{ "id": 8527750, "name": "THE NORTH CAROLINA PRESS ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, d/b/a The News and Observer and The Raleigh Times, Petitioners v. C. D. SPANGLER, JR., President of the University of North Carolina and ARTHUR PADILLA, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs of the University of North Carolina, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Press Ass'n v. Spangler", "decision_date": "1989-07-18", "docket_number": "No. 8810SC1004", "first_page": "694", "last_page": "699", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 N.C. App. 694" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "360 S.E. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358052 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E. 2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714944, 4719591, 4715636, 4716697, 4717148 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0587-05", "/nc/315/0587-02", "/nc/315/0587-03", "/nc/315/0587-04", "/nc/315/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E. 2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526666 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0098-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 467, "char_count": 11848, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.454858700363489e-07, "percentile": 0.8048168059218896 }, "sha256": "8baeda7f845eba00c337a993a9ebee8447558c7ba77e5412e7d4c3669fc1acb7", "simhash": "1:9d4fc526bd595f7e", "word_count": 1843 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:12.068465+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WELLS concur." ], "parties": [ "THE NORTH CAROLINA PRESS ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, d/b/a The News and Observer and The Raleigh Times, Petitioners v. C. D. SPANGLER, JR., President of the University of North Carolina and ARTHUR PADILLA, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs of the University of North Carolina, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nRespondents bring forward five assignments of error that question three findings of the trial court. Respondents contend that the court erred in finding petitioners were the prevailing party in the action to compel disclosure of the reports, in finding no special circumstances which would make the award of fees unjust, and in finding that the records were withheld without substantial justification. We disagree with respondents\u2019 argument and affirm the award.\nG.S. 6-19.2 provides that\n[i]n any civil action in which a party successfully compels the disclosure of public records pursuant to G.S. 132-9 . . ., the court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney\u2019s fees to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate agency if:\n(1) The court finds that the agency acted without substantial justification in denying access to the public records; and\n(2) The court finds that there are no special circumstances that would make the award of attorney\u2019s fees unjust.\nAs the plain language of the statute states, an award of attorney\u2019s fees under G.S. 6-19.2 is in the trial court\u2019s discretion if the court finds the agency acted without substantial justification and there are no special circumstances which make an award unjust.\nRespondents assert in their brief that petitioners are not a \u201cprevailing party\u201d because petitioners have not shown that their action \u201csuccessfully compelled, or was the catalyst for, the ultimate disclosure by Respondents of these disputed documents.\u201d Respondents cite several federal cases for the proposition that petitioners have the burden of showing that their lawsuit caused the agency to release the documents. Respondents argue that at all times they planned to release the documents but their release was going to be after President Spangler had the opportunity to \u201cabsorb and consider their contents.\u201d Respondents claim the documents were released as a consequence of a decision made prior to the lawsuit, not as a consequence of the lawsuit. Therefore, respondents argue, petitioners cannot be a prevailing party. The cases that respondents cite interpret the Federal Freedom of Information Act which contains language substantially different from our Public Records Act. The cases are not persuasive here.\nTo strike the trial court\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees simply because respondents claim the records were released pursuant to a decision made prior to suit would condone and reward their withholding of requested public records. Which party has prevailed is determined by an examination of the trial court\u2019s order. The fact that the respondent, after entry of the order, elects to make the disclosure ordered does not affect the issue of who prevailed in the proceeding to compel disclosure. To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose and spirit of the Public Records Act, and more specifically G.S. 6-19.2. Here petitioners obtained an Order from the trial court directing respondents to release the records for inspection, examination and copying. That respondents were able to obtain a stay of the trial court\u2019s order pending appeal does not alter the fact that petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.\nRespondents\u2019 second argument is that the trial court erred in finding that the withholding of the documents in question was without substantial justification. Respondents assert that the withholding of the documents was in good faith because they are \u201cpreliminary working papers\u201d and \u201cintergovernmental communications\u201d that should be an exception to the Public Records Act. Respondents contend that in order for a refusal to disclose documents to be without substantial justification, the refusal must have been made in bad faith, frivolously or without any reasonable or colorable basis in law. Respondents assert there is no evidence that their actions were in bad faith and therefore no basis for finding that they acted without substantial justification. We disagree and do not accept respondents\u2019 contention that bad faith is the standard to be used by the trial court in determining whether the withholding of public records was without substantial justification.\nThe phrase, \u201cwithout substantial justification,\u201d as it is used in G.S. 6-19.2 has not been judicially defined in North Carolina. We note that the General Assembly has used the phrase \u201csubstantially justified\u201d in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(d) when providing for attorney\u2019s fees for failure to comply with discovery requests. Our court has interpreted Rule 37(d) as requiring the non-complying party to carry the burden of showing justification for non-compliance. Hayes v. Browne, 76 N.C. App. 98, 101, 331 S.E. 2d 763, 764-65 (1985), cert denied, 315 N.C. 587, 341 S.E. 2d 25 (1986). Likewise, respondents here have the burden of showing justification for nondisclosure.\nIn this case one justification given by respondents for nondisclosure was a fear that, if the information was revealed \u201cprematurely, the contextual relevance of such component materials frequently would not be apparent or could not be ascertained.\u201d This argument has no merit. Another basis urged for refusing to release the reports was that there should be an exception to the Public Records Act for preliminary, interoffice communications and if there were such an exception, these documents would be covered by it. Respondents assert that this was a good faith argument for a reasonable judicial extension of existing law and therefore the withholding of the documents was substantially justified. We agree that assertions of their good faith and arguments urging reasonable extensions of existing law are factors to be considered by the trial court in reaching its decision on the issue of substantial justification. Here respondents\u2019 arguments were presented to the trial court. On this record we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the respondents acted without substantial justification.\nRespondents\u2019 final argument is that the trial court erred in finding that there were no \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d to make an award of attorney\u2019s fees unjust. Respondents assert that the special circumstances here are that \u201cit was apparent to all involved here that these documents would be disclosed in a matter of days\u201d and \u201cft]he lawsuit was not necessary to compel the disclosure of the reports.\u201d Respondents\u2019 arguments are without merit. The fact that a governmental agency chooses to chart its own course regarding the timing of the requested release of public documents does not make an award of attorney\u2019s fees against it \u201cunjust.\u201d Additionally, the Public Records Act does not give a governmental agency the discretionary authority to decline to comply with an order for release of records to the public until a time when the agency has determined that release would be prudent or timely. That authority would fly in the face of the Public Records Act and effectively nullify the attorney\u2019s fees provision in G.S. 6-19.2.\nFor the reasons stated, the order awarding attorney\u2019s fees under G.S. 6-19.2 is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge WELLS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Thornburg, by Chief Deputy Attorney General Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General Edwin M. Speas, Jr. and Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Crumpler, for the respondent-appellants.", "Tharrington, Smith and Hargrove, by Wade H. Hargrove and Randall M. Roden, for petitioner-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE NORTH CAROLINA PRESS ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, d/b/a The News and Observer and The Raleigh Times, Petitioners v. C. D. SPANGLER, JR., President of the University of North Carolina and ARTHUR PADILLA, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs of the University of North Carolina, Respondents\nNo. 8810SC1004\n(Filed 18 July 1989)\n1. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.5 \u2014 award of attorney\u2019s fees to prevailing party \u2014 stay of trial court order pending appeal \u2014 prevailing party status unaffected\nWhere petitioners sought to compel the disclosure of written reports containing recommendations about intercollegiate athletics prepared by the chancellors of the various UNC campuses in response to the president\u2019s request, and petitioners obtained an order from the trial court directing respondents to release the records for inspection, examination, and copying, petitioners were the prevailing party in their action within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-19.2, and that fact was not altered by respondents obtaining a stay of the trial court\u2019s order pending appeal. Furthermore, even if the documents were released as a consequence of a decision made prior to the lawsuit and not as a consequence of the lawsuit itself, petitioners\u2019 prevailing party status was not affected.\n2. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.5\u2014 action to compel disclosure of documents \u2014 award of attorney\u2019s fees \u2014 substantial justification for withholding documents \u2014 bad faith not standard\nBad faith is not the standard to be used by the trial court in determining whether the withholding of public records was without substantial justification within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-19.2.\n3. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.5\u2014 action to compel disclosure of documents \u2014failure to show substantial justification for withholding document \u2014 award of attorney\u2019s fees\nRespondents failed to show substantial justification for withholding reports containing recommendations about intercollegiate athletics prepared by the chancellors of the various UNC campuses on the basis that there should be an exception to the Public Records Act for preliminary, interoffice communications and, if there was such an exception, these documents would be covered by it.\n4. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.5 \u2014 action to compel disclosure of documents \u2014 no special circumstances making award of attorney\u2019s fees unjust\nThere was no merit to respondents\u2019 argument that the trial court erred in finding that there were no \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d to make an award of attorney\u2019s fees unjust where respondents asserted that the special circumstances here were that \u201cit was apparent to all involved here that these documents would be disclosed in a matter of days\u201d and \u201c[t]he lawsuit was not necessary to compel the disclosure of the reports,\u201d but the fact that a governmental agency chooses to chart its own course regarding the timing of the requested release of public documents does not make an award of attorney\u2019s fees against it \u201cunjust,\u201d and the Public Records Act does not give a governmental agency the discretionary authority to decline to comply with an order for release of records to the public until a time when the agency has determined that release would be prudent or timely.\nAPPEAL by respondents from Bailey, Judge. Order entered 10 August 1988 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 1989.\nThis appeal involves an award of attorney\u2019s fees under G.S. 6-19.2. Petitioners sought to compel the disclosure of written reports containing recommendations about intercollegiate athletics prepared by the chancellors of the various University of North Carolina campuses. These reports had been requested by respondent, president of the university. The trial court ordered respondents to disclose the reports under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes, \u201cPublic Records.\u201d Respondents appealed, petitioned for a writ of supersedeas and a stay of the trial court\u2019s order. This court granted the stay. Thereafter, during the pendency of the stay, the university disclosed the reports but continued to pursue their original appeal. Our court found the action was moot and dismissed respondents\u2019 appeal. See North Carolina Press Ass\u2019n v. Spangler, 87 N.C. App. 169, 360 S.E. 2d 138 (1987). Petitioners then filed a motion for attorney\u2019s fees under G.S. 6-19.2 which the trial court granted. Respondents appeal.\nAttorney General Thornburg, by Chief Deputy Attorney General Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General Edwin M. Speas, Jr. and Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Crumpler, for the respondent-appellants.\nTharrington, Smith and Hargrove, by Wade H. Hargrove and Randall M. Roden, for petitioner-appellees." }, "file_name": "0694-01", "first_page_order": 724, "last_page_order": 729 }