{ "id": 8527976, "name": "PEGGY HAITH THOMPSON v. ROBERT THOMPSON", "name_abbreviation": "Thompson v. Thompson", "decision_date": "1989-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 8818DC572", "first_page": "229", "last_page": "233", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 N.C. App. 229" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "363 S.E. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358145 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2563389 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E. 2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E. 2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916-17", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523505 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E. 2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358213 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0269-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 402, "char_count": 7909, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.861878193118471e-08, "percentile": 0.49888120890445736 }, "sha256": "3306219cdd0e670410e635fad82bf490c0c3d3a392cda63815c07be7128c15a1", "simhash": "1:a35b589ca4e096d7", "word_count": 1308 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:43.799233+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and BECTON concur." ], "parties": [ "PEGGY HAITH THOMPSON v. ROBERT THOMPSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married in 1966, separated in 1983, and divorced in 1985. One child was born of the union. In 1966, the couple first resided in a home on Cambridge Street in Greensboro which was owned by defendant prior to his marriage to plaintiff. In 1970, defendant sold the house and used part of the proceeds to finance the purchase of a larger residence on Asheboro Street in order to accommodate plaintiff\u2019s two children from a prior relationship who had come to live with the couple. This house was titled in the names of both plaintiff and defendant as tenants by the entireties. Defendant testified that premarital funds of his were used to renovate this residence. In 1979, the parties sold the Asheboro Street residence and used part of the proceeds to purchase a third house on Mystic Drive, also titled as entireties property.\nPlaintiff instituted proceedings for divorce and equitable distribution on 21 December 1984. A judgment of absolute divorce was granted by the trial court, sitting without a jury, on 4 February 1985. On 23 March 1988, the court filed an equitable distribution order which held the real property on Mystic Drive to be marital property.' Defendant appeals from this order.\nThe sole question presented by defendant for our review is whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Mystic Drive residence was totally marital property pursuant to G.S. sec. 50-20(b)(l) when evidence at trial established that the residence was purchased with both separate and marital funds.\nThe first step in the equitable distribution process is the classification of the parties\u2019 property as either separate or marital. G.S. sec. 50-20(a); Cornelius v. Cornelius, 87 N.C. App. 269, 360 S.E. 2d 703 (1987). Marital property includes \u201call real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties, . . .\u201d G.S. sec. 50-20(b)(l). Separate property, which is not included in the category of marital property, means\nall real and personal property acquired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by bequest, devise, descent, or gift during the course of the marriage. However, property acquired by gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be considered separate property only if such an intention is stated in the conveyance. Property acquired in exchange for separate property shall remain separate property regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both and shall not be considered to be marital property unless a contrary intention is expressly stated in the conveyance.\nG.S. sec. 50-20(b)(2).\nThis Court, in previously construing G.S. sec. 50-20(b)(2), has determined that \u201cwhere a spouse furnishing consideration from separate property causes property to be conveyed to the other spouse in the form of tenancy by the entireties, a presumption of a gift of separate property to the marital estate arises, which is rebuttable by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.\u201d McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 154, 327 S.E. 2d 910, 916-17, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E. 2d 488 (1985) (citation omitted). Further, the entireties conveyance itself sufficiently indicates the \u201ccontrary intention\u201d under the statute to preserving separate property. Id. at 156, 327 S.E. 2d at 918.\nThe correctness of this presumption has been upheld by our Supreme Court in the recent case of McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543, 374 S.E. 2d 376 (1988). The Court in McLean, in furnishing us with an extensive analysis of G.S. sec. 50-20(b)(2), resolves the ambiguity of the \u201cinterspousal gift\u201d provision (the second sentence of G.S. sec. 50-20(b)(2)), and the \u201cexchange\u201d provision (the third sentence). After a full discussion of legislative intent, applicable case law, and the nature of the marital relationship and of the entireties estate, all of which we need not detail here, the Court in McLean adopted the marital gift presumption of McLeod for entireties property. McLean, supra.\nApplying this settled rule to the case sub judice, we conclude that the parties\u2019 residence on Mystic Drive, being titled in their names as entireties property, is presumed to have been a gift by defendant to the marital estate. Id. The question then becomes whether defendant has come forward with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. We find that he has not.\nThe conveyance itself contained no statement that defendant intended to keep the residence his separate property. Whether evidence presented by defendant at trial is sufficient to \u201c[rebut] the presumption of gift to the marital estate by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is a matter left to the trial court\u2019s discretion.\u201d Id. at 555, 374 S.E. 2d at 383, quoting with approval, McLean v. McLean, 88 N.C. App. 285, 290, 363 S.E. 2d 95, 98-99 (1987).\nAt trial the only evidence properly before the court as to defendant\u2019s intent concerning the status of the residence on Asheboro Street was the following:\nQ: Mr. Thompson, was it your intent to have your former wife\u2019s name placed on the deed?\nA: No, and this is the reason I asked twice first.\nAs to defendant\u2019s intent concerning the property on Mystic Drive, the transcript reveals only the following interchange:\nQ: Whenever you bought the second house [on Mystic Drive], do you know whose names were put on the deed?\nA: The second house, due to the fact that Peggy\u2019s name was placed on the deed to my second house it was only natural then that her name was going to go to the third house.\nWe agree with plaintiff\u2019s argument that the above-quoted statements of defendant show merely that he considered whether to place plaintiff\u2019s name on the deed and then proceeded to do so. In any event, they certainly do not rise to the level of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of defendant\u2019s intention not to make a gift to the marital estate.\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court properly classified the residence on Mystic Drive as marital property. We further hold that the court committed no abuse of discretion in failing to find that defendant rebutted the presumption that the residence was a gift to the marital estate.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WELLS and BECTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hatfield & Hatfield, by Kathryn K. Hatfield, for plaintiff-appellee.", "King & Stockton, by Michael Lee King, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PEGGY HAITH THOMPSON v. ROBERT THOMPSON\nNo. 8818DC572\n(Filed 21 March 1989)\nDivorce and Alimony \u00a7 30\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014consideration from separate property used to purchase tenancy by the entireties \u2014new property is marital property\nWhere a spouse furnishing consideration from separate property causes property to be conveyed to the other spouse in the form of tenancy by the entireties, a presumption of a gift of separate property to the marital estate arises, which is rebuttable by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; therefore, the parties\u2019 residence in this case was properly classified as marital property where defendant used funds from the sale of a house which he had owned prior to marriage to buy a second house in both their names, and then used funds from that house to buy the house in question, and defendant failed to rebut the presumption of gift where the conveyance itself contained no statement that defendant intended to keep the residence his separate property, and there was no other evidence to that effect. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(b)(2).\nAPPEAL by defendant from Morton (J. Bruce), Judge. Order entered 23 March 1988 in District Court, GUILFORD County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 1989.\nDefendant appeals from an order determining the parties\u2019 marital residence to be totally marital property for purposes of equitable distribution pursuant to the Equitable Distribution Act, G.S. sec. 50-20.\nHatfield & Hatfield, by Kathryn K. Hatfield, for plaintiff-appellee.\nKing & Stockton, by Michael Lee King, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0229-01", "first_page_order": 259, "last_page_order": 263 }