{ "id": 8527692, "name": "LINDA M. HOGAN, Administratrix of the Estate of JAMES C. HOGAN, Deceased, Employee Plaintiff v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp.", "decision_date": "1989-07-18", "docket_number": "No. 8810IC810", "first_page": "640", "last_page": "649", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 N.C. App. 640" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "315 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716956 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573538 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S.E. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600828 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12167341 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "485-86" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "485-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 S.E. 2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571152 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485-86" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716956 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 765, "char_count": 21165, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.357759195667329e-07, "percentile": 0.6348731142240339 }, "sha256": "7813d874974f8c291ff6761dd242b24e49733b692929f01abf018648aa40ec12", "simhash": "1:a420b5ab652f884b", "word_count": 3522 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:12.068465+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Phillips concurs.", "Judge Arnold dissents." ], "parties": [ "LINDA M. HOGAN, Administratrix of the Estate of JAMES C. HOGAN, Deceased, Employee Plaintiff v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nThe original plaintiff (now deceased), James C. Hogan, was born in 1916. He completed sixth grade and could read and write. From 1932 to 1959 he worked in defendant\u2019s cotton plant, in the card or slashing room, both of which were dusty. He was continuously exposed to cotton dust. In 1959, plaintiff followed his doctor\u2019s advice and left the cotton plant due to breathing problems.\nPlaintiff pursued alternate employment until 1976 when he was diagnosed as totally and completely disabled as a result of byssinosis (brown lung). On 21 September 1976 plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission claiming Workers\u2019 Compensation benefits for byssinosis. By letter dated 8 December 1976, Deputy Commissioner Conely, the designated hearing officer, advised plaintiff\u2019s counsel as follows:\nFrom a review of the file it appears that plaintiff\u2019s last exposure to the hazards of byssinosis may have occurred before July 1, 1963. If such be the case, plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation for byssinosis or chronic obstructive lung disease.\nAttached to the letter was an earlier opinion by the Deputy Commissioner in which compensation was denied because the claimant\u2019s last exposure was before 1 July 1963.\nOn 13 December 1976 defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claim because \u201ceven if the employee does have byssinosis, such condition was not compensable on the date it is alleged the injury occurred.\u201d By letter dated 28 December 1976, plaintiff\u2019s counsel informed the Commission that plaintiff\u2019s last exposure to byssinosis hazards was prior to 1963. Counsel for plaintiff also made the following statements:\nI have discussed your letter and the accompanying portion of an opinion and award which you forwarded to me along with your letter of December 8, 1976, with Mr. Hogan, and in doing so, have informed him that the opinion forwarded seemed to control in regard to his case and would appear to terminate any claim he might have regarding this matter ....\nI have not as yet had the opportunity to argue a case before the Industrial Commission and therefore, since it appears that there is no valid claim on the part of Mr. Hogan because of the relevant portion of the opinion and award forwarded to me by your office, I am not certain as to whether it will still be necessary to make an appearance in Court. Therefore, I would appreciate your notifying me as to what procedural steps are at this point necessary and if, in fact, it will be necessary to make an appearance at the January 19, 1977 hearing. If so, of course, I will be happy to do so even though I do not believe there is any valid response, on the part of Mr. Hogan, to the motion propounded by [defendants].\nOn 3 January 1977, plaintiff\u2019s counsel had a phone conversation with Deputy Commissioner Conely to clarify the contents of the 28 December 1976 letter. Regarding that conversation, counsel stated at his 1987 deposition that plaintiff and he \u201ccame to a mutual agreement that there was no further point in pursuing this at that time.\u201d By order dated 4 January 1977, in response to defendants\u2019 motion and based on the letter and phone call with plaintiff\u2019s counsel, Deputy Commissioner Conely granted defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim:\nBy letter dated January 28, 1976, counsel for plaintiff advised the Commission that plaintiff\u2019s last injurious exposure to the hazards of byssinosis was prior to 1963 and that there appears to be no valid response to the motion propounded by the defendants. Counsel further advised the Commission by telephone on January 3, 1977, that plaintiff does not intend to pursue this claim further and does not object to the Commission\u2019s entering an order dismissing this claim.\nThe order also set out the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s legal rationale for denying the claim. This rationale was later disapproved in Wood v. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E. 2d 692 (1979).\nOn 4 January 1977, plaintiff\u2019s counsel drafted a letter to Commissioner Conely stating that he was authorized \u201cto notify you that [plaintiff] is willing to allow the dismissal of this case without prejudice to his initiating a new action within the proper time as allowed by the Industrial Commission . ...\u201d On 6 January 1977, plaintiff met with counsel and refused to sign the letter. A new letter was drafted, which plaintiff did sign which stated:\nMr. Hogan asked me to re-emphasize to you that he is willing to allow the dismissal of this case so long as it does not prejudice his right to initiate a new action should he so desire.\nPlaintiff did not appeal the order as allowed by G.S. sec. 97-85.\nIn July 1980, as a result of legislative changes in the statutory definition of compensable occupational diseases, plaintiff received a notice from the Industrial Commission inviting him to refile his claim. On 19 August 1980, with the advice of present counsel, plaintiff refiled. In its opinion and award dated 12 May 1981, the Commission recognized plaintiff\u2019s claim under the newly enacted Chapter 1305 of the 1979 Session Laws which provided that byssinosis claims are compensable without regard to the employee\u2019s date of last injurious exposure to cotton dust. The Commission determined that the earlier order of dismissal was \u201cnot a determination of the merits of plaintiff\u2019s claim as filed in 1980, and therefore is not res judicata.\u201d\nDefendants appealed to this Court. A divided panel reversed and held that plaintiff\u2019s claim was time barred, res judicata, and that plaintiff could not have the 1977 judgment against him set aside under G.S. sec. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6). Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 63 N.C. App. 439, 305 S.E. 2d 213 (1983), vacated by Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E. 2d 477 (1985).\nIn its opinion which vacated the decision by this Court, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had the power to set aside its own judgments, and found that there were \u201csufficient grounds on which the Commission may rely to set aside its former judgment. . . .\u201d Hogan, 315 N.C. at 141, 337 S.E. 2d at 485.\nThe original plaintiff James C. Hogan died on 2 September 1987. On 19 November 1987 Linda Hogan, administratrix, filed a motion to set aside the order dated 4 January 1977 on the grounds of mistake or other extraordinary circumstances. In its opinion and award dated 8 March 1988, the Commission denied plaintiff benefits on the basis that no grounds existed to set aside the order of dismissal dated 4 January 1977. From this order, plaintiff appeals.\nOn appeal from this Court, the Supreme Court first elaborated on the equities weighing in Hogan\u2019s favor which encouraged the Court to reach the conclusion that\n[t]he Commission could find that Hogan\u2019s determined attempts to keep his case alive are all that a lay person, not schooled in the intricacies of res judicata, reasonably should be expected to do.\nHogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 142, 337 S.E. 2d 477, 485-86 (1985). However, the Court went on to say:\nWe express no opinion as to whether the Commission should set aside its former judgment against Hogan. While we have mentioned certain equities which weigh in Hogan\u2019s favor, we have done so only for the purpose of justifying our remand of this case for the Commission\u2019s consideration. The decision whether to set aside the judgment rests, in the first instance, within the judgment of the Commission. If the Commission refuses to set aside the former judgment, Hogan\u2019s claim will be barred by res judicata. If, on the other hand, the Commission does set aside the former judgment, no final judgment on the merits will exist to bar this action under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13).\nId. at 142, 337 S.E. 2d at 486.\nBy inserting the clause \u201cin the first instance\u201d the Court made it clear that the Commission\u2019s judgment is subject to appellate review. The opinion is less than clear as to what standard of review is appropriate.\nG.S. sec. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) allows that:\nthe court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order . . . for the following reasons:\n* * *\n(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.\nIn its discussion of whether Hogan could have asked the Commission to set aside its judgment under G.S. sec. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) the Court states:\nThe Rules of Civil Procedure are not strictly applicable to proceedings under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act . . . and we find no counterpart to Rule 60(b)(6) in the Act or the Rules of the Industrial Commission. We believe the Industrial Commission, nevertheless, has inherent power to set aside one of its former judgments. . . . This power inheres in the judicial power conferred on the Commission by the legislature and is necessary to enable the Commission to supervise its own judgments.\nHogan at 137, 337 S.E. 2d at 483.\nIf Rule 60(b) were strictly applicable to judgments of the Industrial Commission, the correct standard to review the Commission\u2019s refusal to set aside a judgment would be as follows:\nGeneral Statute 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) \u2018is equitable in nature and authorizes the trial judge to exercise his discretion in granting or withholding the relief sought.\u2019 . . . Our Supreme Court has indicated that this Court cannot substitute \u2018what it consider^] to be its own better judgment\u2019 for a discretionary ruling of a trial court, and that this Court should not disturb a discretionary ruling unless it \u2018probably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice.\u2019 . . . Further, \u2018[a] judge is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only upon a showing by a litigant that the challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.\u2019\nHuggins v. Hallmark Enterprises, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 15, 25, 351 S.E. 2d 779, 785 (1987). (Citations omitted.) Defendant, rightly or wrongly, assumes that abuse of discretion is the correct standard of review.\nGenerally, on review, awards entered in Workers\u2019 Compensation cases \u201cshall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. . . Appeal to this Court shall concern only \u201cquestions of law.\u201d G.S. sec. 97-86.\nWhen the assignments of error bring up for review the findings of fact of the Commission, we review the evidence to determine as a matter of law whether there is any competent evidence tending to support the findings; if so, the findings of fact are conclusive. . . .\nIf a finding of fact is a mixed question of fact and law, it is conclusive also ... if there is sufficient evidence to sustain the facts involved. If a question of law alone, we review.\nLewter v. Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 402-03, 82 S.E. 2d 410, 413 (1954). (Citations omitted.)\nPlaintiff has suggested a hybrid standard which combines the rules of review for Workers\u2019 Compensation cases with the abuse of discretion standard. Plaintiff contends that the North Carolina Industrial Commission abused its discretion in failing to set aside its former judgment because the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law that no grounds exist to set aside the order of dismissal are based on erroneous findings of fact that are not supported by any competent evidence.\nOur Supreme Court has analogized the procedure by which a claimant may request the Industrial Commission to set aside one of its judgments on the grounds of mutual mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, newly discovered evidence, et al., to a G.S. sec. 1A-1, Rule 60(b) motion. Hogan at 137, 337 S.E. 2d at 483. In reaching the conclusion that the legislature impliedly vested the Commission with the power to set aside a former judgment, the Court stated the following policy consideration:\nThe power to provide relief against the operation of a former judgment is an integral part of the judicial power. Such power is a remedy fashioned by courts to relieve hardships which from time to time arise from a fast and hard adherence to the usual rule that judgments should not be disturbed once entered. The remedy has been characterized by a flexibility which enables it to be applied in new situations to avoid the particular injustices inherent in them.\nId. at 139-140, 337 S.E. 2d at 484.\nBecause this power is for all intents and purposes the same as that possessed by a court ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion, we believe that the same standard of review should be employed. As the Court states in Huggins at 25, 351 S.E. 2d at 785, a discretionary ruling of this nature should not be disturbed unless it \u201cprobably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice,\u201d or where the ruling is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d In our opinion, the Commission\u2019s decision in the case sub judice meets both tests.\nAlthough we are mindful of the equities noted by the Supreme Court which weigh heavily in plaintiff\u2019s favor, especially \u201cHogan\u2019s determined attempts to keep his case alive,\u201d Hogan at 142, 337 S.E. 2d at 485, we are more convinced that the Commission\u2019s ruling was erroneous because of its written invitation to plaintiff to refile his action. It is because the Commission communicated with plaintiff by letter in July 1980 to notify him that his claim had become viable due to legislative changes, that we are especially sensitive to plaintiff\u2019s plight. As of January 1977, when the Commission ruled that plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred because his last exposure to byssinosis hazards occurred prior to 1963, plaintiff\u2019s legal battle had ceased. He refiled his action because he was encouraged to do so by the Commission.\nWhile we are aware that the Commission had no authority over this Court\u2019s ruling on appeal that plaintiff\u2019s action was time-barred, and also res judicata, after the Commission had entered an order in plaintiff\u2019s favor, Hogan v. Cone Mills, 63 N.C. App. 439, 305 S.E. 2d 213 (1983), nor over the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling vacating our decision, 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E. 2d 477 (1985), it was empowered to evaluate and determine whether sufficient grounds existed to set aside its former judgment. In light of the heavy equities weighing in plaintiff\u2019s favor, see Hogan at 315 N.C. 141-42, 337 S.E. 2d at 485-86, we are convinced that the Commission\u2019s order finding no grounds to set aside its 4 January 1977 order of dismissal, \u201camounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice\u201d Huggins, supra, and should therefore be reversed.\nWe are mindful of the caution to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the Commission; however, from a study of the entire facts and circumstances of this case we believe that only one decision could possibly have been correctly reached by the Commission, to set aside its former judgment dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action with prejudice.\nReversed.\nJudge Phillips concurs.\nJudge Arnold dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge ARNOLD\ndissenting.\nThe majority cites the following statement made by our Supreme Court after its careful review of the record in this case:\nWe express no opinion as to whether the Commission should set aside its former judgment against Hogan. While we have mentioned certain equities which weigh in Hogan\u2019s favor, we have done so only for the purpose of justifying our remand of this case for the Commission\u2019s consideration. The decision whether to set aside the judgment rests, in the first instance, within the judgment of the Commission. If the Commission refuses to set aside the former judgment, Hogan\u2019s claim will be barred by res judicata. If, on the other hand, the Commission does set aside the former judgment, no final judgment on the merits will exist to bar this action under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13).\nHogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 142, 337 S.E. 2d 477, 486 (1985).\nThe Supreme Court clearly directs the Commission to make a discretionary ruling whether to set aside judgment in this case. The majority ably discusses the parameters for appellate review when a lower tribunal has refused, in its discretion, to set aside judgment. It then proceeds to substitute its own judgment for that of the Commission. Given the heavy burden demanded under either an abuse of discretion test, or a test which would require a finding that there is no competent evidence to support the findings of the Commission, I dissent.\nThese are the pertinent findings of fact of the Commission from its order dated 4 January 1977:\n4. . . . Mr. Hogan did not object to the Commission\u2019s entry of the order of dismissal and did not appeal from same.\n* * * *\n7. The decision not to appeal the order of dismissal of January 4, 1977 was a mutual decision, reached by Hogan and his attorney at the time ....\nBased on these and other findings of fact the Commission concluded that:\n1. No grounds exist in the judgment or discretion of the Commission to set aside the order of dismissal of January 4, 1977.\n2. Plaintiffs claim is barred by res judicata.\nIn its opinion the Supreme Court stated:\nIt appears to us the reason plaintiff did not contest defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss is because he decided he did not have a viable claim under the law then in effect. That plaintiff determined for whatever reason not to oppose defendants\u2019 motion does not transform what is otherwise a dismissal on the merits into a voluntary dismissal.\nHoga3n at 136, 337 S.E. 2d at 482. The record and the 1987 deposition of Hogan\u2019s former counsel could support an interpretation that Hogan did not contest dismissal because he agreed with his attorney that there was no viable claim at that time. The fact that the record also makes clear that Hogan did not understand that by agreeing not to contest, he agreed to a dismissal with prejudice is not enough ammunition for this Court to overturn a finding of fact which is based on any competent evidence. Further, when the Commission makes a discretionary ruling this Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Commission. See Worth-ington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 485-86, 290 S.E. 2d 599, 604 (1982).\nHad it been this Court\u2019s place to rule on plaintiff\u2019s motion \u201cin the first instance,\u201d I would agree with the majority that the equities weigh in favor of granting plaintiff\u2019s motion. That is not our function as an appellate court. I would affirm.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge ARNOLD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Turner, Enochs, Sparrow, Boone & Falk, Inc., by Peter Chas-tain and Laurie S. Truesdell, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, by J. Donald Cowan, Jr. and W. Alexander Audilet, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINDA M. HOGAN, Administratrix of the Estate of JAMES C. HOGAN, Deceased, Employee Plaintiff v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. 8810IC810\n(Filed 18 July 1989)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 94.3\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 refusal of Commission to set aside judgment \u2014 error\nThe Industrial Commission erred by not setting aside its former judgment dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action for workers\u2019 compensation with prejudice where plaintiff was last exposed to cotton dust in 1959; plaintiff filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits for byssinosis in 1976; the Deputy Commissioner wrote a letter advising plaintiff\u2019s counsel that plaintiff would not be entitled to benefits if, as it appeared from the file, plaintiff\u2019s last exposure may have occurred before 1 July 1963; defendants filed a motion to dismiss in December 1976; after discussing the matter with the Deputy Commissioner, plaintiff\u2019s counsel and plaintiff came to a mutual agreement that there was no point in pursuing the matter at that time; plaintiff indicated that he was willing to allow the dismissal of the case so long as it did not prejudice his right to initiate a new action should he so desire; the Deputy Commissioner granted defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim; plaintiff did not appeal the order; plaintiff received a notice from the Industrial Commission in 1980 inviting him to refile his claim as a result of legislative changes; plaintiff refiled in 1980; the Industrial Commission determined that its earlier order was not res judicata; defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held in a divided opinion that plaintiff\u2019s claim was time barred, res judicata, and that plaintiff could not have the 1977 judgment set aside; the Supreme Court held that the Commission had the power to set aside its own judgments and found that there were sufficient grounds on which the Commission could do so; the original plaintiff having died, his administratrix filed a motion to set aside the 1977 order on the grounds of mistake or other extraordinary circumstances; and the Commission denied benefits on the basis that no grounds existed to set aside the 1977 order of dismissal. Because the Commission\u2019s power to set aside one of its judgments is for all intents and purposes the same as that possessed by a court ruling on a motion under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b), the same standard of review should be employed. In light of the heavy equities weighing in plaintiffs favor, especially the Commission\u2019s written invitation to plaintiff to refile his action, the Commission\u2019s order finding no grounds to set aside its 1977 order of dismissal amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice and should therefore be set aside.\nJudge ARNOLD dissenting.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Opinion and Award filed 8 March 1988. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 March 1989.\nTurner, Enochs, Sparrow, Boone & Falk, Inc., by Peter Chas-tain and Laurie S. Truesdell, for plaintiff-appellant.\nSmith Helms Mulliss & Moore, by J. Donald Cowan, Jr. and W. Alexander Audilet, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0640-01", "first_page_order": 670, "last_page_order": 679 }