{ "id": 8528036, "name": "STANLEY LIVINGSTON, Employee, Plaintiff v. JAMES C. FIELDS & CO., Employer, and SELF-INSURED (Carolina Administrators, Incorporated), Carrier, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Livingston v. James C. Fields & Co.", "decision_date": "1989-04-04", "docket_number": "No. 8810IC1101", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 N.C. App. 336" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520432 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523384 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526693 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0222-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 365, "char_count": 5311, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.236726835240998e-08, "percentile": 0.4774915448738517 }, "sha256": "f64d381dbec8e2a6fb0f430ac60115187b8bf1fb96bd7720f23c580a0a6ebd64", "simhash": "1:2f38682be00b055f", "word_count": 858 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:43.799233+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WELLS concur." ], "parties": [ "STANLEY LIVINGSTON, Employee, Plaintiff v. JAMES C. FIELDS & CO., Employer, and SELF-INSURED (Carolina Administrators, Incorporated), Carrier, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nIn Richards v. Town of Valdese, 92 N.C. App. 222, 374 S.E. 2d 116 (1988), this Court faced a similar issue. Citing 6.S. 97-2(6), the Court said a claimant may show a back injury by proving either (1) injury by accident, defined as an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured person or (2) injury arising from a specific traumatic incident. Id. A \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d means the \u201cinjury must not have developed gradually but must have occurred at a cognizable time.\u201d Bradley v. E. B. Sportswear, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 450, 452, 335 S.E. 2d 52, 53 (1985). In this context, \u201ccognizable\u201d means capable of being judicially known and determined. Here, over a period of two hours, plaintiff picked up various pieces of trash and threw or carried them to another place. He testified that the pieces were no heavier than things he normally lifted though he usually did not move trash.\nIn Richards v. Town of Valdese, supra, this Court stated:\nWe believe that through the [1983] amendment [to G.S. 97-2(6)], the General Assembly also recognized the complex nature of back injuries, and did not intend to limit the definition of specific traumatic incident to an instantaneous occurrence. Back injuries that occur gradually, over long periods of time, are not specific traumatic incidents; however, we believe that events which occur contemporaneously, during a cognizable time period, and which cause a back injury, do fit the definition intended by the legislature.\nId. at 225, 374 S.E. 2d at 118-19. Plaintiff contends there is evidence that his back injury occurred during a cognizable time period and therefore he is entitled to compensation. We disagree.\nWe recognize that a \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d could occur during a \u201ccognizable time\u201d of two hours but in every case there must be evidence of proximate cause between the \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d and the injury. In this case plaintiff\u2019s witness, Dr. Rendleman, testified that he did not know the cause of plaintiffs herniated disc. He did not have an opinion satisfactory to himself that the back condition was a result of the activity plaintiff undertook on the 16th of May. Plaintiff testified he had moved his own household goods including appliances and furniture \u201cbetween March and May\u201d of 1980.\nThe Full Commission found as fact that \u201c[g]iven the gradual onset of the stiffness and the difficulty suffered by plaintiff, plaintiff\u2019s injury to his back, which was later diagnosed and treated as a herniated lumbar disc, was not the result of a specific traumatic incident of his assigned work\u201d and concluded that \u201c[o]n May 16, 1985 the plaintiff did not sustain an injury to his back which was the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of his assigned work. N.C.G.S. 97-2(6).\u201d The findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence to support them and even if there is evidence that would support contrary findings. Adams v. Burlington Industries, 61 N.C. App. 258, 300 S.E. 2d 455 (1983). Plaintiff\u2019s own evidence supports the findings of fact. The Industrial Commission has competent evidence to support its findings and conclusions.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WELLS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald B. Hunt for plaintiff-appellant.", "Maupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by Richard M. Lewis and Jack S. Holmes, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STANLEY LIVINGSTON, Employee, Plaintiff v. JAMES C. FIELDS & CO., Employer, and SELF-INSURED (Carolina Administrators, Incorporated), Carrier, Defendant\nNo. 8810IC1101\n(Filed 4 April 1989)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 65.2\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 back injury-specific traumatic incident \u2014failure to show proximate cause\nPlaintiff failed to show that his back injury was the result of a specific traumatic incident of his assigned work where plaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show that he felt a stiffness in his back which gradually increased during a two-hour period he spent moving a pile of trash from a home construction site; his medical expert did not know the cause of plaintiff\u2019s herniated disc; and plaintiff had moved his own household goods, including appliances and furniture, during the three months before his back stiffened.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Opinion and award filed 3 June 1988. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 1989.\nOn 10 April 1987, the Deputy Commissioner filed an opinion and award in favor of plaintiff. Upon appeal by defendant, the Full Commission vacated and reversed denying compensation.\nOn 16 May 1985, plaintiff was employed as a superintendent in defendant\u2019s home-building business and was responsible as part of his job for seeing that home sites were cleaned up. Plaintiff\u2019s employer directed plaintiff to have removed a pile of trash six to eight feet in diameter, three feet high. Because none of the employees who usually did that work were available, plaintiff undertook the task himself. After about one hour of moving debris, plaintiff felt some stiffness in his back which gradually increased during the two hours he spent moving the trash. Plaintiff experienced increased back pain during ensuing days and was ultimately diagnosed as having a lumbar disc disease. He underwent a lumbar laminectomy 12 June 1985.\nDonald B. Hunt for plaintiff-appellant.\nMaupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by Richard M. Lewis and Jack S. Holmes, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 366, "last_page_order": 368 }