{ "id": 8527244, "name": "BERNETTE COTTON, JUDY LYNN JONES and ELIZA HARVEY, et al., Plaintiffs v. NORMAN K. STANLEY and EVELYN B. STANLEY, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Cotton v. Stanley", "decision_date": "1989-06-20", "docket_number": "No. 8810SC1055", "first_page": "367", "last_page": "370", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 N.C. App. 367" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "362 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568898, 2572710, 2569255, 2570411, 2568636 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0296-03", "/nc/321/0296-01", "/nc/321/0296-02", "/nc/321/0296-04", "/nc/321/0296-05" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E. 2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12136450 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521998 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4775585, 4775853, 4771860, 4771992, 4775065 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0333-01", "/nc/317/0333-05", "/nc/317/0333-03", "/nc/317/0333-02", "/nc/317/0333-04" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523105 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12133470 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E. 2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696461 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 451, "char_count": 8407, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8658839460268737e-07, "percentile": 0.7255042668510789 }, "sha256": "ca7b6162f608356715fb5fa579b1a62291705d205553f4e239af99a285d695a4", "simhash": "1:25c7f7427cb94e82", "word_count": 1368 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:12.068465+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges PHILLIPS and Cozort concur." ], "parties": [ "BERNETTE COTTON, JUDY LYNN JONES and ELIZA HARVEY, et al., Plaintiffs v. NORMAN K. STANLEY and EVELYN B. STANLEY, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nThe sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in setting an unreasonable attorneys\u2019 fee award. In an action under Chapter 75 of the General Statutes alleging unfair or deceptive trade practices, the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees when the court finds (i) that the party charged with a violation wilfully engaged in unlawful conduct proscribed by the Chapter and (ii) that there was an unwarranted refusal by the party charged to fully resolve the matter. G.S. 75-16.1.\nOne purpose for the statute authorizing attorneys\u2019 fees is to encourage individuals to bring valid actions to enforce the statute by making such actions economically feasible. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95, 331 S.E. 2d 677, 680 (1985); City Finance Co. v. Boykin, 86 N.C. App. 446, 358 S.E. 2d 83 (1987). Whether to award or deny these fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Morris v. Bailey, 86 N.C. App. 378, 387, 358 S.E. 2d 120, 125 (1987); Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 688, 340 S.E. 2d 755, 761, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E. 2d 137 (1986); Varnell v. Henry M. Milgrom, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 451, 457, 337 S.E. 2d 616, 620 (1985). Once the court decides to award attorneys\u2019 fees, however, it must award reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. G.S. 75-16.1; Morris v. Bailey, 86 N.C. App. at 387, 358 S.E. 2d at 125. Furthermore, in order for the appellate court to determine if the statutory award of attorneys\u2019 fees is reasonable the record must contain findings of fact as to the time and labor expended, the skill required, the customary fee for like work, and the experience or ability of the attorney. Id.\nThe order awarding attorneys\u2019 fees recited that the court had previously \u201cfound that defendant\u2019s conduct was wilful and that their refusal to settle the dispute was unwarranted.\u201d Then after recitations concerning the appeal and settlement the order stated:\nPlaintiffs now seek additional attorneys fees for legal expenses in prosecuting the appeal and in preparing for trial. The Court finds that the defendants failure and refusal to settle this remaining damage issue after the decision of the N. C. Court of Appeals which required Plaintiffs to prepare for a second jury trial was unwarranted. The Court in its discretion therefore awards an additional amount of $1,500 in attorneys fees.\nThis order is deficient in that the findings of fact are inadequate to enable this Court to determine whether or not the award of attorneys\u2019 fees was reasonable. The order merely states, \u201cThe Court in its discretion therefore awards an additional amount of $1,500 in attorneys fees.\u201d Consistent with this Court\u2019s decision in Morris v. Bailey, supra, we remand this action for the trial court to make findings of fact taking into consideration the time and labor expended by plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, the skill required, the experience and ability of the attorneys, and the customary fee for like work and to make an award based on these findings.\nFurther, the language that \u201cdefendants failure and refusal to settle this remaining damage issue after the decision of the N.C. Court of Appeals which required plaintiffs to prepare for a second jury trial was unwarranted,\u201d suggests that the court may have limited its award of attorneys\u2019 fees to those services related to preparation for retrial. This Court has held that when awarding attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to G.S. 75-16.1, the trial court may include fees for services rendered at all stages of the litigation. Finance Co. v. Boykin, 86 N.C. App. at 449, 358 S.E. 2d at 85. Fees are authorized for the prevailing party and may be awarded for all time, including appeal, reasonably expended in obtaining or sustaining the status of prevailing party. See id. at 449-50, 358 S.E. 2d at 85. In the present case, plaintiffs sought review of the trial court\u2019s refusal to submit the issue of damages to the jury and prevailed on this issue on appeal. Since the trial court had already found in the previous order that defendants\u2019 conduct was wilful and that their refusal to settle the dispute was unwarranted, plaintiffs were, in our opinion, entitled to legal fees for prosecuting the appeal as well as for the preparation for retrial.\nWe affirm plaintiffs\u2019 entitlement to legal fees and remand for further findings of fact and an award of attorneys\u2019 fees consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.\nJudges PHILLIPS and Cozort concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "East Central Community Legal Services, by Augustus S. Anderson, Jr. and Victor Boone, and Robert A. Miller, P.A., by Robert A. Miller, for plaintiff s-appellants.", "Robert T. Hedrick for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BERNETTE COTTON, JUDY LYNN JONES and ELIZA HARVEY, et al., Plaintiffs v. NORMAN K. STANLEY and EVELYN B. STANLEY, Defendants\nNo. 8810SC1055\n(Filed 20 June 1989)\nAttorneys at Law \u00a7 7.5\u2014 allowance of fees as part of costs \u2014 failure to make appropriate findings\nIn an action for injunctive relief for alleged unfair trade . practices in failing to comply with the Housing Inspector\u2019s deadline for correcting defects in heating and plumbing facilities in defendants\u2019 rental units, the trial court\u2019s order awarding attorney fees was inadequate where the court made no findings with regard to the time and labor expended by plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, the skill required, the experience and ability of the attorneys, and the customary fee for like work; moreover, language in the court\u2019s order suggested that the court may have limited its award of attorneys\u2019 fees to those services related to preparation for retrial, while plaintiffs were entitled to legal fees for prosecuting the appeal as well as for the preparation for retrial.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from Stephens (Donald W.J, Judge. Order on attorneys\u2019 fees entered 13 June 1988 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 April 1989.\nOn 28 April 1983 plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants seeking injunctive relief and damages under Chapter 75 of the General Statutes for alleged unfair business practices. The damages sought were in the form of a rent rebate for rents paid to defendants after defendants failed to comply with the Housing Inspector\u2019s deadline for correcting defects in heating and plumbing facilities in defendants\u2019 rental units.\nThe action was tried before a jury, and the jury found that defendants were engaged in unfair business practices, including their practice of collecting the full amount of rent for units which the Housing Inspector had determined were unsafe or unfit for human habitation. Based on the jury\u2019s findings, the trial judge entered a judgment concluding that defendants had violated G.S. 75-1.1 and granting plaintiffs injunctive relief. On the issue of rent rebates for defendants\u2019 failure to maintain premises fit for human habitation, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendants based on plaintiffs\u2019 failure to present sufficient direct evidence of the amount by which the rental units had been diminished in value. The court also awarded plaintiffs, as the prevailing party, $10,000.00 in attorneys\u2019 fees.\nBoth parties gave notice of appeal; however, defendants failed to perfect theirs. On plaintiffs\u2019 appeal from the directed verdict, this Court in Cotton v. Stanley, 86 N.C. App. 534, 358 S.E. 2d 692 (1987), ruled that sufficient evidence of diminished rental value had been presented by plaintiffs for this issue to go to the jury. The case was remanded for retrial on the issue of damages. The Supreme Court denied defendants\u2019 petition for discretionary review. Cotton v. Stanley, 321 N.C. 296, 362 S.E. 2d 779 (1987).\nDuring the interim before the case was scheduled for retrial, attempts at settlement were unproductive. After calendar call at the session for which the case was set for retrial, the trial judge urged the parties to pursue further negotiations which resulted in a settlement. Based thereon the court entered a consent judgment ordering defendants to pay the sum of $5,362.56. Plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys then moved the court to award attorneys\u2019 fees incurred in the appeal and preparation for retrial. The court found defendants\u2019 refusal to settle the issue after the decision of this Court to be unwarranted, and awarded plaintiffs an additional $1,500.00 in attorneys\u2019 fees. Plaintiffs appeal.\nEast Central Community Legal Services, by Augustus S. Anderson, Jr. and Victor Boone, and Robert A. Miller, P.A., by Robert A. Miller, for plaintiff s-appellants.\nRobert T. Hedrick for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0367-01", "first_page_order": 397, "last_page_order": 400 }