{ "id": 8526003, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. IRVIN BARNES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Barnes", "decision_date": "1988-10-04", "docket_number": "No. 887SC104", "first_page": "484", "last_page": "492", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "91 N.C. App. 484" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "122 S.E. 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654458 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560974 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560084 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275013 ], "year": 1885, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/93/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E. 2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569542 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569948 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F. 2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 S.E. 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1889, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652693 ], "year": 1889, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/104/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550168 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526020 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41-42", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "41-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570297 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E. 2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562829 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561810 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0065-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 783, "char_count": 17530, "ocr_confidence": 0.805, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5711402504904267e-07, "percentile": 0.8162618747270594 }, "sha256": "0218988f6195173db1bcfff1634cce0340e9c029539752ffd8f8d8c3291fe46b", "simhash": "1:054e5136b6271d53", "word_count": 2965 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:36.579827+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Eagles and Smith concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. IRVIN BARNES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Judge.\nI.\nDefendant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s allowing the jury to consider a charge of burglary based on the acting in concert principle. Defendant contends that the State failed to present evidence showing that defendant was present at the scene of the burglary or that the burglary was pursuant to a common plan.\nEvidence presented at trial relevant to this issue is as follows: On 5 January 1987, defendant\u2019s uncle, Plummer Ruffin, agreed to pay defendant and three other men, Eric Blount, Willie Ruffin, and David Howard, $100 each to go to the home of Plum-mer\u2019s former girlfriend, Rosa Lee Epps, and \u201crough her up.\u201d Plummer further instructed them to \u201crough up\u201d Epps\u2019 boyfriend, William Roberson, \u201cif he got in the way.\u201d Plummer then drove the men to a bridge near Epps\u2019 home and armed each man with a metal pipe.\nAt approximately 7:30 p.m., Howard and Blount approached Epps\u2019 house. Defendant and Willie Ruffin stayed back so that the four men would not be seen together. Howard and Blount spoke to Roberson who was inside the house. They asked to use the telephone, the bathroom and the car in an attempt to get inside the house. Roberson denied all of their requests. Howard and Blount walked away from the house, and then decided to go back and \u201cbust the door open.\u201d Howard kicked the door in and he and Blount immediately began assaulting Roberson and Epps. Roberson escaped, but was caught by defendant and Willie Ruffin who were waiting outside. It was unclear from testimony at trial whether defendant was waiting \u201cdown the road\u201d or only \u201cfive or six yards\u201d from the house. In either case, defendant shot a gun into the air, ordered Roberson to stop and, along with Willie Ruf-fin, took Roberson back into the house.\n\u201cThe elements of burglary in the first degree are: (1) the breaking (2) and entering (3) in the nighttime (4) with the intent to commit a felony (5) into a dwelling house . . . (6) which is actually occupied at the time of the offense. State v. Accor [and State v. Moore], 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E. 2d 583 (1970); G.S. 14-51.\u201d State v. Davis, 282 N.C. 107, 116, 191 S.E. 2d 664, 670 (1972).\nIn North Carolina, one may be convicted of a crime under the \u201cacting in concert\u201d principle if \u201che is present at the scene of the crime and ... he is acting together with another who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose to commit the crime.\u201d State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 357, 255 S.E. 2d 390, 395 (1979).\nWe find defendant\u2019s contention that the State failed to provide evidence establishing that the burglary was part of a common plan to be without merit. The Supreme Court of North Carolina found no error in a jury instruction which stated that if\n\u2018two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose ... or as a natural or probable consequence thereof\u2019\nState v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 41-42, 181 S.E. 2d 572, 586 (1971) (emphasis added).\nThe plan to \u201crough up\u201d Rosa Epps required either gaining entry into her house or persuading her to come outside. Clearly, breaking into her home was in pursuance of the common purpose to assault her.\nWe also find defendant\u2019s contention that there was no evidence of his presence at the scene of the burglary to be without merit. The presence required for acting in concert is either actual or constructive. Id. See also State v. Ruffin, 90 N.C. App. 705, 370 S.E. 2d 279 (1988). In defining constructive presence, this Court has held that actual distance is not determinative, but that \u201cthe accused must be near enough to render assistance if need be and to encourage the actual perpetration of the crime.\u201d State v. Buie, 26 N.C. App. 151, 153, 215 S.E. 2d 401, 403 (1975). In State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900, 10 S.E. 519 (1889), our Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction which stated that the defendant who was one hundred and fifty yards from the actual assault was present if he was there with a gun to lend aid if needed.\nThis case is factually similar to Chastain. The State\u2019s evidence tends to show that defendant was waiting with a gun either five or six yards from the house or down the road, but close enough to lend aid by apprehending William Roberson who fled from the house immediately after the burglary.\nWe hold that there was sufficient evidence as to defendant\u2019s presence and a common plan or purpose to submit the charge of burglary to the jury under the theory of acting in concert.\nII.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to properly instruct the jury that defendant must have been present at the time of the crimes in order to be guilty under that doctrine.\nDefendant failed to object to this instruction at trial. Consequently, for the instruction to be the basis of a reversal, it must rise to the level of \u201cplain error.\u201d \u201cPlain error\u201d exists \u201cwhere, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done . . . .\u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E. 2d 375, 378 (1983) (emphasis supplied), quoting, United States v. McCaskill, 676 F. 2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982). In considering \u201cplain error,\u201d \u201cthe appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt.\u201d Id. at 661, 300 S.E. 2d at 379.\nAs discussed earlier, one may be convicted under the principle of acting in concert if one is present, actually or constructively, at the scene of the crime, and the crime was committed pursuant to a common plan or purpose. State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. at 41-42, 181 S.E. 2d at 586. See also State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. at 357, 255 S.E. 2d at 395.\nDefendant was actually present in the house when all of the crimes were committed, with the exception of burglary. The State\u2019s evidence, even when viewed in defendant\u2019s favor, demonstrates his constructive presence at the scene of the burglary. Since defendant was indeed present or constructively present when all of the crimes were committed, we can find no compelling basis for a belief that an instructional error with regard to presence had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s verdict. We hold that there was no \u201cplain error\u201d in this instruction.\nIII.\nNext, defendant assigns as reversible error the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of statutory rape. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove every element of the crime because the State did not offer any evidence of defendant\u2019s age.\nAn essential element of the crime of statutory rape is that the defendant must be at least twelve years of age and at least four years older than the victim. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) (1986).\nDefendant questions the constitutionality of North Carolina decisions which allow jurors to determine a defendant\u2019s age based on their observation of the defendant. See State v. Evans, 298 N.C. 263, 258 S.E. 2d 354 (1979); State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 233 S.E. 2d 905 (1977); State v. McNair, 93 N.C. 628 (1885).\nWe need not address the constitutional issues raised here in order to decide this case. \u201cIt is well settled that where concurrent sentences are imposed on counts of equal gravity, or concurrent sentences of equal length are imposed, any error in the charge relating to one count only is harmless.\u201d State v. Evans, 298 N.C. at 267, 258 S.E. 2d at 357. Here defendant received a life sentence for statutory rape which will run concurrently with the life sentence imposed for burglary. Therefore, any error on the part of the trial court regarding statutory rape was harmless error and is not grounds for reversal.\nIV.\nDefendant further contends that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair trial by interrupting the testimony of a witness and addressing remarks to the witness and his counsel. Defendant cites State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E. 2d 631 (1976), to support his contention that special hazards are created by judicial warnings and admonitions to a witness in a criminal trial.\nRhodes sets out four hazards which may result from judicial warnings and admonitions to a witness. First, the trial judge may invade the province of the jury by assessing the witness\u2019s credibility. Id. at 24, 224 S.E. 2d at 636. Second, a witness may change the testimony due to a judge\u2019s threat of prosecution for perjury. Id. Third, defendant\u2019s attorney may be intimidated or discouraged from eliciting essential testimony from the witness. Id. at 26, 224 S.E. 2d at 637. Fourth, a judge\u2019s comments may reveal a violation of defendant\u2019s due process right to trial before an impartial judge. Id. at 27, 224 S.E. 2d at 638.\nIn Rhodes, the trial judge warned the witness (defendant\u2019s wife) and defendant\u2019s attorney regarding perjury. The judge stated that the witness was treading on thin ice, that he questioned the truthfulness of her statements and that he would not tolerate perjury. The Supreme Court found these remarks to be \u201cextensive, accusatory, and threatening.\u201d State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. at 28, 224 S.E. 2d at 639. The Court also found that these remarks prevented the defense attorney from questioning the witness further for fear of offering what the trial court believed to be perjured testimony.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court only interrupted the witness in response to defendant\u2019s objection to the district attorney\u2019s leading questions on direct examination. After sending the jury out of the courtroom, the judge found pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(c) that State\u2019s witness David Howard was a hostile witness and that the State could employ leading questions. The trial judge did question the manner of the testimony, but never questioned the truthfulness of the testimony. He stated that the testimony was different from other testimony given by the same person concerning the same series of events and that the witness seemed reluctant to respond to questioning.\nWe cannot find any reason to suspect that the Rhodes hazards materialized in this case. All of the comments were made out of the hearing of the jury, and therefore could not have invaded the jury\u2019s province of determining credibility. The judge never threatened or accused the witness in any way, and the witness continued to testify in much the same way as before the judge\u2019s comments. Defendant\u2019s attorney was able to elicit essential testimony from the witness even getting the witness to agree that in repeatedly contradicting himself, he was \u201cjust like a feather twisting in the wind.\u201d Finally, neither in these comments, nor in any other instance in the record is there evidence which questions the impartiality of the trial judge.\nWe can find no prejudice to defendant; therefore, no error.\nV.\nDefendant next assigns as error the use of the language \u201cand/or\u201d in the jury instructions in that such language is ambiguous and confusing. Defendant contends that the jury may have been misled by the instruction to believe that it should convict all if one is found to be guilty. Again, defendant failed to object to the instructions. Accordingly, if the trial court committed an error, it must rise to the level of \u201cplain error\u201d to warrant a favorable ruling for defendant.\nIn a case where co-defendants are tried jointly, jury instructions which can be construed to mean that if one is convicted the other should be convicted as well, will constitute reversible error. State v. Tomblin, 276 N.C. 273, 276, 171 S.E. 2d 901, 903 (1970). However, in reviewing a charge, it \u201cmust be construed \u2018as a whole in the same connected way in which it was given.\u2019 When thus considered, if it \u2018fairly and correctly presents the law, it will afford no ground for reversing the judgment ....\u2019\u201d Id. at 276, 171 S.E. 2d at 903, quoting, State v. Valley, 187 N.C. 571, 572, 122 S.E. 373, 373-74 (1924).\nThe question then becomes did the use of \u201cand/or\u201d when viewed in the context of the entire charge mislead the jury? We find that it did not.\nIn the preliminary instructions before trial and in the instructions at the close of the evidence, the trial court explained that the defendants must be judged \u201ccompletely separately and absolutely independently\u201d from each other. \u201cAnd/or\u201d was only used to delineate the elements of each crime. After setting out the elements, the trial court additionally charged the jury without using \u201cand/or\u201d regarding what it must find to convict each defendant of each crime.\nFinally, the jury does not appear to have been misled. Co-defendant Ruffin was found not guilty of the two rape charges, the first-degree sex offense, and the charge of robbery. Of these crimes, defendant Barnes was found guilty of statutory rape and robbery with a dangerous weapon. If the jury had been misled to believe that if one was convicted the other must be convicted, it would have found both defendants guilty of identical crimes.\nFor the reasons stated above, we find defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Eagles and Smith concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for the State.", "Lee, Reece & Weaver, by W. Earl Taylor, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. IRVIN BARNES\nNo. 887SC104\n(Filed 4 October 1988)\n1. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings 8 5.3\u2014 acting in concert to \u201crough up\u201d victim-burglary committed in furtherance of assault \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence as to defendant\u2019s presence and a common plan or purpose to submit the charge of burglary to the jury under the theory of acting in concert where the evidence tended to show that defendant and three others went to the home of the victim to \u201crough up\u201d her and her boyfriend; two of defendant\u2019s accomplices broke into the victim\u2019s house by kicking in the door; and defendant remained five or six yards from the house or down the road, but close enough to apprehend the boyfriend who fled from the house immediately after the burglary.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 113.7\u2014 acting in concert \u2014 presence of defendant at crime scene \u2014 instructions not prejudicial\nThe trial court\u2019s alleged failure properly to instruct the jury that defendant must have been present at the time of the crimes in order to be ghilty under the doctrine of acting in concert did not amount to plain error since defendant was actually or constructively present when all of the crimes were committed, and the alleged error had no probable impact on the jury\u2019s verdict.\n3. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings \u00a7 8; Rape \u00a7 7\u2014 first degree burglary and statutory rape \u2014 concurrent life sentences imposed \u2014 error in instructing on statutory rape harmless\nWhere defendant received a life sentence for statutory rape which was to run concurrently with a life sentence imposed for burglary, any error of the trial court in instructing with regard to statutory rape was harmless error.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 99.6\u2014 court\u2019s remarks to witness \u2014 no error\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court violated defendant\u2019s due process right to a fair trial by interrupting the testimony of a witness and addressing remarks to the witness and his counsel, since all of the court\u2019s comments were made out of the hearing of the jury and therefore could not have invaded the jury\u2019s province of determining credibility; the judge never threatened or accused the witness in any way, and the witness continued to testify in much the same way as before the judge\u2019s comments; defendant\u2019s attorney was able to elicit essential testimony from the witness; and there was nothing in the record which questioned the impartiality of the judge.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 113.6\u2014 two defendants \u2014 jury instructions \u2014 use of \u201cand/or\u201d\u2014 no prejudice\nDefendant who was tried with an accomplice was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s use of \u201cand/or\u201d in the jury instructions since the trial court explained in the preliminary instructions before trial and in the instructions at the close of the evidence that defendants must be judged \u201ccompletely separately and absolutely independently\u201d from each other; \u201cand/or\u201d was only used to delineate the elements of each crime; and the jury was not misled because defendant and his accomplice were convicted of different crimes.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Stevens (Henry L., Ill), Judge. Judgment entered 11 September 1987 in Superior Court, WILSON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 June 1988.\nOn 7 September 1987, defendant and Willie Ray Ruffin were joined for trial and tried by a jury on seven bills of indictment. Each defendant was charged with first-degree burglary, statutory rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense. On jury verdicts of guilty, the court entered judgments and imposed sentences on defendant as follows: (1) first-degree burglary \u2014 life imprisonment; (2) statutory rape \u2014 life imprisonment to run concurrently with the life sentence for burglary; (3) robbery with a dangerous weapon \u2014twelve years imprisonment; (4) two counts of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury \u2014 three years imprisonment for each. Defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isham B. Hudson, Jr., for the State.\nLee, Reece & Weaver, by W. Earl Taylor, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0484-01", "first_page_order": 512, "last_page_order": 520 }