{
  "id": 8526462,
  "name": "ERNIE G. MILAM v. LINDA MILAM",
  "name_abbreviation": "Milam v. Milam",
  "decision_date": "1988-11-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 884DC328",
  "first_page": "105",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 369,
    "char_count": 6390,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.827,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:11.858082+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Arnold and Cozort concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "ERNIE G. MILAM v. LINDA MILAM"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s classification of plaintiffs military pension as separate property based upon its finding that it had not vested as of the date of separation. Marital property includes \u201call vested pension, retirement, and other deferred compensation rights, including military pensions eligible under the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses\u2019 Protection Act.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(b)(l) (1987). While our equitable distribution statute specifically refers to \u201cvested\u201d pension and retirement rights, the statute does not define the term \u201cvested\u201d and apparently no decision of the North Carolina courts has defined the term \u201cvested\u201d in the context of equitable distribution. We adopt the definition followed by the Colorado courts: \u201c \u2018[v]est-ing\u2019 occurs when an employee has completed the minimum terms of employment necessary to be entitled to receive retirement pay at some point in the future. . .\" In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P. 2d 661 (Colo. 1987).\nWe are aware that in Seifert v. Seifert, 82 N.C. App. 329, 346 S.E. 2d 504 (1986), affirmed, 319 N.C. 367, 354 S.E. 2d 506 (1987), this Court, citing 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 3911 (1959), stated that vesting of a commissioned officer\u2019s military pension does not occur until the officer has served for twenty years. There are two aspects of Seifert, however, that are of critical significance in the context of the case now before us. First, vesting was not at issue in Seifert, only evaluation of a pension assumed to be vested. Second, the provisions of 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 3911 (1959), which authorize the retirement of a commissioned officer, upon his request, after twenty years of service, must, under the facts of this case, be construed together with the provisions of 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 564(a)(2) (1983).\nAlthough the Secretary of the Army is authorized to retire commissioned officers upon their request after twenty years of service, in evaluating defendant\u2019s argument we must nevertheless consider whether the plaintiff was so assured of eventually receiving his military pension at the time the parties separated as to necessitate classifying it as vested for purposes of equitable distribution. 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 564(a)(2) (1983) provides:\n(a) Unless retired or separated under some other provision of law, a permanent regular warrant officer who has twice failed of selection for promotion to the next higher permanent regular warrant officer grade shall\u2014\n(2) if he has at least 18 but not more than 20 years of such active service on (A) the date when the Secretary concerned approves the report of the board under section 560(g) of this title, (B) the date when his name was removed from the recommended list under section 562(a) of this title, or (C) the date prescribed by the Secretary concerned under section 557(b) of this title, whichever applies, be retired 60 days after the date upon which he completes 20 years of active service, except as provided by section 8301 of title 5, with retired pay computed under section 1401 of this title, unless he is selected for promotion to the next higher permanent regular grade before that date ....\nThis statute guarantees permanent regular warrant officers with at least eighteen years of service, who are twice passed over for promotion, the right to remain in service for up to two additional years until they qualify for retirement.\nAt the time of the parties\u2019 separation plaintiff was guaranteed, against the possibility of dismissal after twice being passed over for promotion, the right to continue in active duty for the remaining time necessary to complete twenty years of service. 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 564(a)(2) (1983). He served through the protected period and retired before the judgment of equitable distribution. Under the In re Marriage of Grubb rule we have adopted, the guarantee of additional time for plaintiff to complete his twenty-year period results in his military pension being vested for purposes of equitable distribution, at the time the parties separated.\nBecause the trial court\u2019s erroneous classification of plaintiffs military pension as separate property affected the subsequent distribution, we must remand the case for a new order of equitable distribution in which the trial court must consider this factor in making its award.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges Arnold and Cozort concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cameron and Coleman, by W. M. Cameron, III, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Lana S. Warlick for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ERNIE G. MILAM v. LINDA MILAM\nNo. 884DC328\n(Filed 15 November 1988)\nDivorce and Alimony \u00a7 21.9\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 military pension \u2014 definition of vesting\nThe trial court erred in an equitable distribution action by holding that plaintiffs retirement rights had not vested and that plaintiffs military pension was separate property where plaintiff had nineteen years and five months of service at the time of separation and had retired with twenty years\u2019 service at the time of judgment. Under 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 564(a)(2) (1983), plaintiff was guaranteed the right to continue in active duty for the remaining time necessary to complete twenty years of service; under the definition of vesting in In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P. 2d 661, adopted by the Court ofAppeals, vesting occurs when an employee has completed the minimum terms of employment necessary to be entitled to receive retirement pay at some point in the future.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Kimble, Wayne G., Jr., Judge. Judgment entered 23 December 1987 in ONSLOW County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 October 1988.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment of equitable distribution classifying as separate property the plaintiffs military retirement income from his pension plan. Plaintiff and defendant were married on 2 November 1968 and were separated on 1 December 1985. At the date of separation plaintiff had nineteen years and five months of creditable military service with the United States Marine Corps. After twenty years\u2019 service, he retired on 1 August 1986 at the rank of CW02, and at the time of the judgment he received $1,022.00 per month in military retirement pay. The trial court held that his military retirement rights had not vested at the time of separation for the purposes of equitable distribution.\nFrom a judgment of equitable distribution declaring the plaintiffs retirement income to be his separate property, defendant appeals.\nCameron and Coleman, by W. M. Cameron, III, for plaintiff-appellee.\nLana S. Warlick for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0105-01",
  "first_page_order": 135,
  "last_page_order": 138
}
