintiff in the present case alleges a violation of \u00a7 1681q, which provides as follows:\nAny person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.\nIt has been held that \u00a7 1681q requires that \u201cusers of consumer information\u201d refrain from obtaining consumer credit information from credit reporting agencies under false pretense. Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F. 2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1978). A violation of \u00a7 1681q forms a basis of liability under either \u00a7 1681n or \u00a7 1681o. Id. Thus, \u00a7 1681q makes \u201cusers of consumer information\u201d amenable to civil suit. Plaintiff in the present case contends that defendant is a \u201cuser\u201d within the meaning of the FCRA because, by taking and transmitting to CCC a credit application, it caused CCC to obtain a consumer credit report to use for the purpose of making a credit determination that benefitted defendant by financing the latter\u2019s customers. However, we hold that defendant was not a \u201cuser\u201d within the meaning of the FCRA.\nA \u201cuser\u201d is one who obtains consumer credit information from a consumer reporting agency for the purpose of making some determination, typically in order to decide whether to advance credit. In the present case, the Credit Bureau of Winston-Salem was the consumer reporting agency, and CCC was the \u201cuser.\u201d It was CCC who solicited and obtained information for the purpose of determining whether to extend credit to plaintiff. Defendant Twin City sells and leases cars. As a service to its customers and in order to assist them in securing financing, defendant frequently forwards credit applications to entities such as CCC. However, defendant Twin City makes no credit determination. It does not use, or even see, the consumer credit information gathered. Since defendant is not a \u201cuser\u201d of consumer information within the meaning of the FCRA, it is not liable as a \u201cuser\u201d under \u00a7 1681q of the Act.\nWe find support for our decision in Rush v. Macy\u2019s New York, Inc., 775 F. 2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1985). In that case, Macy\u2019s furnished information to Credit Bureau, Inc., a consumer reporting agency. On the basis of the information supplied, Credit Bureau gave plaintiff the lowest possible credit rating, and plaintiff sued both Macy\u2019s and Credit Bureau. The court held that a department store which did no more than furnish information to a credit reporting agency is not a \u201cuser\u201d of credit information within the meaning of the FCRA. Id. By analogy, an automobile dealer that merely transmits credit applications to a third party is also not a \u201cuser\u201d under the Act.\nNo error.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge COZORT concur.\n. Under \u00a7 1681a, a \u201cperson\u201d means any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Badgett, Calaway, Phillips, Davis, Stephens & Peed, by Her man L. Stephens, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Petree Stockton & Robinson, by Steve M. Pharr and G. Gray Wilson, for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BRUCE G. HAGEMAN, Plaintiff v. TWIN CITY CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., Defendant\nNo. 8721SC1239\n(Filed 21 June 1988)\nConsumer Credit 8 1\u2014 violation ol Fair Credit Reporting Act \u2014 directed verdict for defendant proper\nThe trial court did not err in an action for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act by granting a directed verdict for defendant automobile dealer where plaintiff\u2019s wife signed an automobile lease agreement with defendant; defendant\u2019s fleet manager prepared a credit application to be submitted to Chrysler Credit Corporation; the fleet manager asked plaintiffs wife for information about plaintiff and plaintiffs wife gave plaintiffs name but advised the fleet manager that plaintiff had nothing to do with the lease agreement or the credit application; the fleet manager telephoned a call-in application to Chrysler Credit Corporation, which ran a credit investigation on plaintiffs wife; a Chrysler Credit Corporation employee telephoned the fleet manager to advise him that plaintiffs wife\u2019s credit application had been denied; the fleet manager and the Chrysler Credit Corporation employee agreed to determine if credit could be established for plaintiff; Chrysler Credit Corporation did a credit investigation of plaintiff, including obtaining a consumer credit report from the Credit Bureau of Winston-Salem; and the Chrysler Credit Corporation rejected plaintiffs credit and advised defendant of the rejection. The FCRA requires that users of consumer information refrain from obtaining consumer credit information from credit reporting agencies under false pretense; however, defendant makes no credit determination, does not use or even see the consumer credit information gathered, and is not a user of consumer information within the meaning of the FCRA.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Washington, Edward K., Judge. Order entered 29 July 1987 in FORSYTH County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 May 1988.\nPlaintiff brought this suit pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 et seq., claiming that defendant Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Twin City) (1) obtained credit information on him under false pretenses in violation of \u00a7 1681q, and (2) invaded his right of privacy. Before trial the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to the action for invasion of privacy, but denied summary judgment on the FCRA claim. Plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of his invasion of privacy claim.\nThe evidence presented at trial established the following facts: On the morning of 30 November 1984, plaintiffs wife, Bonnie Hageman, signed (1) an automobile lease agreement with defendant for a new Chrysler LeBaron convertible, and (2) a credit application to be submitted to Chrysler Credit Corporation (CCC) for the purpose of having the lease financed. Jim Leonard, defendant\u2019s fleet manager, prepared the credit application. Mr. Leonard asked Mrs. Hageman for information about her husband, plaintiff herein. Mrs. Hageman gave her husband\u2019s name but advised Mr. Leonard that Mr. Hageman had nothing to do with the lease agreement or the credit application. Mr. Leonard telephoned a \u201ccall-in\u201d credit application to CCC, which ran a credit investigation on Mrs. Hageman. At 11:15 a.m. on 30 November, Faye Tram-mell, an employee of CCC, telephoned Mr. Leonard and advised him that Mrs. Hageman\u2019s credit application had been denied. Mr. Leonard and Mrs. Trammell then agreed to determine if credit could be established based on Mr. Hageman. CCC did a credit investigation of plaintiff, including obtaining a consumer credit report from the Credit Bureau of Winston-Salem. Based on the information obtained, CCC also rejected plaintiffs credit, advised defendant of the rejection, and forwarded to plaintiff and his wife a Chrysler Credit Notice of Adverse Action letter dated 30 November 1984.\nAt trial plaintiff sought to establish that he had not been an applicant for credit with defendant or CCC, had not authorized a credit application on his behalf, and that the credit inquiry was unlawfully initiated by defendant, causing him humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional distress. At the close of plaintiffs evidence, the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nBadgett, Calaway, Phillips, Davis, Stephens & Peed, by Her man L. Stephens, for plaintiff-appellant.\nPetree Stockton & Robinson, by Steve M. Pharr and G. Gray Wilson, for defendant-appellee.\n. Concurrent jurisdictional authority is granted to state courts per \u00a7 1681p."
  },
  "file_name": "0594-01",
  "first_page_order": 624,
  "last_page_order": 627
}