{ "id": 8526636, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEAN NICOLAS JOSEPH", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Joseph", "decision_date": "1988-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 8812SC244", "first_page": "203", "last_page": "207", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 N.C. App. 203" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "348 S.E. 2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "dismissing interlocutory criminal appeal as nonappealable under Chapter 7A and Chapter 15A" }, { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733226 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "dismissing interlocutory criminal appeal as nonappealable under Chapter 7A and Chapter 15A" }, { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572216 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no statutory right to interlocutory criminal appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 N.C. App. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549641 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no statutory right to interlocutory criminal appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/7/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "holding denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy ground did not affect a substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526492 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "holding denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy ground did not affect a substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4721250, 4726152, 4720174, 4723376, 4721109 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0608-01", "/nc/313/0608-04", "/nc/313/0608-03", "/nc/313/0608-02", "/nc/313/0608-05" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E. 2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523263 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E. 2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168626 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding no right to appeal interlocutory order in criminal proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2221471 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding no right to appeal interlocutory order in criminal proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/209/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1917 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "holding right to appeal was not constitutional but allowing appeal of double jeopardy claim as collateral order under federal statute permitting, appeal of final judgment or \"decision\"" }, { "page": "657-58", "parenthetical": "holding right to appeal was not constitutional but allowing appeal of double jeopardy claim as collateral order under federal statute permitting, appeal of final judgment or \"decision\"" }, { "parenthetical": "holding right to appeal was not constitutional but allowing appeal of double jeopardy claim as collateral order under federal statute permitting, appeal of final judgment or \"decision\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 U.S. 211", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6138603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212-13", "parenthetical": "\"final judgment\" in criminal case means \"sentence\"" }, { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "\"final judgment\" in criminal case means \"sentence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/302/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576362 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0575-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 432, "char_count": 8821, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.108336370861571e-07, "percentile": 0.8598032163265117 }, "sha256": "f1760e1f64a708c00537a8b746cf4b76f68fbbd13a3149612f2c75f35f95ebab", "simhash": "1:390d4462166304b0", "word_count": 1423 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:11.858082+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Orr and Smith concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEAN NICOLAS JOSEPH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nDefendant was originally tried in superior court on counts of trafficking in cocaine and carrying a concealed weapon. On 10 September 1987, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial based upon a witness\u2019s reference to a statement by defendant which the trial court had previously suppressed. The trial court subsequently ordered the matter set for retrial; however, defendant moved to dismiss any retrial based upon his constitutional right to avoid double jeopardy. The trial court determined defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the charges based upon the prosecutor\u2019s conduct or otherwise and denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss based on his claim of double jeopardy. However, we dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal as an attempt to appeal a nonappealable interlocutory order rendered in a criminal proceeding.\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was not a final judgment since it did not \u201cdispose ... of [the case] as to the State and the defendant, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court.\u201d State v. Childs, 265 N.C. 575, 578, 144 S.E. 2d 653, 655 (1965) (per curiam); see also N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-101(4)(a) (1988) (providing \u201cjudgment\u201d is entered when sentence is pronounced); Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13, 82 L.Ed. 204, 205 (1937) (\u201cfinal judgment\u201d in criminal case means \u201csentence\u201d). The right to appeal from a criminal proceeding is not derived from the federal constitution but is instead a creature of statute. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 52 L.Ed. 2d 651, 657-58, 97 S.Ct. 2034 (1977) (holding right to appeal was not constitutional but allowing appeal of double jeopardy claim as collateral order under federal statute permitting, appeal of final judgment or \u201cdecision\u201d). Our own Supreme Court has similarly held that the right to appeal in this state is purely statutory. State v. Blades, 209 N.C. 56, 182 S.E. 714 (1935) (holding no right to appeal interlocutory order in criminal proceeding).\nUnlike the federal statute permitting appeal of final \u201cdecisions\u201d in Abney, we are aware of no statute in this state which provides for appeal of an interlocutory order rendered in a criminal proceeding under these circumstances. Section 15A-1444(d) states that the procedure for criminal appeals to the appellate division is that permitted by our own Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chapter 7A and Section 15A-1441 et seq. N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-1444(d) (1988). Rule 3(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure merely provides for appeal by \u201cany party entitled by law to appeal from a judgment or order of a superior court rendered in a criminal action.\u201d Section 7A-27 provides for appeal in criminal proceedings only from final judgments. N.C.G.S. Sec. 7A-27(a), (b) (1988) (providing for appeal of life and death sentences and from any \u201cfinal judgment\u201d of a superior court).\nWith one exception, Chapter 15A also only allows a defendant to appeal after a \u201cfinal judgment.\u201d Sec. 15A-1444(a) (if plead not guilty, may appeal conviction as matter of right); Sec. 15A-1444(al) (can only appeal sentence as matter of right if exceeds presumptive term). A recent amendment to Section 15A-1432(d) does permit a defendant to maintain an interlocutory appeal of a superior court\u2019s reversal of a district court\u2019s dismissal of criminal charges. N.C.G.S. Sec. 15A-1432(d) (1988) (effective 1 October 1987). However, this statute is not applicable to defendant\u2019s appeal since by its terms Section 15A-1432(d) only applies to instances where the superior court reverses a dismissal of criminal charges by the district court: in this case, the superior court simply declared a mistrial requiring another trial in superior court.\nThus, there is under these circumstances no statutory right for defendant to conduct an interlocutory appeal of the superior court\u2019s denying his motion to dismiss these charges based on double jeopardy. We note some confusion in recent decisions of this court as to the relevance of Section 1-277 which permits appeals of interlocutory orders which affect a substantial right \u201cfrom every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior or district court . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. Sec. l-277(a) (1983); see, e.g., State v. Major, 84 N.C. App. 421, 422, 352 S.E. 2d 862, 863 (1987); State v. Montalbano, 73 N.C. App. 259, 260, 326 S.E. 2d 634, 635, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 608, 332 S.E. 2d 182 (1985); State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 413, 415, 313 S.E. 2d 264, 266 (1984) (holding denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy ground did not affect a substantial right); but see State v. Black, 7 N.C. App. 324, 172 S.E. 2d 217 (1970) (no statutory right to interlocutory criminal appeal).\nThe source of this confusion is an earlier pair of decisions by our Supreme Court which have since been superseded by the enactment of Section 15A-1444(d) and by more recent Supreme Court decisions. In Childs, our Supreme Court applied Section 1-277 in holding an appeal from a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding did not affect a substantial right. 265 N.C. at 578, 144 S.E. 2d at 653. The Court subsequently determined an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary adjudication of the obscenity of materials seized by police in State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E. 2d 854 (1972). Although the Bryant Court cited the Childs proposition that an interlocutory appeal would lie if defendant\u2019s substantial right was impaired, it noted defendant could also appeal the lower court\u2019s lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and in fact based its decision on that lack of jurisdiction. Id.\nWhile the denial of defendant\u2019s double jeopardy claim would presumably affect a \u201csubstantial right\u201d under Abney, the enactment of Section 15A-1444(d) subsequent to Childs and Bryant precludes defendant\u2019s resort to any \u201csubstantial right\u201d analysis under Section 1-277 since Section 15A-1444(d) limits criminal appeal procedures to those specified in Section 15A-1441 et seq., Chapter 7A and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Despite its earlier decisions in Childs and Bryant, our Supreme Court now limits its analysis of the appeal of interlocutory criminal orders to those sources of appellate rights set forth in Section 15A-1444(d). E.g., State v. Henry, 318 N.C. 408, 348 S.E. 2d 593 (1986) (dismissing interlocutory criminal appeal as nonappealable under Chapter 7A and Chapter 15A). We note Section 7A-27(e) does permit an appeal \u201cfrom any other order or judgment of the superior court from which an appeal is authorized by statute.\u201d It may be argued Section 7A-27(e) thus permits resort to a \u201csubstantial right\u201d analysis under Section l-277(a). However, except as the Legislature has amended Section 15A-1432(d) since Henry was decided, we are bound by the Henry Court\u2019s unqualified statement that \u201cthere is no provision for appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from an interlocutory order entered in a criminal case.\u201d 318 N.C. at 409, 348 S.E. 2d at 593.\nThus, in light of the Legislature\u2019s subsequent enactment of Section 15A-1444(d) and our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Henry, we conclude the statutory basis for the holding in Childs and the dictum in Bryant \u2014 Section 1-277 \u2014is no longer relevant to the appeal of interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, we decline to follow Jones, Major and Montalbano insofar as they might allow interlocutory appeals in criminal proceedings based on Childs, Bryant or Section 1-277. We therefore dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal as an attempt to appeal an interlocutory order entered in a criminal proceeding where such appeal is not permitted by statute.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJudges Orr and Smith concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.", "Harris, Sweeny & Mitchell, by Ronnie M. Mitchell, for defendant-appe llant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEAN NICOLAS JOSEPH\nNo. 8812SC244\n(Filed 6 December 1988)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 148\u2014 motion to dismiss based on claim of double jeopardy \u2014 denial of motion not appealable\nDefendant\u2019s appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss based on his claim of double jeopardy was an attempt to appeal a non-appealable interlocutory order rendered in a criminal proceeding, and defendant could not appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-277, which permits appeals of interlocutory orders which affect a substantial right, because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1444(d) limits criminal appeal procedures to those specified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1441 et seq., Chapter 7A, and the Rules of Appellate Procedure.\nAppeal by defendant from Stephens (Donald WJ, Judge. Judgment entered 20 October 1987 in Superior Court, CUMBERLAND County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 September 1988.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.\nHarris, Sweeny & Mitchell, by Ronnie M. Mitchell, for defendant-appe llant." }, "file_name": "0203-01", "first_page_order": 233, "last_page_order": 237 }